Meilah 4b (ד:) — the Talmud in English

Furthermore,

there is proof in accordance with Rav Giddel’s statement:

as it teaches in the latter clause,

of that same beraita:

if its blood remained overnight,

and it was not sprinkled on the day it was offered,

even though he subsequently sprinkled it

the next day,

one misuses it,

And now,

if you say

that the beraita is speaking

of a sin-offering, it works out well:

the beraita teaches us that since its blood remained overnight, and the sprinkling is invalid, it therefore did not remove it from the category of “that which belongs to the Lord,” and one misuses it. But had its blood not remained overnight, one would not misuse it, like any valid sin-offering, which leaves the status of misuse through the sprinkling of its blood,

But if you say

that the beraita is speaking

of a burnt-offering,

it is difficult: surely

is it necessary to say

that one misuses it? It is obvious! For with every burnt-offering, even when its sacrificial rites were performed validly, one misuses it.

In other words, the questioner [who is proceeding according to Rav Giddel’s position] compares the laws of leaving the blood overnight with the laws of pigul. Just as Rav Giddel maintains that a sprinkling performed with a pigul intention does not remove an offering from the status of misuse, so too the questioner maintains that sprinkling blood invalidated by remaining overnight does not remove it from the status of misuse. And since it is necessary to establish that the case is one of a sin-offering, one can derive from the beraita that just as sprinkling blood invalidated by remaining overnight does not remove an offering from the status of misuse, so too sprinkling blood affected by pigul does not remove it, in accordance with Rav Giddel’s statement.

And the respondent [who disputes Rav Giddel] answers:

The latter clause

speaking of a sin-offering

certainly supports him,

as explained: an invalid sprinkling, such as when the blood remained overnight, does not remove the offering from the status of misuse,

and the same law and rationale apply to the fact that sprinkling after pigul does not remove it from the status of misuse!

And the Gemara clarifies:

What of the first clause—

the first clause of the beraita, which speaks of “pigul”? Does it too support Rav Giddel, and should one say:

Since the latter clause supports him,

just as the latter clause speaks of a sin-offering,

the first clause also supports him,

so too the first clause? And there is support for Rav Giddel: only because the sin-offering became pigul does one misuse it, whereas had it not become pigul, one would not misuse it. This proves explicitly Rav Giddel’s statement that sprinkling after pigul does not remove an offering from the status of misuse.

And we reject this: Is it so that

the latter clause certainly supports him?

For one can distinguish between sprinkling performed after the blood remained overnight and sprinkling performed after pigul [and the reason for the distinction will be explained], and say that sprinkling after the blood remained overnight does not remove the offering from the status of misuse, whereas sprinkling after pigul does remove it from the status of misuse [contrary to Rav Giddel’s statement]?

And the Gemara explains:

What is different—

what is different about sprinkling after the blood remained overnight from sprinkling after pigul,

that is, both are invalid; so what is the difference between them?

The distinction is:

leaving the blood overnight is something he does actively—

that is, the sprinkling was not performed on the day the offering was brought, and there is a deficiency in the “act” of the sacrificial service, therefore, even when he sprinkles the blood the following day,

, the sprinkling is ineffective

this sprinkling, which is invalid and was rendered invalid through an “act,”

to remove the offering from the status of misuse,

whereas in the case of pigul, the invalidation is created through

thought

alone,

not

through an active deed.

It is therefore still possible to say that the tanna of the beraita maintains that

the sprinkling is effective for him to remove the offering from the status of misuse,

contrary to Rav Giddel’s statement.

Consequently, there is no proof from the latter clause for Rav Giddel’s statement.

The Gemara cites another beraita in support of Rav Giddel.

Shall we say,

is it to be said:

this

beraita

supports him,

Rav Giddel?

We learned:

In the case of pigul involving an offering of the most sacred order, one misuses it.

Does this

not

mean that the beraita is speaking

even though he sprinkled

the blood, and one misuses it, because the sprinkling did not remove it from the status of misuse, in accordance with Rav Giddel’s statement,

and the

beraita

supports him?

And we reject this:

No!

The beraita is speaking

that

still

he had not sprinkled !

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

And we challenge this:

But

if he had already

sprinkled, what

does the tanna of the beraita maintain? Does he maintain

that even in this case one does not misuse it!

