Meilah 3b — the Talmud in English

The partitions apprehended it for every matter. "

A private altar" is an altar that an individual makes for himself at the head of his roof, and upon which he sacrifices offerings to Hashem. This altar, which became forbidden after the Temple was built by King Solomon, was permitted during certain periods, as explained in the final chapter of tractate Zevachim. " A communal altar" is the Tent of Meeting, the "Mishkan" that Moses erected in the wilderness, which was erected in the Land of Israel after the Children of Israel entered the Land of Israel, and was repeatedly dismantled and rebuilt, and went into exile from place to place.

A private altar” is an altar that an individual makes on the roof of his house and on which he offers offerings to the Lord. This altar, which became forbidden after King Solomon built the Temple, was permitted during certain periods, as explained in the final chapter of Tractate Zevahim. “

A public altar” is the Tent of Meeting, the “Tabernacle” that Moses erected in the wilderness. It was erected in the Land of Israel after the Israelites entered the Land of Israel, and it was repeatedly dismantled and rebuilt, and moved from place to place.

The Sages expounded there, in tractate Zevachim, that there were times when, while the Mishkan was erected, and it was a "communal altar," the "private altars" were forbidden; and there were times when, despite the Mishkan being erected, "private altars" were permitted, namely, when the Mishkan was at Gilgal, Nob, and Gibeon.

And we learned there in the Mishna: What is the difference between a private altar and a communal altar? The Mishna there enumerates several laws concerning the sacrificial services in which one is not obligated at a private altar.

For example: the slaughtering of offerings of the most sacred order on the north. One who slaughters a burnt-offering at a private altar need not slaughter it on the northern side of the altar; it is permitted to slaughter it in the south, or on whichever side it may be.

And Rabbi Elazar said there that a burnt-offering which was consecrated, at a time when a private altar was permitted, to be offered at a private altar, and he brought it inside, within the curtains of the communal altar—the partitions of the communal altar apprehended it, and all the laws of a communal altar enumerated there apply to it, as though it had originally been consecrated to be offered upon the altar, even though originally it had been consecrated to be offered at a private altar.

Therefore, he is obligated to slaughter it on the north of the altar, like the other offerings of the most sacred order at a communal altar; and if he slaughtered it in the south, it is invalid.

And

Rabbi Elazar raised a question

a burnt-offering of a private altar that he brought inside,

inside, and now its law is that it must be slaughtered in the north,

if

he slaughtered it in the south

so that it became invalid,

In retrospect, if

it went up, what is the law as to whether it must come down,

must they bring it down from the altar? And the sides of the uncertainty will be explained below.

And the Gemara infers:

Since

he

Since he raised a question concerning one matter,

from the fact that Rabbi Elazar was uncertain only concerning a burnt-offering of a private altar, which originally, at the time of its consecration, did not have the law that it must be slaughtered in the north,

by implication,

it follows from the generality of the matter,

that the other,

concerning a burnt-offering that was originally consecrated to be offered inside at a communal altar—that is, ordinary offerings of the most sacred order concerning which Rabba and Rav Yosef disagreed—

it was obvious to him,

the law was clear to him.

For if he did not have a clear ruling concerning the law of a burnt-offering of a communal altar, then he should first have been uncertain about the law of a burnt-offering of a communal altar. Rather, it is necessarily the case that he had a clear ruling.

And now that it has been established that, according to Rabbi Elazar, the law of offerings of the most sacred order that were slaughtered in the south, became invalid, and went up was obvious, the Gemara is uncertain what his ruling was:

whether it was like Rabba,

and they must come down,

or whether it was like Rav Yosef,

and they need not come down. For Rabbi Elazar's uncertainty can be explained in both ways, whether he holds like Rabba or whether he holds like Rav Yosef.

For

he raised one question within another,

after the law of offerings of the most sacred order that were slaughtered in the south and went up was obvious to him, he was uncertain concerning a burnt-offering of a private altar.

And the Gemara explains his uncertainty: shall we say that he had issued a clear ruling that if they went up they must come down, in accordance with Rabba's view?

It is possible to say:

Rabba said there only this far,

that

if they went up, they must come down, only

because

a properly arranged partition rendered it invalid,

that is, when he vowed to offer the burnt-offering, he vowed to offer it at a communal altar, and its consecration to be offered at the communal altar was proper. Therefore, if he changed its place and slaughtered it in the south, he rendered it invalid. This is not so with one who vowed a burnt-offering of a private altar,

for the partition

the partition

was not

was

properly arranged,

that is, originally he did not vow to offer it at a communal altar, and at the time of his vow he vowed to offer it at a private altar; and at the time of the vow, the obligation of slaughtering it in the north did not apply to it. There is reason to say that

it did not render it invalid,

even if the partitions apprehended it and it became invalid through slaughter in the south; nevertheless, its obligation to be slaughtered in the north is less severe, and it is possible that even Rabba would agree that if it went up, it need not come down.

Or shall we say that there is no distinction, and in this case too it must come down?

And now the Gemara explains Rabbi Elazar's uncertainty if we say that he had a clear ruling that offerings of the most sacred order that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard and went up need not come down, in accordance with Rav Yosef's view:

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say,

even according to Rav Yosef, who says: if they went up, they need not come down,

Rabbi Elazar was uncertain, for one can distinguish: when he consecrated it to offer it upon the altar at a communal altar, and

the partition was properly arranged,

so that the sanctity of the altar is so great that it apprehends

it apprehended even invalid offerings,

therefore, if they went up, they need not come down. But when he consecrated it for a private altar, and

the partition was not properly arranged,

and originally it had not been consecrated with the sanctity of the altar, one may say that

the altar did not apprehend

this offering that became invalid. Or shall we say that there is no distinction, and in this case too it need not come down?

And we conclude:

teyku!

All offerings of the most sacred order are subject to meila from the time of their consecration until they receive permission for the priests through the sprinkling, at which point the meat becomes permitted to the priests and the sacrificial portions to the altar.

Offerings of lesser sanctity are not subject to meila until the time of the sprinkling; at that point, one commits meila only with regard to their sacrificial portions.

It is further explained that all consecrated offerings that were slaughtered, or in which one of the services was performed with a thought of outside its time or with a thought of outside its place, the offering is invalid. This is called "pigul"; one who eats them is liable for lashes, and one who eats pigul resulting from a thought of outside its time is liable to karet. "

Provided that the permitting element is offered in accordance with its mitzva." That is, that he sprinkle the blood with that same thought of pigul, or in silence, meaning without a thought. But if he slaughtered with a thought of outside its time and sprinkled with a thought of outside its place, or with a thought not for its sake, in offerings that are "invalid when not for their sake," the meat leaves the prohibition of pigul resulting from outside its time, and one who eats it is not liable to karet.

It follows that the sprinkling is what "establishes" the prohibition of pigul, and before it, the pigul is "suspended," and it is uncertain whether the services will indeed be completed with a thought of outside its time.

This law was learned in tractate Zevachim [28b] from what is stated in the passage of pigul, "It shall not be accepted," and we expound: just as the presentation of a valid offering, so is the presentation of an invalid offering. That is, the "sprinkling of the blood," which is the "presenter" in all valid offerings, is not a "presenter" in an offering of pigul. From here it follows that it establishes the pigul.

And since this sprinkling is effective to "establish" the pigul, even after the offering was slaughtered with a thought of pigul, it is evident that the sprinkling is not like merely pouring water, but rather it has the "importance" of sprinkling.

And since the sprinkling has the "designation" of sprinkling upon it, and the importance of sprinkling, it occurred to us to say that likewise it should be effective to remove pigul from meila, since he performed an act of sprinkling [which activates laws concerning the offering]. And likewise it should be effective to bring offerings of lesser sanctity to a state of meila.

And Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav to reject this reasoning, as will be explained.

Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: Sprinkling of pigul,

if he slaughtered with a thought of pigul and afterwards sprinkled without a specific thought, and this sprinkling establishes the pigul,

does not remove [

it does not remove]

offerings of the most sacred order from meila,

so that the offering should be considered permitted to the priests

. And

likewise it

does not bring offerings of lesser sanctity to a state of meila.

Because the sprinkling cannot perform two things: both to establish pigul and to remove offerings of the most sacred order from meila and bring offerings of lesser sanctity to a state of meila.

Abaye sat,

he sat,

Abaye, and he stated this teaching,

and he stated this teaching of Rav Giddel.

Rav Pappa raised an objection to Abaye,

Rav Pappa cites a Mishna taught concerning the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering in order to raise an objection against Rav Giddel .

