Meilah 5a — the Talmud in English

Or, we are stating the permission of the sprinkling.

for from the time that they were fit for sprinkling, such as when the blood was received validly, there is no misuse of them [even though afterward they became disqualified], since they were fit for sprinkling, it is considered as though the blood had been sprinkled and their status as “sacred offerings of the Lord” departs from them

or, we are stating the permission of eating,

for only after the blood was sprinkled validly, and they became fit for the eating of the priests, do they leave the category of misuse .

And the Gemara resolves

Hezekiah said: permission of slaughter

is what we state

we state .

Rabbi Yohanan said: permission of eating is what we state.

The Gemara cites our Mishna to raise a difficulty against the words of Rabbi Yohanan, and also because it is not precise according to the words of Hezekiah.

Rabbi Zeira said: our Mishna is not precise, neither according to Hezekiah nor according to Rabbi Yohanan .

since it had acquired the permission to be sprinkled, and can we not conclude from this that we learned that the decisive time is when sprinkling is permitted?

We learned

in our Mishna: “Which is one that had a time of permission for priests?”

One that remained overnight, became impure, or went out,

What ,

what is the meaning of “one that remained overnight”? Is it

not that the blood remained overnight,

after it was received in the vessel,

and

concerning this

it teaches: there is no misuse of it,

since it had permission for sprinkling,

and infer from it: we are stating permission of sprinkling?

That is, if the interpretation of the Mishna is that the blood remained overnight and was not sprinkled, it is certainly difficult for Rabbi Yohanan, who holds that the offering leaves the category of misuse only if it was sprinkled as prescribed. Why, then, did the Mishna say that before the sprinkling it had already left the category of misuse

? But for Hezekiah there is no contradiction from the Mishna. Nevertheless, it is not precise, for it said, “its blood remained overnight,” and did not state a greater novelty: that immediately after it was slaughtered, even if the blood was not received validly, there is no misuse of it.

And although the difficulty is also against Hezekiah, nevertheless, the principal difficulty is against Rabbi Yohanan.

And we reject:

No!

There is no proof from the Mishna, because it can be established as referring to

meat that remained overnight, but the blood

already

was sprinkled

to the kohanim? Those that were slaughtered outside their designated time or outside their designated area, and those whose blood was received by disqualified people and whose blood was sprinkled.

, for this reason,

since the meat became disqualified after it had reached permission of eating, therefore

it teaches

that

there is no misuse of it.

this is difficult: Why do I need both? That is, one of the two—either “disqualified people received the blood” or “disqualified people sprinkled it”—is unnecessary and superfluous. For if the blood became disqualified when a ritually impure person or a person with a physical defect received it, and therefore the offering did not cease to be subject to misuse of sacred property, according to the one who says that the decisive time is when sprinkling is permitted, it is difficult: Why did the Mishna teach, “or disqualified people sprinkled it”? And if the blood was not disqualified when it was received, but only when it was sprinkled, and therefore the offering did not cease to be subject to misuse of sacred property, according to the one who says that the decisive time is when eating is permitted, it is difficult: Why did the Mishna teach, “or disqualified people received it”? Even if qualified people had received it, the offering would likewise not have ceased to be subject to misuse of sacred property, since it had not yet become permitted for eating. Nor can one answer that the Mishna follows the opinion that the decisive time is when eating is permitted and comes to teach the principle “not only this, but even that”: not only when disqualified people received the blood does the offering not cease to be subject to misuse of sacred property, but even when qualified people received it, since disqualified people sprinkled it, the offering does not cease to be subject to misuse of sacred property.

The Gemara continues to prove the view of the one who says “permission of sprinkling,” from the final clause of the Mishna .

,

we learned,

“And which is one that did not have a time of permission

for priests? One that was slaughtered outside its time or outside its place, and that disqualified persons received and sprinkled its blood.”

Rather, the Mishna was compelled to add “and sprinkled its blood,” because if it had stated only “disqualified people received the blood” [according to the questioner, who maintains that the decisive time is when sprinkling is permitted], one might have mistakenly said that it mentioned receiving the blood because this is the first sacrificial procedure performed by the kohanim, and that it did not mean receiving the blood specifically.

What are the circumstances,

what is the Mishna speaking about?

If disqualified persons received it or disqualified persons sprinkled it,

it is difficult:

why do I need two?

That is, one of the two—either disqualified persons received it or disqualified persons sprinkled it—is not specifically necessary and is superfluous.

For if it became disqualified through the receiving, where an impure person or a blemished person received it, and therefore it did not leave the category of misuse, according to the one who says “permission of sprinkling,” it is difficult: why did we learn, “or disqualified persons sprinkled it”? And if it did not become disqualified through the receiving, but through the sprinkling, and therefore it did not leave the category of misuse, according to the one who says “permission of eating,” it is difficult: why did we learn, “or disqualified persons received it”? Is it not the case that even if fit persons received it, it likewise would not leave the category of misuse?

And one cannot answer and say that the Mishna follows the view of the one who says “permission of eating,” and comes to state “not only this, but also that”—that is, not only if disqualified persons received it did it not leave the category of misuse, but even if fit persons received it, since disqualified persons sprinkled it, it did not leave the category of misuse.

