Menachot 16b (טז:) — the Talmud in English

And we challenge this:

But it teaches: both

in the first

and

in the second

,

which indicates that he formulated the piggul intention during one of the sprinklings, but not during both?

And we say:

This is difficult!

The Master said: Rabbi Meir says: It is piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for it.

And we challenge: Granted,

indeed

karet

is not liable

for piggul

until all the permitting rites have been performed,

meaning that all the rites that permit the offering have been completed,

as the Master said:

It is written: “It is piggul; it shall not

be accepted,”

and since with regard to a valid offering it is also stated: “It shall be accepted as an offering made by fire,”

just as the acceptance of a valid offering,

is not valid

until all the permitting rites have been performed, so too the acceptance of a disqualified offering,

the liability of karet for piggul does not take effect upon eating it

until all the permitting rites have been performed,

that is, until all the sprinklings have been performed.

But in this case, since he formulated the piggul intention concerning it inside

the sanctuary,

he disqualified it,

and afterward,

when he sprinkles [

the blood]

in the Sanctuary, he is merely sprinkling water!

It is considered a disqualified offering, and the sprinkling of its blood is not considered a sprinkling at all [and this is not comparable to one who formulated a piggul intention during slaughter, for we do not say that the sprinkling performed afterward is merely the sprinkling of water, since there the rite during which he formulated the intention was completed in its entirety in sanctity. But here, all the sprinklings constitute a single rite]!?

And we answer:

Rabba said: You can find a case

in which all the permitting rites were performed

with four bulls and four goats.

He brought a bull and a goat and formulated a piggul intention concerning them inside, and the blood was poured out after the sprinklings between the staves; then he brought another bull and goat for the sprinklings toward the Curtain and formulated the intention concerning them, and after the sprinklings the blood was poured out; and he brought yet another bull and goat for the corners of the Altar and formulated the intention concerning them, and after the sprinklings the blood was poured out. And similarly, he brought another bull and goat for the sprinklings on the purity of the Altar, through which all the permitting rites were performed [and it is not necessary to return and sprinkle from the second bull between the staves; rather, from the point at which he stopped, he begins].

Rava said: Even if you say that it was one bull and one goat, with regard to

the issue of

piggul,

that it should become piggul,

these

sprinklings render the offering acceptable.

The Gemara returns and raises another difficulty against the beraita, which states that there are forty-three sprinklings on Yom Kippur, and asks: Does the High Priest sprinkle only

forty-three

times on Yom Kippur?

But it was taught in a beraita: Forty-seven

sprinklings he performs!?

And we answer:

This is not difficult. This

beraita of ours follows the opinion

of the one who says that one combines

the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat

for

the giving on the

corners

of the inner Altar.

And that

beraita which states forty-seven sprinklings follows the opinion

of the one who says that one does not combine

the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat. Accordingly, four additional sprinklings are counted: four sprinklings from the bull’s blood and four sprinklings from the goat’s blood, each separately, rather than only four from both together.

And we challenge:

But it was taught

in another beraita

forty-eight

sprinklings?

And we answer:

This is not difficult. This

beraita, which states forty-eight, follows the opinion

of the one who says that the pouring of the

remnants

of the blood

of all the sprinklings onto the foundation of the Altar

is indispensable

and the pouring of the remnants is therefore added, making forty-eight.

And that beraita which teaches forty-seven follows the opinion

that the remnants are not indispensable.

Therefore, it is not counted among the sprinklings.

A dilemma was raised before them: If he formulated a piggul intention during the conveyance

of the handful,

what is

the halakha? Is this considered half of a permitting rite, since there is also the conveyance of the frankincense, and do Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in this case as well, or not?

Rabbi Yohanan said: Conveyance is like taking the handful 13 .

Just as taking the handful is a complete permitting rite and not half a permitting rite, since there is no taking of a handful from the frankincense, so too is the law with regard to conveyance.

And Reish Lakish said: Conveyance is like burning.

Just as burning applies to both the handful and the frankincense, and if he formulated a piggul intention concerning one of them it is half a permitting rite, so too is the law with regard to conveyance: it is only half a permitting rite.

And we say:

Granted, according to Reish Lakish,

there is also

the conveyance of the frankincense,

and therefore it is understandable that he holds that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in this case as well.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan, what is his reason?

There is also conveyance with regard to the frankincense, and if so, this is half a permitting rite!?

Rava said: Rabbi Yohanan holds that any rite that does not effect atonement,

such as conveyance, which is not indispensable, since one can hand it from one person to another without walking, or slaughter beside the Altar,

is an important rite in its own right for purposes of piggul,

so that it is not applicable to say of it that the intention must be formulated during the entire permitting rite. It is not a permitting rite, since it is not indispensable.

Abaye said to him: But there is the slaughter of one of the

two

lambs

of Shavuot,

which is a rite that does not effect atonement,

since only the sprinkling permits the sacrificial portions and the meat,

and

nevertheless

they disagree.

As we learned in a Mishna: If one slaughtered one of the lambs

with the intention

of eating the two loaves on the following day,

or

burned one of the bowls

of the showbread

with the intention of eating the two arrangements

of bread

on the following day,

Rabbi Meir says: It is piggul

and one is liable to receive karet for it.

And the Rabbis say: There is no liability for karet until he formulates the piggul intention concerning the entire permitting rite.

He said to him,

Rava:

Do you hold that the bread becomes sanctified in the oven

when it is

sanctified?

That is not so. Rather,

the slaughter of the lambs sanctifies it, and one who comes to sanctify is considered like one who comes to effect permission,

and therefore the Rabbis hold that if he formulated a piggul intention concerning one of the lambs, this is not piggul, because he must formulate the intention concerning everything that sanctifies it, namely, specifically both lambs and not one.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi raised an objection: Others say: If, in slaughtering

the Paschal offering, he slaughtered

circumcised [

those who are circumcised]

before the uncircumcised,

meaning that he slaughtered the first sign of the animal for the sake of the circumcised and the second sign for the sake of the uncircumcised,

it is valid; if he slaughtered the uncircumcised before the circumcised—

it is disqualified,

and the Rabbis disagree.

And we hold [

in Pesachim 63a, where the distinction between slaughtering the circumcised before the uncircumcised and slaughtering the uncircumcised before the circumcised is also explained]

that they disagree with regard to half a permitting rite,

as one sign is half a permitting rite. Yet here this slaughter does not effect permission and does not sanctify anything, for with a Paschal offering there is no bread that the slaughter sanctifies. And nevertheless they disagree?

He said to him,

Rava:

Do you hold that the blood in the animal’s neck becomes

sanctified

as such?

It is not so. Rather,

the blood of the knife

sanctifies it,

and therefore slaughter is considered to come to sanctify,

and one who comes to sanctify is considered like one who comes to effect permission.

Come and hear

from the beraita cited above:

When is this statement said,

that in all these cases it is piggul even though he formulated the intention only during the rite involving the handful?

With regard to taking the handful, placing it in a vessel, and carrying it!

And plainly, this carrying mentioned here refers to

the carrying for burning,

and the Rabbis do not disagree; this is a proof for Rabbi Yohanan.

And we reject this:

No,

it refers to

the carrying for

carrying it to

placement in a vessel,

and it is not considered half a permitting rite, since there is no placement in a vessel with regard to the frankincense.

And we challenge:

If so,

how can it say

“with placement in a vessel and carrying,”

when, according to your statement,

it should have said, “with carrying and placement in a vessel,”

since it is referring to carrying that precedes placement in a vessel?

And we say:

This is not difficult; read it in this manner:

“with carrying, and with placement in a vessel.”

We challenge further: This statement written at the conclusion of the beraita,

“If he came to burn it,”

according to your statement,

it should have said, “If he came to carry it,”

for they also disagree with regard to carrying for burning.

And he answers:

This is not difficult: Since carrying is necessary for burning, it calls it burning,

but in truth it also refers to carrying.

And we challenge: Rather, concerning the statement

“placed”

the handful silently and so forth—which means that he placed it on the Altar for burning—according to your statement,

it should have said, “carried it,”

for you said that they also disagree with regard to carrying for burning?

The Gemara concludes: Indeed,

this is difficult!

If he burned

an amount of

sesame

with the intention

of eating

an amount of sesame

on the following day,

and he again burned an amount of sesame with the intention of eating an amount of sesame on the following day,

and he continued in this manner until the entire handful was consumed

through such burnings, and he did the same in burning the frankincense,

Rav Hisda, Rav Hamnuna, and Rav Sheshet disagreed about this.

One said—

it is piggul; another said—

it is disqualified,

but it is not piggul and there is no liability for karet;

and another said—

it is valid.

And we say:

Shall we say that the one who says it is piggul follows Rabbi Meir,

who holds that one can formulate a piggul intention concerning half a permitting rite, and here too, each sesame-sized portion concerning which he formulated a piggul intention is considered half a permitting rite;

and the one who says it is disqualified

follows the Rabbis,

who said with regard to half a permitting rite that the offering is disqualified but not piggul;

and the one who says it is valid

follows Rabbi,

who said above (14a) that if one slaughters the lamb with the intention of eating half an olive-bulk from one loaf, and likewise his fellow slaughters with the intention of eating half an olive-bulk from that loaf, it is valid, because the two halves do not combine to produce piggul?

And we reject this:

From where

is this the explanation?

Perhaps Rabbi Meir stated his ruling there only

that it is piggul

when he formulated

a piggul intention

for its requisite measure,

an amount equal to the requisite measure for burning,

but here, where he did not formulate the intention for its requisite measure,

since each intention concerned only a sesame-sized amount—

no,

it will not be piggul.

And the Rabbis stated their ruling there only

that it is disqualified

when he did not formulate the intention concerning the entire permitting rite,

but only concerning the handful or the frankincense, which is half a permitting rite.

But here, where he formulated the intention concerning the entire permitting rite,

since he completed the entire handful and the frankincense with piggul intentions,

it is likewise piggul.

And Rabbi stated his ruling there only

that it is valid

when he did not complete it

to the measure of an olive-bulk of eating from the same rite of the first lamb and the first loaf, but formulated the intention concerning half an olive-bulk in the second loaf with the second lamb.

But here, where he completed it through the same rite,

since ultimately he formulated the intention concerning the entire handful and the frankincense,

it is likewise disqualified.

Rather, the one who says it is piggul

holds that

it is the opinion of all.

—

And the one who says it is disqualified

holds that

it is the opinion of all.

—

And the one who says it is valid

holds that

it is the opinion of all.

And now we explain: The one who says it is piggul, according to all, holds that this is the normal manner of eating

and the normal manner of burning

is to burn several times an amount the size of a sesame seed; and if so, this is complete piggul, like one who burns an olive-bulk with the intention of eating an olive-bulk on the following day.

And the one who says it is disqualified, according to all, holds that this is the normal manner of eating but not the normal manner of burning, and it is therefore like a meal-offering that was not burned.

Therefore it does not become piggul, since the intention is not considered an intention concerning burning. Nor may the remnants be eaten, since it is as though the meal-offering had not been burned.

And the one who says it is valid, according to all, holds that this is the normal manner of burning

and therefore the remnants may be eaten,

but it is not the normal manner of eating,

and this is not considered an intention “to eat”; therefore it is not piggul.