Meilah 6b — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

It is explained in the preceding Mishna that sacrificial meat of the most sacred sacrifices leaves the status of misuse from the time of the sprinkling of the blood, and the sacrificial portions of sacrifices of lesser sanctity acquire the status of misuse through the sprinkling of the blood.

Our Mishna discusses sacrificial meat of the most sacred sacrifices that went out [that they took it out] from the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, and the meat became disqualified [and this is called “that which went out”], and afterward the blood was sprinkled: is there misuse of it? The tannaim disagreed about this.

They likewise disagreed whether there is liability concerning the meat on account of pigul, notar, and impurity.

And in the latter clause, they disagreed concerning the sacrificial portions of sacrifices of lesser sanctity that went out before the sprinkling of the blood.

Sacrificial meat of the most sacred sacrifices that went out before the sprinkling of the blood,

and afterward he sprinkled the blood,

Rabbi Eliezer says: There is misuse of it.

For he held: “Sprinkling is not effective for that which went out, to remove it from the status of misuse.”

And there is no liability for it on account of pigul, notar, or impurity.

Sacred meat that became pigul, or that remained after the time allotted for eating it, or that became impure: one who eats it intentionally is liable to karet and lashes, and unintentionally is liable to a sin-offering [and for a thought of outside its place, lashes alone].

And since the meat became disqualified through “that which went out,” and the sprinkling is not effective for it, therefore, if in addition to its having gone out it also became pigul, or remained, or became impure, and he ate it, he is not liable.

Rabbi Akiva says: There is no misuse of it,

because the sprinkling is effective for “that which went out,” as will be explained.

And there is liability

for it on account of pigul, notar, and impurity. .

Rabbi Akiva said:

proof for my words that the sprinkling is effective for “that which went out”:

But consider one who set aside his sin-offering and it was lost, and he set aside

a sin-offering

another in its place, and afterward the first was found, and behold, both of them are standing

before him—that is, he slaughtered both of them, and their law is that if he wishes, he sprinkles from this one, and if he wishes, he sprinkles from that one [nevertheless, the second is a sin-offering whose owner achieved atonement through another sacrifice, and it is disqualified],

Is it not the case that

just as its blood exempts its meat

from the law of misuse,

so does it exempt the meat of its fellow

from the law of misuse, even though it is disqualified?!

If so, it may be learned:

if its blood exempted the meat of its fellow from misuse,

it is a

kal va-chomer

that it should exempt its own meat,

when it became disqualified through “that which went out” .

The sacrificial portions of sacrifices of lesser sanctity that went out

outside the Temple courtyard,

before the sprinkling of the blood,

and afterward he returned them and sprinkled the blood,

Rabbi Eliezer says: There is no misuse of them,

because the sacrificial portions have still not been clarified to be “the sacred things of the Lord,” since the sacrifice became disqualified through “that which went out,” and the sprinkling of the blood is not effective for “that which went out” to bring them to the status of misuse.

And there is no liability for them on account of pigul, notar, and impurity,

as explained in the first clause.

Rabbi Akiva says: There is misuse of them,

and the sprinkling is effective to bring them to the status of misuse.

And there is liability for them on account of pigul, notar, and impurity.

Gemara:

The general principle in his Mishna is: according to Rabbi Eliezer, the sprinkling is not effective for that which went out, and according to Rabbi Akiva, it is effective.

This dispute has consequences for the law of misuse and for the law of liability for pigul, notar, and impurity, both with regard to the most sacred sacrifices and with regard to sacrifices of lesser sanctity.

And the Gemara clarifies:

And why do I need these two?

Why did the Mishna need to inform us of their dispute both with regard to the most sacred sacrifices and with regard to sacrifices of lesser sanctity?

They are necessary!

