Meilah 3b (ג:) — the Talmud in English

The partitions apprehended it for every matter. "

A private altar" is an altar that an individual makes for himself at the head of his roof, and upon which he sacrifices offerings to Hashem. This altar, which became forbidden after the Temple was built by King Solomon, was permitted during certain periods, as explained in the final chapter of tractate Zevachim. " A communal altar" is the Tent of Meeting, the "Mishkan" that Moses erected in the wilderness, which was erected in the Land of Israel after the Children of Israel entered the Land of Israel, and was repeatedly dismantled and rebuilt, and went into exile from place to place.

A private altar (bamat yachid) is an altar that an individual makes for himself on the roof of his house, upon which he offers sacrifices to the Lord. This altar, which became prohibited after the Temple was built by King Solomon, was permitted during certain periods, as explained in the final chapter of tractate Zevachim." "

A communal altar (bamat tzibbur) is the Tent of Meeting, the Mishkan that Moses erected in the wilderness. It was erected in the Land of Israel after the Israelites entered the Land of Israel, and was repeatedly dismantled and rebuilt, moving from place to place."

The Sages expounded there, in tractate Zevachim, that there were periods when, while the Mishkan was erected—and it was then a communal altar—private altars were prohibited; and there were periods when, despite the erection of the Mishkan, private altars were permitted. This was when the Mishkan was at Gilgal, Nob, and Gibeon.

And we learned there in the Mishna: What is the difference between a private altar and a communal altar? The Mishna there lists several laws concerning the sacrificial service that do not apply to a private altar.

For example: the slaughtering of sacrificial animals of the highest degree of sanctity in the north. One who slaughters an olah offering on a private altar need not slaughter it on the northern side of the altar; he may slaughter it in the south, or on whichever side he wishes.

And Rabbi Elazar said there that an olah offering that was consecrated, during a period when a private altar was permitted, to be offered on a private altar, and was brought inside, into the enclosure of the communal altar, was apprehended by the partitions of the communal altar, and all the laws of a communal altar listed there take effect upon it, as though it had initially been consecrated to be offered upon the altar, despite the fact that it had initially been consecrated to be offered on a private altar.

Accordingly, it must be slaughtered on the north side of the altar, like other offerings of the highest degree of sanctity on a communal altar; and if it was slaughtered in the south, it is invalid.

And

Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma

An olah offering of a private altar that he brought inside,

and whose status now requires it to be slaughtered in the north,

if

he slaughtered it in the south ,

so that it became invalid,

after the fact, if

it ascended, may it be taken down?

Should it be brought down from the altar? The two sides of the dilemma will be explained below.

And the Gemara infers:

Since he

only

raised a dilemma concerning one ,

from the fact that Rabbi Elazar was uncertain only about an olah offering of a private altar, which initially, at the time it was consecrated, was not required to be slaughtered in the north,

it follows—

the general implication of the matter is—

that the other,

namely, an olah offering that was initially consecrated to be offered inside on a communal altar—that is, ordinary offerings of the highest degree of sanctity concerning which Rabba and Rav Yosef disputed—

was obvious to him,

the law was clear to him.

For if he had no clear ruling concerning an olah offering of a communal altar, then he should first have raised his dilemma concerning an olah offering of a communal altar. Rather, it is necessarily the case that he had a clear ruling.

And now that it has been established that the law of offerings of the highest degree of sanctity that were slaughtered in the south, became invalid, and ascended was obvious to Rabbi Elazar, the Gemara considers what his ruling was:

whether like Rabba,

and they must be taken down,

or whether like Rav Yosef,

and they need not be taken down. For Rabbi Elazar's dilemma can be interpreted according to both possibilities, whether he holds like Rabba or whether he holds like Rav Yosef.

For

he raised one dilemma on the basis of another:

after the law of offerings of the highest degree of sanctity that were slaughtered in the south and ascended was obvious to him, he raised a dilemma concerning an olah offering of a private altar.

And the Gemara explains his dilemma: Is it to be said that he had reached a clear ruling that if an offering ascended it must be taken down, in accordance with the opinion of Rabba?

