Menachot 15a (טו.) — the Talmud in English

The Sages hold that although the acceptance effected by the tzitz does not permit that which became impure to be eaten, nevertheless

the tzitz

effects acceptance for offerings that are to be eaten

in the sense that the offering is considered a complete offering and the sprinkling was fully valid despite the fact that it became impure. And since the loaves and the arrangements are items eaten by the priests, they are subject to the acceptance of the tzitz, and the sprinkling of their blood was valid. If so, the pure loaf was permitted because of the sprinkling of the blood, and likewise, with regard to the pure arrangement, it was permitted through the burning of the spoonful of frankincense. Indeed, although this is considered a fully valid offering, nevertheless the impure loaf is not permitted to be eaten, since the Torah warned not to eat impure sacred food, as it is stated: “And the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten.”

And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the tzitz does not effect acceptance for offerings that are to be eaten,

and therefore the sprinkling of the blood was not valid, and consequently even the pure loaf was not permitted to be eaten by virtue of it. This is how Rashi explained it. And Rabbi Yosef Dov Soloveitchik wrote in his writings: It is implied from his explanation that if the tzitz effects acceptance, the impure flesh is prohibited from being eaten only because of the prohibition against impurity, just as it would be if it became impure after the sprinkling. He further wrote that from the wording of Tosafot [s.v. And the Sages] it would be possible to explain that sprinkling upon an impure item does not permit it to be eaten at all, and serves only so that the flesh will not be considered lost. Since, with regard to the opinion of the Sages, Tosafot wrote: “Not to permit this impure item to be eaten, but only so that this impure item should not be considered lost or burned; rather, it is considered like a pure item with regard to the fact that the sprinkling permits the other, completely pure item,” the implication is that with regard to this impure item, this is not considered sprinkling. However, from the version of the Shita Mekubetzet in Tosafot, which cites the prohibition against eating impure food, it appears that even according to Tosafot there is here only this prohibition.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: But

with regard to items whose legal status requires them to

ascend

to the altar, and which became impure,

since

according to everyone

the tzitz effects acceptance for items that ascend, and

nevertheless

Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages disagree

even in this case.

As it is taught in a beraita: If one

of

the bowls

whose legal status requires them to ascend upon the altar becomes impure,

Rabbi Yehuda says: Both shall be made

upon the altar

in impurity,

because a communal offering overrides impurity. He may even render the pure bowl impure by bringing the two into contact with one another in such a manner that the second one will also become impure,

because a communal offering is not divided,

and the pure bowl is considered impure even without its having come into contact with the impure bowl.

And the Sages say: The impure one

shall be burned

in its state of impurity, and the pure one in its state of purity.

Now, since according to everyone the tzitz effects acceptance for the bowls that ascend upon the altar, why, according to Rabbi Yehuda, may he render the second one impure? Here there is fully valid burning by virtue of the acceptance of the tzitz, and if so, that pure bowl remains in its state of purity, and it is prohibited to render the pure item impure!?

Furthermore,

it is difficult: But

Rav Ashi said: Come and hear:

With regard to the Paschal offering, which may be offered in a state of communal impurity,

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if

only

one tribe is impure

on the fourteenth of Nisan

and all

the other

tribes are pure, they shall all offer

the Paschal offering

in impurity,

as is the law with regard to a community that became impure. Rabbi Yehuda holds that one tribe is called a community, and its impurity is overridden for the sake of the Paschal offering; and the other tribes likewise offer together with it in impurity

because a communal offering is not divided.

But according to the Sages, the other, pure tribes offer the first Paschal offering, while the tribe that became impure offers the second Paschal offering.

But what acceptance of the tzitz is there here?

The tzitz effects acceptance for impurity of sacred objects, but not for impurity of the person!?

Furthermore, Ravina said: Come and hear

from what is taught in our Mishna:

If one of the loaves or one of the arrangements became impure, Rabbi Yehuda says: Both go to the place of burning, because a communal offering is not divided; and the Sages say: The impure one remains in its state of impurity, and the pure one may be eaten.

And if it is so

that their dispute concerns the law that the tzitz effects acceptance for offerings that are to be eaten, why did Rabbi Yehuda give as his reason that a communal offering is not divided?

He should have said: Because the tzitz does not effect acceptance for offerings that are to be eaten.

That is what he should have said.

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is an established teaching that Rabbi Yehuda had memorized

from his teachers,

that a communal offering is not divided,

and if part of it becomes impure, the whole of it is disqualified.

Mishna:

The thanksgiving-offering

for which one formulated a piggul intention

renders the loaves piggul,

that is, the forty loaves brought with the offering;

but the loaves

for which one formulated such an intention

do not render the thanksgiving-offering piggul,

and one who eats it is not liable to karet.

How so? If one slaughtered the thanksgiving-offering

with the intention

of eating from it on the following day—

both it and the loaves become piggul!

But if he slaughtered it with the intention

of eating from the loaves on the following day—

the loaves become piggul, but the thanksgiving-offering does not become piggul!

