Menachot 102b (קב:) — the Talmud in English

And the Sages say:

it shall graze until it becomes blemished

[a blemish develops in it],

and

then

it shall be sold, and its proceeds shall be allocated for a free-will offering.

Rabbi Eliezer says:

He shall sacrifice

the guilt-offering,

as, if it does not come for this sin, it comes for another sin

that is unknown to him.

And

if, after it was slaughtered

the guilt-offering—but before its blood was sprinkled—

he learned

that he had not sinned:

The blood shall be poured out,

as it is non-sacred animal meat,

and the flesh shall be burned,

in accordance with the law of non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard.

And if he learned this after

the blood had been sprinkled:

The flesh may be eaten,

like other guilt-offerings. This is because at the time of the sprinkling, which effects atonement, there was still uncertainty; and a provisional guilt-offering is initially brought to effect atonement for a case of uncertainty.

Rabbi Yosei says:

Even

if he learned it while

the blood was still

in

the bowl—

the blood shall be sprinkled,

the blood,

and the flesh may be eaten.

And Rava said,

to explain the rationale of Rabbi Yosei, who does not consider it non-sacred animal meat:

Rabbi Yosei stated his ruling in accordance with the approach of Rabbi Shimon, as he said

Rabbi Shimon:

Anything that is destined to have its blood sprinkled is considered as though its blood had already been sprinkled,

and just as when the blood has been sprinkled this is not non-sacred animal meat in the Temple courtyard, but the flesh may be eaten, so too, even when it is merely destined to have its blood sprinkled, it is not non-sacred animal meat; rather, the blood shall be sprinkled and the flesh may be eaten.

If so, this is difficult for Rav Naḥman and Rav Ashi, who hold that we do not say: “If he wishes, he may sprinkle it”!

And we answer:

Is that the rationale

[and is Rabbi Yosei’s rationale the same as the one just explained]? But:

In the West

[in Eretz Yisrael]

they said in the name of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina:

This is Rabbi Yosei’s rationale:

Because

he holds

that once he places the blood in a service vessel,

service vessels consecrate invalid offerings—

with regard to an invalidity of the type under discussion here—

initially, so that they may be sacrificed.

He said

in astonishment

to Rav Kahana, Rav Ashi,

according to Rava’s reasoning that Rabbi Yosei stated his ruling in accordance with the approach of Rabbi Shimon:

According to Rabbi Shimon, since

“anything that is destined to have its blood sprinkled is considered as though its blood had already been sprinkled,”

according to Rava’s reasoning, we should likewise say:

“Anything that is destined to be burned is considered as though it had already been burned.”

If so, this is difficult:

Remnant and the cow—

with regard to which Rabbi Shimon said that they impart food impurity, as explained above on page 102b—

why do they impart food impurity,

since they are considered as though burned and

are merely dust

[they are merely dust]?!

He said to him,

Rav Kahana to Rav Ashi:

The affection of the Sanctuary renders them fit,

to be considered food. This is similar to what we find with regard to wood and frankincense: They are not food, yet they become susceptible to impurity because the affection of the Sanctuary renders them fit.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi:

Granted that it is effective for them—

for the frankincense and wood, and likewise for the remnant and the cow—

the affection of the Sanctuary with regard to their intrinsic disqualification,

meaning that they themselves become impure when they come into contact with impurity; but

with regard to designating them as impure, so that one counts a first degree and a second degree of impurity through them, is it also effective for them?!

That is, does the affection of the Sanctuary render them impure and capable of imparting impurity to others? If they come into contact with a primary source of impurity, will they become first-degree impure, so that if they touch other food, that food becomes second-degree impure, as is the case with any first-degree impure item?!

But if so,

resolve

the question

that Reish Lakish raised:

Dry

meal-offering material

[it is dry flour that has not been mixed with oil and has not yet been rendered susceptible to impurity through liquid; its impurity is due to the affection of the Sanctuary]—

does one count a first degree

of impurity through it

and a second degree

of impurity,

or does one not count a first and second degree through it?

If your statement is correct—that what we learned with regard to remnant and the cow, that they impart food impurity, is due to the affection of the Sanctuary—then it follows that it is impure and imparts impurity to others!

And we answer: In fact, what we learned—that they impart food impurity—is due to the affection of the Sanctuary. Indeed, this is not merely a disqualification; it is impurity that can impart impurity to others. Nevertheless, this does not resolve Reish Lakish’s question, because—

when Reish Lakish raises his question—

whether the dry meal-offering material is impure due to the affection of the Sanctuary or is merely disqualified—

it is with regard to a Torah ruling,

but

when we say

that the remnant and the cow are impure and impart impurity, it is

by rabbinic law.

Mishna:

One who says,

“It is incumbent upon me

to bring a meal-offering

in a pan,”

and he brought it in a deep pan—

or he said, “It is incumbent upon me

in a deep pan,”

and he brought it in a pan—

in either this case or that case,

what he brought, he brought,

as we say that he did not bring it for the purpose of his vow, but it is another free-will meal-offering,

and he has not fulfilled his obligation.

