Menachot 12b (יב:) — the Talmud in English

Rather,

and

for this reason Rabbi Hiyya did not teach the words “or an olive-bulk” even in the first clause, because

since

the latter clause, which deals with one who had the intention at the time of

placing the vessel

and

during the carrying and burning, he did not teach it

“or an olive-bulk” with regard to the remnants

for the reason stated, therefore in the first clause, which deals with one who

has

the intention at the time of the

taking to eat the remnants

the following day,

he likewise did not teach “or an olive-bulk.”

And now, after we have established that the Mishna is speaking of one who had a pigul intention with regard to remnants that became deficient,

and it teaches

with regard to this in the

latter clause

that it is

pigul, and one is liable to receive karet for it, it follows that the burning benefits remnants that became deficient

between the taking and the burning, and therefore pigul takes effect with regard to them!

The Gemara rejects this:

Abaye said to Rava:

The Mishna may always be understood as referring to remnants that became deficient, and the burning does not benefit them by making them subject to pigul or removing them from the prohibition of misuse. You cannot prove this from Rabbi Hiyya, because in the Mishna

it is not

speaking of a case in which the remnants became deficient and amounted to an olive-bulk, which is why Rabbi Hiyya did not teach “or an olive-bulk” in the latter clause.

Rather, the reason Rabbi Hiyya did not teach “or an olive-bulk” in his beraita is that

this

beraita

is according to

Rabbi Elazar,

who maintains that burning is not considered complete until he burns all of it.

As we learned: The handful

of an Israelite’s meal-offering,

and the frankincense

of a meal-offering,

and the incense

burned every day,

and a kohein’s meal-offering

offered by a kohein, whose law is that it is not taken by handful but is burned in its entirety,

and the anointed kohein’s meal-offering

the griddle-offering brought by the High Priest, which is burned in its entirety,

and the libation meal-offering

whose law likewise is that it is burned in its entirety—

if he offered an olive-bulk of one of them outside,

he is liable; but Rabbi Elazar exempts him until he offers all of it,

because Rabbi Elazar maintains that burning an olive-bulk is not considered burning.

And

now,

since with regard to burning the handful he did not teach him “or an olive-bulk from the handful outside,”

as it could not be taught in this manner, because since this is not considered burning, the intention does not render it pigul, for this reason

with regard to the remnants,

that is,

“to eat from its remnants outside”—

he likewise did not teach him “or an olive-bulk.”

And we challenge this:

If it is Rabbi Elazar,

and is

this

intention—

“in order

to burn its handful”—

rendering it pigul? But according to Rabbi Elazar, burning the handful alone is not considered burning until he also burns the frankincense; and if so,

he should have had to write “to burn its handful and its frankincense”

in the Mishna! For the intention renders it pigul only when he has the intention concerning the burning of both.

As we learned: If he offered the handful and the frankincense, one of them outside, he is liable; but Rabbi Elazar exempts him until he offers both?

And we answer: Our Mishna, which states that an intention concerning burning the handful alone renders the offering pigul, is speaking

of the handful of a sinner’s meal-offering,

which has no frankincense, and therefore this meal-offering becomes pigul through an intention concerning the burning of the handful alone. And what the Mishna states, that an intention concerning burning the frankincense alone renders the offering pigul, refers to the bread of the leḥem ha-panim, which has no handful, but only the burning of frankincense.

And we challenge this:

And

did

the tanna

—exert himself—

and

teach all this merely in order

to inform us of the handful of a sinner’s meal-offering!?

And we answer:

Yes. And when Rav Dimi came, he said in the name of Rabbi Elazar

[ben Pedat, the amora]: Our Mishna

is referring to the handful of a sinner’s meal-offering, and it is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar

[ben Shamua, the tanna,]

that is.

And we say:

Rava subsequently said: What I said is not correct—

what

I said,

that when remnants became deficient and he burned the handful over them, the burning benefits them with regard to pigul and misuse. Rather, certainly it does not benefit them.

As it was taught:

It is stated with regard to the bread of the leḥem ha-panim, “For

it is most holy

to him” [Leviticus 24], and from the word “it” we learn

that if one of them became split

from the loaves of the arrangement of the leḥem ha-panim,

all its loaves are disqualified

and must be burned. The reason is that the burning of the bowls is valid only when the entire meal-offering is intact; and since one of them became disqualified, there are not two complete arrangements, and the burning does not benefit them. It follows that it is specifically with regard to this disqualification of becoming split, whose status is like that of a meal-offering that became deficient, that the burning disqualifies all of them.

