Meilah 4a (ד.) — the Talmud in English

And we challenge this: Even if we do not infer anything from Ulla’s wording, “its piggul has departed,” nevertheless, the proof can be derived from the law itself and from the rationale Ulla gave for his statement.

But it was taught concerning it

If it brings others to a state of piggul, is it not all the more so that it itself does so?!

And the Gemara explains there that this means: If it is not accepted, how can it bring others to a state of piggul? That is, the handful is the matir—the element that permits the meal-offering [with regard to meal-offerings that are eaten, it is forbidden to eat them until the handful has been burned on the altar, and the handful “permits” them for consumption by the kohanim]—and in order for something to be called piggul, it is necessary that “its permitting elements be brought”,

And if we say that the piggul did not depart from it, and when it is placed upon the altar it is piggul, then it is merely dust! It follows that the matir of the remnants [the remainder of the meal-offering left after the handful was removed] was not brought, so how can it bring the remnants to a state of piggul?!

It must therefore be said that it is not merely dust and that it retains the designation of a handful; rather, its piggul departed from it [and therefore it is permitted to return it to the altar]. This is Ulla’s explanation of the reason that the piggul departed from the handful.

From these words the Gemara proves that piggul takes effect from the time of the taking of the handful [and, in the case of an animal-offering, from the time of slaughter], contrary to Rabbi Abba’s position.

For this works out well if the piggul had already taken effect before the offering was placed upon the altar: it is possible to say that now, when it is placed upon the altar, the piggul that it already possessed “departed,” in accordance with Ulla’s reasoning, as explained.

But if it is as Rabbi Abba said, that piggul does not take effect until the offering is placed upon the altar, what is Ulla’s proof that the piggul departed from the handful? It is not yet piggul, and it is not merely dust!—

And even without Ulla’s reasoning, it is well explained why the remnants became piggul: Since the handful did not become piggul “before” the remnants were permitted, but rather the time of burning—which, in a valid offering, is the time when the remnants become permitted—is the time of piggul [“As the acceptance of a valid offering, so is the acceptance of an invalid offering”], the piggul and the permitting of the remnants take effect simultaneously. Since it is piggul, the remnants consequently became piggul, and not because the piggul “departed” from it. What, then, is Ulla’s proof and reasoning?

And we answer:

This too,

Ulla’s words can be explained in accordance with Rabbi Abba, that piggul does not take effect until the time of the burning or the sprinkling; until then, it has only

a prohibition that leads to piggul .

Nevertheless, Ulla proves that the piggul departed from it [and it is permitted to return it to the altar], since this prohibition that leads to piggul begins at the time of taking the handful. If the piggul had not “departed,” it should have been considered merely dust even before it was burned, since it bears the “designation of a prohibition,” and at that point it is not considered a matir, so its permitting elements were not brought.

Why, then, did the remnants become piggul? It must be said that the piggul “departed” from it.

And Rabbi Abba’s words are not challenged by Ulla’s statement .

The Gemara continues to challenge Rabbi Abba’s words [and his resolution of Rav Giddel’s statement], that piggul does not take effect until the time of sprinkling, and it proves this from the words of the amora Ilfa, who maintains that piggul takes effect from the time of slaughter.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: But did Ilfa not say,

as we learned in tractate Zevahim (29b): This is the general rule: Anyone who slaughters, receives, walks, or sprinkles [with the intention] to eat or burn outside its designated place is disqualified, but there is no liability for karet. If it is outside its designated time, it is piggul, and one is liable for karet.

Provided that the matir is brought in accordance with its requirement!

What is meant by “the matir is brought in accordance with its requirement”? If he slaughtered [with the intention] outside its designated time, and then received, walked, and sprinkled without an invalid intention, this is a case in which the matir was brought in accordance with its requirement.

What is meant by “the matir was not brought in accordance with its requirement”? If he slaughtered outside its designated place, and then received, walked, and sprinkled outside its designated time; or if he slaughtered outside its designated time, and then received, walked, and sprinkled outside its designated place—this is a case in which the matir was not brought in accordance with its requirement.

Rabbi Yehuda said: This is the general rule: Whenever the intention concerning the time preceded the intention concerning the place, it is piggul and one is liable for karet. But if the intention concerning the place preceded the intention concerning the time, it is disqualified and there is no liability for karet.

And the Sages say: In both this case and that case, it is disqualified and there is no liability for karet.

The amoraim there disagreed concerning the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages.

Ilfa maintains:

The dispute

between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages is

with regard to two services.

