Menachot 102a (קב.) — the Talmud in English

And

also

if he wished, he could have sprinkled [if he wished, he could have sprinkled] without rendering it piggul,

and

nevertheless

it teaches that it does not impart the ritual impurity of food;

and according to Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning, this is difficult: they already had a period of fitness before he rendered it piggul, because:

Does it not mean

that the beraita is discussing

one who rendered it piggul during the sprinkling

, and they had a period of fitness before the sprinkling!? And we answer:

No

, the beraita is discussing a case such as

one who rendered it piggul during slaughter.

And we challenge this:

But

if he

rendered it piggul during the sprinkling—

according to your words—

what?

Is it likewise the case that it imparts the ritual impurity of food

, since it is destined to be sprinkled and is considered as though it had already been sprinkled, with the result that it had a period of fitness!? If so, this is difficult:

Rather than teaching

the tanna of the beraita:

One who rendered a meal piggul causes it to impart the ritual impurity of food

because it had a period of fitness,

let him distinguish [let the tanna make a distinction]

the tannaitic author

within it [within the sacrificial animal itself]

and say:

In what case are these matters stated

, that a sacrificial animal rendered piggul does not impart the ritual impurity of food? Only in a case such as

one who rendered it piggul during slaughter

, when it did not have a period of fitness.

But if he rendered it piggul during the sprinkling

, when it had a period of fitness, because anything destined to be sprinkled is considered as though it had already been sprinkled, then it

imparts the ritual impurity of food!?

And we answer: The tanna could indeed have found a distinction even within a sacrificial animal, but

it was necessary for him to teach the case of one who rendered a meal piggul

, because the tanna wished to teach us a novel point: that it imparts the ritual impurity of food, and the novelty is:

That even though he rendered it piggul during the removal of the handful, for the removal of the handful from a meal is

equivalent

to slaughter

in the case of an animal,

it is considered

as though he had rendered the animal piggul during slaughter, in which case it would not have imparted the ritual impurity of food, and I would have thought that the same law applies to a meal when he rendered it piggul during the removal of the handful, so that it does not impart the ritual impurity of food;

even so, it does impart the ritual impurity of food, since it had a period of fitness

from the outset

before the meal was consecrated.

Rav Ashi said:

I stated the matter before Rav Naḥman

, I presented to Rav Naḥman the difficulties arising from the beraita, which appears to indicate that sacrificial offerings fit for sprinkling do not impart the ritual impurity of food; and Rav Naḥman said to me:

You may even say

that what we taught, “that remained overnight before the sprinkling,” means

that it actually remained overnight

, that is, it remained overnight before the sprinkling itself, and not as we explained above, namely, that it remained overnight before it became fit to be sprinkled.

And you may even say

that the latter clause of the beraita is to be understood as referring to a case such as

one who rendered it piggul during the sprinkling

, and not during slaughter; nevertheless, it is understandable that it does not impart the ritual impurity of food, even though it is fit to be sprinkled validly, and we do not say that it is considered as though it had already been sprinkled, just as we say that anything destined to be redeemed is considered as though it had already been redeemed. For:

Since

if he wished, he could redeem it

, it is considered as though it had been redeemed; indeed,

said

Rabbi Shimon, that it lacks only the verbal act of redemption. But

if he wished, he could sprinkle it

, it is considered as though it had already been sprinkled—

we do not

say this

, since it lacks an act of sprinkling.

The following objection is raised

against what Rav Ashi and Rav Naḥman said, that we do not say, “if he wished, he could sprinkle it”:

Rabbi Yehoshua stated a general principle:

Any

sacrificial animal

that

became disqualified and

had

before it became disqualified

a period during which it was permitted to the priests, there is no misuse of consecrated property with regard to it; and any that did not have

before it became disqualified

a period during which it was permitted to the priests, there is misuse of consecrated property with regard to it.

And which

disqualified animal is one that had

a period during which it was permitted to the priests?

One that remained overnight, one that became impure, and one that left

, since before it became impure or left, it was permitted to the priests once its blood had been sprinkled; and even when it became disqualified because it remained overnight, it had a period during which it was permitted to the priests, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

And which is it

that is a disqualified animal that

did not have a period during which it was permitted to the priests: One that was slaughtered

with the intention of performing its sacrificial service or eating it

beyond its designated time and beyond [or beyond]

its appointed place, and one whose blood was received and sprinkled by disqualified persons,

its designated place, and one whose blood was received or sprinkled by disqualified persons

, since these disqualifications already existed before the sprinkling that permits it to the priests.