It is possible to say:

Rabba stated there only up to this point,

that

if they ascended, they must be taken down,

because

a properly constituted partition rendered it invalid—that is, when he vowed to offer the olah offering, he vowed to offer it on a communal altar, and its consecration to be offered on a communal altar was properly constituted. Therefore, when he changed its location and slaughtered it in the south, he rendered it invalid. This is unlike one who vowed to offer an olah offering of a private altar,

that is, when he vowed to offer the burnt-offering, he vowed to offer it at a communal altar, and its consecration to be offered at the communal altar was proper. Therefore, if he changed its place and slaughtered it in the south, he rendered it invalid. This is not so with one who vowed a burnt-offering of a private altar,

for

the partition

was not

properly

properly constituted—that is, initially he did not vow to offer it on a communal altar; at the time of his vow, he vowed to offer it on a private altar, and at the time of the vow there was no obligation upon it to be slaughtered in the north. It is therefore possible to say that

that is, originally he did not vow to offer it at a communal altar, and at the time of his vow he vowed to offer it at a private altar; and at the time of the vow, the obligation of slaughtering it in the north did not apply to it. There is reason to say that

it did not render it invalid,

even if the partitions apprehended it and it became invalid through being slaughtered in the south. In any event, its obligation to be slaughtered in the north is less stringent, and it is possible that even Rabba would agree that if it ascended, it need not be taken down.

Or perhaps one should say that there is no distinction, and in this case too it must be taken down.

And now the Gemara explains Rabbi Elazar's dilemma if we say that he had reached a clear ruling that offerings of the highest degree of sanctity slaughtered in the courtyard and then ascended need not be taken down, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef:

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say:

Even according to Rav Yosef, who says: If they ascended, they need not be taken down ,

Rabbi Elazar raised his dilemma, because a distinction can be made: When an offering was consecrated to be offered upon the altar on a communal altar, and

the partition was properly constituted,

the sanctity of the altar is so great that it apprehends an offering,

it apprehended

even invalid offerings. Accordingly, if they ascended, they need not be taken down. But when it was consecrated for a private altar and

the partition was not properly constituted,

and initially it had not been consecrated with the sanctity of the altar, one may say that

the altar did not apprehend

this offering, which had become invalid. Or perhaps one should say that there is no distinction, and in this case too it need not be taken down.

And we conclude:

Teyku!

All offerings of the highest degree of sanctity are subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property from the time of their consecration until they become permitted to the priests through the sprinkling of the blood, at which point the meat becomes permitted to the priests and the sacrificial portions to the altar .

Offerings of lesser sanctity are not subject to misuse until the time of sprinkling; at that point, only their sacrificial portions are subject to misuse.

It is further explained that all offerings that were slaughtered, or upon which one of the sacrificial services was performed, with an intention concerning outside its designated time or with an intention concerning outside its designated place, are invalid. This is called piggul. One who eats them is liable to lashes, and one who eats piggul resulting from an intention concerning outside its designated time is liable to karet. "

Provided that the permitting rite is performed in accordance with its mitzva." That is, the blood must be sprinkled with the same piggul intention, or silently—that is, without an intention. But if he slaughtered with an intention concerning outside its designated time and sprinkled with an intention concerning outside its designated place, or with an intention that it not be performed for its own sake, then, in offerings rendered invalid through an improper intention, the meat leaves the prohibition of piggul resulting from an intention concerning outside its designated time, and one who eats it is not liable to karet.

It follows that the sprinkling is what "establishes" the prohibition of piggul, whereas before it, the piggul is "hanging," and it remains uncertain whether the sacrificial services will indeed be completed with an intention concerning outside its designated time.

This law is derived in tractate Zevachim [28b] from what is stated in the passage concerning piggul: "It shall not be accepted." And we expound: Just as the presentation of a valid offering, so is the presentation of an invalid offering. That is, the "sprinkling of the blood," which "presents" all valid offerings, does not "present" an offering that is piggul. From this it follows that it is the act that establishes the piggul.

