Menachot 13a — the Talmud in English

And from now:

this too

the Mishna above and the inference from our Mishna —

why do I need it?

If

it is said that this inference came to teach us:

to eat

something whose manner is to be eaten

and to eat something whose manner is not to be eaten do not combine,

this matter

from the beginning

of the Mishna

you learn it,

for above the Mishna stated the law of piggul specifically when he had the thought concerning something whose manner is to be eaten.

And

if

you say that the law of the thought of burning and eating, which do not combine, stated in our Mishna, did not come merely in order to infer another law from it, but came to teach this very law of

to eat and to burn,

that thoughts of burning and eating do not combine, this too

you learn from the inference of the beginning clause,

for we inferred at the beginning clause that the thoughts of eating and burning must be concerning something fit for that purpose; and if he thought to eat half an olive-bulk of remainders and half an olive-bulk of the handful tomorrow, this is not a thought of piggul. And since this is so, it is obvious that thoughts of eating and burning will not combine:

now, if to eat

half an olive-bulk of remainders

and to eat something whose manner is not to be eaten

namely, half an olive-bulk of the handful, in both of which he had a thought of eating,

you say that they do not combine; to eat

half an olive-bulk of remainders

and to burn

half an olive-bulk of the handful, where the thoughts also differ in their performance,

is it necessary

to say that they do not combine?!

And we answer:

yes; to eat and to burn was necessary for it

the Mishna, to teach us that these two thoughts do not combine, and you cannot learn this from the law of a thought concerning something fit for that purpose. For

it might have entered your mind,

specifically

there,

in the beginning clause, where he thought to eat half an olive-bulk of remainders and half an olive-bulk of the handful,

it

is that we said that they do not combine, since

he is thinking not in its ordinary manner

concerning half an olive-bulk of the handful, for its manner is not to be eaten, and he thought concerning it to eat;

but here,

in the final clause,

with this

half olive-bulk of remainders, concerning which he thought for eating,

he is thinking in its ordinary manner, and with this

half olive-bulk of the handful, concerning which he thought to burn,

he is thinking in its ordinary manner; say that they should combine; it teaches us

the final clause, that they do not combine.

We shall return to you, chapter “All the Meal-offerings.”

Mishna:

One who takes the handful from the meal-offering,

and thought at the time of taking the handful with the intention

of eating its remainder, or burning its handful, on the following day, Rabbi Yosei concedes —

who disputes later in the Mishna concerning one who thinks about burning the frankincense —

in this case that it is piggul, and one is liable to excision for it.

But if he took the handful with the intention

of burning its frankincense on the following day, Rabbi Yosei says: It is disqualified, but there is no excision for it.

And the Sages say: It is piggul, and one is liable to excision for it.

They said to him

the Sages, to Rabbi Yosei:

What has changed [that is, in what does this differ]

what is different in

this,

the frankincense,

from the sacrifice,

for if one slaughtered an animal sacrifice with the intention of burning its portions on the following day, this is piggul. If so, the same law should apply to the burning of the frankincense of a meal-offering, which is like the burning of the sacrificial portions; and why is the thought of burning the frankincense, which he thought at the time of taking the handful [which is like slaughtering], not effective!?

He said to them:

They are not comparable,

for the sacrifice—its blood, flesh, and sacrificial portions—are one, whereas the frankincense is not part of the meal-offering.

This distinction will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

And the Gemara discusses:

Why do I need it to teach

at the beginning

“Rabbi Yosei concedes in this case”?

Why would there have been room to think that he disputes this?

And we answer:

Because it wishes to teach at the end: “To burn its frankincense on the following day, Rabbi Yosei says: It is disqualified, but there is no excision for it.”

And if so,

what might you say, the reason of Rabbi Yosei

in this case is

because he holds that one does not cause piggul through half a permitting act,

and if one thought the thought of piggul concerning the service of half a permitting act, this is not piggul? Since the burning of the handful and the burning of the frankincense together permit the remainder, it follows that the burning of the frankincense is the service of “half a permitting act”; therefore, if he thought to burn its frankincense on the following day, this is not piggul,

and

if this is said, it follows that

even the beginning as well

would not be piggul, since the burning of the handful too is the service of half a permitting act.