Menachot 15a — the Talmud in English

The Rabbis hold

that although the tzitz’s acceptance does not avail to permit for eating what became impure, nevertheless

the tzitz accepts the foods

in the sense that this is considered a fully valid offering and an excellent sprinkling, even though it became impure. And since the loaves and the arrangements are something eaten by the priests, there is acceptance of the tzitz for them, and the sprinkling of their blood was valid. If so, the pure loaf was permitted because of the sprinkling of the blood, and likewise with regard to the pure arrangement, which was permitted through the burning of the bowls. Indeed, although this is considered an excellent offering, nevertheless the impure loaf is not permitted for eating, for the Torah warned not to eat impure sacred food, as it says: “And the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten.”

And Rabbi Yehuda holds: The tzitz does not accept the foods,

and for this reason the sprinkling of the blood was not valid, and therefore even the pure loaf was not permitted for eating because of it.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: But

items whose law is that they should be

going up

to the altar and became impure,

for

according to everyone

the tzitz accepts those going up, and

even so

they dispute

Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis even in this matter.

For it was taught: If one

of the

bowls

whose law is that they go up upon the altar became impure,

Rabbi Yehuda says: Both of them shall be made

upon the altar

in impurity

because a communal offering overrides impurity. He may even render the pure bowl impure by bringing them into contact with one another in such a manner that the second one too becomes impure,

because a communal offering is not divided

and the pure bowl is considered impure even without its coming into contact with the impure bowl.

And the Rabbis say: The impure one

shall be burned

in its impurity, and the pure one in its purity.

Now, since according to everyone the tzitz accepts the bowls that go up upon the altar, why, according to Rabbi Yehuda, may he render the second one impure? Is there not here an excellent burning because of the acceptance of the tzitz? If so, that pure bowl remains in its purity, and it is forbidden to render the pure item impure!?

Furthermore,

it is difficult: Did not

Rav Ashi say, ta shma:

with regard to the Paschal offering, which may be offered in the impurity of the community,

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if

only

one tribe is impure

on the fourteenth of Nisan,

and all

the remaining

tribes are pure, they shall make

all the Paschal offering

in impurity

according to the law of a community that became impure. For Rabbi Yehuda holds that one tribe is called a congregation, and its impurity is overridden for the sake of the Paschal offering, and the other tribes likewise make it with them in impurity

because a communal offering is not divided.

But according to the Rabbis, the other, pure tribes make the first Paschal offering, and the tribe that became impure shall make the second Paschal offering.

And here, what acceptance of the tzitz is there?

For the tzitz accepts not the impurity of the body, but only the impurity of sacred objects!?

And furthermore, did Ravina not say, ta shma

from what is taught in our Mishna:

If one of the loaves or one of the arrangements became impure, Rabbi Yehuda says: Both of them shall go to the place of burning, because a communal offering is not divided; and the Rabbis say: The impure one in its impurity, and the pure one shall be eaten.

And if it is so

that their dispute is concerning the rule that the tzitz accepts the foods, why did Rabbi Yehuda give his reason as being that a communal offering is not divided?

He should have said: Because the tzitz does not accept the foods

as his reason?

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is a received teaching in Rabbi Yehuda’s mouth

that he learned from his teachers,

that a communal offering is not divided

and if part of it became impure, all of it is invalidated.

Mishna:

The thanksgiving-offering

that one considered with a piggul intention concerning it

renders the bread piggul,

that is, the forty loaves that come with the offering,

but the bread

concerning which one considered

does not render the thanksgiving-offering piggul,

and one who eats it is not liable for karet.

How so? If he slaughtered the thanksgiving-offering

with the intention

to eat from it tomorrow—

it and the bread are piggul!

But if he slaughtered it with the intention

to eat from the bread tomorrow—

the bread is piggul, and the thanksgiving-offering is not piggul!

And likewise

the rams

of Shavuot

render

the two

loaves piggul, but the bread does not render the rams piggul. How so?

If one slaughters the rams in order to eat from them tomorrow—

they and the bread are piggul!

But if he slaughtered them with the intention

to eat the bread tomorrow—

the bread is piggul, and the rams are not piggul!

