Menachot 14b (יד:) — the Talmud in English

They become piggul

the remainder

, here

where he had the intent of piggul regarding the right thigh,

which he considered as part of the slaughtering itself,

that is, regarding the flesh itself,

all the more so

that the left thigh should become piggul?!

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

What Rav Huna said in the opinion of Rabbi Yosei—that if one had the intent of piggul regarding the right thigh, the left thigh does not become piggul—is incorrect. For we have seen that even though, if one had the intent regarding the blood alone, the flesh becomes piggul.

And this is the reason for Rabbi Yosei

who said in our Mishna that the two loaves are two separate entities, and if one had the intent of piggul regarding one, he did not have the intent of piggul regarding the other, whereas in another Mishna he said: “Until he has the intent of piggul regarding both of them, with an olive-bulk,” which indicates that they are one entity and combine:

The verse made them

the two loaves

one entity

by stating: “two, two-tenths,” meaning two and not one; and this requirement is indispensable, as it is stated with regard to it: “They shall be,” and every expression of being indicates that the matter is indispensable.

But

that same

verse

itself

made them two entities,

as “two” indicates that each one stands independently!

One entity—

as they prevent one another!

That is, each one prevents the other.

Two entities—

as the Merciful One said: This one is made separately and that one is made separately,

the kneading and baking of each loaf are performed independently.

Therefore, if

he combined them

in his thought, saying that he intended to eat an olive-bulk from both of them,

they combine

and join together, because

the verse made them one entity.

But if

he divided them

in his thought, saying that he intended to eat from one of them,

they are divided

and its counterpart does not become piggul,

as the verse made them two entities.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma: If he had the intent of piggul

regarding one of the types that are

in the loaves of the thanksgiving offering,

which come from four types—three types of matza: loaves, wafers, and boiled loaves, and one type of leavened bread,

what is

the halakha as to whether the other types become piggul as well? Do Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis also disagree in this case, with Rabbi Yosei maintaining that since they are not of the same type, this type does not become piggul on account of the thought regarding that type; or perhaps Rabbi Yosei concedes here that since one offering permits all four types, they are considered like a single entity, and piggul takes effect in all of them?!

He further raised a dilemma according to Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that a baked offering comes from two types—five loaves and five wafers: If one had the intent of piggul regarding one type that is

in a baked offering,

what is

the halakha as to whether the second type also becomes piggul? Do Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis also disagree here because they are two types, or perhaps he concedes here that piggul takes effect in both, since the kemitza of this offering is performed from both types together?!

The Gemara resolves the dilemma:

Rav Taḥlifa bar Ma’arava taught it to him: And so you say with regard to the loaves of a thanksgiving offering, and so you say with regard to a baked offering,

that they too are subject to this dispute.

The Sages taught: If, at the time of slaughter, he had the intent to eat half an olive-bulk, and at the time of sprinkling, he had the intent to eat half an olive-bulk,

this is

piggul, because slaughter and sprinkling combine.

The Gemara says:

There are those who say

that specifically

slaughter and sprinkling, both of which are permitting rites,

as slaughter sanctifies the blood, and, as explained below (16b): “One who comes to sanctify is considered as one who comes to permit,” while sprinkling permits the flesh—

yes,

they combine. But if he had the intent regarding half an olive-bulk during

receiving and

half an olive-bulk during

carrying, they do not

combine, because these rites do not permit anything.

And there are those who say: These

slaughter and sprinkling

that are distant

from one another,

since receiving and carrying intervene between them, nevertheless combine;

and all the more so these—

receiving and carrying, whose thoughts combine because

they are close

to one another, as they are performed consecutively.

And we raise an objection:

Is that so?

Do rites combine to produce piggul?

But Levi taught: The four rites do not combine to produce piggul: slaughter, sprinkling, receiving, and carrying!

And we answer:

Rava said: It is not difficult; this

statement, which teaches that they do not combine, is the opinion of

Rabbi,

whereas

that

statement above, which said that they do combine, is according to

the Rabbis.

For it was taught: One who slaughters the lamb

As it was taught in a baraita: If one slaughters the lamb

of Shavuot with the intention

of eating half an olive-bulk from this loaf

of the two loaves,

and likewise

if, while slaughtering the other lamb, he had the intent

of eating half an olive-bulk from this loaf, Rabbi says: I say that this is valid

and is not piggul; thus, he maintains that the rites do not combine to produce piggul.

Abaye said to him: Granted that you have heard Rabbi say

that the rites do not combine

in

a case where he had the intent during the rite of

half a permitting rite,

namely, the slaughter of one lamb,

and

his thought concerned

half an act of eating,

namely, half an olive-bulk; but in a case where he had the intent during

the entire

permitting rite,

such as slaughter, which alone permits the blood, or sprinkling, which alone permits the flesh,

and

his thought concerned

half an act of eating, have you heard him say

that even in this case, if he had the intent regarding half an olive-bulk during one rite and half an olive-bulk during the other, they do not combine?

Rav bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: And if Rabbi maintains that

combine for piggul, then he should have

an entire permitting rite and half an act of eating

combine to produce piggul, he should have

decreed

that

half a permitting rite and half an act of eating

combine to produce piggul, as a decree

lest it be confused with

that is, because of

an entire permitting rite and half an act of eating,

which combine by law and for which one is liable to karet. Why, then, should he have issued such a decree?

For Rabbi Yosei issued a decree

in matters of piggul,

and the Rabbis

also

issue decrees.

And where do we find that they issued such a decree?

