Menachot 14a — the Talmud in English

Rather, if you say

with regard to the two thighs,

they are two bodies,

and if he rendered one piggul, its fellow was not rendered piggul, then with regard to the loaves, when he intended to eat an olive-bulk from both of them on the following day,

do they combine?!

And is the intermingling of his intention preferable, making them considered as coming from one body, more than in the case of the thighs, which are truly one body?!

And we answer:

Who is this?

This is the beraita that holds that the two loaves combine to be like one body;

it is Rabbi

and not Rabbi Yosei.

As it was taught: One who slaughters the lamb

of Shavuot

to eat half an olive-bulk from this loaf

of the Two Loaves on the following day,

and likewise

he slaughtered

its fellow, to eat half an olive-bulk from this loaf

the second one on the following day,

Rabbi says: I say that this is valid!

And one may burn the fats of the lamb and eat its flesh. And the Gemara infers:

The reason is that he said “half, half,”

for this is half an eating, which he intended concerning half of the permitting factor, namely one lamb;

but if he said

with regard to each lamb, “to eat

an olive-bulk from both of them

[namely, from the two loaves] on the following day,” having combined them in his intention,

it combines

for piggul.

And we raise an objection:

And Rabbi,

who taught this Mishna and said that there is never karet for it until he renders both loaves piggul with an olive-bulk,

according to whose view

did the tanna state his words?

If according to the view of the Rabbis,

then

even if

he rendered

one of them as well

piggul, piggul takes effect in both of them.

Rather, according to the view of Rabbi Yosei,

who holds that only the loaf concerning which he intended becomes piggul, then

the original difficulty returns

the first

to its place,

that combining through intention is not preferable to one actual body?!

And we answer:

Actually, according to the view of the Rabbis

Rabbi taught his Mishna.

And do not say, “until he renders both of them piggul,”

namely, the two loaves, for according to the Rabbis both become piggul even through an intention concerning one of them;

rather, say, “until he renders both of them piggul,”

namely, the two lambs: it is not sufficient that he intended at the slaughtering of one of them; rather, he must intend at the slaughtering of both of them.

And

when he intended at the slaughtering of both lambs, then

even if he intended

only

with regard to one of them

—the loaves—to eat an olive-bulk on the following day, this is piggul. But if he intended an intention of piggul concerning the loaves only at the slaughtering of one lamb, and with the second he had no intention at all, this is not piggul, since one does not render piggul through the service of half of the permitting factor.

And to exclude the view of Rabbi Meir, who says that one does render piggul through half of the permitting factor, it teaches us

in this

that no

intention of piggul is effective when performed during the service of only half of the permitting factor.

And we raise an objection:

If so, what

does the Mishna mean by stating in the language

“never

is there karet for it”? Its meaning is to exclude and limit several cases concerning which one might have considered that there is piggul, and the Mishna comes to exclude them.

Granted, if you say

that the Mishna intends to say that he must intend

with regard to both

—the two loaves—

and with regard to both

—the two lambs—

and it is Rabbi Yosei’s view

who holds that a loaf does not become piggul because of an intention concerning its fellow,

and

the Mishna comes

to exclude the view of Rabbi Meir,

who holds that one renders piggul through half of the permitting factor, according to whom an intention concerning one lamb is sufficient to render the loaves piggul,

and

likewise to exclude

from

the view

of the Rabbis,

who hold that one can render both loaves piggul through an intention concerning one of them,

this is what it says: “never,”

meaning: never—even if he intended with both lambs—is this piggul until he intends with both of them, namely, the two loaves [and it is thereby explained that nevertheless he must also intend with both lambs].

But if you say

that this Mishna

is the Rabbis’

view,

and it comes to exclude the view of Rabbi Meir,

to say that he must render it piggul at the slaughtering of both lambs,

and no more

the Mishna has taught anything, for according to the Rabbis an intention concerning one of the loaves is sufficient to render both of them piggul. If so,

what

is the meaning of the expression

“never”?

Furthermore,

there is a difficulty concerning what you said according to Rabbi Yosei, that if he rendered the right thigh piggul, he did not render the left thigh piggul.

