Menachot 16a (טז.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

If he rendered the handful piggul—

at the time of burning the handful, he intended to eat the remainder the following day—

but not the frankincense,

or if he rendered

the frankincense piggul but not the handful,

Rabbi Meir says: It is piggul

and

one is liable to karet for it,

as Rabbi Meir holds that one can render piggul through half of the permitting element.

And the Sages say: There is no liability to karet for it until he renders piggul through the entire permitting element.

But here he rendered piggul through only half of the permitting element, since the handful and the frankincense together permit the meal-offering.

And the Sages concede to Rabbi Meir with regard to a sin-offering meal-offering

and a meal-offering of jealousy,

which do not contain frankincense,

that if he rendered piggul through the handful, which is piggul and one is liable to karet for it,

because

the handful is the permitting element

by itself.

And likewise, if

he slaughtered one of the sheep

of Shavuot, intending

to eat the two loaves

of the two loaves-offering

the following day,

or

he burned one of the bowls

that accompany the shewbread, intending

to eat two arrangements

of bread

the following day:

Rabbi Meir says: It is piggul

and

one is liable to karet for it. And the Sages say: There is no piggul in it until he renders piggul through the entire permitting element.

And one sheep, and likewise one bowl, constitute only half of the permitting element of the bread.

If he slaughtered one of the sheep

of Shavuot, intending

to eat from it the following day,

it is

piggul

even according to the Sages, because only with regard to permitting the bread is one sheep considered half of the permitting element; but with regard to itself, it is a complete permitting element.

And its fellow—

the second sheep, with regard to which he did not have the intention—

is valid.

And if he slaughtered it intending

to eat from its fellow the following day—

both are valid [the permitting element cannot render the permitting element piggul, as we stated on page 13b].

Gemara:

Rav said: The dispute

between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is when

he placed the handful silently,

without having a piggul intention concerning it,

and

only

the frankincense

did he place

with an intention

of piggul.

But

if

he placed the handful with an intention

of piggul,

and the frankincense

he placed afterward

silently, everyone agrees that it is piggul

because

everyone who performs an act does so on the basis of his original intention

he acts,

and therefore, when he burned the frankincense as well, he acted on the basis of his piggul intention, and it follows that he rendered piggul through the entire permitting element.

And Shmuel said: It is still the subject of a dispute ,

also in this case.

Rava was sitting and reciting this teaching

of Rav.

Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna raised an objection to Rava

from what we learned:

In what case is this statement said,

that an intention during the service of the handful renders piggul?

With regard to taking the handful, placing it in a vessel, and carrying it, ,

for these services are not performed with the frankincense; therefore, an intention during them constitutes piggul through the entire permitting element, and not through only half of it.

But

if

he came

with the handful and the frankincense

to burn them, he placed

on the altar

the handful silently, and the frankincense with an intention

of piggul.

Or he placed the handful with an intention, and the frankincense silently, Rabbi Meir says: It is piggul

and

one is liable to karet for it.

And the Sages say: There is no liability to karet for it until he renders piggul through the entire permitting element,

and here, since he had an intention concerning only one of them, it is half of the permitting element.

Rav Aḥa deduces:

In any event, it teaches: “He placed the handful with an intention, and

afterward

the frankincense silently,” and

nevertheless

they dispute,

and we do not say that everyone who performs an act does so on the basis of his original intention!

And we reject this:

Say

that the wording is: “He placed the handful with an intention,

and he had already placed the frankincense silently, at the outset.”

And we challenge this:

There are two answers

that refute this explanation:

First, for

if so, he first acted silently and afterward acted with an intention,

that is identical to the first case, “He placed the handful silently, and the frankincense with an intention.”

“He placed the handful without any specific intention, and the frankincense with an intention.”

And further, it was explicitly taught

that it was

“afterward” that he placed the frankincense silently?

