Menachot 13b (יג:) — the Talmud in English

Therefore,

this teaches us that in this case,

namely, in the first clause, Rabbi Yosei

concedes

to the Sages.

[The reason that one cannot render an offering piggul through an intention concerning half a permitting act applies when one has the intention during the service of half a permitting act. Here, however, he had the intention during the taking of the kemitzah, which is a “complete permitting act,” since the frankincense is not taken by kemitzah; only the object of his intention was the service of half a permitting act, and this does not involve the deficiency of half a permitting act. Rashi below, 14a.] The reason for Rabbi Yosei’s disagreement in the latter clause will be explained below.

We learned in our Mishna:

“To burn its frankincense on the following day, Rabbi Yosei says: It is invalid, but there is no liability of karet for it.”

Reish Lakish said: Rabbi Yosei would say,

that is, this is Rabbi Yosei’s reason in our Mishna, because he holds that

no

intention of piggul during the service of one

permitting act,

such as the kemitzah,

renders the other permitting act piggul,

such as when he had an intention of piggul concerning the frankincense at the time of taking the kemitzah.

And so you say with regard to the two bowls of frankincense of the Showbread: one permitting act does not

that is, an intention of piggul during the burning of one permitting act

render the other permitting act piggul.

Therefore, if one had the intention, while burning one of the bowls, to burn the other after its proper time, this is not an intention of piggul that renders the offering invalid. And we raise a difficulty:

What does “and so you say” mean?

Is it not obvious? Wherever there are two permitting acts and one has the intention concerning one on behalf of the other, Rabbi Yosei disagrees! And we answer:

You might say that Rabbi Yosei’s reason with regard to the frankincense

of the meal-offering, that an intention at the time of taking the kemitzah does not render it piggul, is

because

the frankincense

is not of the same type as the meal-offering,

since the meal-offering from which the kemitzah is taken is fine flour, whereas this is frankincense.

But with regard to the two bowls of frankincense, which are of the same type as one another,

since both are the same kind,

say that they render one another piggul; this teaches us that Rabbi Yosei’s reason is not that the frankincense is not of the same type as the meal-offering. Rather, his reason is that one permitting act does not render the other permitting act piggul. Since this is his reason, even in the case of the two bowls of frankincense of the Showbread, one permitting act does not render the other permitting act piggul.

that the reason for Rabbi Yosei’s ruling is not that the frankincense is not of the same kind as the meal-offering. Rather, his reason is that one permitting act does not make the other permitting act pigul. Therefore, in the case of the two bowls of frankincense of the shewbread as well, one permitting act does not make the other pigul.

And we raise a difficulty:

Can you really say

that

Rabbi Yosei’s reason with regard to the frankincense is not that it is not of the same type as the meal-offering?

But the latter clause teaches

of the Mishna:

“They said to him: What difference is there between it and the animal-offering?”

He said to them: The blood, flesh, and sacrificial portions of the animal-offering are one, whereas the frankincense is not part of the meal-offering. It is thus evident that his reason is that the frankincense is not of the same type as the meal-offering!?

And we answer:

What is the meaning of

“the frankincense”

“is not part of the meal-offering,” as stated by Rabbi Yosei?

It is not included in the requirements of the meal-offering!

That is, its burning is not prevented by the absence of the burning of the kemitzah, unlike the kemitzah:

for it is not the case that

just as the kemitzah prevents the remainder,

in that

as long as

all

the kemitzah has not been burned, the remainder may not be eaten, so too the kemitzah prevents the frankincense—in that as long as the kemitzah has not been burned, the burning of the frankincense is prevented. This is not so.

Rather, if one wishes, he burns this one first, and if he wishes, he burns that one first,

and neither prevents the other. Therefore, the kemitzah and the frankincense are considered two permitting acts, and one permitting act does not render the other permitting act piggul. This is what Rabbi Yosei said in distinguishing the frankincense from the sacrificial portions of an animal-offering: The entire animal-offering is one, and the sprinkling of the blood permits the sacrificial portions for burning; as long as the blood has not been sprinkled, they may not be burned. Therefore, if one had an intention of piggul concerning the sacrificial portions at the time of sprinkling, this is not an intention concerning two permitting acts, and it is piggul. This is not so with the frankincense, whose burning is not permitted by the burning of the kemitzah, and whose burning is considered a permitting act in its own right.

And the Gemara is precise: it implies that specifically if he rendered both piggul,

yes, with both,

in this case piggul takes effect with regard to all of them,

but if he formulated the intent with regard to only one of them, no.

And the Gemara proves: according to whose view is this baraita stated?

If you say, the Rabbis,

that cannot be, for according to their view,

even

if he formulated the intent

with regard to only one of them as well,

piggul takes effect.

Rather, it is obvious: it is Rabbi Yosei’s view

.

And now, with regard to two thighs,

if you grant

that since both of them come from one altar, they are

one body,

and if he rendered one of them piggul, the other one also becomes piggul,

that is why

it can be said that with regard to two loaves, if he rendered both of them piggul with an olive-bulk, they

combine.

For although the loaves do not come from one body, nevertheless, since he combined them in his intent to eat an olive-bulk from both of them on the following day, they combine; and his intent, in which he joined the eating of both of them, is effective in deeming them as though both had come from one body. But this is not so in our Mishna, where he formulated the intent with regard to eating only one of them and did not combine them in his intent. Therefore, the one does not become piggul through the piggul of its fellow.