Meilah 6a (ו.) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara cites a beraita from which to establish the view of the one who says that the criterion is permission to eat.

ta shma,

we learned:

Rab

bi

Shimon says: There is notar for which one is liable for misuse,

[meat of kodshei kodashim that remained after the time permitted for its consumption,]

and there is notar for which one is not liable for misuse.

How so? If it remained

the

meat,

before the zerika,

[meaning that he did not perform the zerika until the following day,]

one is liable for misuse .

And if it remained

after the zerika,

meaning that he performed it properly on the day of its offering,

one is not liable for misuse.

In any event, it teaches,

we learned that although there had been permission to perform the zerika,

one is liable for misuse.

Does this

not

mean that he received the blood while

there was time to sprinkle it,

that he had sufficient time to do so,

for, had he wished, he would have sprinkled it,

meaning that he delayed the zerika until after sunset?

And infer from this

that

“permission to eat”

is what we learned.

For according to the one who says “permission to sprinkle,” it is difficult: Why did it not leave the status of misuse, since it had reached the point of permission to sprinkle?

We reject this:

No!

There is no proof from this beraita, because the beraita is speaking of a case in which he received it

—he received it

meaning that he received the blood

close to sunset ,

when there was no time to sprinkle it,

and thus there had been no permission to sprinkle it.

We raise an objection:

But if

there

was time, what

would be the status of the notar?

Would it likewise be the case that one is not liable for misuse,

because there had been permission to sprinkle?

If so, this is difficult: If Rabbi Shimon wished to distinguish between notar for which one is liable for misuse and notar for which one is not liable,

why specifically did he teach

that one is liable in the case of

before the zerika?

Let him teach

the distinction by stating that if he received it

before sunset,

so that there was time to sprinkle it, one is not liable for misuse, whereas if he received it

close to sunset, when there was no time to sprinkle it, one is liable for misuse .

We answer:

We answer:

This too is what he teaches.

That is, this is indeed his intention. When he says “before the zerika,” he means that he received it

before it became fit for sprinkling,

namely, close to sunset,

and

when he says “after the zerika,” he means

after it became fit for sprinkling,

when there had been time to sprinkle it.

The Gemara cites a beraita similar to the preceding one, in order to establish the view of the one who says: permission to eat.

ta shma,

we learned:

Rabbi Shimon says: There is pigul for which one is liable for misuse, and there is pigul for which one is not liable for misuse.

How so?

If he rendered the offering pigul

before the zerika, one is liable for misuse,

but if he rendered it pigul

after the zerika,

that is, he rendered it pigul through the zerika,

one is not liable for misuse.

In any event, it teaches,

we learned that if he rendered it pigul

before the zerika,

and there had been permission to sprinkle it,

one is liable for misuse.

Does this

not

mean that he received it properly,

when there was time to sprinkle it, for, had he wished,

if he had wanted to,

he would have sprinkled it,

and there had already been permission to sprinkle it?

And

nevertheless

it teaches: one is liable for misuse,

because it never reached a valid zerika.

And infer from this

that Rabbi Shimon holds: “

Permission to eat is what we learned !”

We reject this:

No!

There is no proof from the beraita, because the beraita is speaking of a case in which he received it close to sunset,

when there was no time to sprinkle it,

and consequently it never reached permission to sprinkle, as stated above.

We raise an objection:

But if

there

was time to sprinkle it, what

would be the status of the offering?

Would it likewise have left

the status of

misuse!

If so, this is difficult: If Rabbi Shimon wished to distinguish between pigul for which one is liable for misuse and pigul for which one is not liable,

why specifically did he teach

that the case in which one is not liable is when he rendered it pigul

after the zerika?

Let him teach

a distinction within the case of “before the zerika”: If he received it

before sunset,

it left the status of misuse, since there had been permission to sprinkle,

and if he received it

if he received it

close to sunset ,

it did not leave the status of misuse.

We answer:

This too is what he means.

That is indeed his intention. When he says “before the zerika,” he means

before it became fit for sprinkling,

close to sunset. Therefore, one is liable for misuse, since it did not reach permission to sprinkle. And when he says “after the zerika,” he means

after it became fit for sprinkling,

when there had been time to sprinkle it. Therefore, one is not liable for misuse, since there had been permission to sprinkle.

The Gemara cites another beraita to establish the view of the one who says “permission to eat.”

ta shma

from what we learned:

With regard to pigul of kodshei kodashim, one is liable for misuse.

What

is the meaning of the beraita? Does it

not mean that he had already

sprinkled ,

and had reached permission to eat, yet one is nevertheless liable for misuse because he had rendered it pigul? And had he not rendered it pigul, it would have left the status of misuse through the zerika.

And infer from this: “

Permission to eat”

is what we learned.

We reject this:

No!

There is no proof from the beraita, because the beraita is speaking of a case in which

he had not sprinkled it .

We raise an objection:

But if he had already

if he had already

sprinkled it, what

would be the status of the offering?

Would it likewise be the case that one is not liable for misuse!

Since it had already left the status of misuse, according to the one who says “permission to sprinkle.”

If so, this is difficult: When the tanna wished to distinguish between a case in which one is liable for misuse and one in which one is not liable,

why specifically did he teach

in the latter clause:

With regard to kodashim kalim, one is not liable for misuse,

and the pigul did not cause it to become subject to misuse?

Let him teach

the distinction within kodshei kodashim themselves, where there is one case in which one is liable for misuse and another in which one is not liable.

Here,

where he rendered it pigul

before the zerika,

and it did not leave the status of misuse through a zerika performed with pigul;

and here,

where he rendered it pigul

after the zerika,

and it left the status of misuse from the moment there was permission to sprinkle?

We answer:

This is what it comes to teach:

The tanna comes to teach a major novelty:

“Every case of bringing in,”

the sacrificial portions of kodashim kalim, which the zerika causes to become subject

to misuse, a properly performed zerika

without pigul

brings them into the status of misuse,

whereas a zerika performed with pigul does not bring them into that status. And

“every case of removing,”

kodshei kodashim , which the zerika removes from the status

of misuse, even

a zerika performed with pigul, which is

not performed properly, nevertheless removes them,

and likewise removes them

from the status of misuse.

And it is not like Rav Giddel

!