And likewise,

the lambs

of Shavuot

render

the two

loaves piggul, but the loaves do not render the lambs piggul. How so?

If one slaughtered the lambs with the intention of eating from them on the following day—

they and the loaves become piggul!

But if he slaughtered them with the intention

of eating the loaves on the following day—

the loaves become piggul, but the lambs do not become piggul!

Gemara:

And we ask:

What is the reason

for this ruling that the thanksgiving-offering renders the loaves piggul?

If you say it is because of what Rav Kahana said—for Rav Kahana said: From where is it derived that the loaves of the thanksgiving-offering are called thanksgiving-offering? As it is stated: “And he shall offer upon the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering loaves”

[Leviticus 7], which implies that the loaves themselves are the thanksgiving-offering; for otherwise, it should have written: “And he shall offer loaves upon the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering.” And because the loaves are called thanksgiving-offering, it is stated that if one formulated a piggul intention with regard to the thanksgiving-offering, the loaves become piggul. If so,

this too is difficult: Conversely as well,

if one formulated a piggul intention with regard to the loaves, the thanksgiving-offering should also become piggul.

And we answer:

This is not difficult,

for indeed

the bread is called thanksgiving-offering

for the reason we stated, and therefore when one intends to eat from the thanksgiving-offering on the following day, his intention includes eating from the loaves on the following day as well. But

the thanksgiving-offering,

that is, the animal,

is not called bread,

and when one intends to eat from the bread, his words do not include eating from the thanksgiving-offering. Therefore, if one formulated a piggul intention with regard to the loaves, the thanksgiving-offering does not become piggul.

And we challenge: This reason does indeed explain the law of the thanksgiving offering that renders the bread piggul, since we find in Scripture that it is called a thanksgiving offering. However,

“the lambs

of Shavuot

enable the bread to become piggul, whereas the bread does not render the lambs piggul,” where do we find that the bread is called lambs—so that the intention concerning the lambs includes the bread as well?

so that one could say that the thought concerning the sheep includes the bread as well?

And we answer:

Rather, this is the reason

for the laws in the Mishna:

The bread is subsidiary

because of

the thanksgiving offering,

meaning that the thanksgiving offering is primary and the bread is subsidiary to it, for the slaughter of the thanksgiving offering sanctifies the bread; therefore, if one rendered the thanksgiving offering piggul, the bread also becomes piggul,

but the thanksgiving offering is not subsidiary to the bread,

and therefore, if one rendered the bread piggul, the thanksgiving offering does not become piggul. And likewise,

the bread is subsidiary to the lambs,

for the slaughter of the lambs sanctifies the bread,

but the lambs are not subsidiary to the bread.

It is necessary,

for our Mishna to state this law with regard both to the thanksgiving offering and to the lambs.

For had it taught us this with regard to the thanksgiving offering

alone, I might have reasoned that only

there, when one renders the bread piggul, the thanksgiving offering does not become piggul, because they were not dependent upon one another for the waving,

as they are not waved together.

But in the case of the lambs, which were dependent upon one another

that is, the bread and the lambs

for the waving, say that when one renders the bread piggul, the lambs should also become piggul.

And likewise, had the Mishna stated only the law concerning the lambs, I would have reasoned that specifically in this case the lambs render the bread piggul because they were dependent upon one another for the waving, unlike the thanksgiving offering. For this reason,

it is necessary

to state the law concerning both of them.

Rabbi Elazar asked Rav: If one slaughters the thanksgiving offering

and, while slaughtering it, he intended

to eat an olive-bulk of it and of its bread

that is, half an olive-bulk of this and half an olive-bulk of that

the next day, as far as rendering the thanksgiving offering piggul, it is obvious

to me

that it itself does not become piggul, because

now,

if he intended to eat the olive-bulk

entirely from its bread—

the thanksgiving offering does not become piggul

through this, even though this is a complete intention that does not require combination with another intention, as we learned in the Mishna that an intention concerning the bread does not render the thanksgiving offering piggul. If he intended to eat

of it and of its bread,

when the requisite measure for piggul is absent from the intention concerning the bread and it requires combination with the other half-olive-bulk intention,

is it necessary

to say that piggul does not take effect in this case!?

What I am asking

is with regard to

rendering the bread piggul: Does

the intention concerning half an olive-bulk of

the thanksgiving offering

combine with the intention concerning the bread

to render the bread piggul, or not?

He said to him: Even in this case, the bread becomes piggul, while the thanksgiving offering does not become piggul,

just as when one renders the bread alone piggul.

And we challenge:

But why

does the bread become piggul?

Let us say a kal va-chomer: Just as the thanksgiving offering, which renders the bread

piggul with its assistance, nevertheless it itself

does not become piggul,

as we said, when one’s intention concerns half an olive-bulk of the bread

that comes to render piggul

the thanksgiving offering

is it not logical that it should not become piggul?