Meilah 4a — the Talmud in English

And we challenge: Even if we do not infer anything from Ulla’s wording, “its pigul was removed,” nevertheless it is possible to prove it from the law itself and from the reason Ulla gave for his words.

But it was taught concerning it

If it brings others to pigul, does it not all the more so bring itself to pigul?!

And the Gemara explains there that this means: If it is not accepted, how does it bring others to pigul? That is, the handful is the “permitter” of the meal-offering [with meal-offerings that are eaten, it is forbidden to eat them until the burning of the handful, and the handful “permits” them for the eating of the priests], and in order for it to be called pigul, we require “its permitters were brought near,”

And if it is said that the pigul did not leave it, and when he raises it upon the altar it is pigul, then it is merely dust! It follows that the “permitter” of the remnants [the remainder of the meal-offering left over from the taking of the handful] was not brought near, and how does it bring the remnants to pigul?!

It must necessarily be said that it is not merely dust and that it bears the designation “handful,” but its pigul left it [and therefore it is permitted to return it upon the altar]. These are Ulla’s words, in explaining his reason that the pigul left the handful.

And from these words the Gemara proves that pigul takes effect from the time of taking the handful [and in an animal offering, from the time of slaughter], unlike the words of Rabbi Abba,

for granted, if the pigul had already taken effect before the raising upon the altar, it is possible to say that now, with the raising, the pigul that it had already possessed was “removed,” according to Ulla’s reasoning, as explained.

But if it is according to Rabbi Abba, that the pigul had still not taken effect until the raising, then what is Ulla’s proof that the pigul left the handful? For it is still not pigul, and it is not merely dust! —

And even without Ulla’s reasoning, it is well explained why the remnants became pigul: Since the handful did not become pigul “before” permitting the remnants, but rather the time of the burning, which is the time of permitting the remnants in a valid offering, is the time of pigul [“as the acceptance of a valid offering, so is the acceptance of an invalid offering”], and both of them—the pigul and the permitting of the remnants—take effect together. And since it is pigul, consequently the remnants became pigul, and not because the pigul “left” it. And what is Ulla’s proof and reasoning?

And we resolve:

This too,

Ulla’s words can also be explained in accordance with Rabbi Abba, that the pigul does not take effect until the time of the burning or the sprinkling, and until then it bears only

a prohibition that leads to pigul ,

Nevertheless, Ulla proves that the pigul left it [and it is permitted to return it upon the altar], since this prohibition that leads to pigul begins from the time of taking the handful, and if not for the fact that it “left,” it should have been considered merely dust even before he burned it, since it bears “the designation of prohibition,” and then it is not in the category of a “permitter,” and its permitters were not brought near,

and why did the remnants become pigul? It is necessarily to be said that the pigul “left” it.

And there is no difficulty from Ulla’s words against the words of Rabbi Abba .

The Gemara continues to challenge Rabbi Abba’s words, [and his resolution of Rav Giddel’s words], that pigul does not take effect until the time of the sprinkling, and proves from the words of the amora Ilfa, who holds that pigul takes effect from the time of slaughter.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: But Ilfa said, that we learned in tractate Zevachim [29b]: This is the rule: Whoever slaughters, receives, walks, or sprinkles [with the thought] to eat or burn outside its place is disqualified, but there is no karet for it. Outside its time, it is pigul, and one is liable to karet for it.

We learned in tractate Zevahim (29b): This is the general rule: Anyone who slaughters, receives the blood, carries it, or sprinkles it [with the intention] to eat or burn the offering outside its designated place renders it invalid, but it is not subject to excision. If he does so with the intention that it be eaten or burned after its designated time, it is piggul, and one who eats it is liable to excision.

Provided that the permitter is offered according to its law!

How is the permitter offered according to its law? He slaughtered [with the thought] outside its time, and received, walked, and sprinkled silently [without an invalidating thought]; this is when the permitter was offered according to its law.