For Rav Ashi said, “Come and hear”: Rabbi Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Yosei: If he rendered it piggul

—that is, he intended an intention of piggul at the slaughtering of bulls that are burned and goats that are burned, and his intention was

concerning something performed outside, namely

the burning of the fats and the pouring of the remainder, this is

piggul,

but if his intention was

concerning something performed inside,

the Sanctuary, such as sprinklings on the curtain and on the golden altar, this is

not piggul.

How so? If he was standing outside and said, “I am slaughtering in order to sprinkle from its blood

inside

on the following day,” he did not render it piggul,

since

this

intention is

an intention outside concerning something performed inside,

namely, the sprinkling of the blood.

If he was standing inside and said, “I am sprinkling in order to burn the fats on the following day and to pour

the

remainder

of the blood that will remain after the sprinklings, which are poured onto the foundation of the outer altar”

on the following day, he did not render it piggul,

since

the intention was inside concerning something performed outside.

But if

he was standing outside and said, “I am slaughtering in order to pour the remainder on the following day and to burn the fats on the following day, he rendered it piggul,

since

this

is

an intention outside concerning something performed outside.

And from now,

this

one who intended at the slaughtering

to pour the remainder,

which we said in this case is piggul,

what does it render piggul?

What will he eat that will make him liable for piggul?

If you say, to render the

blood piggul, so that if he unintentionally eats from the blood of the sacrifice, he will be liable for a sin-offering because of piggul [in addition to the sin-offering that he is obligated to bring because of eating blood],

does blood render [something] piggul?

But we learned: “These are the matters concerning which one intended an intention of piggul, and nevertheless

there are

none liable for them

who eat them by karet

because of piggul: the handful

and the frankincense

and the incense, the priests’ meal-offering and the meal-offering

of libations, and the anointed priest’s meal-offering, and the blood”?!

The reason for this is that none of all these has permitting factors; rather, they permit others, and piggul takes effect only in something that is permitted for the altar or for human consumption because of another matter, such as the remnants of a meal-offering, which are permitted for human consumption because of the handful, and the fats of an animal, which are permitted for the altar because of the throwing of the blood. We learned this from peace-offerings, from which the law of piggul is derived. Just as a peace-offering is “something that has permitting factors” for its fats on the altar and its flesh for human consumption, namely through the throwing of the blood, so too, piggul takes effect in anything that has permitting factors for a person or for the altar, excluding these, which have no other matter that permits them.

Rather, it is obvious: to render the flesh piggul,

so that one who eats of the flesh is liable because of piggul. And since Rabbi Yosei holds that the thought concerning the pouring of the leftover blood renders the flesh piggul, if so, how is it possible that the thought concerning one thigh does not render its fellow piggul?

Now, just as there, where he did not have the thought concerning the flesh itself

but concerning the pouring of the leftover blood,

Rabbi Yosei says that it renders

the flesh piggul, even though the thought of piggul was not concerning the flesh but concerning the blood,

here,

with regard to having rendered the right thigh piggul,

where he had the thought concerning the sacrifice itself,

namely, concerning the flesh,

is it not all the more so that

if

he rendered the right thigh piggul

and had the thought to eat it outside its allotted time, it

renders piggul

also

the left thigh,

concerning which he did not have the thought?!

And furthermore,

there is a difficulty:

for Ravina said, “Ta shma:”

from the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter:

“If one took the kometz of the meal-offering in order to eat its leftovers, or to burn its kometz on the next day, Rabbi Yosei concedes in this case that he has rendered it piggul, and one is liable for karet on account of it.”

And now, this that the Mishna said that if he had the thought to burn its kometz

it is piggul,

to render what piggul?

What will he eat, for which he will become liable because of piggul?

If you say, to render the kometz piggul,

so that he eats the kometz itself,

can a kometz become piggul?

But did we not learn: “These are the things for which one is not liable because of piggul: the kometz, and so on”?!

Rather, it is obvious: to render the leftovers piggul

of the meal-offering. And since Rabbi Yosei holds that the leftovers of the meal-offering become piggul because of the thought concerning the burning of the kometz, how is it possible that he holds that one thigh does not become piggul because of the thought concerning its fellow?

Now, just as there,

when he had the thought to burn its kometz on the next day,

where he did not have the thought concerning the leftovers themselves

but concerning the kometz,