Meilah 5a (ה.) — the Talmud in English

Alternatively, we learned the allowance of the sprinkling.

Once they became fit for sprinkling—for example, when the blood was received validly—there is no me'ila in them [even if they subsequently became disqualified], since they were fit for sprinkling; they are considered as though the blood had been sprinkled, ke-zaruk dami , and they cease to be “the sacred offerings of the Lord.”

Alternatively, we learned the allowance of eating

, for they leave the status of me'ila only after the blood has been validly sprinkled and they have become fit for the kohanim to eat.

The Gemara resolves the matter Hezekiah said: We learned the allowance of slaughter . We learned . Rabbi Yohanan said: We learned the allowance of eating. The Gemara cites our Mishna to challenge Rabbi Yohanan's words, and also to show that it is not precise according to Hezekiah. Rabbi Zeira said: Our Mishna is not precise, neither according to Hezekiah nor according to Rabbi Yohanan.

and

Rabbi Yohanan said: We learned that the decisive time is when eating is permitted.

The Gemara cites our Mishna as a difficulty against Rabbi Yohanan, and notes that it is also imprecise according to Hezekiah. Rabbi Zeira said: Our Mishna is not precise, neither according to Hezekiah nor according to Rabbi Yohanan. We learned in our Mishna: “Which offerings had a time when they were permitted to the kohanim? Those that remained overnight, became impure, or left their designated area.” What does this mean? What does “those that remained overnight” mean? Is it not referring to blood that remained overnight after it had been received in a vessel, and

Rabbi Yohanan said: permission of eating is what we state.

We learned

in our Mishna: “Which is the offering that had a period of permission for the kohanim?

One that remained overnight, became impure, or left .”

What

—what is the meaning of “one that remained overnight”? Is it

not that the blood remained overnight

,

after it had been received in a vessel,

and

No!

concerning this

the Mishna teaches:

“There is no me'ila in it,”

since it had an allowance for sprinkling?

And learn from this: We learned the allowance of sprinkling?

That is, if the meaning of the Mishna is that the blood remained overnight and was not sprinkled, it is certainly difficult according to Rabbi Yohanan, who maintains that the offering leaves the status of me'ila only if the blood was sprinkled as prescribed. Why, then, did the Mishna say that before the sprinkling it had already left the status of me'ila?

According to Hezekiah, there is no contradiction from the Mishna. Nevertheless, it is not precise, since it says, “its blood remained overnight,” rather than stating the greater novelty that immediately after it was slaughtered, even if the blood was not received validly, there is no me'ila in it.

And although the difficulty also applies to Hezekiah, the principal difficulty is directed at Rabbi Yohanan.

And we reject this:

No!

There is no necessity to infer this from the Mishna, for it may be established as referring to a case where

the meat remained overnight, but the blood

had already

been sprinkled [

sprinkled],

therefore,

since the meat became disqualified after it had reached the allowance of eating,

it teaches

that

there is no me'ila in it.

this is difficult: Why do I need both? That is, one of the two—either “disqualified people received the blood” or “disqualified people sprinkled it”—is unnecessary and superfluous. For if the blood became disqualified when a ritually impure person or a person with a physical defect received it, and therefore the offering did not cease to be subject to misuse of sacred property, according to the one who says that the decisive time is when sprinkling is permitted, it is difficult: Why did the Mishna teach, “or disqualified people sprinkled it”? And if the blood was not disqualified when it was received, but only when it was sprinkled, and therefore the offering did not cease to be subject to misuse of sacred property, according to the one who says that the decisive time is when eating is permitted, it is difficult: Why did the Mishna teach, “or disqualified people received it”? Even if qualified people had received it, the offering would likewise not have ceased to be subject to misuse of sacred property, since it had not yet become permitted for eating. Nor can one answer that the Mishna follows the opinion that the decisive time is when eating is permitted and comes to teach the principle “not only this, but even that”: not only when disqualified people received the blood does the offering not cease to be subject to misuse of sacred property, but even when qualified people received it, since disqualified people sprinkled it, the offering does not cease to be subject to misuse of sacred property.

The Gemara continues to prove that the view is the one that says that the allowance is the allowance of sprinkling, from the latter clause of the Mishna.

We learned

in our Mishna:

“And which is the one that did not have a period of permission

for the kohanim? One that was slaughtered outside its time or outside its place, or whose blood was received by disqualified persons and sprinkled by disqualified persons.”

Rather, the Mishna was compelled to add “and sprinkled its blood,” because if it had stated only “disqualified people received the blood” [according to the questioner, who maintains that the decisive time is when sprinkling is permitted], one might have mistakenly said that it mentioned receiving the blood because this is the first sacrificial procedure performed by the kohanim, and that it did not mean receiving the blood specifically.

What are the circumstances

—what case is the Mishna discussing?

If disqualified persons received it, or disqualified persons sprinkled it

, this is difficult:

Why do I need both?

That is, one of the two—either “disqualified persons received it” or “disqualified persons sprinkled it”—is not specifically required and is superfluous.

For if it became disqualified through the receiving, which a person who was impure or blemished performed, and therefore it did not leave the status of me'ila, according to the one who says that the allowance is the allowance of sprinkling, it is difficult: Why did we learn, “or disqualified persons sprinkled it”? And if it did not become disqualified through the receiving, but through the sprinkling, and therefore it did not leave the status of me'ila, according to the one who says that the allowance is the allowance of eating, it is difficult: Why did we learn, “or disqualified persons received it”? After all, even if fit persons had received it, it likewise would not have left the status of me'ila.