If so, this is difficult:

Why does it teach in the latter clause

why does the latter clause of the beraita state that pigul

in an offering of lesser sanctity does not entail misuse,

because the sacrificial rites were not performed validly and the sacrificial portions did not become “that which belongs to the Lord”?

And if the case is one in which he had not yet sprinkled the blood, what novelty is there in the beraita? It is obvious that one does not misuse an offering of lesser sanctity before the sprinkling of the blood.

Rather, it is certainly necessary to say that he had already sprinkled. And since the sprinkling was performed with a pigul intention, the sacrificial portions did not enter the status of misuse, in accordance with Rav Giddel’s statement! Furthermore, if, according to your words, there is a distinction between before sprinkling and after sprinkling, why did the tanna of the beraita distinguish between offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity?

Let him distinguish in the first clause—

he could have made the distinction within offerings of the most sacred order themselves—

and let him teach

and he should have stated as follows:

Before sprinkling, one misuses it; after sprinkling, one does not misuse it?

And we conclude:

That one,

the latter clause

, certainly supports him,

Rav Giddel,

who says that sprinkling after pigul does not bring offerings of lesser sanctity into the status of misuse, since the latter clause certainly speaks of a case after the sprinkling, as explained.

The Gemara clarifies:

Shall we say,

is it to be said that

since the latter clause supports him, the first clause also supports him?

And should one say that just as the latter clause speaks of a case in which he had already sprinkled, so too does the first clause? This would prove that an offering of the most sacred order does not leave the status of misuse through sprinkling after pigul, in accordance with Rav Giddel.

And we reject this: It is not necessary to say so! It is possible that the first clause speaks of a case in which he had not yet sprinkled,

and as for the questioner’s objection that, if so, the tanna should have distinguished within offerings of the most sacred order themselves between before sprinkling and after sprinkling, as stated above,

we can answer that

with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity, it is a definite matter:

the matter is fixed and clear, for among offerings of lesser sanctity there is no difference from one offering to another, and with all offerings one does not misuse them through sprinkling after pigul,

but

here,

with regard to offerings of the most sacred order,

it is not a definite matter:

the matter is not fixed, since a burnt-offering entails misuse even after sprinkling,

and therefore the tanna did not wish to say [according to the view of the one who disputes Rav Giddel], “After sprinkling, one does not misuse it,” since this law does not apply to all offerings of the most sacred order.

Furthermore, with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, the matter is not fixed and absolute, and it would be necessary to distinguish between before sprinkling and after sprinkling, whereas with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity, one never misuses them, whether before sprinkling or after sprinkling.

In conclusion: this beraita provides proof for Rav Giddel’s statement that offerings of lesser sanctity do not enter the status of misuse through sprinkling after pigul, but this beraita provides no proof for his statement that offerings of the most sacred order do not leave the status of misuse through sprinkling after pigul.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Yehoshua stated a general principle: Any offering that had a time when it was permitted to the priests is not subject to me'ila, and any offering that did not have a time when it was permitted to the priests is subject to me'ila.

Which offering had a time when it was permitted to the priests? One that remained overnight, became impure, or left the permitted area. And which offering did not have a time when it was permitted to the priests? One that was slaughtered after its designated time, or outside its designated area, or whose blood was received and sprinkled by unfit individuals.

The Gemara discusses: What is the time that removes valid offerings of the highest sanctity from the liability of me'ila? And concerning this time we learned: If they became disqualified during the time of permission, they do not cease to be subject to me'ila; but if they became disqualified afterward, they cease to be subject to me'ila.

Bar Kappara said to Bar Peda

My sister's son! Look,

consider,

what you will ask me tomorrow in the beit-midrash!

That is, tomorrow, when the two of us will be occupied with halakha, ask me! In order to clarify the matter. And prepare yourself to examine the matter precisely, so that tomorrow we may discuss it thoroughly.

Regarding what we learned in our Mishna, “a time when it was permitted to the priests”: Did we learn

the permission of slaughter

—that as soon as the slaughter was performed validly, the offering ceased to be subject to me'ila [even though it was subsequently disqualified]—and this is the time when it was permitted for the “service of the priests”, since slaughter is valid when performed by a non-priest, whereas from the time of receiving the blood onward, the services are valid only when performed by priests?