Meilah 5b — the Talmud in English

If so,

so too here

, the Mishna of Meila as well, concerning what it taught, “disqualified persons received,” should interpret it as

not specifically

, and the essential novelty is “disqualified persons threw it”, because the tanna of our Mishna holds, “permission to eat”! And even if fit priests received it, since disqualified persons threw it, and it did not come to the permission for the kohanim to eat it, one commits meila with it.

And the proof brought by Rabbi Zeira, that we taught permission for throwing, is rejected.

Rav Asi said

: If so

, that in both Mishnayot, here in Meila and there in Zevahim, there are duplicate, superfluous expressions, and one of them is “not specifically,”

why do I need to teach two

, why were both of them taught in superfluous expressions?

Granted, if one of them is precise, then it is possible to say that the other was taught in a similar style, as is the way of the Mishna. But if you say that both are “not specifically,” it is difficult: why were they taught in superfluous expressions?

Rather

, Rav Asi concludes:

Always

, it is possible to say

that

the Mishna of

Meila

is

specific, and the Mishna speaks of a case in which the disqualified persons both received and threw it [as will be explained],

and the Mishna is speaking of a case in which the invalid people both received the blood and sprinkled it, as will be explained.

And

if you say: Why do I need both of them? That is, the offering had already become disqualified through the disqualified persons’ receiving it, so why did the Mishna teach, “and disqualified persons threw it”?

This teaches us

, for the Mishna comes to teach us another law,

and it is:

that a disqualified person

, one who is disqualified for the service,

makes what remains

. If he received the blood and threw it, the blood remaining at the animal’s neck becomes “what remains.” This “what remains” is no longer fit to be thrown. Therefore, even if a fit kohen subsequently receives the remaining blood and throws it, it is nothing.

And thus the Mishna is interpreted: The reason that the offering is disqualified, and a subsequent receiving and throwing will not help it [and therefore it does not leave the status of meila], is because the blood has already been thrown by a disqualified person,

Even though

at the beginning

a disqualified person

received and threw it, and

afterward

a fit person received and threw it, it is nothing

. What is the reason?

Because

they are what remains

, they are the remainder of disqualified blood,

Whereas if the disqualified person had still not thrown the blood, but the disqualified person had only received it, and “the blood of the life” remained at the animal’s neck [blood fit for the throwing of offerings], the fit person may receive and throw it again, and the offering will be fit and will leave the status of meila!

And this is why the Mishna taught the duplication of the expression, “disqualified persons received it and threw its blood”: to inform us that this is the reason why there is no “repair” for the offering, and therefore it does not leave the status of meila.

And since the Mishna of Meila is precise, and contains no superfluous expressions, therefore the Mishna concerning the sin-offering also taught this expression, in a style identical to the Mishna of Meila.

Or, the Mishna concerning the sin-offering also comes to teach us the same novelty The garment does not require washing, since the sin-offering became disqualified and has no repair, since the blood has already been thrown; but if it still had a repair, and they indeed repaired it, it requires washing.

And now there is no proof at all from our Mishna, and the question has not been resolved. For one may infer from it, as Rabbi Zeira inferred, in accordance with the one who says permission for throwing; but conversely, it is possible to interpret it as Rav Asi interpreted it, in accordance with the one who says permission for eating.

Before the Gemara brings beraitot to prove when offerings of the most sacred order leave the status of meila—whether at the time of slaughter, receiving, or throwing—the Gemara discusses the law that “a disqualified person makes what remains”.

And we raise a difficulty against Rav Asi: How did he interpret the Mishna as the obvious matter, that “a disqualified person makes what remains”?

But did Resh Lakish not ask Rabbi Yohanan: “A disqualified person”

, one who is disqualified for the service, if he received and threw,

what

, what is the law,

that he should make what remains

, can a fit kohen return and receive and throw it, and the offering will be fit?

And the sides of the uncertainty are: Shall we say that since the disqualified person threw the blood, he gave the blood remaining at the animal’s neck the status of “what remains,” and it is no longer fit to be thrown? Or shall we say that the throwing of a disqualified person has no “power” to make the remaining blood “what remains,” and the fit person may return and receive and throw it, and the offering will be fit?

And he said to him

, Rabbi Yohanan to Resh Lakish:

There is no matter

, there is no disqualified throwing

that makes what remains, except

a throwing with the intention of

outside its time or outside its place

, and what is the reason?