Rather, we explain:

Rav Ḥanina interpreted it:

here we are dealing

with two people,

where one priest burned the handful with an intention, and afterward his fellow burned the frankincense silently; therefore, it is not applicable to say that he acts on the basis of the original intention.

Come and hear: In what case is this statement said

that if he placed one of the applications of blood that are placed on the altar with a piggul intention, he rendered the offering piggul?

With regard to blood applied on the outer altar.

Since even if he made only one application he effected atonement, it follows that he rendered piggul through the entire permitting element.

But blood applied on the inner altar, such as the forty-three

sprinklings

of Yom Kippur ,

and some say those of the bull of the anointed priest, and some say those of the bull for the unwitting communal transgression [see Rashi, who provides the details of the sprinklings], if

he rendered piggul either with the first,

which he sprinkles between the staves,

or with the second,

which he sprinkles on the curtain,

or with the third,

which he sprinkles on the golden altar—

Rabbi Meir says: It is piggul, and one is liable to karet for it.

He holds that one can render piggul through half of the permitting element.

And the Sages say: There is no liability to karet for it until he renders piggul through the entire permitting element 7 .

If he did not render piggul through all of them, this is not piggul.

The Gemara deduces:

In any event, it teaches: “He rendered piggul either with the first, or with the second, or with the third,” and they dispute.

We do not say that if he rendered piggul with the first, then with the second and third he acts on the basis of his original intention!

And if you would say

perhaps

it is likewise

a case

of two people 8 . [It may be asked: How is such a case possible? Surely all the sprinklings of Yom Kippur are performed only by the High Priest! One can answer by establishing the case where the High Priest performed the first sprinklings and then died, or experienced a seminal emission and became impure, and another served in his place for the second sprinklings. In such a case, one cannot say that he acts on the basis of his original intention.]

You might ask: How could such a situation occur? After all, all the sprinklings of Yom Kippur are performed only by the High Priest! It can be answered by establishing the case where the High Priest performed the first sprinklings and then died, or experienced a seminal emission and became impure, and another priest served in his place for the second sprinklings. In such a case, one cannot say that the second priest acted with the original intention.

This works according to the one who says that the verse states, “With this shall Aaron enter the Sanctuary, with a

with a bull,” means

bull”—

even with the blood of a bull,

meaning that if the High Priest slaughtered the bull and afterward a disqualification occurred to the High Priest, another High Priest may come and perform the service with its blood, and it is not necessary to slaughter another bull. According to this view, the case can be established as one involving two people: one High Priest can slaughter and perform the first sprinkling, and another can perform the second sprinkling, without slaughtering another bull.

But according to the one who says, “With a bull”

specifically

and not with the blood

of the bull, what can be said?

According to him, it is impossible for one priest to perform the first sprinkling and another to perform the second; rather, the second must again slaughter a bull and perform all the sprinklings from the beginning.

Rava said: Here we are dealing with a case where he rendered piggul with the

first

sprinkling, remained silent during the second, and rendered piggul with the third.

In such a case it is impossible to say that, during the second, in which he remained silent, he acted on the basis of his original intention, because

we say: If it enters your mind that “everyone who performs an act does so on the basis of his original intention,” why did he return to render piggul with the third!?

He should have relied on what he had articulated during the first, just as during the second he relied on the first. Rather, it is necessarily the case that he did not act on the basis of his original intention.

Rav Ashi challenged this: Is it stated

that he

remained silent

during the second

sprinkling?

Rather, Rav Ashi said: Here we are dealing with a case where he rendered piggul with the first and second sprinklings,

and it is still only half of the permitting element, because he did not render piggul with the third,

as we say

that he certainly did not perform the third on the basis of the earlier intentions:

If it enters your mind that everyone who performs an act does so on the basis of his original intention, why did he return to render piggul

with the second?

He should have performed it silently and relied on his original intention. Rather, it is necessarily the case that this person does not rely on his original intention, and therefore articulated his intention during the second. Consequently, during the third, when he did not articulate an intention, he did not intend to act on the basis of his original intention, and he did not render piggul!