Menachot 14b — the Talmud in English

Mefaglei

remnants

, here

when he had an improper intention concerning the right thigh

which he considered in the slaughtering itself,

that is, in the meat itself,

all the more so

should the left thigh become piggul?!

Rather, Rabbi Yohanan said:

What Rav Huna said in the opinion of Rabbi Yosei—that if he had an improper intention concerning the right thigh, the left thigh did not become piggul—is not so, for we have seen that even though if he had an intention concerning the blood alone, the meat becomes piggul. And

this is the reason of Rabbi Yosei

who said in our Mishna that the two loaves are two bodies, and if he had an improper intention concerning this one, he did not have an improper intention concerning that one, whereas in another Mishna he said: “until he has an improper intention concerning both of them with an olive-bulk,” implying that they are one body and combine: for

the verse made

the two loaves

one body

by saying, “two, two-tenths,” that is, two and not one; and this law is indispensable, for it is said concerning it, “they shall be,” and every expression of being is for indispensability.

And

on the other hand, that same

verse

itself

made them two bodies,

for “two” implies each one separately!

One body—

for they impede one another!

That is, they prevent one another.

Two bodies—

for the Merciful One said: this is made separately and that is made separately,

the kneading and baking of each loaf shall be done separately.

And therefore, if

he combined them

in his intention, and said, “in order to eat an olive-bulk from both of them,”

they combine

and join together, because

the verse made them one body.

And if

he divided them

in his intention, and said, “in order to eat from one of them,”

they are divided

and its fellow is not piggul,

for the verse made them two bodies.

Rabbi Yohanan raised a question: If he had an improper intention

concerning one of the types that are

in the loaves of the thanksgiving-offering,

which come from four types—three types of matza: loaves, wafers, and scalded loaves, and one type of leavened bread—

what

is the law: should the other types also become piggul? Does Rabbi Yosei also disagree in this case and hold that since they are not of the same type, this type does not become piggul because of the intention concerning that type, or perhaps in this case Rabbi Yosei concedes that since one offering permits all four types, they are like one thing and piggul takes effect in all of them?!

And he further raised a question according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that the oven-baked meal-offering comes from two types, five loaves and five wafers: if he had an improper intention concerning one type that is

in the oven-baked meal-offering,

what

is the law: should the second type also become piggul? Does Rabbi Yosei also disagree in this case because they are two types, or perhaps he concedes in this case that piggul takes effect in both, since the handful of this meal-offering is taken from the two types together?!

And the Gemara resolves:

Rav Tahlifa bar Ma’arava taught it to him: And so you say concerning the loaves of the thanksgiving-offering, and so you say concerning the oven-baked meal-offering

that in these too they disagree.

The Sages taught: At the time of slaughtering, he had an intention to eat half an olive-bulk, and at the time of sprinkling, he had an intention to eat half an olive-bulk,

this is

piggul, because the slaughtering and sprinkling combine.

And the Gemara says:

Some say,

specifically

slaughtering and sprinkling, both of which are permitting acts

for the slaughtering sanctifies the blood, and as explained below [16b], “one who comes to sanctify is like one who comes to permit”; and the sprinkling permits the meat—

yes,

they combine. But if he had an intention concerning half an olive-bulk at the time of

receiving and

half an olive-bulk at the time of

carrying, they do not

combine, because these acts do not permit.

And some say: These

slaughtering and sprinkling

that are distant

from one another,

for receiving and carrying intervene between them, combine;

and all the more so these—

receiving and carrying, whose intentions combine, because

they are near

one to the other.

And we raise an objection: Is that so?

Do acts combine for piggul?

But Levi taught: The four acts do not combine for piggul: slaughtering, sprinkling, receiving, and carrying!

And we answer:

Rava said: It is not difficult; this

which we taught, that they do not combine, is

Rabbi’s

view,

and this

which we said above, that they combine according to the view of

the Sages,

is their view.

For it was taught: One who slaughters the lamb

of the Festival of Weeks with the intention

of eating half an olive-bulk from this loaf

of the two loaves,

and so

he had an intention at the slaughtering of his fellow lamb

to eat half an olive-bulk from this loaf, Rabbi says: I say that this is valid

and it is not piggul; thus, he holds that the acts do not combine for piggul.

Abaye said to him: I would say that you have heard Rabbi

say that the acts do not combine

—

in

a case where he had an intention during the act of

half a permitter,

that is, the slaughtering of one lamb,

and

his intention was concerning

half an eating,

that is, half an olive-bulk; but in a case where he had an intention during

the entire

permitter,

such as slaughtering, which alone permits the blood, or sprinkling, which alone permits the meat,

and

his intention was concerning

half an eating, have you heard him say even in this case that if he had an intention in this act concerning half an olive-bulk and in that one concerning half an olive-bulk, they do not combine?

Rava bar Rav Hanan said to Abaye: And if Rabbi holds that

the entire permitter and half an eating

combine for piggul, then he should have

decreed that

half a permitter and half an eating

should combine for piggul as a decree

lest

the entire permitter and half an eating

which combine by the essential law and for which there is karet. And why should he have made a decree?

For Rabbi Yosei made

a decree concerning piggul,

and the Sages

also

make decrees.

And where do we find that they made a decree?

Rabbi Yosei made a decree, for we learned:

one who took the handful with the intention

of burning its frankincense tomorrow, Rabbi Yosei says: It is disqualified, but there is no karet for it, and the Sages say: It is piggul, and one is liable to karet for it;

we see, then, in Rabbi Yosei’s words, that although piggul was not produced because of this intention, nevertheless it became disqualified. This means that Rabbi Yosei decreed that it become disqualified as a decree because of a matter that has piggul.