Gemara:

And we raise a difficulty:

What is the reason

for this—that the thanksgiving-offering renders the bread piggul?

If you say it is because of Rav Kahana, for Rav Kahana said: From where is it derived that the thanksgiving loaves are called “thanksgiving-offering”? As it is stated: “And he shall offer upon the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering loaves”

[Leviticus 7], which indicates that the thanksgiving-offering is the loaves; for if not, it should have written: “And he shall offer loaves upon the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering.” And because the loaves are called “thanksgiving-offering,” it is therefore said that if he made the thanksgiving-offering piggul, the loaves became piggul. If so, it is difficult:

If so, the reverse should also be true,

that if he made the bread piggul, the thanksgiving-offering should also become piggul?

And we answer:

That is not difficult,

for indeed

the bread is called “thanksgiving-offering”

for the reason we stated, and therefore when he considered eating from the thanksgiving-offering tomorrow, included in his intention is also eating from the bread tomorrow. But

“thanksgiving-offering,”

that is, the animal,

is not called “bread,”

and when he intended to eat from the bread, eating from the thanksgiving-offering is not included in his words. Therefore, if he made the bread piggul, the thanksgiving-offering did not become piggul.

And we challenge: This reason indeed explains the law of the todah that renders the bread piggul, for we find in Scripture that it is called todah. However,

rather, this that it teaches: “the sheep

of the Festival of Shavuot

render the bread piggul, but the bread does not render the sheep piggul”—where do we find that the bread is called sheep,

so that the thought concerning the sheep includes the bread within it?!

And we answer:

rather, this is the reason

in the laws of the Mishna:

bread is because of

because of

the todah,

that is, the todah is primary and the bread is ancillary to it, for the slaughter of the todah sanctifies the bread, and therefore, if he rendered the todah piggul, the bread also became piggul,

and the todah is not because of the bread,

and therefore, if he rendered the bread piggul, the todah did not become piggul. And likewise,

bread is because of the sheep,

for the slaughter of the sheep sanctifies the bread,

and the sheep are not because of the bread.

And they are necessary,

our Mishna needs to state this law both with regard to the todah and with regard to the sheep.

For if it had taught us [this concerning] the todah

alone, I would have thought that specifically

there, when he renders the bread piggul, the todah does not become piggul, because they were not required for one another in the waving,

for they are not waved together.

But the sheep, which were required for one another,

that is, the bread and the sheep,

in the waving, I would say that when he renders the bread piggul, the sheep also become piggul.

And likewise, had the Mishna taught only the law of the sheep, I would have thought that specifically in this case the sheep render the bread piggul because they were required for one another in the waving, but not so with regard to the todah. Therefore,

it is necessary

to state the law of both of them.

Rabbi Elazar asked Rav: [If] one slaughters the todah

and, at the time of its slaughter, thought

to eat an olive’s measure of it and of its bread

that is, half an olive’s measure of this and half an olive’s measure of that

on the following day, what is [the law]? As for rendering the todah piggul, it is obvious

to me

and it is obvious that it itself did not become piggul, for

now,

if he thought to eat the olive’s measure

all of it from its bread—

the todah does not become piggul

through this, even though this is a complete thought that does not require the joining of another thought, and that is because we learned in the Mishna that the thought concerning the bread does not render the todah piggul. When he thought to eat

of it and of its bread,

for there is no measure of piggul in the thought concerning the bread, and it requires the joining of the other thought of half an olive’s measure,

is it necessary to ask

that piggul should not take effect in this case?!

What I ask

is concerning

rendering the bread piggul: does it combine

the thought of half an olive’s measure in

the todah

with the thought concerning the bread

to render the bread piggul, or not?

He said to him: Even in this case the bread is piggul, but the todah does not become piggul

as in the law when he renders the bread alone piggul.

And we challenge:

But why

did the bread become piggul?

Let us say a kal va-chomer: If the todah, which renders the bread piggul

that assisted in rendering it piggul, nevertheless it itself

does not become piggul,

as we said, that the todah does not become piggul, [then] half an olive’s measure of the bread,

which comes to render

the todah

[piggul] but did not render it piggul, is it not certainly [the case] that it should not become piggul?