How was the permitter not offered according to its law? He slaughtered outside its place, and received, walked, and sprinkled outside its time; or he slaughtered outside its time, and received, walked, and sprinkled outside its place. This is when the permitter was not offered according to its law.

Rabbi Judah said: This is the rule: Whenever the thought of the time preceded the thought of the place, it is pigul, and one is liable to karet for it. And if the thought of the place preceded the thought of the time, it is disqualified, but there is no karet for it.

And the Sages say: Both this and that are disqualified, but there is no karet for them.

And the amoraim there disputed in explaining the dispute between Rabbi Judah and the Sages.

Ilfa holds:

The dispute

between Rabbi Judah and the Sages is

with regard to two rites.

For example, when

the slaughterer

said, “

I am slaughtering the first sign [

the windpipe or the gullet], with the intention to eat or burn

outside its time, and the second sign,

with the intention to eat or burn

outside its place” ,

Rabbi Judah holds: “One renders [an offering] pigul through half a permitter,” that is, in order to render it pigul, it is sufficient to think a thought of pigul during half of a rite, such as during half of the slaughtering, which is one of the rites among the sacred offerings that “permit” the offering. It follows that when he slaughtered the first sign with the thought of outside its time, its pigul was already established, and its prohibition was established as the prohibition of pigul, for which there is karet, before the arrival of the thought that prevents it. Consequently, one who eats an olive-sized portion of it is liable to karet.

And the Sages hold: “One does not render [an offering] pigul through half a permitter,” meaning that a thought of pigul during half of a rite is insufficient. It follows that its pigul comes at the completion of making the permitter, that is, at the completion of slaughtering the two signs. And since the two thoughts of pigul take effect simultaneously, there is here a “mixture of thoughts” of outside its time with outside its place. Therefore, “the permitter was not offered according to its law,” and it does not bear the designation of pigul of outside its time alone. Consequently, it is not pigul so as to incur karet.

But if he thought

during one rite,

the thought of outside its time together with the thought of outside its place, in one sign,

everyone

—Rabbi Judah—agrees with the Sages that

it was a mixture of thoughts,

and one who eats it is not liable to karet. These are Ilfa’s words.

And from Rabbi Judah’s words, according to Ilfa’s explanation, it is proven that pigul takes effect immediately at the time of slaughter [and even through the slaughtering of one sign]. For if it is said, according to Rabbi Abba, as Rava resolved, that pigul takes effect at the time of sprinkling, it follows that even if he thought outside its time at the first sign and outside its place at the second, nevertheless the two thoughts take effect simultaneously at the time of sprinkling, and at the time pigul takes effect the thoughts have already become mixed; there is no prior establishment of the thought of outside its time. Why, then, does Rabbi Judah hold that its pigul is “established” through the thought of outside its time ? And we resolve:

Here too,

also concerning Ilfa’s words, we will resolve that Rabbi Judah holds that pigul is established at the time of sprinkling, and then

when he sprinkles,

when he actually sprinkles the blood,

the matter will be revealed retroactively

that the pigul took effect from the time of slaughtering the first sign. Consequently, the pigul was established through the first thought, which was the thought of outside its time .

This explanation of Rav Ashi according to Rabbi Abba is according to Ilfa. But Rabbi Yohanan in the Gemara of Zevachim [there] holds that Rabbi Judah disputes even with regard to one rite, and holds that the pigul of the thought of outside its time is established because “we seize the first expression,” meaning that in a mixture of two thoughts the first is seized, even when at the time they take effect they are already mixed . Consequently, the Gemara explains: Whether with one rite or with two rites,

meaning that even according to Rabbi Yohanan it will be explained as according to Ilfa: at the time of sprinkling, which is the time when pigul takes effect, the first takes effect first, and the thought of outside its time is seized.

meaning that even according to Rabbi Yohanan, the matter can be explained as it was according to Ilfa: At the time of sprinkling, which is the time when piggul takes effect, the first intention takes effect first, and the intention concerning the designated time is adopted.

And we challenge:

If so,

if pigul takes effect “retroactively” from the time of slaughter, it is difficult:

with regard to the thanksgiving-offering as well,

until he sprinkles,

and then the pigul will be established retroactively from the time of slaughter?

