Menachot 15b — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection to this a-fortiori inference:

And do we say that an a-fortiori inference can be made in such a case?

But it was taught in a beraita: There was an incident involving one who ![](pamud.bmp "

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sowed

seeds within

his fellow’s vineyard

after the grapes had already formed and become

unripe grape clusters, and the case came before the Sages, who prohibited the seeds

because of prohibited mixtures in a vineyard,

but permitted the vines!

And why

did they prohibit the seeds?

Let us say that this follows from an a-fortiori inference:

The vines, which are the item that causes the prohibition—the vines that prohibit the seeds—are not themselves prohibited;

therefore, the item that comes to cause the prohibition

namely, the seeds that come to prohibit the vines,

and did not cause the prohibition, should it not follow that it will certainly not become prohibited?

And the Gemara rejects this:

Can it be compared? There,

with regard to prohibited mixtures,

hemp and arum

specifically—because they have roots and their seeds do not perish—are the ones that

the Torah prohibited,

as it is stated: “You shall not sow your vineyard with diverse kinds.” We learn from this that the reference is to seeds resembling a vineyard, on which clusters resembling grapes grow. But

the other seeds are prohibited only by rabbinic decree.

Since the seeds sown in this vineyard were not hemp or arum, but other seeds that are prohibited only by rabbinic decree, for this reason

this one

who sowed the seeds,

who committed a transgression,

the Sages penalized;

whereas

this one,

namely, the owner of the vineyard,

who did not commit a transgression,

the Sages did not penalize. But here,

with regard to piggul,

let us say that an a-fortiori inference applies!

And some teach this

with regard to this discussion of piggul

about the sheep:

Rabbi Elazar asked Rav: If one slaughters the sheep

and, during their slaughter, intends

to eat an olive-bulk of them and of their loaves, what is the law?

With regard

to

rendering the sheep subject to piggul, this is not a question for me,

because

now,

if one intends to eat the olive-bulk

entirely from the bread,

the sheep

are not rendered subject to piggul.

If so, when he intends to eat

from them and from their loaves, is it necessary to say that the sheep are not rendered subject to piggul?

My question concerns rendering the bread subject to piggul: Do the sheep combine with the bread to render the bread subject to piggul, or not?

He said to him: In this case as well, the bread is rendered subject to piggul, but the sheep are not rendered subject to piggul!

And we raise an objection:

And why

was the bread rendered subject to piggul?

Let us say that an a-fortiori inference applies: Just as the item that causes piggul—

namely, the sheep—

does not itself become subject to piggul, should not the item that comes to cause piggul

namely, the bread—

and did not cause piggul, certainly not become subject to piggul?

And we raise an objection to this a-fortiori inference:

And do we say that an a-fortiori inference can be made in such a case? But it was taught: There was an incident involving one who sowed his fellow’s vineyard when it had unripe grape clusters, and so on. And why? Let us say that an a-fortiori inference applies: Just as the item that causes the prohibition does not become prohibited, should not the item that comes to cause the prohibition and did not cause it certainly not become prohibited?

And the Gemara rejects this:

Can it be compared? There, the Torah prohibited hemp and arum, while the other seeds are prohibited only by rabbinic decree. The one who committed the transgression was penalized by the Sages, while the one who did not commit a transgression was not penalized by the Sages. But here, let us say that an a-fortiori inference applies!

And we say:

The one who teaches this

discussion

with regard to the thanksgiving-offering,

and holds there that an intention concerning a half-olive-bulk of it and a half-olive-bulk of its bread renders the bread subject to piggul,

all the more so

will he teach

it with regard to the sheep

and hold that they combine with the bread to render it subject to piggul.

But the one who teaches it with regard to the sheep

may not hold this with regard to the thanksgiving-offering, because

the sheep

specifically

are

able to combine to render the bread subject to piggul, because

they were designated

the bread and the sheep

for one another for the waving; but in the case of the thanksgiving-offering, which was not designated

the thanksgiving-offering and the bread

for one another for the waving, the intention concerning it does not combine to render the bread subject to piggul.

