Meilah 4b — the Talmud in English

And furthermore,

a proof according to the words of Rav Giddel:

for it teaches in the latter clause,

of that same beraita:

its blood remained overnight,

and it was not sprinkled on the day of its sacrifice,

even though he returned and sprinkled it,

on the following day,

one commits misuse with it,

And now,

if you say, granted,

that the beraita is speaking

of a sin-offering, it is well:

the beraita informs us that since its blood remained overnight, and the sprinkling is invalid, it therefore did not leave the category of “sacred things of the Lord,” and one commits misuse with it. But had its blood not remained overnight, one would not commit misuse with it, like any valid sin-offering that leaves the prohibition of misuse through the sprinkling of the blood,

but if you say

that the beraita is speaking

of a burnt-offering,

it is difficult: Is it

necessary to state

that one commits misuse with it?! It is obvious! For with every burnt-offering, even when its rites were performed validly, one commits misuse with it?

That is, the questioner [according to the position of Rav Giddel] compares the laws of leaving the blood overnight with the laws of pigul. Just as Rav Giddel holds that a sprinkling of pigul does not remove the item from the prohibition of misuse, so too the questioner holds that the sprinkling of blood invalidated by remaining overnight does not remove the item from the prohibition of misuse. And since it was established that the case is speaking of a sin-offering, it may be learned from the beraita that just as the sprinkling of blood invalidated by remaining overnight does not remove the item from the prohibition of misuse, so too the sprinkling of pigul, in accordance with the words of Rav Giddel.

And the respondent [who disagrees with Rav Giddel] answers: Indeed,

the latter clause,

which speaks of a sin-offering,

certainly supports him,

as explained: an invalid sprinkling, such as when the blood remained overnight, does not remove the item from the prohibition of misuse,

and the same law, and the same reason, apply to the fact that a sprinkling of pigul does not remove the item from the prohibition of misuse!

And the Gemara clarifies:

What of the first clause—does the first clause of the beraita, which speaks concerning “pigul,” also support Rav Giddel? Shall we say,

the first clause of the beraita, which speaks of “pigul”? Does it too support Rav Giddel, and should one say:

since the latter clause supports him,

just as the latter clause speaks of a sin-offering,

the first clause also supports him—so too the first clause? And there is support for Rav Giddel: only because the sin-offering became pigul does one commit misuse with it, whereas had it not become pigul, one would not commit misuse with it. This proves explicitly the words of Rav Giddel, that a sprinkling of pigul does not remove the item from the prohibition of misuse?

so too the first clause? And there is support for Rav Giddel: only because the sin-offering became pigul does one misuse it, whereas had it not become pigul, one would not misuse it. This proves explicitly Rav Giddel’s statement that sprinkling after pigul does not remove an offering from the status of misuse.

And we reject this: Does

the latter clause certainly support him?!

For it is possible to distinguish between a sprinkling that follows leaving the blood overnight and a sprinkling that follows pigul [and the reason for the distinction will be explained], and to say that a sprinkling that follows leaving the blood overnight does not remove the item from the prohibition of misuse, whereas a sprinkling that follows pigul does remove the item from the prohibition of misuse [not in accordance with the words of Rav Giddel]?

And the Gemara explains:

What is different—what is different about a sprinkling that follows leaving the blood overnight from a sprinkling that follows pigul,

that is, both this and that are invalid, so what is the difference between them?

that is, both are invalid; so what is the difference between them?

The distinction is:

leaving it overnight is performed by his hands,

that is, the sprinkling was not performed on the day of its sacrifice, and there is here a deficiency in the “act” of the rite of the offering, therefore, even when he sprinkles the blood on the following day,

the sprinkling is not effective,

this sprinkling, which is invalid and which was invalidated “by his hands,”

to remove it from the prohibition of misuse,

whereas pigul, in which the invalidation was performed through

thought

alone,

for it did not

perform it by his hands,

it is still possible to say that the tanna of the beraita holds that

the sprinkling is effective for him to remove it from the prohibition of misuse, not in accordance with the words of Rav Giddel.

contrary to Rav Giddel’s statement.

And consequently, there is no proof from the latter clause for the words of Rav Giddel.

The Gemara brings another beraita as support for Rav Giddel.

Let us say,

shall we say: This

this

beraita

supports him,

Rav Giddel?

We learned:

In the case of pigul involving sacred offerings of the highest sanctity, one commits misuse with it.

Is it

not

that the beraita is speaking

even though he sprinkled

the blood, and one commits misuse with it, and the sprinkling did not remove it from the prohibition of misuse, in accordance with the words of Rav Giddel,

and

the beraita

supports him?

And we reject this:

No!

The beraita is speaking

that

he had still

not sprinkled !

