Menachot 13b — the Talmud in English

Therefore,

it teaches us that in this case,

namely, at the beginning,

Rabbi Yosei

concedes. [And that which one does not cause piggul through half a permitting act refers to one who thinks at the time of the service of half a permitting act. But here he thought at the time of taking the handful, which is a “complete permitting act,” since the frankincense is not taken by handful; only his thought was about the service of half a permitting act, and in this there is no deficiency of half a permitting act. Rashi below, 14a.] And the reason of Rabbi Yosei, who disputes at the end, will be explained below.

We learned in our Mishna:

“To burn its frankincense on the following day, Rabbi Yosei says: It is disqualified, but there is no excision for it.”

Reish Lakish said: Rabbi Yosei would say,

that is, this is Rabbi Yosei’s reason in our Mishna, because he holds that there is no thought of piggul in the service of

one permitting act,

such as the handful,

that causes piggul in the other permitting act,

such as when he thought at the time of taking the handful the thought of piggul concerning the frankincense.

And so you say concerning the two bowls of frankincense of the showbread, that one permitting act does not

cause piggul in the other permitting act,

that is, thought at the time of burning one permitting act does not cause piggul in the other. Therefore, if he thought at the time of burning one of the bowls to burn its fellow outside its appointed time, this is not a thought of piggul that disqualifies.

And we ask:

What is the meaning of “And so you say”?

Is it not obvious, since wherever there are two permitting acts and one thought from one about the other, Rabbi Yosei disputes!? And we answer:

What might you say, Rabbi Yosei’s reason concerning the frankincense of the meal-offering, that the thought at the time of taking the handful does not make it piggul, is

because

the frankincense

is not of the same kind as the meal-offering,

for the meal-offering from which the handful is taken is fine flour, whereas this is frankincense,

but concerning the two bowls of frankincense, which are of the same kind as each other,

for both of them are one kind,

say that they cause piggul in each other; it teaches us

that Rabbi Yosei’s reason is not that it is not of the same kind as the meal-offering, but rather his reason is that one permitting act does not cause piggul in the second permitting act. Since this is his reason, even concerning the two bowls of frankincense of the showbread, one permitting act does not cause piggul in the other.

And we ask: Can you say that Rabbi Yosei’s reason concerning the frankincense is not because it is not of the same kind as the meal-offering? But does he not teach at the end

since both are the same type,

say that they make each other pigul; this teaches us

that the reason for Rabbi Yosei’s ruling is not that the frankincense is not of the same kind as the meal-offering. Rather, his reason is that one permitting act does not make the other permitting act pigul. Therefore, in the case of the two bowls of frankincense of the shewbread as well, one permitting act does not make the other pigul.

of the Mishna:

“They said to him: What has changed from the sacrifice?”

He said to them: The sacrifice—its blood, flesh, and sacrificial portions—are one, whereas the frankincense is not part of the meal-offering. Behold, his reason is that the frankincense is not of the same kind as the meal-offering!?

And we answer:

What is the meaning of “The frankincense is not part of the meal-offering,” which Rabbi Yosei said?

It is not included in the hindrance of the meal-offering!

That is, its burning is not delayed because of the absence of burning the handful, and it differs from the handful:

for it is not that, just as the handful prevents it for the remainder,

in that so long as the handful has not been burned, the remainder may not be eaten,

so too the handful prevents it for the frankincense,

in that so long as the handful has not been burned, the burning of the frankincense is delayed. This is not so;

rather, if he wishes, he burns this first, and if he wishes, he burns that first,

and neither prevents the other.

Therefore, the handful and the frankincense are considered two permitting acts, and one permitting act does not cause piggul in the other. This is what Rabbi Yosei said in distinguishing between the frankincense and the sacrificial portions: The sacrifice is entirely one, and the sprinkling of the blood permits the sacrificial portions for burning; so long as the blood has not been sprinkled, they may not be burned. Therefore, if he thought at the time of sprinkling the thought of piggul concerning the sacrificial portions, this is not thought concerning two permitting acts, and it is piggul. This is not so with the frankincense, whose burning is not permitted through the burning of the handful, and its burning is considered a permitting act in its own right.

it is not

the case that, just as the handful holds back what remains,

in that

as long as

all of

the handful has not been burned, what remains may not be eaten, so too the handful holds back the frankincense — in that as long as the handful has not been burned, the burning of the frankincense is held up. This is not so.