мысль о ней не присоединяется, чтобы сделать хлеб пигуль.

Rav Zutra raised

the question of Rabbi Elazar

as follows:

Rabbi Elazar asked Rav: If one slaughters the sheep

one of the two sheep brought on Shavuot, and intends

to eat an olive-bulk of its fellow on the following day,

without explicitly intending the other sheep, but merely intending “its fellow,”

what is the law?

Does the intention concerning

“its fellow”

that he had

mean a sheep,

so that he intended the other sheep,

and it does not render the offering subject to piggul,

as is taught in the Mishna below (16a), that one who intends, concerning one sheep, the other sheep does not render it subject to piggul?

Or perhaps

the intention concerning “its fellow”

means bread,

so that he intended, concerning the sheep, the bread,

and renders it subject to piggul,

as is the law when one intends, concerning a sheep, the bread!?

He said to him

Rav:

You have learned the answer in a Mishna: If one slaughtered one of the sheep

with the intention

of eating from it on the following day,

the one concerning which he had the intention during its slaughter

is piggul, while its fellow is fit.

But if he intended

to eat from its fellow on the following day,

both are fit. Therefore, “its fellow”

means a sheep!

And the Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps

that passage is discussing a case in which he explicitly stated:

“Its fellow, the sheep.”

Mishna:

A sacrificial offering

concerning which one had an intention of piggul

renders the libations subject to piggul,

so that one who drinks them is liable to excision for piggul. And from when do they become subject to piggul?

From

the time

that they were sanctified in a vessel,

when their sanctity becomes full and they can no longer be redeemed.

This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

But

the libations

concerning which one had an intention of piggul

do not render the offering subject to piggul.

How so?

If one slaughters the offering with the intention of eating from it

itself

on the following day, both it and its libations are subject to piggul.

But if he slaughtered it with the intention

of offering its libations

on the following day, the libations are subject to piggul,

but

the offering is not subject to piggul.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: One is liable for the libations of an animal because of piggul, because

the sprinkling of

the blood of the offering permits them to be offered

on the altar. Therefore, the libations are considered an item whose permitting component allows it to be offered on the altar, and the law of piggul is that it takes effect not in the item that permits, but in an item permitted through another.

This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

They said to Rabbi Meir: But a person may bring his offering today, and its libations

he is permitted to bring

from then until ten days later,

as they derived from the verse “and their meal-offerings and their libations.” If so, the libations are not considered part of the offering, so why do they become subject to piggul through it?

Rabbi Meir said to them: I too said only

that the offering renders subject to piggul libations brought after ten days,

but only

libations that

come with the offering

did I say become subject to piggul through it.

And we raise an objection to Rabbi Meir’s view:

It is possible to transfer it

the libations

to another offering.

It necessarily follows that they are not part of this offering, for if they were part of this offering, how could they be transferred? And we answer:

Rava said: Rabbi Meir holds that they were fixed

the libations

at the time of slaughter

to be for this offering that was slaughtered, and they may not be transferred to another offering, and this is like

the loaves of the thanksgiving-offering,

which were fixed together with the offering and cannot be transferred to another offering.

The Sages taught: A log of oil of a metzora

that comes with his guilt offering,

one is liable for it on account of piggul

if he rendered the guilt offering piggul at its slaughter, and the reason is

because the blood of the guilt offering

permits it for the

placement on the

thumbs

of the metzora, for only after the placement of the blood on the thumbs does he place the oil, as it is stated in the passage that he places the oil “upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering” [Leviticus 14]. And this means that as long as he has not placed the blood, he is prevented from placing the oil. And for this reason the log is considered an item permitted by means of others,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

They said to Rabbi Meir: But does a person not bring his guilt offering today, and its log from now until ten days

and if so, the oil is not permitted by means of the guilt offering?!

He said to them

Rabbi Meir:

I too said only with regard to a log of oil that comes with the guilt offering.

And we raise an objection: But

it is possible to change it

this log of oil

to

the guilt offering of

another

and we answer:

Rava said: Rabbi Meir holds that the oil became fixed

at

slaughter, like the loaves of a thanksgiving offering.