Nor can one answer that the Mishna follows the view that the allowance is the allowance of eating and comes to teach the principle of “not only this, but even that”: Not only if disqualified persons received it did it not leave the status of me'ila, but even if fit persons received it, since disqualified persons sprinkled it, it did not leave the status of me'ila.

For according to the one who says that the allowance is the allowance of eating, it makes no difference in which procedure the disqualification occurred. As long as it has not reached the allowance of eating, it has not left the status of me'ila. The principle of “not only this, but even that” is therefore inapplicable.

Rather

, the questioner infers not

that the Mishna's statement

that disqualified persons received it specifically

is precise, and that the receiving by disqualified persons is what causes it not to leave the status of me'ila, whereas its statement, “and sprinkled its blood,” is not specific?

Rather, the Mishna was compelled to add “and sprinkled its blood,” because if it had said [according to the questioner, who maintains that the allowance is the allowance of sprinkling] only “disqualified persons received it,” one might mistakenly say that it mentioned “receiving” because it is the first of the kohanim's procedures, and that it did not specifically mean receiving.

Therefore, the Mishna emphasized and also said “sprinkling,” to indicate that it is specifically the receiving, and not that it was mentioned merely because it is the first procedure.

And learn from this: We learned the allowance of sprinkling

.

is what we state.

Rav Yosef challenged him: And if it enters your mind that

you can entertain the notion that

it can be divided in this manner,

to divide the wording of the Mishna in this way, and to say that what it stated, “the disqualified received” is specifically stated, because of the question: Why did the Mishna state both “the disqualified received” and “the disqualified sprinkled”?

one may raise an objection:

that which we learned

we find this same repetition of wording in another Mishna as well; and how is that Mishna to be understood? The Torah said [Leviticus 6]: “This is the law of the sin-offering … and whatever of its blood is sprinkled on the garment … shall be laundered”—that is, if its blood was sprinkled on the garment, the place on the garment onto which the blood was sprinkled must be laundered in a sacred place .

And the Sages expounded: “whatever is sprinkled” means “that which is fit to be sprinkled,” namely, a valid sin-offering. But in the case of an invalid sin-offering whose blood was sprinkled on the garment, it does not require laundering .

And we learned [Zevahim 92a]:

An invalid sin-offering does not have blood that requires laundering, whether it had

originally

a period of fitness

for sprinkling

and

afterward

became invalid, or whether it never had a period of fitness and became invalid.

And which is one that had a period of fitness and became invalid? One whose blood remained overnight

and

which became impure or left .

Which is one that never had a period of fitness? One that was slaughtered

with the thought of

outside its designated place,

or

outside its designated time, and whose blood was received by disqualified people and sprinkled by them.

And the Gemara analyzes this statement of the Mishna: “and whose blood was received by disqualified people and sprinkled by them”

what are the circumstances—

what case is this referring to?

If we say,

if it is stated, as we precisely inferred concerning our Mishna with regard to misuse of consecrated property,

that disqualified people received it and

also

disqualified people sprinkled it,

then this is difficult, for are we to infer:

It is only when disqualified people received it and disqualified people sprinkled it

that

the law is stated

that its blood does not require laundering;

but if

qualified people received it and qualified people sprinkled it,

or qualified people sprinkled it —

that is, either disqualified people received it and qualified people sprinkled it, or qualified people received it and disqualified people sprinkled it—

does its blood require laundering?

For granted, regarding the Mishna of misuse of consecrated property, which Rabbi Zeira precisely analyzed and explained as referring either to disqualified people receiving it or to disqualified people sprinkling it, it was necessary to determine as a matter of halakha which of them was stated specifically and which was mentioned incidentally, because this determination has a practical legal consequence: at what point does the item cease to be subject to misuse of consecrated property—upon receiving it or upon sprinkling it? And Rabbi Zeira determined that “the disqualified received” was stated specifically, whereas “they sprinkled” was stated incidentally.

But with regard to a sin-offering, there is no need at all to determine the matter, because whenever the sin-offering becomes invalid, its blood does not require laundering. Therefore, the Mishna could be understood as referring either to disqualified people receiving it and qualified people sprinkling it, or to qualified people receiving it and disqualified people sprinkling it: Its blood requires laundering.

And this is difficult: How can the Mishna be understood in this manner, as coming to teach that when qualified people received it and disqualified people sprinkled it, its blood does not require laundering? This would imply that the only reason its blood does not require laundering is that the sin-offering became invalid now, through the sprinkling.

Yet in either event, its blood does not require laundering for another reason, since the blood has already been sprinkled.

Read here,

for it is possible to apply to this case the verse

“whatever of its blood is sprinkled,”

and expound:

but not that which has already been sprinkled—

that is, blood that spattered after its sprinkling does not require laundering .

And for what purpose did the Mishna exempt it from laundering because the sprinkling was invalid? In any event, even if the sprinkling had been valid, it would not require laundering .

For granted, what the Mishna stated, “the disqualified received,” contains a novel teaching: If the blood spattered “before” the completion of the sprinkling [and we do not apply “whatever is sprinkled,” but not that which has already been sprinkled], its blood does not require laundering solely because the offering had already become invalid through the invalid receiving. But for what purpose did the Mishna state, “and sprinkled its blood”?

Rather,

what, Rav Yosef argues to Rabbi Zeira, compelled you to explain that what the Mishna stated, “and sprinkled its blood”

was not stated specifically,

but was mentioned incidentally along with “the disqualified received”?