And since this sprinkling is effective in "establishing" the piggul, even after the offering was slaughtered with a piggul intention, it is evident that the sprinkling is not merely like pouring water , but possesses the "significance" of sprinkling.

And since the sprinkling bears the "designation" of sprinkling and possesses the significance of sprinkling, it occurred to the Gemara to say that it should likewise be effective in removing the piggul from the prohibition of misuse, since he performed an act of sprinkling [which activates laws concerning the offering]. It should likewise bring offerings of lesser sanctity into the category of items subject to misuse.

Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav that he came to refute this reasoning, as will be explained.

Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: Sprinkling performed with a piggul intention,

if he slaughtered with a piggul intention and afterward sprinkled without specifying an intention, and this sprinkling establishes the piggul,

does not remove

[does not remove it]

offerings of the highest degree of sanctity from the prohibition of misuse ,

so that the offering would be considered permitted to the priests

. And

likewise, it

does not bring offerings of lesser sanctity into the category of items subject to misuse .

This is because the sprinkling cannot accomplish two things at once: both to establish piggul and to remove offerings of the highest degree of sanctity from the prohibition of misuse and bring offerings of lesser sanctity into the category of items subject to misuse .

Abaye sat,

that is, he sat,

and he stated this teaching,

and recited this teaching of Rav Giddel.

Rav Pappa raised an objection to Abaye,

Rav Pappa cites a Mishna taught with regard to the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering in order to challenge Rav Giddel .

One who brings a thanksgiving-offering brings with it forty loaves: ten loaves of leavened bread, ten loaves of matza, ten matza wafers, and ten scalded loaves. The owner gives the priest one loaf of each kind for the priests to eat, while the remainder is eaten by the owner with the sanctity of kodashim kalim.

The Sages derived [Menahot 78b] from that which is stated [Leviticus 7], “He shall offer his offering with the sacrifice,” that the loaves become sanctified only through the slaughter of the sacrifice. That is, once the loaves of the thanksgiving-offering have been consecrated verbally, they acquire sanctity of value and become forbidden in consumption and benefit. However, they have not yet acquired sanctity of the offering itself. If they become impure, they are redeemed and become non-sacred. The slaughter of the sacrifice, by contrast, sanctifies them with the sanctity of the offering [the sanctity of a sacrifice], and they become subject to all the laws governing disqualified consecrated items, such as impurity, notar, and the like. For the slaughter of the sacrifice sanctifies the loaves of the thanksgiving-offering with the sanctity of the offering.

And we learned:

If one slaughters the thanksgiving-offering inside

the courtyard,

while its loaves

are found

outside the wall,

of the courtyard,

he has not sanctified the loaves,

with the sanctity of the offering, since at the time of slaughter the loaves were not inside the courtyard. And it is stated in the Torah [ibid.], “Upon the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering, loaves,” from which we derive that “upon” means in close proximity .

They further derived from what the Torah says, “He shall offer it upon loaves of leavened bread,” that the loaves become sanctified only if, when he slaughtered the sacrifice, they were already “bread,” meaning that their surface had formed a crust in the oven .

Accordingly, the Mishna continues:

If he slaughtered it,

the thanksgiving-offering,

before its surface had formed a crust in the oven, even if all of them had formed a crust except for

one

loaf, he has not sanctified the loaves,

with the sanctity of the offering, even those loaves whose surfaces had formed a crust.

But if he

slaughtered it

with the intention of

outside its designated time or

outside its designated place, he has sanctified the loaves,

and they are sanctified loaves that have been disqualified.

Rav Pappa proves:

Apparently,

it is evident from this that just as the loaves acquired the sanctity of the offering even though the offering is piggul and the sacrifice was disqualified, so too a

piggul sprinkling brings it

has the power to bring it

to the status of me'ila.

That is, if we were to say that a sprinkling performed with a piggul intention is not considered a sprinkling that brings sanctity, but is merely like pouring water, why does it cause the loaves to acquire the sanctity of the offering ? This is a difficulty against Rav Giddel in the name of Rav!

He fell silent!