In any event, the first clause teaches: One that remained overnight, one that became impure, and one that left

—this is a disqualified animal that had a period during which it was permitted to the priests—

and

does this not mean one that actually remained overnight

, that is, the entire animal remained overnight, both the meat and the blood, because he did not manage to sprinkle the blood before it remained overnight and became disqualified; and it is called an animal that had a period during which it was permitted to the priests because the blood was fit to be sprinkled—

But here—

the blood still had not been sprinkled, but

if he wished, he could have sprinkled it, and

nevertheless

it teaches that there is no misuse of consecrated property with regard to it

, since it had a period during which it was permitted because it was fit to be sprinkled. We have therefore learned that we say, “anything destined to be sprinkled is considered as though it had already been sprinkled,” which presents a difficulty to Rav Ashi and Rav Naḥman, who said otherwise!?

And we answer:

No

, the beraita is not dealing, as you understood its interpretation, with a case in which the blood remained overnight before the sprinkling. Rather, the beraita is dealing with a case in which the animal remained overnight while it was

fit to leave and fit to become impure

, meaning after the sprinkling.

And we challenge this:

But if it remained overnight

actually

, meaning that the entire animal, both the meat and the blood, remained overnight before the blood was sprinkled,

what

will the law be, according to your words?

Is there likewise misuse of consecrated property

, since it did not actually have a period of fitness?

If so,

this

that it teaches: “

Any that had a period during which it was permitted to the priests, and any that did not have a period during which it was permitted to the priests

,” which implies that it had a time at which it was fit to be permitted, but was not actually permitted, presents a difficulty, because: “

Any that has a period during which it is permitted to the priests has no misuse of consecrated property with regard to it, and any that does not have a period during which it is permitted to the priests has misuse of consecrated property with regard to it,”

which implies that it has an actual period of permission—

For you are saying: When it has an actual period of permission, there is no misuse with regard to it; but when it does not have an actual period of permission, it is not enough that there was a possibility that it would become permitted!?

Rather, Rav Ashi said

to resolve the difficulty: In this beraita, which deals with misuse of consecrated property, the case is indeed one in which it actually remained overnight, and this is because it was destined to be sprinkled. Nevertheless, there is no difficulty, because:

Are you bringing a proof concerning ritual impurity from the law of misuse of consecrated property [are you challenging the law of ritual impurity of food from the law of misuse of consecrated property], saying: Since with regard to misuse of consecrated property we say, “anything destined to be sprinkled is considered as though it had already been sprinkled,” and consequently the law of misuse has lapsed, the same should apply to ritual impurity of food, so that it is considered as though it had been sprinkled? The cases are not comparable:

For

misuse of consecrated property is due to sanctity, and it is not sanctity [the law depends on sanctity], and

and

once its sanctity has lapsed, by what means could it return to rest upon it [once the sanctity of the animal has lapsed because it is destined to be sprinkled, how could sanctity return to it]—

But

ritual impurity

is

due to whether it is food or not food [due to whether it bears the status of food or does not bear the status of food]

itself

, and therefore:

Where it has not been rendered food [if it has not actually become food],

that is, through the sprinkling,

it does not impart the ritual impurity of food.

Any transgression for which one is liable to karet when committed intentionally and a sin-offering when committed unwittingly, and one is uncertain whether he sinned unwittingly—for example, there were before him two pieces, one ḥelev and one permitted fat, and he thought that both were permitted fat and ate one, and later learned that one was ḥelev but does not know which one he ate—he brings an uncertain guilt-offering, which protects him from suffering until he learns the truth and brings a sin-offering.

The following objection is raised

from the Mishna in Keritot 23b against Rav Ashi and Rav Naḥman, who say that we do not say, “anything destined to be sprinkled is considered as though it had already been sprinkled”:

As we learned:

One who brings an uncertain guilt-offering

because he is uncertain whether he sinned,

and it becomes known

to

him that he did not sin [because that piece was the permitted fat, while the other was the one that was ḥelev], what should he do?

If, before the guilt-offering was slaughtered,

the fact

became known to him, he takes it out and lets it graze among the herd

, with his other animals, since it is non-sacred because he did not sin.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.