Rather, if one wishes, he burns this first, and if he wishes, he burns that first,

and neither holds back the other. Therefore, the handful and the frankincense are considered two permitting acts, and one permitting act does not make the other pigul. This is what Rabbi Yosei said in distinguishing frankincense from the sacrificial portions of an animal-offering: an animal-offering is one whole, and the sprinkling of the blood permits the sacrificial portions to be burned. As long as the blood has not been sprinkled, they may not be burned. Therefore, if one thought during the sprinkling about the sacrificial portions, this is not an intention concerning two separate permitting acts, and it is pigul. The frankincense, by contrast, is not permitted to be burned through the burning of the handful; its burning is considered a separate permitting act.

And the Rabbis

who disagree maintain:

When we say

this rule, that

a permitting element does not render the permitting element piggul, this applies when they were not established in a single vessel

such as the rams of Shavuot offerings [below 15b], one of which was slaughtered with the thought of eating from its fellow on the following day. Since each one is a permitting element for the bread, one does not render the other piggul,

but where they were established in a single vessel,

such as in this case, where the handful and the frankincense were established in a single vessel, they

are considered as one

and become piggul because of one another.

Rabbi Yannai said: The gathering of the frankincense

which, after the burning of the handful, he would gather from upon the fine flour, that was performed

by a non-koen—

is invalid.

For what reason?

Rabbi Yirmeya said: They treated it as a matter of conveyance,

since the gathering is part of the service of conveying it to the altar, and this person who gathered it and gave it to the koen reduced the koen’s walking. Since conveyance is a service, as is learned from Zevachim, where it is stated concerning them, “And the sons of Aharon shall bring,” whose meaning is conveyance, for this reason it is invalid when performed by a non-koen. And

he holds

Rabbi Yannai

that conveyance without walking

such as this gathering, where the non-koen did not move from his place but gathered it and extended it to the koen—

is called conveyance,

and conveyance

that was performed

by a non-koen is invalid.

Rav Mari said: We too have learned this

that the gathering of frankincense is a service, for we learned in the Mishna above:

This is the principle: Whoever takes the handful and places it

the handful

in a vessel

of service,

and conveys it and burns it

and performs these as services with a thought of piggul, the meal-offering becomes piggul, because these are the four important services of a meal-offering, corresponding to the four services of a sacrifice, namely slaughtering, sprinkling, receiving, and conveyance.

And now,

granted, the handful is equivalent to slaughtering,

for just as the slaughterer separates the portion belonging to the Most High, namely the blood, so the handful separates the portion belonging to the Most High, which is the taking of the handful. And likewise,

conveying

the handful of the meal-offering

is also equivalent to conveying

the blood. And likewise,

burning is equivalent to sprinkling

the blood of the sacrifice. But placing it in a vessel,

what does he do?

of the meal-offering

What does he accomplish?

And why is this considered a service?

If you say, because it resembles

placing it in a vessel

receiving

the blood,

do they resemble one another? There, it occurs automatically:

the blood falls into the basin from the animal’s neck, whereas

here

he

takes

the handful

in his hands

and places it

in the vessel.

Rather, because, since he has no alternative but to perform it

this placing of the handful in the vessel, and he is compelled to perform it, therefore

it is an important service,

and

necessarily he makes it equivalent to receiving

even though it does not entirely resemble it. If so,

here too,

with the gathering of the frankincense,

since there is no alternative but to perform it, it is an important service,

and

necessarily he makes it equivalent to conveyance!

And from here there is proof that the gathering of frankincense is considered conveyance.

