Meilah 6b (ו:) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

It was explained in the preceding Mishna that sacrificial offerings of the highest degree of sanctity cease to be subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property from the time of the sprinkling of the blood, while the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity become subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property through the sprinkling of the blood.

Our Mishna discusses the flesh of offerings of the highest degree of sanctity that went out—or that was taken out—from the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, and the flesh thereby became disqualified; this is what is called yotze—that which went out. Afterwards, the blood was sprinkled. The question is whether one who misuses this flesh is liable. The tannaim disagree about this.

They likewise disagree as to whether the flesh carries liability for piggul, notar, and impurity.

In the final clause, they disagree concerning the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that went out before the sprinkling of the blood.

The flesh of an offering of the highest degree of sanctity that went out before the sprinkling of the blood

and afterwards the blood was sprinkled,

Rabbi Eliezer says: One who misuses it is liable.

This is because he holds that “sprinkling does not benefit that which went out, to remove it from the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.”

And one is not liable on its account for piggul, notar, or impurity.

If consecrated flesh became piggul, or remained after the time allotted for its eating, or became impure, one who eats it intentionally is liable for karet and lashes, while one who eats it unintentionally is liable to bring a sin-offering [and for the intention of eating it outside its designated place, he is liable only to lashes].

Since the flesh was disqualified as yotze, and the sprinkling does not benefit it, if, in addition to having gone out, it also became piggul, remained beyond its time, or became impure, one who eats it is not liable.

Rabbi Akiva says: One who misuses it is not liable,

because sprinkling benefits that which went out, as will be explained.

And one is liable

on its account for piggul, notar, and impurity.

Rabbi Akiva said:

Here is proof for my position, that sprinkling benefits that which went out:

And is it not the case with one who designated his sin-offering, and it was lost, and he designated

another sin-offering

in its stead, and afterwards the first one was found, and both of them were standing before him—that is, he slaughtered both of them—and the law is that if he wishes, he sprinkles the blood of this one, and if he wishes, he sprinkles the blood of that one [nevertheless, the second is a sin-offering whose owner achieved atonement through another offering, and it is disqualified],

is it

not just as the blood of one exempts its flesh from the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property,

so does it exempt the flesh of the other from that prohibition, even though the other offering is disqualified ?

If so, one may derive:

If its blood exempted the flesh of the other from the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property,

the

kal va-chomer

is that it should exempt its own flesh,

when it became disqualified as yotze.

The sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that went out

outside the Temple courtyard

before the sprinkling of the blood,

and afterwards they were returned and the blood was sprinkled,

Rabbi Eliezer says: One who misuses them is not liable,

because the sacrificial portions had not yet been designated as “the sacred things of the Lord,” since the offering became disqualified as yotze, and sprinkling the blood does not benefit yotze by making it subject to the prohibition of misuse.

And one is not liable on their account for piggul, notar, or impurity,

as explained in the first clause.

Rabbi Akiva says: One who misuses them is liable,

and the sprinkling benefits them by making them subject to the prohibition of misuse.

And one is liable on their account for piggul, notar, and impurity.

Gemara:

The general principle in the Mishna is this: According to Rabbi Eliezer, sprinkling is not effective for yotze, while according to Rabbi Akiva, it is effective.

This dispute has consequences for the law of misuse of consecrated property and for liability concerning piggul, notar, and impurity, both with regard to offerings of the highest degree of sanctity and with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity.

The Gemara inquires:

And why do I need these two cases?

Why did the Mishna need to teach us their dispute both with regard to offerings of the highest degree of sanctity and with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity?

Both are necessary!

The Mishna needed to teach both cases; had it taught only one of them, we would not have been able to derive the other.

For if it were stated

only

with regard to offerings of the highest degree of sanctity, I might have said,

we would have said:

In this case,

only with regard to offerings of the highest degree of sanctity,

Rabbi Eliezer says: One who misuses it is liable, because

only

sprinkling

in the case of a valid offering, when it is

performed properly, removes it from the prohibition of misuse,

whereas sprinkling in the case of a disqualified offering, when it is

not performed properly, does not remove it from the prohibition of misuse,

But

in the latter clause, concerning lesser sanctified offerings, where the sprinkling comes

to include

bringing the sacrificial portions

to the status of misuse—

it might have entered one's mind to say that Rabbi Eliezer

agrees with Rabbi Akiva that even

a sprinkling that is

not performed properly can bring them

and has the power to bring them

to the status of misuse.

The Mishna teaches us that Rabbi Eliezer disputes the matter even with regard to lesser sanctified offerings, and holds that the sprinkling is not effective even to bring them to the status of misuse. And

conversely,

if it was stated

that the Mishna teaches only the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva

with regard to lesser sanctified offerings alone,

one might have thought

we would say:

It is specifically with regard to lesser sanctified offerings

that

Rabbi Akiva says that there is liability for misuse of them,

because he holds

that even a sprinkling

of “that which went out,” which is a sprinkling

not performed properly, can bring them

and has the “power” to bring the sacrificial portions

to the status of misuse. But

in the first clause, concerning

most sacred offerings, where

the sprinkling

serves to remove,

comes to remove the meat from the status of misuse,

we would have said that Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Eliezer that this sprinkling, which is

not performed properly, cannot remove

and has no “power” to remove it

from the status of misuse.

It teaches us

that the Mishna teaches that Rabbi Akiva disputes the matter even with regard to most sacred offerings.

From this point onward, they disagree both with regard to most sacred offerings and with regard to the sacrificial portions of lesser sanctified offerings. Therefore, the Mishna was stated in “two [separate] cases.”

The Gemara continues to discuss the words of Rabbi Akiva.

It was stated: Rabbi Yohanan said: When

did

Rabbi Akiva say “

the sprinkling is effective for that which went out”?

Specifically, when

part of it went out,

and the sprinkling is effective for the part that remained in the Temple courtyard; and since the sprinkling is effective for the part inside, it is also effective for the part that went out, with regard to removing it from the status of misuse.

But

if

all of it went out

Rabbi Akiva did not say

that the sprinkling is effective for it.

The reason is that Rabbi Akiva derived his law from the case of one who designates an animal as a sin-offering . There, the sprinkling was effective at least with regard to that sin-offering itself, and since this was so, it was also effective—with regard to the law of misuse—for the second one. Consequently, this can be derived from it only where the sprinkling was effective, at least with regard to part of it. The passage concerning forming an intention regarding that which was lost or burned Rav Asi said to Rabbi Yohanan: Our colleagues in the Diaspora have already taught us:

entirely ,

Rabbi Akiva did not say

that the sprinkling should be effective for it.

And the reason is that Rabbi Akiva derived his law from one who designates a sin-offering , and there the sprinkling was effective, at least, for this sin-offering itself; and since this is so, it was effective—with regard to the law of meila—also for the second one. Therefore, it is possible to derive from it only in a case where the sprinkling was effective, at least, for part [of it].

The discussion of forming an intention concerning what was lost and what was burned

Rav Asi said

to Rabbi Yohanan: Our colleagues in the Diaspora have already taught us: