Menachot 13a (יג.) — the Talmud in English

And now,

this too

—the earlier Mishna and the inference from our Mishna—

why is it necessary?

If

it is said that this inference comes to teach us:

to eat

something that is ordinarily eaten,

but not to eat something that is not ordinarily eaten, for they do not combine,

this matter is already

learned from the first clause

of the Mishna,

you can infer it,

for the Mishna above stated the law of piggul only when one had the intention concerning something that is ordinarily eaten.

And

if

you say that the law concerning an intention to burn and an intention to eat, which do not combine, as stated in our Mishna, was not included merely so that another law could be inferred from it, but rather to teach us this very law of

eating and burning,

that an intention to burn and an intention to eat do not combine, this too

can be inferred from the inference of the first clause,

for we inferred in the first clause that the intentions must concern something fit for its purpose. Thus, if one intended to eat half an olive-bulk of sheyarei and half an olive-bulk of the kometz on the following day, this is not an intention of piggul. Since that is so, it is obvious that an intention to eat and an intention to burn will not combine.

Now, if

half an olive-bulk of sheyarei

and eating something that is not ordinarily eaten,

namely, half an olive-bulk of the kometz, where in both cases he formulated an intention to eat,

you say they do not combine, eating

half an olive-bulk of sheyarei

and burning

half an olive-bulk of the kometz, where the intentions also differ in the acts to be performed,

is it necessary to ask

whether they do not combine?!

And we answer:

Indeed, the clause “eating and burning” was necessary for it

for the Mishna to teach us that these two intentions do not combine; this cannot be learned from the law concerning an intention regarding something fit for its purpose. For

it might enter your mind to say

that only

there,

in the first clause, where he intended to eat half an olive-bulk of sheyarei and half an olive-bulk of the kometz,

he

is said not to combine them, since

he is formulating the intention not in the usual manner

with regard to half an olive-bulk of the kometz, since it is not ordinarily eaten, yet he intended to eat it.

But here,

in the latter clause,

with this

half an olive-bulk of sheyarei, concerning which he intended to eat,

he is formulating the intention in the usual manner, and with this

half an olive-bulk of the kometz, concerning which he intended to burn,

he is also formulating the intention in the usual manner; one might say that they should combine. Therefore, it teaches us

that the latter clause does not combine them.

We will return to you, chapter “All the Meal-Offerings.”

Mishna:

If one takes the kemitzah from the meal-offering,

and, at the time of taking the kemitzah, he had in mind

to eat its remainder, or to burn its kemitzah, on the following day, Rabbi Yosei concedes—

who later in the Mishna disagrees concerning one who has the intention of burning the frankincense—

in this case, that it is piggul, and one is liable to karet for it.

But if he took the kemitzah with the intention

of burning its frankincense on the following day, Rabbi Yosei says: It is invalid, but there is no liability of karet for it.

And the Sages say: It is piggul, and one is liable to karet for it.

They said to him

the Sages said to Rabbi Yosei:

What difference is there

[in what way does this differ]

between this,

the frankincense,

and the animal-offering,

for if one slaughtered an animal-offering with the intention of burning its sacrificial portions on the following day, it is piggul. If so, the same law should apply to the burning of the frankincense of a meal-offering, which is analogous to the burning of sacrificial portions; why is an intention concerning the burning of the frankincense, entertained while taking the kemitzah [which is analogous to slaughtering], ineffective in this regard?!

He said to them:

They are not comparable,

for the blood, flesh, and sacrificial portions of an animal-offering are one, whereas the frankincense is not part of the meal-offering.

This distinction will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses:

Why do I need the Mishna to teach

in the first clause,

“Rabbi Yosei concedes in this case”?

Why would there have been reason to think that he disagrees in this case?

And we answer:

Because it wanted to teach in the latter clause: “To burn its frankincense on the following day, Rabbi Yosei says: It is invalid, but there is no liability of karet for it.”

And if so,

you might say that Rabbi Yosei’s reason

in this case is

that he holds that one cannot render an offering piggul through an intention concerning half a permitting act,

and if one had the intention of piggul concerning the service of half a permitting act, this is not piggul. Since the burning of the kemitzah and the burning of the frankincense together permit the remainder, it follows that burning the frankincense is the service of “half a permitting act.” Therefore, if he had the intention to burn its frankincense on the following day, this is not piggul,

and

if this were so, it would follow that

even the first clause as well

would not be piggul, since burning the kemitzah is also the service of half a permitting act.