The Mishna needed to inform us of both, and if it had informed us of one of them, we would not have learned the other,

for if it were stated

only

with regard to the most sacred sacrifices, we might have said,

we would have said:

in this case,

with regard to the most sacred sacrifices alone,

Rabbi Eliezer says: There is misuse of it, because

only

sprinkling

in a valid sacrifice, and it is

as prescribed, removes from the status of misuse,

whereas sprinkling in a disqualified sacrifice, and it is

not as prescribed, does not remove from the status of misuse,

But,

in the concluding clause, concerning lesser sanctity offerings, where the sprinkling comes

to include,

to bring the sacrificial portions

to the status of meila,

it might have entered one’s mind to say that Rabbi Eliezer

agrees with Rabbi Akiva that even

a sprinkling that is

not in accordance with its proper procedure does bring them,

that it has the power to bring them

to the status of meila.

The Mishna teaches us that Rabbi Eliezer also disagrees in the case of lesser sanctified offerings, and holds that the sprinkling is not effective even to bring them under the law of misuse. And on the other hand, if it was stated, if the Mishna had taught us only the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva regarding lesser sanctified offerings alone, one might have thought, that is, we would have said: Regarding lesser sanctified offerings only, is it that Rabbi Akiva says that one is liable for misuse, because he holds that even a sprinkling of an offering that went out, which is a sprinkling not performed properly, has the power to bring the sacrificial portions under the law of misuse, but in the first clause, concerning most-sacred offerings, where the sprinkling

The Mishna teaches us that Rabbi Eliezer also disputes [the matter] concerning lesser sanctity offerings, and holds that the sprinkling is not effective even to bring [the sacrificial portions] to the status of meila.

And

on the other hand,

if it was stated,

if the Mishna had taught us the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva

only concerning lesser sanctity offerings,

it might have entered our minds,

we would have said:

Concerning lesser sanctity offerings

only,

is it that Rabbi Akiva says that one commits meila with them,

because he holds

that even a sprinkling

of “that which went out,” which is a sprinkling

not in accordance with its proper procedure, does bring them,

that it has “power” to bring the sacrificial portions

to the status of meila. But,

in the opening clause, concerning

most holy offerings, where

the sprinkling

is to remove,

comes to remove the flesh from the status of meila,

we would say that Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Eliezer that this sprinkling, which is

not in accordance with its proper procedure, does not remove,

that it has no “power” to remove

it from the status of meila.

It teaches us,

the Mishna teaches us that Rabbi Akiva disputes [the matter] even concerning most holy offerings.

And from now on, they disputed both concerning most holy offerings and concerning the sacrificial portions of lesser sanctity offerings. Therefore, the Mishna was taught in “two [instances].”

The Gemara continues to discuss the words of Rabbi Akiva.

It was stated: Rabbi Yohanan said: When

did

Rabbi Akiva say, “

sprinkling is effective for that which went out”?

Only

when part of it went out,

and the sprinkling is effective for the part that remained in the Temple court; and since the sprinkling is effective for the part that is inside, it is also effective for the part that went out, with regard to removing [the offering] from the law of meila.

But

if

all of it went out

The reason is that Rabbi Akiva derived his law from the case of one who designates an animal as a sin-offering . There, the sprinkling was effective at least with regard to that sin-offering itself, and since this was so, it was also effective—with regard to the law of misuse—for the second one. Consequently, this can be derived from it only where the sprinkling was effective, at least with regard to part of it. The passage concerning forming an intention regarding that which was lost or burned Rav Asi said to Rabbi Yohanan: Our colleagues in the Diaspora have already taught us:

entirely ,

Rabbi Akiva did not say

that the sprinkling should be effective for it.

And the reason is that Rabbi Akiva derived his law from one who designates a sin-offering , and there the sprinkling was effective, at least, for this sin-offering itself; and since this is so, it was effective—with regard to the law of meila—also for the second one. Therefore, it is possible to derive from it only in a case where the sprinkling was effective, at least, for part [of it].

The discussion of forming an intention concerning what was lost and what was burned

Rav Asi said

to Rabbi Yohanan: Our colleagues in the Diaspora have already taught us: