Menachot 12a (יב.) — the Talmud in English

Pigul

is

and its consumers are liable for

its

karet,

as it is stated: “And the person who eats of it shall bear his iniquity” [Leviticus 7]. And they derived by means of a gezera shava from eating notar, concerning which it is stated: “And its consumers shall bear their iniquity”: Just as notar is subject to karet, so too is [an offering] outside its appointed time subject to karet.

The reason the Mishna did not mention a measure of “an olive-bulk” for the frankincense, as it did for the remainder and the kometz, is that the Mishna stated its words without qualification in accordance with the view that the frankincense is valid with a single grain, and an olive-bulk is not required for its burning.

They further derived that just as, in the case of an animal-offering, a thought invalidates the offering during any one of its four services—slaughtering, receiving [the blood] in a vessel, conveying [it], and sprinkling the blood—so too, in the case of a meal-offering, a thought invalidates the offering during any one of its four services. The Mishna therefore proceeds to specify during which services a thought invalidates.

This is the general principle: Whoever takes the kometz

of the meal-offering—for the taking of the kometz of a meal-offering corresponds to slaughtering in the case of an animal-offering—

or

who

places

it

in a consecrated vessel,

which corresponds to receiving the blood of an animal-offering in a vessel, or

conveys

it for burning, which corresponds to conveying the blood of an animal-offering, or

burns

it, corresponding to sprinkling the blood of an animal-offering, and he forms a thought during any one of these services

to eat something whose normal use is to be eaten

such as the remainder designated for eating,

or

to

burn something whose normal use is to be burned

such as the kometz, and he thought to do this

outside its place, it is invalid, but there is no karet for it;

but

if he thought to do it outside its appointed time, it is pigul, and one is liable for it כרת.

However, if he formed a thought of burning concerning the remainder designated for human consumption, or formed a thought of human consumption concerning the kometz and frankincense designated for burning, he did not render the offering pigul, because his opinion is disregarded as it is by all people.

Provided,

this invalidation of pigul resulting from a thought of “outside its appointed time,” for which one is liable for karet, applies only on the condition

that the permitting element is offered

namely, the kometz and the frankincense—

in accordance with its prescribed manner,

as though this were a valid meal-offering, so that it has no other invalidation besides pigul. But if, at the time the permitting element of the meal-offering was offered, it had another invalidation as well, the invalidation of pigul does not apply to it, and one is not liable for karet for eating it. This is derived from the fact that “It shall not be accepted” is stated with regard to pigul, while “It shall be accepted as an offering made by fire to the Lord” is stated with regard to a valid animal-offering. They expounded: Just as the acceptance of a valid offering is performed, so is the acceptance of pigul. And just as the “permitting element” of a valid animal-offering effects acceptance only when it has no other invalidation, so too the offering of the “permitting element” of pigul effects the invalidation of pigul only when it has no other invalidation. [The invalidation of pigul that entails karet applies only after the “permitting element” has been offered.]

How is the permitting element offered in accordance with its prescribed manner?

He took the kometz silently,

without forming a disqualifying thought at the time of taking the kometz, and

placed it in a vessel, conveyed it, and burned it—

all of these with a thought of

outside its appointed time,

or he took the kometz

with a thought of outside its appointed time

and

placed it in a vessel, conveyed it, and burned it silently, or he took it, placed it in a vessel, conveyed it, and burned it—

all of these with a thought of

outside its appointed time; this is [a case in which] the permitting element was offered in accordance with its prescribed manner,

as there was no other invalidation besides the thought of “outside its appointed time.”

How was the permitting element not offered in accordance with its prescribed manner?

He took the kometz

with a thought of

outside its place,

and

placed it in a vessel, conveyed it, and burned it

with a thought of

outside its appointed time, or he took the kometz

with a thought of

outside its appointed time

and

placed it in a vessel, conveyed it, and burned it outside its place, or he took it

and

placed it in a vessel, conveyed it, and burned it outside its place—

meaning that he performed one of these services with a thought of outside its place and the other three services with a thought of outside its appointed time—

this is [a case in which] the permitting element was not offered in accordance with its prescribed manner,

since, in addition to the thought of pigul, “outside its appointed time,” he also formed another disqualifying thought, of outside its place.

