Menachot 102a — the Talmud in English

And

also

if he wished, he could throw [if he wished, he would throw] without pigul,

and

nevertheless

it teaches that it does not contract impurity of food;

and according to the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon, this is difficult: surely they already had a time of fitness before he rendered it pigul, for:

What, is it not

the beraita

dealing with one who rendered it pigul through the throwing

and they had a time of fitness before the throwing!? And we answer:

No,

the beraita does not deal with this situation, but with a case such as

one who rendered it pigul through slaughtering.

And we raise an objection to this:

But

if

he rendered it pigul through the throwing—

according to your words—

what?

Is it likewise the case that it contracts impurity of food,

since it is destined to be thrown and is considered as thrown, and it follows that it had a time of fitness!? If so, this is difficult:

Rather than the tanna teaching

the tanna of the beraita:

If he rendered a meal-offering pigul, it contracts impurity of food

since it had a time of fitness,

let him distinguish

[let the tanna divide]

within it

[within the consecrated animal itself] and say:

In what case are these words stated,

that a consecrated animal does not contract impurity of food when it has been rendered pigul? Only in a case such as

one who rendered it pigul through slaughtering,

when it did not have a time of fitness;

but if he rendered it pigul through the throwing,

when it had a time of fitness because of the principle that anything destined to be thrown is considered as thrown, then it

contracts impurity of food!?

And we answer: Indeed, the tanna could have found a distinction even within the consecrated animal, but

“if he rendered a meal-offering pigul” was necessary for him,

the tanna wished to teach us a novelty: that it contracts impurity of food, and the novelty is:

That even though he rendered it pigul through the taking of the handful, for the taking of the handful from a meal-offering is

corresponding to

slaughtering

in an animal,

considered,

and if he had rendered it pigul through slaughtering an animal, it would not have contracted impurity of food, and I would have thought that the same law applies to a meal-offering when he rendered it pigul through the taking of the handful, that it does not contract impurity of food,

even so, it contracts impurity of food, since it had a time of fitness

from the outset

before the meal-offering became consecrated.

Rav Ashi said:

I stated the teaching before Rav Naḥman,

I presented before Rav Naḥman the difficulties from the beraita, from which it appears that consecrated animals fit to have their blood thrown with fitness do not contract impurity of food; and Rav Naḥman said to me:

Even if you say,

that what we taught, “that remained overnight before the throwing,” means

that it remained overnight literally,

that is, literally before the throwing, and not as we explained above, namely, that it remained overnight before it was fit to be thrown,

and even if you say

that the conclusion of the beraita is to be explained as referring to a case such as

one who rendered it pigul through the throwing

and not through slaughtering, nevertheless it is understandable that it does not contract impurity of food, even though it is fit to be thrown with fitness, and we do not say that it is considered as thrown, as we say that it is considered as redeemed; for:

Since

if he wished, he could redeem it,

it is considered as redeemed, indeed

said

Rabbi Shimon, for it lacks only the speech of redemption; but

if he wished, he could throw it,

it is considered as thrown

we do not

say,

since it lacks the act of throwing.

It was raised as an objection

to what Rav Ashi and Rav Naḥman said, that we do not say “if he wished, he could throw it”:

Rabbi Yehoshua stated a general rule:

Every

consecrated animal

that

became disqualified and

had

before it became disqualified

a time of permission for the priests does not have the prohibition of misuse applied to it; and any that did not have

before it became disqualified

a time of permission for the priests has the prohibition of misuse applied to it.

And which

is the disqualified animal that had

a time of permission for the priests?

One that remained overnight, one that became impure, and one that left,

for before it became impure or left it was permitted to the priests once its blood had been thrown; and even when it became disqualified because it remained overnight, it had a time of permission for the priests, as he proceeds to explain.

And which is it

that is the disqualified animal that

did not have a time of permission for the priests: one that was slaughtered

with the intention of performing its service or eating it

outside its time and outside

[or outside]

its place, and one whose blood was received and thrown by disqualified persons,

for these disqualifications had already been present in it before the throwing that permits it to the priests.