For example, when

the slaughterer

said, “

I am slaughtering the first siman [the windpipe or the gullet] with the intention of eating or burning

outside its designated time, and the second siman,

with the intention of eating or burning

outside its designated place

” ,

Rabbi Yehuda maintains: “One can render an offering piggul through half of a matir”; that is, in order to render it piggul, it suffices to have a piggul intention during half of a service, such as during half of the slaughter, which is one of the services involving consecrated offerings that “permit” the offering. It follows that when he slaughtered the first siman with the intention of doing so outside its designated time, its piggul status was already established, and its prohibition was established as the prohibition of piggul, for which there is liability for karet, before the arrival of the disqualifying intention. Consequently, one who eats an olive-bulk of it is liable for karet.

And the Sages maintain: “One cannot render an offering piggul through half of a matir.” That is, a piggul intention during half of a service is insufficient. It follows that its piggul status takes effect upon completion of the matir—that is, upon completion of the slaughter of both simanim. Since the two piggul intentions take effect simultaneously, there is a “mixture of intentions” concerning outside its designated time and outside its designated place. Therefore, “the matir was not brought in accordance with its requirement,” and it does not have the designation of piggul solely on account of being outside its designated time. Consequently, it is not piggul in a manner that entails liability for karet.

But if he thought

during one service

the intention of outside its designated time together with the intention of outside its designated place, in a single siman,

everyone—

Rabbi Yehuda concedes to the Sages that

it was a mixture of intentions,

and one who eats it is not liable for karet. These are Ilfa’s words.

From Rabbi Yehuda’s statement, according to Ilfa’s explanation, it is evident that piggul takes effect immediately at the time of slaughter [even through the slaughter of a single siman]. For if we say, in accordance with Rabbi Abba, as Rava explained his resolution, that piggul takes effect at the time of sprinkling, then even if he thought “outside its designated time” during the first siman and “outside its designated place” during the second, nevertheless, the two intentions take effect simultaneously at the time of sprinkling. At the moment piggul takes effect, the intentions have already become mixed, and there is no prior establishment of the intention of outside its designated time. Why, then, does Rabbi Yehuda maintain that its piggul status was “established” through the intention of outside its designated time ? And we answer:

This too

can be said concerning Ilfa: We can resolve the matter by saying that Rabbi Yehuda maintains that piggul is established at the time of sprinkling, and then

when he sprinkles,

when he actually sprinkles the blood,

the matter will be revealed retroactively

that the piggul took effect from the time of slaughtering the first siman. Consequently, the piggul was established through the first intention, which was the intention of outside its designated time .

This explanation by Rav Ashi, according to Rabbi Abba, follows Ilfa’s view. But Rabbi Yohanan, in the Gemara of Zevahim [there], maintains that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees even with regard to one service, and maintains that the piggul resulting from the intention of outside its designated time is established because “the first expression is grasped”; that is, when two intentions are mixed, the first is grasped, even when they are already mixed at the moment they take effect . Therefore, the Gemara explains: It is either with regard to one service or with regard to two services:

either with regard to one service or with regard to two services,

that is, according to Rabbi Yohanan as well, it can be explained as it was according to Ilfa: At the time of sprinkling, which is the time piggul takes effect, each intention takes effect in sequence, and the intention of outside its designated time is grasped first.

And we challenge this:

If so,

if piggul takes effect “retroactively” from the time of slaughter, it is difficult:

with regard to the thanksgiving-offering as well,

until he sprinkles,

and only then will the piggul be established retroactively from the time of slaughter ?

Nevertheless, although according to Rabbi Abba the piggul is established retroactively from the time of slaughter, the Mishna states that the loaves were sanctified with intrinsic sanctity at the time the offering was slaughtered with a piggul intention, which takes effect retroactively, despite the offering’s having become piggul. If so, it is proven that a piggul intention is effective to sanctify the loaves. Why, then, should a piggul intention not be effective to bring kodashim kalim into the category of misuse [and remove kodshei kodashim from the category of misuse]?

The question returns: What is the difference between the taking effect of intrinsic sanctity through the slaughter of a piggul offering and the taking effect of the law of misuse? This is difficult for Rav Giddel in the name of Rav.

And we answer: The Gemara retracts all the preceding give-and-take and distinguishes between the sanctity of the loaves, which takes effect at the time of slaughter, and the law of misuse, which takes effect at the time of sprinkling .