For according to the one who says “permission of eating,” there is no practical difference in which service it became disqualified. And as long as it has not reached permission of eating, it did not leave the category of misuse. And it is not appropriate to say, “not only this, but also that

” ,

rather, the questioner infers

is it not

what the Mishna said—

that disqualified persons received it specifically—

is precise, and the receiving by disqualified persons is what causes it not to leave the category of misuse, whereas what the Mishna said, “and sprinkled its blood,” is “not specifically

” Rather, the Mishna was compelled to add, “and sprinkled its blood,” because if it had said [according to the questioner, who holds “permission of sprinkling”] only “disqualified persons received it,” it would have been possible to err and say that it mentioned “receiving” because it is the first service of the priests, and that “receiving” was not intended specifically.

Therefore, the Mishna emphasized and also said “sprinkling,” in order to inform us that “receiving” is specifically intended, and not because it is the first service.

And infer from it: permission of sprinkling

is what we state.

Rav Yosef challenges him: And if it enters your mind that

if you thought that

it is possible to distinguish in this manner:

to divide the language of the Mishna in this way, and to say that what it said, “disqualified persons received,” is specifically so, because of the difficulty: why did the Mishna say both “disqualified persons received” and “disqualified persons cast”?

There is a difficulty:

that which we learned:

we learned this duplication of language also in another Mishna, and how will that Mishna be explained? The Torah said [Leviticus 6]: “This is the law of the sin-offering ... and whatever of its blood is spattered upon the garment ... shall be washed,” that is, if some of its blood was spattered upon the garment, that place on the garment upon which its blood was spattered shall be washed in a holy place .

And the Sages expounded: “whatever is spattered” means “that which is fit to be spattered,” namely, a valid sin-offering; but in the case of a disqualified sin-offering whose blood was spattered upon the garment, it does not require washing .

And we learned [Zevakhim 92a]:

A disqualified sin-offering does not have blood that requires washing, whether it had

from the outset

a fit time

for sprinkling,

and

afterward

became disqualified, or whether it did not have a fit time and became disqualified.

And which is the one that had a fit time and became disqualified? One whose blood remained overnight

and

which became impure or went out .

Так объяснил Раши там, в трактате Зевахим. См. Рашаша и «Керен Ора». Что же касается того, что приписываемый Раши здесь объяснил: «кровь или мясо», — это требует серьезного рассмотрения, поскольку если кровь была брошена согласно закону, а затем мясо пролежало ночь, очевидно, что одежда не требует стирки, ведь кровь уже была окроплена, как разъясняется далее в Гемаре.

Which is the one that did not have a fit time? One that was slaughtered

with the thought of

outside its place

or

outside its time, and disqualified persons received and cast its blood.

And the Gemara discussed: This that the Mishna said, “and disqualified persons received and cast its blood,”

what are the circumstances

in which this is speaking?

If you say,

if it is said, as we precisely inferred concerning our Mishna with regard to meila,

that disqualified persons received it, and

also

disqualified persons cast it,

then it is difficult, for should we infer:

disqualified persons received it and disqualified persons cast it

is

only then is the law stated

that its blood does not require washing, but

but if

qualified persons received it and qualified persons cast it,

or qualified persons cast it

that is, either disqualified persons received it and qualified persons cast it, or qualified persons received it and disqualified persons cast it,

does its blood require washing?

For granted, the Mishna concerning meila, which Rabbi Zeira precisely inferred and explained: either disqualified persons received or disqualified persons cast, had to determine as a matter of law which of them is “specifically” intended and which was mentioned incidentally, because this determination has a legal consequence: when does it leave the status of meila, whether through receiving or through casting? And Rabbi Zeira determined that “disqualified persons received” was taught “specifically,” whereas “cast” was taught incidentally.

But with regard to a sin-offering, there is no need at all to determine the matter, because in every manner in which the sin-offering became disqualified, its blood does not require washing. Therefore, it is possible to explain the Mishna: either disqualified persons received and qualified persons cast, or qualified persons received and disqualified persons cast—its blood requires washing.

And it is difficult: how is it possible to explain the Mishna in this way, when it comes to innovate that if qualified persons received and disqualified persons cast, its blood does not require washing? It would then imply that it is only because the sin-offering became disqualified now, through the casting, that its blood does not require washing.

But in either case, its blood does not require washing for another reason, since the blood has already been cast.

Read here:

is it not possible to apply to it the verse

“whatever of its blood is spattered”,

and expound:

“but not that which has already been spattered”,

that is, blood that was spattered after its casting does not require washing ,

And for what purpose did the Mishna exempt it from washing because the casting was disqualified? In any event, even if the casting was valid, it does not require washing .

For granted, what the Mishna said, “disqualified persons received,” contains an innovation: if the blood was spattered “before” the completion of the casting [and we do not read “whatever is spattered,” but not that which has already been spattered], its blood does not require washing solely because the offering had already become disqualified through disqualified receiving. But for what purpose did the Mishna say, “and cast its blood”?

Rather,

what, argues Rav Yosef to Rabbi Zeira, compelled you to explain that what the Mishna said, “and cast its blood”

is not specifically intended,

and was mentioned incidentally to “disqualified persons received”?