Since

a throwing of pigul

effects acceptance for their pigul, and the Torah establishes the pigul [as explained above 2b and 3b], and since it bears the name “throwing” and is not like merely pouring water, therefore it makes the remnants of the blood “what remains,” and the fit person can no longer return and throw the “what remains”,

and the Torah establishes the piggul, and since this act has the status of “sprinkling” rather than being merely like pouring water, it renders the remaining blood “remainder,” so that a valid priest can no longer sprinkle that “remainder” .

is it not so

, did Rabbi Yohanan not resolve:

except for a disqualified person

, only when it was thrown with a disqualifying intention; in contrast, when other disqualified persons threw the blood, their throwing is not throwing, and it is like merely pouring water, and the blood did not become “what remains,” and the fit person may return and receive and throw it?

And it is difficult concerning Rav Asi, who infers from our Mishna, as the obvious matter, that all disqualified persons make “what remains”?

And we answer:

No!

Rabbi Yohanan did not exclude a disqualified person, but rather:

Even a disqualified person

makes what remains, just as an intention outside its time or outside its place makes “what remains.”

And we wonder: How is it possible to say this in Rabbi Yohanan’s words?!

But

“there is no matter”

he teaches

: Rabbi Yohanan explicitly said that no disqualification makes what remains, except for an intention outside its time or outside its place?

And we answer:

This is what he is saying

, this is what Rabbi Yohanan said:

There is no matter

that does not effect acceptance in a

communal

offering and makes what remains, except outside its time and outside its place,

but an impure person, who exists in a communal

offering

and does,

makes

what remains.

That is, a disqualification of this kind, which is valid in a communal offering, such as an impure person, makes what remains. Since his service is valid in a communal offering, his throwing therefore makes “what remains” even in an individual offering, in which his service is entirely disqualified, because in any event his throwing has some significance,

That is, an invalid person who is valid for a communal offering, such as an impure person, renders the remainder. Since his service is valid in a communal offering, his sprinkling renders the blood “remainder” even in an individual offering, in which his service is entirely invalid. Nevertheless, his sprinkling has some legal significance.

whereas

the other disqualified persons

, such as blemished persons,

who are not present in the community

, who are not fit even in a communal offering,

do not make

, they do not make

what remains

, and their throwing is not throwing at all. The exception is an intention outside its time or outside its place: the disqualification applies even in a communal offering, and nevertheless it makes what remains, since it effects acceptance for their pigul.

And it is resolved: Now Rabbi Yohanan too holds that an impure person makes what remains, and our Mishna, from which Rav Asi inferred that a disqualified person makes what remains, speaks of an impure person. And since he both received and threw, it therefore did not leave the status of meila; whereas if he received alone, there would still be a possibility of removing it from the status of meila, when the fit person returned, received it, and threw it.

The Gemara returns to bring a proof from a beraita for the one who says: permission for throwing.

Come and hear

, we learned:

The pigul

, an offering that became pigul, does not leave the status of meila, and

one always commits meila with it.

Through which service did it become pigul? Is it

not

that it became pigul through slaughter or receiving,

for he did not throw

, and he had still not thrown the blood?

And

since it is also possible to interpret the beraita as referring to its becoming pigul through receiving, therefore:

learn from it

, it is possible to learn from it that it holds

we taught permission for throwing!

The reason one commits meila in it is only because it became pigul; had it not become pigul, it would have ceased to be subject to meila through the receiving, according to the one who says that throwing renders it permitted!

For if it held that slaughter renders it permitted, it would already have ceased to be subject to meila through the slaughter, and it would not again become subject to meila through a disqualified receiving.

And if it held that it does not cease to be subject to meila until after the throwing, according to the one who says: the permitting of eating, it is difficult: why did the beraita state as the reason that one commits meila that the offering became pigul? In any event, it would not have ceased to be subject to meila, since the blood had still not been thrown.

And we reject this:

No!

The beraita is speaking

where he threw it , and since he rendered it pigul, therefore it did not cease to be subject to meila; but if he had not rendered it pigul, it would have ceased to be subject to meila after the throwing, because the beraita holds: the permitting of eating.

and since he had formed an improper intention, it did not cease to be subject to misuse. Had he not formed an improper intention, it would have ceased to be subject to misuse after the sprinkling, because the beraita follows the view that permission for eating is what ends the prohibition of misuse.

And what,

and what is the meaning of what the beraita said: "

forever" ?

This teaches us,

the beraita comes to teach us

in accordance with Rav Giddel,

for Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: A throwing of pigul does not remove

offerings of highest sanctity

from meila, and it does not bring

lesser holy offerings

to a state of meila.

And the beraita teaches us that one commits meila in it, and the throwing did not remove it from meila.