And the Sages too made decrees, for we learned: If he had an improper intention concerning the handful

but not concerning the frankincense,

or

concerning the frankincense but not concerning the handful, Rabbi Meir says: It is piggul and one is liable to karet for it, but the Sages say: There is no karet for it until he has an improper intention concerning the entire permitter,

that is, the handful and the frankincense. The words of the Sages imply that specifically there is no karet for this because it is not piggul, but nevertheless the meal-offering became disqualified and may not be eaten; this is because of a decree on account of piggul.

He said to him

Abaye:

Is this comparable? Certainly there

the case where he had an intention at the taking of the handful concerning the burning of the frankincense,

Rabbi Yosei decreed

that the

handful of the frankincense

be disqualified, as a decree

lest it be the handful of the meal-offering,

which he took with the intention of burning it tomorrow. Since Rabbi Yosei concedes in this case that it is piggul, he therefore decreed that it be disqualified even in this case, where it is not piggul, because the cases resemble one another.

And likewise

the Sages

also

make decrees

in a case where he had an improper intention concerning the

handful

but not concerning the frankincense, as a decree

lest it be the handful of the sin-offering,

which comes without frankincense, and in it the handful is the entire permitter.

And

so too, when he had an improper intention concerning the

frankincense

without the handful, the Sages decreed that it become disqualified, as a decree

lest it be the frankincense

of the showbread,

which comes in bowls,

for only it is burned, and it is the entire permitter; and if he had an intention concerning it, piggul certainly takes effect. And likewise,

the lamb too,

as the Sages said in the Mishna below, that if he slaughtered one of the lambs with the intention of eating the two loaves tomorrow, it is disqualified even though it is not piggul; this is because of a decree

lest

the case be where he also had an intention at the slaughtering of

his fellow lamb,

for since he slaughtered both with an intention of piggul, piggul certainly takes effect, since he had an improper intention concerning the entire permitter. And likewise,

the bowl

mentioned there in the Mishna, that if he burned one of the bowls with the intention of eating the two arrangements tomorrow, it is disqualified even though it is not piggul, is because of a decree

lest it be his fellow bowl,

for if he had an improper intention concerning both bowls, piggul certainly takes effect.

But here,

in a case where he had an intention during the act of half a permitter concerning half an eating,

is there any half-permitter and half-eating elsewhere

whose law is piggul,

that

because of it he should get up and make a decree even in this case as a decree on account of another place? Since we do not find piggul in such a manner, there is no reason to make a decree in this case.

And we say:

Here too, it is reasonable that the reason of the Sages is indeed this,

that one should decree disqualification in a matter resembling piggul,

for it teaches in the conclusion

of that same Mishna in which Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree, that although they hold that if he had an improper intention concerning the handful but not the frankincense there is no piggul, nevertheless

the Sages concede to Rabbi Meir concerning the sin-offering and the jealousy-offering

that if he had an improper intention concerning the handful,

that

piggul takes effect and one is liable to karet for it,

because

in

these meal-offerings

the handful is the permitter

alone.

Apparently, one should wonder:

why do I need to teach this at all,

for it is

obvious! Is there

another permitter

in these meal-offerings

because of which I would think that piggul would not take effect through the intention at the taking of the handful alone?

Rather, is it not this that it teaches us:

this conclusion:

that the reason

of the Sages concerning the case

of the handful

of a freewill meal-offering, where he had an intention only at its burning and did not have an intention at the burning of the frankincense, that it is disqualified, is

because there is the handful of the sin-offering, which resembles it,

in which the Sages concede to Rabbi Meir that it is piggul. Therefore one should decree concerning a freewill meal-offering that has frankincense and disqualify it because of the intention at the burning of the handful alone, as a decree because of one who has an intention at the burning of the handful of a sin-offering, which is piggul.

Mishna:

If one of the loaves became impure

of the two loaves,

or one of the

two

arrangements

of six loaves each of the showbread,

Rabbi Yehuda says: Both of them

that is, both loaves or both arrangements

go out to the place of burning,

because

a communal offering is not divided,

but it is one offering, and if half of the offering is disqualified, all of it is disqualified.

of the two loaves,

or one of the

two

And the Sages say:

Only

the impure one in its impurity

is disqualified,

and the pure one shall be eaten.

Gemara:

Rabbi Elazar said: The dispute

between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda is in a case where the loaf became impure

before the sprinkling that is, the sprinkling of the blood of the lambs of the Festival of Weeks; and with the showbread, in a case where the arrangement became impure before the burning of the bowls. But if they became impure

after the sprinkling,

when the sprinkling of the blood was performed validly,

everyone agrees: The impure one remains in its impurity, and the pure one shall be eaten.

And we raise a difficulty:

And

in this case, where they became impure

before the sprinkling, over what do they disagree?

And the Gemara explains:

Rav Pappa said: They disagree

about whether the

frontplate effects acceptance for

the impurity of

edibles,

that is, impurity that touched something eaten by the priests.

They disagree.

And

in this case, where they became impure

before the presentation of the blood, what are they disagreeing about?

The Gemara explains:

Rav Pappa said: They disagree

whether

the frontplate effects acceptance for

impurity involving

items to be eaten,

that is, impurity that touched something eaten by the priests—

this is the basis of their dispute.