At any rate, it teaches in the first clause: “one that remained overnight, one that became impure, and one that left,”

this is a disqualified animal that had a time of permission for the priests—

and

what, is it not one that remained overnight literally,

that is, the entire animal remained overnight, both the meat and the blood, because he did not manage to throw the blood before it remained overnight and became disqualified; and it is called as having had a time of permission for the priests because the blood was fit to be thrown—

but here—

for the blood still had not been thrown, but

if he wished, he could have thrown it, and

nevertheless

it teaches that the prohibition of misuse does not apply to it,

because it had already had a time of permission since it was fit to be thrown; we have thus learned that we say, “Anything destined to be thrown is considered as thrown,” and this is difficult for Rav Ashi and Rav Naḥman, who said otherwise!?

And we answer:

No,

not as you understood the interpretation of the beraita, that it deals with a case in which the blood remained overnight before the throwing; rather, the beraita deals with a case in which the animal remained overnight while it was

fit to leave and fit to become impure,

that is, after the throwing.

And we raise an objection to this:

But if it remained overnight

literally,

that the entire animal, the meat and the blood, remained overnight before it was thrown,

what

will the law be, according to your words?

Is it likewise the case that the prohibition of misuse applies

since it did not have an actual time of fitness—

If so,

this

that it teaches: “

Any that had a time of permission for the priests, and any that did not have a time of permission for the priests”—

which implies that it had a time suitable for permitting it, but it was not actually permitted—is difficult, for: “

Any that has a time of permission for the priests does not have the prohibition of misuse applied to it, and any that does not have a time of permission for the priests has the prohibition of misuse applied to it,”

which implies: it has an actual time of permission—

for you are saying: If it has an actual time of permission, the prohibition of misuse does not apply to it; but when it does not have an actual time of permission, it is insufficient that there was a possibility that it would have permission!?

Rather, Rav Ashi said

to resolve the difficulty: In this beraita, which deals with the prohibition of misuse, it indeed means that it remained overnight literally, and because it is destined to be thrown; nevertheless, there is no difficulty, for:

Are you raising the law of misuse against impurity [are you raising a difficulty from the law of misuse against the law of impurity of food], saying: Since with regard to the prohibition of misuse we say, “Anything destined to be thrown is considered as thrown,” and because of this the law of misuse is removed, the same law should apply, that it becomes impure with impurity of food as something thrown? The matter is not comparable to the proof:

For

misuse is because of sanctity, and it is not sanctity [the law depends on this], and

and

once its sanctity has departed, by what can it again be mounted upon it [once the sanctity of the animal has departed because it is destined to be thrown, how can sanctity return upon it]—

but

impurity

is

because of food, and it is not food [because of the status of food, or because it does not have the status of food]

itself,

and therefore:

where he does not make it food [if it does not actually become food],

that is, through the throwing,

it does not contract impurity of food.

Any transgression for which one is liable to karet when intentional and a sin-offering when inadvertent, and he is uncertain whether he sinned inadvertently—for example, two pieces were before him, one forbidden fat and one ordinary fat, and he thought that both were ordinary fat and ate one, and it became known to him that one was forbidden fat, but he does not know which one he ate—he brings a provisional guilt-offering, and it protects him from suffering until it becomes known to him and he brings a sin-offering.

It was raised as an objection

from a Mishna in Keritot 23b against the words of Rav Ashi and Rav Naḥman, that we do not say that anything destined to be thrown is considered as thrown:

For we learned:

One who brings a provisional guilt-offering

because he is uncertain whether he sinned,

and it became known

to

him that he did not sin [because that piece was ordinary fat, and the other was the one that was forbidden fat], what shall he do?

If, before the guilt-offering was slaughtered,

the guilt-offering,

it became known to him, he goes out and grazes in the herd

with his other animals, for they are ordinary animals, since he did not sin.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.