But if one went out

of its loaves beyond the curtains and became disqualified because of yotzei,

those that are inside

and did not go out

are valid

and are not disqualified because of the one that went out. For although one of them became disqualified because of yotzei, nevertheless the burning of the bowls is still considered a valid burning with regard to twelve loaves, since the burning of the bowls is considered effective even with regard to the one that went out. This is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that sprinkling benefits yotzei, and the burning of the bowls of a meal-offering takes the place of the sprinkling of the blood of an offering. It is thus evident that sprinkling can benefit even an item forbidden to be eaten, so that it is counted among those that were not disqualified. And now,

whom do you find who says that sprinkling benefits yotzei? It is Rabbi Akiva, and he says

that burning benefits specifically yotzei, but with regard to

becoming split, it does not

benefit it. Thus, burning does not benefit an item that is forbidden to be eaten because of deficiency, and the same applies to remnants that became deficient: burning does not benefit them.

Abaye said:

It is still possible that burning benefits remnants that became deficient, and you cannot bring proof from this beraita. For

does it explicitly teach

in the beraita

“but if one went out, those inside are valid,”

which would compel the beraita to follow the view of Rabbi Akiva? It is nothing more than an inference; and if so,

perhaps

the inference should be made as follows:

“But if it became impure,

the loaf,

the remaining ones are valid.

And

for what reason? Because the frontplate effects acceptance

for impurity.

But

with regard to

one that went out,

of them,

no,

the remaining ones were not rendered permitted,

and

the reason is that this beraita

is according to Rabbi Eliezer, who says that sprinkling does not benefit yotzei.

And if you will say: If so, why did the beraita not teach this law as well with regard to a loaf that went out? I will tell you:

It would indeed have been appropriate for it also to teach

that if

one went out

of them, all are disqualified.

And the reason it teaches “became split,”

rather than “went out,” is that

the beraita comes to teach us

that

even if it became split,

a loaf

that is inside

and did not go out beyond the courtyard, nevertheless

the burning does not benefit it.

But

in fact,

according to Rabbi Akiva, who says that sprinkling benefits yotzei,

it follows that

even

the disqualification of

deficiency is likewise benefited by burning, and this question concerning remnants that became deficient remains dependent on the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer as to whether sprinkling benefits yotzei.

Mishna:

If, during the procedures of the meal-offering, one had the intention

to eat half an olive-bulk

the following day

and to burn half an olive-bulk

the following day,

it is valid, for

the intentions of

eating and burning do not combine

to reach the measure of an olive-bulk.

Gemara:

The Gemara infers:

The reason

that these two intentions do not combine is

that they are “to eat” and “to burn, and an intention of eating and an intention of burning do not combine.

But

if one had the intention of half an olive-bulk

to eat

an item normally eaten, such as remnants,

and

half an olive-bulk

to eat an item not normally eaten,

such as the handful,

they combine!

Since in both cases he had an intention of eating. It is thus established that even an intention to eat on the following day an item not normally eaten—that is, an intention to eat the handful—renders the offering pigul. If so, this is difficult:

But did it not teach in the first clause

that if one had the intention

to eat an item normally eaten and to burn an item normally burned, it is pigul? This proves that specifically if he had the intention concerning

an

item normally eaten, yes,

it becomes pigul; but if he had the intention concerning an item

not normally eaten—

no,

he renders it pigul. If so,

who

is the

tanna

of the latter clause, who disagrees with the tanna of the first clause!?

And we answer:

Rav Yirmeya said: This

latter clause

is according to Rabbi Eliezer,

who says that one may formulate an intention from eating

an item designated for human consumption, such as remnants eaten by kohanim,

to the eating of the altar—

if he intended to burn on the altar the following day remnants, which are an item normally eaten and not normally burned, the intention renders the offering pigul.

And

likewise, one may formulate an intention

from eating

an item designated for the

altar,

such as the handful, which is normally burned,

to human eating—

if he intended to eat it the following day, he renders the offering pigul.

As we learned: If one took the handful of the meal-offering with the intention of eating an item not normally eaten or burning an item not normally burned, it is valid; but Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies it,

though one is not liable to receive karet for eating it.

Abaye said: You may even say

that our Mishna

is according to the Sages

and you can explain and infer it in a different manner.

Do not say

that the inference from what is stated—“he had the intention to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk”—is:

“But to eat

half an olive-bulk of an item normally eaten

and to eat

half an olive-bulk of

an item not normally eaten

combine.”

Rather, say

the inference is as follows: Specifically, eating half an olive-bulk on the following day and burning half an olive-bulk on the following day do not combine, because this is an intention of eating and that is an intention of burning.

But

if he had two intentions of eating, such as

eating

half an olive-bulk

and eating

another half an olive-bulk, and he had the intention concerning half an olive-bulk outside its time and half an olive-bulk outside its place, with both intentions involving

an item normally eaten, they combine to disqualify the offering!

And we challenge this answer:

And what does it come to teach us

by stating that two intentions of eating involving two half-olive-bulks combine to disqualify the offering? This matter is stated explicitly in the Mishna [above, on page 12a]:

to eat an olive-bulk outside and an olive-bulk the following day,

to eat

an olive-bulk the following day and an olive-bulk outside, a half-olive-bulk outside and a half-olive-bulk the following day, or a half-olive-bulk the following day and a half-olive-bulk outside—it is disqualified, but there is no liability for karet!?