There are meal-offerings in which there can be an additional invalidation that removes them from the category of pigul, such as a meal-offering invalidated because it was not performed for its designated purpose. This refers to

the sin-offering meal-offering and the meal-offering of jealousy whose kometz was taken not for their designated purposes

and

he placed it in a vessel, conveyed it, and burned it outside its appointed time, or he took the kometz outside its appointed time

and

placed it in a vessel, conveyed it, and burned it not for its designated purpose, or he took it, placed it in a vessel, conveyed it, and burned it not for its designated purpose,

for in all these cases the meal-offering is invalidated because it was performed not for its designated purpose, and there is another invalidation in addition to the thought of pigul. Therefore,

this is [a case in which] the permitting element was not offered in accordance with its prescribed manner,

and the invalidation of pigul does not apply to them; there is no karet for eating their remainder. However, with the other meal-offerings, a thought that they were not being performed for their designated purpose does not remove them from the category of pigul, since such a thought does not invalidate them.

Until now we have dealt with a case in which one formed a thought of outside its appointed time during one service and of outside its place during another, and we said that in such a case the thought of outside its place removes the offering from the category of pigul. The Mishna now states that the same law applies when he formed both thoughts during a single service, for example, when he thought

to eat an olive-bulk outside

and

an olive-bulk tomorrow,

or

an olive-bulk tomorrow

and

an olive-bulk outside.

In this case as well, the meal-offering is removed from the category of pigul, since it included a thought of outside its place. Likewise, if he thought of

approximately half an olive-bulk outside

and

approximately half an olive-bulk tomorrow,

or

approximately half an olive-bulk tomorrow

and

approximately half an olive-bulk outside,

in all these cases it is

invalid

and there is no karet for it.

Rabbi Yehuda disputes the first tanna with regard to an olive-bulk tomorrow and an olive-bulk outside:

Rabbi Yehuda said: This is the general principle: If the thought of time

namely, outside its appointed time—

preceded the thought of place,

namely, outside its place, the later thought of place does not remove the offering from the earlier thought of time; rather, it is

pigul, and one is liable for it karet.

Only

if the thought of place preceded the thought of time, it is invalid and there is no karet for it,

in accordance with the first tanna, since one always follows the first thought.

And the Sages say: Both this and that are invalid, and there is no karet for it.

Rabbi Yehuda’s view applies not only when he formed the two thoughts during two services; even if he formed both of them during a single service, one follows the first thought. Therefore, the Mishna brought the law of “an olive-bulk tomorrow, an olive-bulk outside” in the context of a single service, to teach you that Rabbi Yehuda disputes even in this case.

Indeed, with regard to one who thought of half an olive-bulk outside its appointed time and half an olive-bulk outside its place, Rabbi Yehuda concedes that there is no pigul, because a thought invalidates or renders an offering pigul only when one thought of an olive-bulk. The reason the meal-offering is invalidated is that the two thoughts concerning the two half-olive-bulks combine to invalidate it.

Gemara:

They raised a dilemma before them: According to the opinion of the one who says

[namely, Rabbi Yoḥanan, above 9a]

the remainder

of a meal-offering

that became diminished between the taking of the kometz and its burning,

so that only an olive-bulk remained of it,

one burns the kometz over it

[For although in the case of an animal-offering the law is: “If there is no meat, there is no blood,” and the same applies to a meal-offering—if there is no remainder, there is no burning of the kometz—this applies specifically when nothing remains; but when an olive-bulk remains, he may burn it.]

And we hold

[there 9b]

that this remainder is forbidden to be eaten

[as it is stated: “And that which remains of the meal-offering shall be for Aaron and his sons,” and they expounded: “And not that which remains of what remained.” This olive-bulk is what remains of the remainder that had remained from the kometz.]

what benefit do they derive

from these remainders

from the burning—

for example, he burned the kometz with the intention of eating the remainder outside its appointed time—

to establish them as pigul?

Is it said that since he burns the kometz with permission, this is like any fully valid burning, so that if he formed a thought of outside its appointed time with regard to a meal-offering, it is established as pigul through this burning? Or perhaps, since these remainders are not eaten, this is like one who thinks of eating tomorrow something whose normal use is not to be eaten, with regard to which the thought does not invalidate?

And

similarly, one may raise a doubt concerning remainders that became diminished, when he burned the kometz silently:

whether this burning removes them

this burning with regard to the remainders

from

the law of

misuse of consecrated property.