The Gemara rejects this:

No; actually,

the reason for the similarity between placing in a vessel in a meal-offering and receiving is

that it resembles receiving,

and not because of the necessity of performing it. And as for what was difficult to you, to distinguish between them by saying that

there it occurs automatically,

whereas

here he takes and places,

you can answer:

After all,

both of them are

the sanctification of a vessel:

in receiving the blood, the koen sanctifies the blood through the vessel in which he receives it, and in the meal-offering he sanctifies the handful through placing it in a vessel. If so,

what difference is it to me

whether it is placed in the vessel

automatically, or what difference is it to me that he takes and places it? Ultimately, they are similar in this: both are sanctified through a vessel of service. This is not so with the gathering of frankincense, which does not resemble any of the four services of a sacrifice; you may therefore say that it is not an important service and is not invalid when performed by a non-koen.

ведь в конечном счете они сходны в том, что оба освящаются посредством сосуда-служения. В отличие от собирания ливаны, которое не подобно ни одной из четырех служб жертвоприношения, можно сказать, что оно не является важной службой и не становится недействительным при совершении заром.

Mishna:

If he slaughtered two rams

of Shavuot as prescribed, as it is stated, “And two year-old rams for a sacrifice of peace-offerings,” and they permit and sanctify the two loaves, and at the time of their slaughter he thought

to eat one of the loaves on the following day,

and likewise

he burned two bowls

of the showbread with the intention

to eat one of the

two

arrangements

of six loaves that were in the showbread

on the following day, Rabbi Yose says: That loaf and that arrangement about which he had the thought

is

piggul, and one is liable to excision

for eating it,

while the second is invalid

but there is no liability of excision for it.

And the Sages say: Both this one and that one are piggul, and one is liable to excision for it.

Rabbi Yose’s reason will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

Rav Huna said: Rabbi Yose would say: If he rendered the right thigh piggul

that is, he had the thought of eating the right thigh beyond its appointed time,

the left

thigh did not become piggul [and the same applies to the other parts of the animal].

В чем причина? Если хочешь, скажи: логика,

What is the reason? If you wish, say: It is a logical consideration,

so it is,

and if you wish, say:

we learn this from a

verse.

If you wish, say: It is a logical consideration: A thought

of piggul

is no more effective

than

the act of impurity,

for if

one limb became impure

of the sacrifice in a manner that it was not attached to the flesh but had separated from it, would the entire sacrifice become impure?! The same applies with regard to piggul: the thought concerning one limb does not render the entire sacrifice piggul.

If you wish, say: A verse:

It is stated concerning the eating of piggul,

“And the person who eats of it shall bear his iniquity”

[Leviticus 7]—which implies specifically

“of it,”

from the limb concerning which he rendered it piggul,

but not from its fellow.

Rav Nachman raised an objection to Rav Huna

from what we learned in a beraita:

There is never in it

—in bread concerning which he did not have a thought of piggul—a

liability of excision

for eating it

until he renders both of them piggul

[that is, the two loaves]

with an olive-bulk,

and even if there is a thought concerning an olive-bulk only through combining the thought of piggul concerning both of them, both of them are piggul.

And the Gemara is precise: it implies that specifically if he rendered it pigul

in both,

pigul takes effect in all of them,

but if he had the intention in one of them, it does not.

And the Gemara proves: according to whose method is this beraita stated?

If you say the Rabbis,

this cannot be, for according to their view

even

if he had the intention

in one of them as well,

pigul takes effect.

Rather, it is obvious that it is Rabbi Yosei

[whose view it follows].

And now, with regard to two thighs,

if you say it is well

that since both of them come from one altar, they are

one body,

and if he rendered one of them pigul, the other one also becomes pigul,

for this reason

it can be said that with two loaves, in which he rendered both pigul with a kezayit, it

combines.

For even though the loaves do not come from one body, nevertheless, since he joined them in his intention to eat a kezayit from both of them on the following day, they combine, and his intention, in which he combined the eating of both of them, is effective to regard them as though both of them came from one body. But this is not so in our Mishna, where he had the intention regarding the eating of only one, and did not join them in his intention; therefore, one did not become pigul through the pigul of its fellow.