Menachot 15b (טו:) — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection to this kal va-chomer:

And do we say a kal va-chomer in a case such as this?

But it was taught in a beraita: There was an incident involving one who

sowed

seeds within

his fellow’s vineyard

after the grapes had already set and become

veraison, and the case came before the Sages, who prohibited the seeds

because of kil’e ha-kerem,

but permitted the vines!

And why

did they prohibit the seeds?

Let us say that it is a kal va-chomer:

If the item that causes the prohibition—that is, the vines, which cause the seeds to be prohibited—does not itself become prohibited,

then the item that comes to cause a prohibition

that is, the seeds, which come to prohibit the vines—

and did not cause a prohibition, does it not follow that it should not become prohibited!?

The Gemara rejects this:

How can these cases be compared? There,

with regard to kil’ayim,

hemp and arum

specifically, which have roots and whose seeds do not decay—those

the Torah prohibited,

as it is stated: “You shall not sow your vineyard with diverse kinds.” We learned from this that the reference is to seeds resembling a vineyard, on which clusters resembling grapes hang; whereas

the other seeds are prohibited only by rabbinic decree.

Since the seeds sown in this vineyard were not hemp or arum, but other seeds that are prohibited only by rabbinic decree, therefore

this one

who sowed the seeds,

who committed a transgression—

the Sages penalized him;

whereas

this one,

namely, the owner of the vineyard,

who did not commit a transgression—

the Sages did not penalize him. But here,

with regard to pigul, still

let us say a kal va-chomer!

And some teach this

discussion concerning pigul

with regard to the sheep:

Rabbi Elazar asked Rav: If one slaughters the sheep

and, while slaughtering them, has the intention

to eat an olive-bulk of them and of their loaves, what is the law?

With

regard to

rendering the sheep pigul, I have no question,

for

now,

if he intended to eat the olive-bulk

entirely from the bread,

then the sheep

do not become pigul;

if so, when he intended to eat

from them and from their bread, is it necessary to ask whether they become pigul?

My question concerns rendering the bread pigul: Do the sheep combine with it to render the bread pigul, or not?

He said to him: In this case too, the bread is pigul, but the sheep do not become pigul!

The Gemara raises an objection:

And why

did the bread become pigul?

Let us say a kal va-chomer: If the item that renders another pigul

namely, the sheep—

does not itself become pigul, then the item that comes to render another pigul

namely, the bread—

and did not render it pigul, does it not follow that it should not itself become pigul?

The Gemara raises an objection to this kal va-chomer:

And do we say a kal va-chomer in a case such as this? But it was taught in a beraita: There was an incident involving one who sowed his fellow’s vineyard at the stage of veraison, and so on. And why? Let us say a kal va-chomer: If the item that causes the prohibition does not become prohibited, then the item that comes to cause a prohibition and did not cause it, does it not follow that it should not become prohibited?

The Gemara rejects this:

How can these cases be compared? There, the Torah prohibited hemp and arum, whereas the other seeds are prohibited only by rabbinic decree. The one who committed a transgression was penalized by the Sages, while the one who did not commit a transgression was not penalized by the Sages. But here, let us say a kal va-chomer!

And we say:

The one who teaches this

discussion

with regard to the todah

and holds there that an intention concerning half an olive-bulk from it and half an olive-bulk from its bread renders the bread pigul—

all the more so

will he hold this

with regard to the sheep,

and will hold that they combine with the bread to render it pigul.

But the one who teaches it with regard to the sheep

may not hold this with regard to the todah, because

the sheep

specifically

are

able to combine with the bread to render it pigul, because

they were designated

the bread and the sheep

for one another for the waving; but in the case of the todah, which was not designated

the todah and its bread

for one another for the waving, the intention concerning it does not combine to render the bread pigul.

for one another for the waving, the intention concerning it does not combine to render the bread pigul.