Is it said that since permission was granted to burn it, this is like any fully valid burning that removes the remainders from the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, as explained in Me'ila [9a], that there is no misuse of consecrated property with regard to remainders, since they have a time when they are permitted to the priests? Or perhaps, since they are not eaten, they are like something that has no permission for the priests and does not leave the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property?

Rav Huna said:

Even according to Rabbi Akiva, who says

[in Me'ila 7a] that

the sprinkling

of the blood

is effective

also

for

meat that went outside the curtains and became invalid because of

“that which went outside,”

making it something that has permission for the priests and removing it from liability for misuse of consecrated property—even though the sprinkling does not permit it to be eaten, since it is invalid because it went outside—nevertheless, one cannot compare that case to our matter [and say that since burning is analogous to the sprinkling of the blood, just as sprinkling is effective for that which went outside, so burning is effective for an offering invalidated because its remainders became diminished]. For

these words

apply in the case of the invalidation of

that which went outside,

because

the

meat

is intact

and there is no deficiency in its substance,

and it is invalid because of another factor,

namely, the air of Jerusalem, which invalidates it when it goes outside.

But

in our case, namely,

the deficiency

of the remainder,

for the invalidation is intrinsic

to the meal-offering,

the burning is not effective for it

to remove it from the status of misuse of consecrated property.

Rava said to him: On the contrary, even according to Rabbi Eliezer,

who disagrees with Rabbi Akiva, and

who says that the sprinkling is not effective for an item that has gone outside

to remove it from the status of me'ila, you can say that he agrees with regard to sheyarei that became deficient. For

this statement applies only to an item that has gone outside, which is not inside,

since it has gone outside; therefore, the sprinkling is not effective for it,

but with regard to deficiency

of a meal-offering, since

it is present

—the meal-offering—

inside

and has not gone outside the Temple courtyard, therefore

the burning is effective for it,

and Rabbi Eliezer holds that the disqualification of an item that has gone outside is more severe than the disqualification of deficient sheyarei.

Rava said: From where do I say this

that the burning of a meal-offering that became deficient is effective with regard to piggul and me'ila?

As we learned in the Mishna: One who takes the kometz of the meal-offering

with the intention

of eating its sheyarei outside, or an olive-bulk of its sheyarei outside, etc.; and Rabbi Hiyya taught

the following version of this Mishna: “

One who takes the

kometz of the meal-offering

to eat its sheyarei outside,”

and he did not teach

the words

“or an olive-bulk”

—neither with regard to the kometz nor with regard to the sheyarei, whether concerning the disqualification of outside its place or concerning piggul through an intention of outside its time. Ostensibly,

what is the reason he did not teach “or an olive-bulk”

with regard to the intention to eat the sheyarei on the following day? Is it

not

because the tanna who taught this clause holds that the statement later in the Mishna, “And one who places it in a vessel, and one who carries it, and one who burns it, with the intention of eating a certain item, etc., outside its time,” also refers to a case in which he had an intention concerning an olive-bulk or half an olive-bulk,

for example, where the sheyarei became deficient

between kemitza and the burning

and were reduced to an olive-bulk,

and he said: “I am placing it in a vessel, carrying it, and burning it with the intention of eating that olive-bulk of sheyarei on the following day.” [Therefore, the tanna taught at the beginning, “or an olive-bulk,” for the sake of the later clause, to teach that even when the sheyarei became deficient and remained the size of an olive-bulk, the intention renders them piggul]. Although the kemitza service included in this later clause cannot be established in this manner, since if the meal-offering became deficient before kemitza, it is disqualified and can no longer be fixed as piggul, nevertheless, the other three services can be established in this manner, where the sheyarei became deficient.

The reason Rabbi Hiyya did not teach this way is that once we have established the intention in the three services as referring to a case in which the meal-offering had already become deficient and the sheyarei had been reduced to an olive-bulk, it is impossible to teach “or an olive-bulk”—that is, an intention concerning the remaining olive-bulk—except with regard to an intention to eat it by a person, namely, to eat the sheyarei. But with regard to an intention concerning the consumption of the altar mentioned there, that is, an intention concerning the kometz, it is not applicable to teach this wording, because the law is that a kometz that became deficient disqualifies the meal-offering, and an intention concerning it does not render it piggul.

Indeed, the beginning of the Mishna, which deals with the intention at the time of kemitza, certainly does not refer to a case where the sheyarei became deficient, since if the sheyarei became deficient before kemitza, the meal-offering is disqualified; and if so, it would have been possible to teach there “or an olive-bulk.”