Abaye remained silent and did not answer him.

The Gemara relates:

When he came,

when Abaye came

before,

before

Rabbi Abba,

and raised this difficulty against Rav Giddel from the Mishna concerning the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering,

he said to him,

Rav Abba said to him:

With regard to the sprinkling.

That is, the two subjects must be distinguished.

Introduction

The sanctity of the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering is the sanctity of the offering itself, and it takes effect at the time of slaughter. At the time of slaughter, however, the piggul has not yet been established; that occurs only at the sprinkling. Therefore, the loaves were sanctified at the time of slaughter. This differs from the prohibition of me'ila, whose departure from kodshei kodashim or entry into the category of kodashim kalim occurs at the time of the sprinkling. That sprinkling, however, was performed with a piggul intention, and it established the piggul. Accordingly, Rav Giddel maintains that a sprinkling performed with a piggul intention cannot remove kodshei kodashim from the prohibition of me'ila or bring kodashim kalim to the status of me'ila.

It is clear from Rabbi Abba’s words that the piggul is not established until the sprinkling. This contains no novelty and is self-evident, as explained: we derive that “the offering of a valid sacrifice is compared to the offering of a disqualified one.” If, at the time of slaughter, he formulated an intention concerning the wrong time, and at the time of the sprinkling he formulated an intention concerning the wrong place [or an intention not for its sake in the case of a sin-offering or Paschal offering], it is not piggul.

However, without Rabbi Abba’s statement, we might have thought that until the sprinkling it is not piggul only in the sense that one who eats it [even within its designated time] is not liable to karet; nevertheless, it is piggul and bears the status of piggul. Rabbi Abba comes to teach that it is not piggul “at all,” and that the status of piggul does not take effect upon it until the blood is sprinkled .

He therefore answered that the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering became sanctified even though the sacrifice was slaughtered with a piggul intention, since the sacrifice is not piggul until the sprinkling. The Gemara discusses this novel teaching of Rabbi Abba. Rav Ashi proves from Ulla’s statement that the status of piggul takes effect immediately after slaughter.

A meal-offering requires four rites: kemitza, placing the kemitza in a vessel, carrying it to the altar, and burning the kemitza upon the fire.

These four rites parallel the four rites involving the blood of an animal sacrifice: kemitza corresponds to slaughter, placing the kemitza in a sacred vessel corresponds to receiving the blood, carrying it corresponds to carrying the blood, and burning corresponds to sprinkling the blood.

The laws of piggul in all their details were stated with regard to meal-offerings just as they were stated with regard to animal sacrifices. One who eats from a meal-offering that is piggul [apart from the kemitza] is liable to karet [if he formulated an intention concerning the wrong time during its service]. If, during its service, he formulated an intention concerning the wrong place, he is liable to lashes for eating it בלבד.

Rav Ashi said to Rava: But Ulla said: A kemitza that is piggul,

because he formulated a piggul intention during the kemitza,

which he placed

upon the altar, its piggul status departed from it .

The reason will be explained below.

The wording “its piggul status departed” implies that it had already been piggul immediately after the kemitza, even before the burning , but that it departed from it.

And kemitza is equivalent to slaughter,

as it is the rite in meal-offerings that parallels slaughter. Thus, Ulla maintains that immediately after kemitza—or slaughter, in the case of an animal sacrifice—performed with a piggul intention, the status of piggul takes effect, even before the offering is placed upon the altar. This is difficult according to Rabbi Abba, who said that the status of piggul does not take effect until the sprinkling.

And we answer:

He said to him,

Rava said to him: The truth is as Rabbi Abba said: the status of piggul does not take effect until the time of the sprinkling of the blood or the time of the burning of the kemitza [and therefore a sprinkling performed with a piggul intention does not bring kodashim kalim to the status of me'ila, as Rav Giddel said, and therefore the loaves became sanctified],

and as for Ulla’s statement that its piggul status departed from it, he means that

the prohibition that would bring it to the status of piggul

departed from it—the prohibition of piggul that would have taken effect at the time of the burning.