Menachot 14a (יד.) — the Talmud in English

Rather, if you say

with regard to the two thighs,

they are two separate entities,

and if he had a פיגול thought concerning one, its fellow did not become פיגul, then, with regard to the loaves, when he intended to eat an olive-bulk from both of them on the following day,

do they combine!?

And is the joining of his thought, which treats them as though they came from a single entity, preferable to the case of the thighs, which are actually one entity

And we answer:

Who is the tanna of this?

This is the beraita that maintains that the two loaves combine to be considered one entity:

It is Rabbi,

and not Rabbi Yosei.

As it is taught in a beraita: One who slaughters the lamb

of Shavuot

with the intention of eating half an olive-bulk from this loaf

of the two loaves on the following day,

and likewise

he slaughtered

its fellow with the intention of eating half an olive-bulk from this loaf

the second one on the following day,

Rabbi says: I say that this is valid!

And one may burn the sacrificial portions of the lamb and eat its flesh. The Gemara infers:

The reason is that he said: half and half,

which constitutes half of the eating concerning which he had the intention, in half of the permitting factor, namely, one lamb;

but if he said

with regard to each lamb that he intended

to eat an olive-bulk from both

[namely, from both loaves], on the following day, having combined them in his thought,

it combines

for purposes of פיגול.

And we challenge this:

And Rabbi,

who taught this Mishna and said that there is never liability for karet unless he renders both loaves פיגul through an intention concerning an olive-bulk,

in accordance with whose view

did this tanna state his words?

If it is in accordance with the view of the Rabbis,

then

even

if he rendered פיגul

one of them as well,

פיגול takes effect with regard to both of them.

Rather, it is in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yosei,

who maintains that only the loaf concerning which he had the intention becomes פיגul. If so,

the original difficulty returns

to

its place:

the combination effected through thought is not preferable to an entity that is actually one entity

And we answer:

Actually, it is in accordance with the view of the Rabbis.

Rabbi taught his Mishna

and do not say, “unless he renders both of them פיגul,”

namely, both loaves, since according to the Rabbis both become פיגul even through a thought concerning one of them.

Rather, say: “unless he renders both of them פיגul,”

namely, both lambs: it is not enough that he had the intention while slaughtering one of them; rather, he must have the intention while slaughtering both of them.

And

when he had the intention while slaughtering both lambs,

even if he intended

only

with regard to one of them

—the loaves—to eat an olive-bulk on the following day, this is פיגול. But if he had a פיגול thought concerning the loaves only while slaughtering one lamb, and had no thought at all while slaughtering the other, this is not פיגול, since one cannot render an offering פיגul through the service of half of its permitting factor.

And to exclude the view of Rabbi Meir, who says that one can render an offering פיגul through half of its permitting factor, it teaches us

in this matter

that

a פיגול thought during the service of only half of the permitting factor is not effective.

And we challenge this:

If so, what

is the Mishna coming to say by using the expression

“never”

—“there is never liability for karet”? This expression implies that it comes to exclude and limit several cases in which there might have been reason to discuss פיגול, and that the Mishna comes to exclude them.

Granted, if you say

that the intention of the Mishna is that one must have the intention

with regard to both of them

—the two loaves—

and with regard to both of them

—the two lambs—

and it is the view of Rabbi Yosei,

who maintains that a loaf does not become פיגul because of a thought concerning its fellow,

and

the Mishna comes, in this matter,

to exclude the view of Rabbi Meir,

who maintains that one can render an offering פיגul through half of its permitting factor, so that according to him an intention concerning one lamb is sufficient to render the loaves פיגul,

and

it also comes to exclude

the

view

of the Rabbis,

who maintain that both loaves can be rendered פיגul through an intention concerning one of them,

this is why it says, “never,”

meaning: Never—even if he had the intention while slaughtering both lambs—is it פיגול until he has the intention with regard to both of them, namely, both loaves [and it is thereby clear that he must nevertheless have the intention while slaughtering both lambs].

But if you say

that this Mishna

is the view of the Rabbis

and

comes to exclude the view of Rabbi Meir,

to say that one must render the offering פיגul while slaughtering both lambs,

and nothing more,

the Mishna has introduced nothing new, since according to the Rabbis an intention concerning one of the loaves is sufficient to render both of them פיגul. If so,

what

is the point of the expression

“never”?

Furthermore,

there is a difficulty concerning what you said according to Rabbi Yosei: that if he rendered the right thigh פיגul, he did not render the left thigh פיגul.