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

And we raise an objection:

But,

if he has already

sprinkled, what does the tanna of the beraita hold? Does he indeed hold

does the tanna of the beraita maintain? Does he maintain

that one also does not commit misuse with it!

If so, this is difficult:

Why does it teach in the latter clause,

why did we learn in the latter clause of the beraita: Pigul

in sacred offerings of lesser sanctity—one does not commit misuse with it,

because the rites were not performed validly, and the sacrificial portions did not come to be “sacred things of the Lord”?

And if it is speaking of a case in which he had still not sprinkled, what is the novelty in the beraita? It is obvious that one does not commit misuse with sacred offerings of lesser sanctity before the sprinkling of the blood?

Rather, certainly we must say that he had already sprinkled. And since the sprinkling was one of pigul, therefore the sacrificial portions did not come to the prohibition of misuse, in accordance with the words of Rav Giddel! And furthermore, if, according to your words, there is a distinction between before the sprinkling and after it, why did the tanna of the beraita distinguish between sacred offerings of the highest sanctity and sacred offerings of lesser sanctity?

Let him distinguish in the first clause,

he could have made the distinction within sacred offerings of the highest sanctity themselves,

and let him teach,

and so he should have taught:

Before the sprinkling one commits misuse with it; after the sprinkling one does not commit misuse with it?

And we conclude:

That one,

the latter clause,

certainly supports him,

Rav Giddel,

who says that a sprinkling of pigul does not bring sacred offerings of lesser sanctity into the prohibition of misuse, since the latter clause certainly speaks after the sprinkling, as explained.

The Gemara clarifies:

Let us say,

shall we say that

since the latter clause supports him, the first clause also supports him?

And shall we say that just as the latter clause speaks of a case in which he had already sprinkled, so too the first clause does. And it is proven that sacred offerings of the highest sanctity do not leave the prohibition of misuse through a sprinkling of pigul, in accordance with the words of Rav Giddel.

And we reject this: It is not necessary to say so! It is possible to say that the first clause speaks of a case in which he had still not sprinkled,

and as for the questioner’s objection that if so, the tanna should have made the distinction within sacred offerings of the highest sanctity themselves, between before the sprinkling and after it, as above,

we shall answer: because

with sacred offerings of lesser sanctity it is definite,

the matter is definite [clear and fixed], since with sacred offerings of lesser sanctity there is no difference between one offering and another, and with all the offerings one does not commit misuse through a sprinkling of pigul,

but

here,

with sacred offerings of the highest sanctity,

it is not definite,

the matter is not definite, since with a burnt-offering there is misuse even after the sprinkling,

therefore the tanna did not wish to say [according to the words of the one who disagrees with Rav Giddel]: “After the sprinkling one does not commit misuse,” since this law does not apply to all offerings of the highest sanctity.

Furthermore, with sacred offerings of the highest sanctity it is not a definite and absolute matter, and he would have to distinguish between before the sprinkling and after it, whereas with sacred offerings of lesser sanctity one never commits misuse with them, whether before the sprinkling or after the sprinkling.

And in conclusion: From this beraita there is proof for the words of Rav Giddel that sacred offerings of lesser sanctity do not come into the prohibition of misuse through a sprinkling of pigul, but from this beraita there is no proof for his statement that sacred offerings of the highest sanctity do not leave the prohibition of misuse through a sprinkling of pigul.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Joshua stated a general rule: Any offering that had a time when it was permitted to the priests, there is no me'ilah in it; and any offering that did not have a time when it was permitted to the priests, there is me'ilah in it.

Which is one that had a time when it was permitted to the priests? One that remained overnight, one that became impure, and one that went out. And which is one that did not have a time when it was permitted to the priests? One that was slaughtered outside its time, one that was slaughtered outside its place, and one whose blood was received and sprinkled by disqualified persons.

The Gemara discusses: What is the time of permission for removing valid offerings of the highest sanctity from liability for me'ilah . And concerning this time we learned: If they became disqualified during the time of permission, they did not leave the status of me'ilah; and if they became disqualified afterward, they left the status of me'ilah.

Bar Kappara said to Bar Peda

My sister's son! See,

consider

what you will ask me tomorrow in the beit-midrash!

That is to say, tomorrow, when the two of us will be occupied with halakha, ask me! In order to clarify the matter. And prepare yourself to examine the matter precisely, so that tomorrow we may discuss and deliberate over it.

What we learned in our Mishna, “a time when it was permitted to the priests”: Is it the time of

permission of slaughter that we learned,

that as soon as the slaughter was performed validly, they left the status of me'ilah [even though afterward they became disqualified], and this is the time of permission for “service of” priests, since slaughter is valid when performed by a non-priest, whereas from the time of receiving the blood onward, the services are valid only when performed by priests?