Rabba Zutra posed

the following reformulation of Rabbi Elazar’s question

as follows:

Rabbi Elazar asked Rav: If one slaughters the sheep

the one sheep of Atzeret, and intended

to eat an olive-bulk of its fellow on the next day,

without explicitly directing his intention to the other sheep, but merely intending “its fellow,”

what is the law?

Does the intention concerning

“its fellow”

that he had—

refer to a sheep,

so that he intended the other sheep,

and it does not become pigul

as taught in the Mishna below (16a), that one who directs his intention from one sheep to its fellow does not render it pigul;

or perhaps

the intention concerning “its fellow”—

refers to bread,

so that he is directing his intention from a sheep to bread

and renders it pigul,

as is the law when one directs his intention from a sheep to bread!?

He said to him,

Rav:

You have learned the answer: If one slaughtered one of the sheep

with the intention

of eating from it on the next day,

the one concerning which he had the intention at the time of its slaughter

is pigul, while its fellow is fit;

but if he had the intention

of eating from its fellow on the next day,

both are fit. Evidently, “its fellow”

refers to a sheep!

The Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps

the case there is one in which he explicitly specified and said:

“Its fellow sheep.”

Mishna:

A sacrifice

upon which one had an intention of pigul

renders the libations pigul,

so that one who drinks from them is liable to karet on account of pigul. And when do they become pigul?

From

the time

that they are sanctified in a vessel,

at which point their sanctity is complete and they cannot be redeemed—

the words of Rabbi Meir.

However,

the libations

upon which one had an intention of pigul

do not render the sacrifice pigul.

How so?

If one slaughters the sacrifice in order to eat from it

itself

on the next day, both it and its libations are pigul.

But if he slaughtered it with the intention

of offering its libations

on the next day, the libations are pigul,

but

the sacrifice is not pigul.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: One is liable for the libations of an animal on account of pigul, because

the

sprinkling of the blood of the sacrifice permits them to be offered

on the altar. Therefore, the libations are considered an item that has a permitting factor for the altar, and the law of pigul is that it does not take effect in the permitting factor, but in an item that is permitted through another’s action.

This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

They said to Rabbi Meir: But does a person not bring his sacrifice today, while its libations

he is permitted to bring

from then until ten days

as they expounded from the verse, “And their meal-offerings and their libations”? If so, the libations are not considered part of the sacrifice, so why should they become pigul through it?

Rabbi Meir said to them: I too said

that the sacrifice renders pigul the libations brought after ten days

only with

libations that

come together with the sacrifice.

I said only that these become pigul through it, because in this manner they are considered part of the sacrifice.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Meir’s opinion: But

it is possible to transfer it

to the libations

of another sacrifice.

It must therefore be that they are not part of this sacrifice, for if they were part of this sacrifice, how could they be transferred!? The Gemara answers:

Rava said: Rabbi Meir holds that they were fixed

the libations

through slaughtering

to be for this sacrifice that was slaughtered, and one may not transfer them to another sacrifice, and it is

like the loaves of a todah

that were fixed together with the sacrifice and cannot be transferred to another sacrifice.

The Sages taught: With regard to a log of oil of a leper

that is brought with his guilt offering,

one is liable for it on account of piggul

if he formed a piggul intention while slaughtering the guilt offering, and the reason is:

because the blood of the guilt offering

permits it for

the application to the

thumbs and big toes

of the leper; for the oil is given only after the blood has been applied to the thumbs and big toes, as it is stated in the passage that the oil is given “upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering” [Leviticus 14]. That is, as long as he has not applied the blood, he is prevented from giving the oil. And for this reason, the log is considered an item permitted through the agency of another,

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

They said to Rabbi Meir: But can a person not bring his guilt offering today and his log of oil from now until ten days from now

and if so, the oil is not rendered permitted through the agency of the guilt offering!?

He said to them

Rabbi Meir:

I said this only with regard to a log of oil that is brought with the guilt offering.

And we raise a difficulty: But

it is possible to designate

this log of oil

for the guilt offering

of a leper

another?

And we answer:

Rava said: Rabbi Meir holds that the oil becomes designated

at slaughter,

like the loaves of a Todah offering.