If a tenth of an ephah of flour was placed before him, and he said,

“This—

this tenth of an ephah—

is incumbent upon me to bring in a pan,”

and he brought

the tenth of an ephah

in a deep pan—

or he said, “This is to be brought

in a deep pan,”

and he brought

it

in a pan—

in either this case or that case,

it is disqualified,

as he designated this particular tenth of an ephah to be brought in a different vessel.

One who says,

“It is incumbent upon me to bring two tenths of an ephah in one vessel,”

which is one large meal-offering requiring one handful,

and he brought

the two tenths of an ephah

in two vessels,

which are two meal-offerings requiring two handfuls—

or he said, “It is incumbent upon me to bring two tenths of an ephah

in two vessels,”

and he brought

them

in one vessel—

what he brought, he brought,

as he brought it for the purpose of another free-will offering,

and he has not fulfilled his obligation.

If two tenths of an ephah were before him and he said,

“These

I undertake

to bring in one vessel,”

and he brought

them

in two vessels—

or he said, “These I undertake to bring

in two vessels,”

and he brought

them

in one vessel—

in either this case or that case,

these are disqualified.

And if he said,

“It is incumbent upon me to bring two tenths of an ephah in one vessel,”

and he brought them in two vessels,

and

they said to him:

“You

vowed to bring it in one vessel,”

and he did not respond to them, “I am bringing it as another meal-offering,” and

he sacrificed them

These

in two vessels—

These are

disqualified,

as he did not intend another meal-offering, but the meal-offering that he had vowed to bring, and he brought it improperly; therefore, it is disqualified.

But if he heard them and sacrificed it

in one vessel,

these are

valid.

And if he said,

“It is incumbent upon me to bring two tenths of an ephah

in two vessels,”

and he brought them in one vessel,

and

they said to him:

“You

vowed to bring them in two vessels”—

and he divided them and

sacrificed them in two vessels,

these are

valid.

But if he

placed them in one vessel,

they are

like two meal-offerings that became intermingled: If he can take a handful from each one independently, they are valid; and if not, they are disqualified.

and it is necessary for the Mishna to teach both clauses, so that it will teach that if he specified the vessel at the time of his vow—including the type, size, and number of vessels—his specification is binding and he may not change it. This is because:

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “It is incumbent upon me to bring it in a pan,” and he brought it in a deep pan; “in a deep pan,” and he brought it in a pan—the obligation was not fulfilled; “It is incumbent upon me to bring two tenths of an ephah in one vessel,” and he brought them in two vessels; “in two vessels,” and he brought them in one vessel—the obligation was not fulfilled:

The Gemara explains:

And it is necessary

for the Mishna to teach us both cases, that if he specified the vessel at the time of his vow—meaning the type, size, and number of vessels—his specification is binding and he may not change it. This is because:

If it had taught us only the first case

[the first clause], in which he changed the type of vessel, I would say that it is specifically in this case that he has not fulfilled his obligation,

because

he

said “in a pan,” but he brought it in a deep pan,

which is a change of vessel—

but here,

in the latter clause,

both this and that were in a pan, and both this and that were in a deep pan,

[both his specification and the manner in which he brought it involved the same type of vessel], and the change was only in the number of vessels—

I might say

[I would say] that

he also fulfilled his vow.

And if it had taught us

only

this

[the latter clause], I would say that it is only

because he divided it

[one meal-offering into two meal-offerings] that he did not fulfill his obligation,

but there,

in the first clause—where he changed the type of vessel—

he did not divide it,

but merely changed the vessel—

I might say: No,

the change should not invalidate it, and he should fulfill his obligation—

Therefore,

it is necessary

to teach both laws.

The Sages taught:

One who changes the vessel or the number of vessels:

what he brought, he brought, but he has not fulfilled his vow,

as explained in the Mishna.

Rabbi Shimon says:

Whether he changed the vessel or changed the number of vessels,

he also fulfilled his vow,

because in his opinion he cannot specify in which vessel or in how many vessels he will bring the meal-offering; rather, he may bring it as he wishes.

We learned in the Mishna:

“This is to be brought in a pan,”

and he brought it in a deep pan—it is disqualified. And we challenge the Mishna’s ruling that the meal-offering is disqualified,

but it was taught in a baraita:

“This is to be brought in a pan,” and he brought it in a deep pan,

they did not consecrate it

for the meal-offerings, in

service vessels

in which he placed it to consecrate it; rather, it remains non-sacred and is not a disqualified meal-offering, contrary to our Mishna?!

He said

in answer,

Abaye:

They did not consecrate it

the service vessels

for sacrifice

with the changed vessel,

but they did consecrate it

the service vessels, in order

to render it disqualified.

And

he said

further, Abaye:

They taught

that if he specified bringing it in a pan, he may not change it to a deep pan and conversely—