Rabbi Yosei issued a decree, as we learned:

If one performed the kemitza with the intention

of burning its frankincense on the following day, Rabbi Yosei says: It is disqualified, but there is no liability of karet for it; and the Rabbis say: It is piggul, and one is liable to karet for it.

Thus, according to Rabbi Yosei, although piggul does not result from this thought, the offering nevertheless becomes disqualified. This means that Rabbi Yosei issued a decree that it be disqualified because of a case in which piggul does apply.

And the Rabbis too

have we found

that they issue a decree, as we learned: If one had the intent of piggul regarding the kemitz

but not regarding the frankincense,

or

regarding the frankincense but not regarding the kemitz, Rabbi Meir says: It is piggul

and

one is liable to karet for it; but the Rabbis say: There is no liability of karet for it until he has the intent of piggul regarding the entire permitting rite,

namely, the kemitz and the frankincense. This indicates that according to the Rabbis there is no liability of karet specifically because it is not piggul; nevertheless, the offering is disqualified and may not be eaten, because of a decree on account of piggul.

He said to him,

Abaye:

How can these cases be compared? Granted, there

the case where he had the intent at the time of kemitza regarding the burning of the frankincense,

Rabbi Yosei issued a decree

that

the kemitz of the frankincense be disqualified,

as a decree

lest it be confused with the kemitz of the offering,

where he performed the kemitza with the intention of burning it on the following day. Since Rabbi Yosei concedes that this is piggul, he therefore decreed that even the former case be disqualified, since the two cases resemble one another.

Likewise,

the Rabbis

too

issue a decree

in a case where he had the intent of piggul regarding the

kemitz

but not the frankincense, as a decree

lest it be confused with the kemitz of a sinner’s offering,

which is brought without frankincense, and in which the kemitz is the entire permitting rite.

And

similarly, when he had the intent of piggul regarding the

frankincense

without the kemitz, the Rabbis decreed that it be disqualified, as a decree

lest it be confused with the frankincense

of the showbread

brought in the bowls,

of which only the frankincense is burned, and it is therefore the entire permitting rite; if he had the intent regarding it, piggul certainly takes effect. Likewise,

with regard to the lamb too,

which the Rabbis say in the Mishna below is disqualified, although it is not piggul, if one slaughtered one of the lambs with the intention of eating both loaves on the following day, this is because of a decree

lest

he had the intent also at the slaughter of

the other lamb,

for once he slaughtered both with the intent of piggul, piggul certainly takes effect, since he had the intent regarding the entire permitting rite. And likewise,

with regard to a bowl mentioned there in the Mishna, if one burned one of the bowls with the intention of eating both arrangements on the following day, it is disqualified although it is not piggul, because of a decree

because of the other bowl,

lest it be confused with the other bowl,

for if he had the intent regarding both bowls, piggul certainly takes effect.

But here,

in a case where he had the intent during the rite of half a permitting rite regarding half an act of eating,

is there anywhere a mere half permitting rite and half an act of eating

whose law is piggul,

that

because of it

he should arise and issue a decree

that this case too is disqualified because of another case? Since we do not find piggul in such a case, there is no reason to issue a decree here.

And we say:

Here too, it is reasonable that the reason of the Rabbis is indeed this,

that one should decree disqualification in a matter resembling piggul,

as the latter clause teaches

of that same Mishna in which Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree: Although they maintain that if one had the intent of piggul regarding the kemitz but not the frankincense there is no piggul, nevertheless

the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir with regard to a sinner’s offering and a jealousy offering

which do not contain frankincense,

that if one had the intent of piggul regarding the kemitz,

piggul

takes effect and one is liable to karet for it,

because

in

these offerings

the kemitz is the permitting rite

alone.

Seemingly, this is difficult:

Why was it necessary to teach this at all?

It is

obvious! For

is there another permitting rite

in these offerings

such that I might have thought that piggul would not take effect through the thought during kemitza alone?

Rather, is it not teaching us this:

this latter clause teaches

that the reason

of the Rabbis regarding the case

of the kemitz

of a voluntary offering, where he had the intent only at the time of burning it and did not have the intent at the time of burning the frankincense, and it is disqualified, is

because there is the kemitz of a sinner’s offering, which resembles it,

in which the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir that it is piggul. Therefore, one must decree that a voluntary offering containing frankincense be disqualified because of the intent at the burning of the kemitz alone, as a decree on account of one who has the intent at the burning of the kemitz of a sinner’s offering, where piggul takes effect.

Mishna:

If one of the loaves became impure

of the two loaves

or one of the

two

arrangements

of six loaves each of the showbread,

Rabbi Yehuda says: Both of them,

that is, both loaves or both arrangements,

go out to the place of burning,

because

a communal offering is not divisible,

but is one offering; and if half of the offering is disqualified, all of it is disqualified.

And the Sages say:

Only

the impure one remains in its impurity

and is disqualified,

but the pure one may be eaten.

Gemara:

Rabbi Elazar said: The dispute

between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda applies when the loaf became impure

before the sprinkling

that is, the sprinkling of the blood of the Shavuot lambs; and with regard to the showbread, when the arrangement became impure before the burning of the bowls,

but

if they became impure

after the sprinkling,

when the blood was sprinkled in accordance with the requirements,

everyone agrees: The impure one remains in its impurity, and the pure one may be eaten.

And we raise an objection:

And

in this case, when they became impure

before the sprinkling, over what do they disagree?

The Gemara explains:

Rav Pappa said: They disagree with regard to whether

the

frontplate effects acceptance for

the impurity of

food,

that is, impurity that touched something eaten by the priests—

they disagree.