For Rav Ashi said: Come and hear: Rabbi Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Yosei: If one rendered

—that is, had a פיגול thought while slaughtering the bulls that are burned and the goats that are burned, and his thought concerned

something performed outside, namely,

the burning of the sacrificial portions and the pouring of the remainder of the blood, it is

but if his thought concerned

something performed inside

the Sanctuary, such as sprinkling on the curtain or on the golden altar, it is

How so? If he was standing outside and said, “I am slaughtering with the intention of sprinkling some of its blood”

inside

on the following day, it is not פיגול,

since

this

is

a thought outside concerning something performed inside,

namely, the sprinkling of the blood.

If he was standing inside and said, “I am sprinkling with the intention of burning the sacrificial portions on the following day and pouring”

the

remainder

of the blood that remains after the sprinklings, which is poured onto the base of the outer altar,

on the following day, it is not פיגול,

since

it is a thought inside concerning something performed outside.

But if

he was standing outside and said, “I am slaughtering with the intention of pouring the remainder on the following day and burning the sacrificial portions on the following day, it is פיגול,

since

this

is

a thought outside concerning something performed outside.

And now,

this

one who has a thought while slaughtering

to pour the remainder,

which we said in this case is פיגול,

what does he render פיגul,

what could he eat that would make him liable for פיגול?

If you say that he renders

the blood פיגul—so that if he inadvertently eats some of the blood of the offering, he would be liable for a sin-offering because of פיגול [in addition to the sin-offering he must bring for eating blood],

does blood become פיגul?

But we learned in the Mishna:

“These are the things concerning which one had a פיגול thought, and nevertheless

those who eat them are not liable

for karet

because of פיגול: The handful

and the frankincense,

and the incense, the meal-offering of priests, and the meal-offering

of libations, the meal-offering of the anointed priest, and the blood”?!

The reason for this is that none of these has a permitting factor; rather, they permit other things. פיגול takes effect only with regard to something that is permitted for the altar or for human consumption by means of another thing, such as the remnants of a meal-offering, which are permitted for human consumption by means of the handful, or the sacrificial portions of an animal, which are permitted for the altar by means of the casting of the blood. We learn this from peace-offerings, from which the law of פיגול is derived. Just as a peace-offering is “something that has a permitting factor”—its sacrificial portions for the altar and its flesh for human consumption, through the casting of the blood—so too, פיגול takes effect with regard to anything that has a permitting factor for a person or for the altar, excluding these, which have no other element that permits them.

Rather, it is obvious: [the issue is] rendering the flesh piggul,

so that one who eats from the flesh is liable for piggul. And since Rabbi Yosei holds that a thought concerning the pouring of the residual blood renders the flesh piggul, how is it possible that a thought concerning one thigh does not render its counterpart piggul?

Now, if there, where he did not focus on the flesh itself

but rather on the pouring of the residual blood,

Rabbi Yosei says that it renders

the flesh piggul, even though the thought of piggul concerned not the flesh but the blood,

here,

with regard to one who rendered the right thigh piggul,

where he did focus on the sacrifice itself

namely, on the flesh,

is it not all the more so that

if

he rendered the right thigh piggul

and intended to eat it beyond its allotted time, it is

rendered piggul

also

the left thigh,

which he did not intend concerning?!

And furthermore,

there is a difficulty:

For Ravina said, “Come and hear”

from the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter:

“One who takes the kometz from the meal-offering with the intention of eating its residual portion, or of burning its kometz on the following day—Rabbi Yosei concedes in this case that he has rendered it piggul, and one who eats it is liable to receive karet.”

And now, when the Mishna says that if he intended to burn its kometz

it is rendered piggul,

what is rendered piggul?

What will one eat so that he will be liable for piggul?

If you say that it is to render the kometz piggul,

so that he would eat the kometz itself,

can the kometz become piggul?

But we learned in the Mishna: “These are the matters for which one is not liable for piggul: the kometz, etc.”?!

Rather, it is obvious that it is to render the residual portion piggul

of the meal-offering. And since Rabbi Yosei holds that the residual portion of the meal-offering becomes piggul because of the thought concerning the burning of the kometz, how is it possible that he holds that one thigh does not become piggul because of a thought concerning its counterpart?

Now, if there,

when he intended to burn its kometz on the following day,

where he did not focus on the residual portion itself

but rather on the kometz,