Rather, what

was meant by what we learned, that the loaves become sanctified through the slaughter of a piggul offering,

was not to make one liable for misuse ;

that is, the loaves do not possess intrinsic sanctity in the full sense, since the slaughter was performed with a piggul intention.

Rather, so as to disqualify them, since they require burning, that is, the loaves are not unconsecrated; they were sanctified with intrinsic sanctity, so that if a person who has immersed that day or one who lacks atonement touches them [although such contact does not impart impurity to unconsecrated food], the loaves become impure and require burning. Likewise, if a night passes over them [“overnight,” linah], they require burning . Explanation A piggul service, which “distances” the offering from its purpose, can result only in “disqualification,” so that the loaves require burning; it cannot bring kodashim kalim into the category of misuse. On the contrary! The entire law of misuse, which takes effect with regard to kodashim kalim and ceases with regard to kodshei kodashim, applies only following valid slaughter, when the offering has reached its purpose, and not following a piggul service. Consequently, the loaves of the thanksgiving-offering do not pose a difficulty for Rav Giddel in the name of Rav. The Gemara cites a beraita in support of Rav Giddel in the name of Rav, that the sprinkling of piggul does not remove kodshei kodashim from the category of misuse. Let us say, that this beraita supports him? We learned: With regard to piggul, one is always liable for misuse! Does this not mean that the beraita is speaking of a case in which although the blood was sprinkled, the blood having already been sprinkled, one is nevertheless liable for misuse, and the sprinkling did not remove it from the category of misuse,

meaning that the loaves are not ordinary unconsecrated food. They acquire intrinsic sanctity, so that if a person who immersed that day or one who still requires atonement touches them [although such contact does not render unconsecrated food impure], the loaves become impure and must be burned. Likewise, if a night passes over them—“remaining overnight”—they must be burned .

Explanation The piggul procedure, which distances the offering from its intended purpose, can result only in disqualification, so that the loaves must be burned. But it cannot cause offerings of lesser sanctity to become subject to the law of misuse of consecrated property. On the contrary: The law of misuse that takes effect with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity and is removed with regard to offerings of the highest sanctity applies only through valid slaughter, when the offering has reached its intended completion, and not through a piggul procedure.

and this supports him—the beraita supports Rav Giddel, who maintains this?

And we reject this:

No!

This beraita does not support him, because the beraita is speaking of a case in which

he did not sprinkle,

that he had not yet sprinkled the

blood,

and therefore the law of misuse still applies to it. Indeed, if he had already sprinkled the blood, it could be said that the sprinkling removes it from the category of misuse!

And we ask:

If

the case is

that he did not sprinkle the blood, what does it teach us?!

What does the beraita come to teach us?

It is obvious, for it has not yet left the category of

“the sacred property of the Lord” .

And the Gemara retracts its explanation that he had not yet sprinkled the blood:

Rather, it is always a case in which he sprinkled, and

nevertheless, this beraita does not support Rav Giddel. Why?

Because that statement was taught—the beraita is speaking

of

an

olah

offering, which is subject to misuse—even when valid, after sprinkling, since its meat is not eaten by the kohanim, and it remains among “the sacred property of the Lord” even after sprinkling . Therefore, it is subject to misuse even when it has become piggul. But with regard to the other kodshei kodashim, which leave the category of misuse through sprinkling, the beraita offers no support; it is possible that they leave the category of misuse even through the sprinkling of piggul.

And we raise a difficulty:

If

the case is

one in which he did not sprinkle the blood, what does it teach us?!

What does the beraita come to teach us?

It is obvious, for it has still not left the category of

“offerings of

the Lord”!

The Gemara retracts its explanation that he had not yet sprinkled the blood.

Rather, it is always a case in which he did sprinkle, and

nevertheless, this beraita does not support Rav Giddel. Why?

For that [beraita] was taught

concerning

an

offering of

burnt offering,

which is subject to the law of misuse of consecrated property—even in the case of a valid offering, after sprinkling—since its meat is not eaten by the priests and it remains among the “offerings of the Lord” even after sprinkling . Therefore, it is subject to the law of misuse even when it becomes piggul. But with regard to the other offerings of the highest sanctity, which leave the law of misuse of consecrated property through sprinkling, the beraita provides no support; it is possible that they leave that law even through sprinkling of piggul.

And we raise a difficulty:

if

the beraita is speaking

of an olah, it is obvious

that one commits me’ila with it even after the sprinkling, even if it did not become piggul, since

it is entirely for the Most High

; it is offered entirely upon the altar,

so why did the beraita state that one commits me’ila with it specifically when it became piggul?