And nevertheless, although the pigul is established retroactively, according to Rabbi Abba, from the time of slaughter, the Mishna stated that the bread became sanctified with the sanctity of the body at the time when the offering was slaughtered with the thought of pigul, which takes effect retroactively, even though the offering became pigul. If so, it is proven that a thought of pigul is effective to sanctify the bread. Why, then, should a thought of pigul not be effective to bring kodashim kalim to the state of meila [and remove kodshei kodashim from the state of meila]?

The question returns: What is different about the taking effect of the sanctity of the body through the slaughter of pigul from the taking effect of the law of meila? This is difficult for Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav?

And we resolve: The Gemara retracts all of the preceding discussion distinguishing between the sanctity of the bread, which is at the time of slaughter, and the law of meila, which is at the time of sprinkling .

Rather, what

we learned, that the bread became sanctified through the slaughter of pigul,

was not to make it liable for meila ,

that is, the bread is not actually sanctified with the sanctity of the body, since the slaughter was performed with the thought of pigul,

Rather, to be disqualified, for it requires burning,

that is, the bread is not ordinary produce, but became sanctified with the sanctity of the body, so that if a tevul yom or one lacking atonement touches it [this touch does not impart impurity to ordinary produce], the bread becomes impure and requires burning. Likewise, if a night passes over it [“overnight”], it requires burning .

Explanation The rite of pigul, which “distances” the offering from the purpose of the offering, can bring it only to “disqualification,” so that the bread requires burning, but it cannot bring kodashim kalim to the state of meila. On the contrary! The entire law of meila that takes effect with regard to kodashim kalim and is removed with regard to kodshei kodashim applies only through valid slaughter, when the offering reached its purpose, and not through a rite of pigul. Consequently, there is no difficulty from the loaves of the thanksgiving-offering against the words of Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav.

The Gemara brings a beraita in support of the words of Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav, that the sprinkling of pigul does not remove kodshei kodashim from the state of meila.

The Gemara cites a beraita in support of Rav Giddel in the name of Rav, that sprinkling of piggul does not remove offerings of the highest sanctity from the law of misuse of consecrated property.

Let us say,

shall we say that this beraita

supports him?

We learned:

With regard to pigul, one always commits meila through it!

Is it

not

that the beraita is speaking in a case where

even though it was sprinkled,

they had already sprinkled the

blood,

and nevertheless one commits meila through it, and the sprinkling did not remove it from the state of meila,

and it supports him,

and the beraita supports Rav Giddel, who holds so?

And we reject this:

No!

There is no support from this beraita, because the beraita is speaking

where he did not sprinkle,

for he had still not sprinkled the

blood,

and therefore the law of meila applies to it. And indeed, if he had already sprinkled the blood, it is possible to say that the sprinkling removes it from the state of meila!

And we wonder:

If

it is speaking

where he did not sprinkle the blood, what does it come to teach?!

What does the beraita come to teach us?

It is obvious, for it has still not left the category of

“the sacred offerings of

the Lord” !

And the Gemara retracts from what it resolved, that he had still not sprinkled the blood,

rather, it is always a case where he sprinkled, and

nevertheless there is no support from this beraita for Rav Giddel. And why?

For that one was taught:

the beraita is speaking

of

an

olah

offering, with which there is meila—in a valid offering, even after sprinkling, since its flesh is not eaten by the priests and it remains among “the sacred offerings of the Lord” even after sprinkling . Consequently, meila applies to it even when it became pigul. But with regard to the other kodshei kodashim, which leave the state of meila through sprinkling, there is no support from the beraita, and it is possible that they leave the state of meila even through the sprinkling of pigul.

And we raise a difficulty:

if,

if the beraita is speaking of an olah,

it is obvious,

that there is meila with it even after the sprinkling, even if it was not exposed, because

it is entirely for on high,

it ascends entirely upon the altar,

and why did the beraita say that there is meila with it specifically when it was exposed?