One who brings a thanksgiving-offering brings with it forty loaves: ten of them loaves of leavened bread, ten loaves of unleavened bread, ten wafers of unleavened bread, and ten scalded loaves. And the owner gives the priest one loaf of each kind for the priests’ consumption, while the rest is eaten by the owner with the sanctity of lesser sacred offerings.

The Sages expounded [Menachot 78b] from what is stated [Leviticus 7], “He shall offer his offering with the sacrifice,” that this teaches that the bread becomes sacred only through the slaughter of the sacrifice. That is, once the thanksgiving-offering loaves have been consecrated verbally, they acquire sanctity of value and become forbidden in consumption and benefit. But they have not yet acquired the sanctity of the offering itself. If they become impure, they are redeemed and go out to the non-sacred domain. The slaughter of the sacrifice, however, consecrates them with the sanctity of the offering [the sanctity of a sacrifice], and they become subject to all the laws of disqualification of consecrated things, such as impurity, notar, and the like. For the slaughter of the sacrifice consecrates the thanksgiving-offering loaves with the sanctity of the offering.

And we learned:

If one slaughters the thanksgiving-offering inside

the Temple courtyard,

and its bread

is found

outside the wall,

of the courtyard,

he has not consecrated the bread,

with the sanctity of the offering, since at the time of slaughter the bread was not inside the courtyard; and it is stated in the Torah [there], “Upon the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering, unleavened loaves,” and we expound “upon” as meaning adjacent.

They further expounded from what the Torah says, “Upon loaves of leavened bread shall he offer,” that this teaches that the bread becomes sacred only if, when he slaughtered the sacrifice, it was already “bread,” which is when its surface had crusted in the oven.

Therefore, the Mishna continues:

If he slaughtered it,

the thanksgiving-offering,

before its surface had crusted in the oven, even if all of them had crusted except for

one

loaf among them, he has not consecrated the bread,

with the sanctity of the offering, even those loaves whose surfaces had crusted.

But if he

slaughtered it,

with the thought

outside its designated time or

outside its designated place, he has consecrated the bread,

and it is disqualified sacred bread.

And Rav Pappa proves:

Evidently,

it is demonstrated from this that just as the bread acquired the sanctity of the offering despite the fact that it is pigul and the sacrifice was disqualified, so too the sprinkling of

a pigul thought brings it,

it has the power to bring it

to the status of meila.

That is, if we say that sprinkling with a pigul thought is not considered sprinkling that brings about sanctity, but is merely like pouring water, then why does it bring the bread to acquire the sanctity of the offering? And this is difficult for Rav Giddel in the name of Rav!

He was silent!

Abaye was silent and did not answer him.

And the Gemara relates:

When he came,

when Abaye came

before

before

Rabbi Abba,

and asked this objection against Rav Giddel from the Mishna concerning the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering,

he said to him,

Rav Abba said to him:

With sprinkling.

That is, a distinction must be made between the subjects.

Introduction

The loaves of a thanksgiving-offering possess the sanctity of the offering itself, and this sanctity takes effect at the time of slaughter. At the time of slaughter, however, the pigul has not yet been established until the sprinkling; therefore, the bread was consecrated at the time of slaughter. This is unlike the prohibition of meila, whose removal in the case of offerings of the highest sanctity, or whose imposition in the case of lesser sacred offerings, takes place at the time of sprinkling. That sprinkling was performed with a pigul thought, and it established the pigul. Therefore, Rav Giddel holds that sprinkling performed with a pigul thought cannot remove offerings of the highest sanctity from the status of meila or bring lesser sacred offerings to the status of meila.

It is explained from Rabbi Abba’s words that the pigul is not established until the sprinkling. There is no novelty in this statement, and it is straightforward, as explained: We expound, “As the acceptance of a valid offering, so is the acceptance of a disqualified offering.” If, at the time of slaughter, he formulated a thought concerning beyond its designated time, and at the time of sprinkling formulated a thought concerning beyond its designated place [or a thought not for its sake in the case of a sin-offering or a Paschal-offering], it is not pigul.

Rather, without Rabbi Abba’s words, we would have held that until the sprinkling it is not pigul only with regard to the fact that one who eats it [even within its designated time] is not liable for karet; but nevertheless, it is pigul and it bears the designation of pigul. Rabbi Abba comes to teach and say that it is not pigul “at all,” and the designation of pigul does not take effect upon it until the blood is sprinkled .

And therefore he answered that the loaves of a thanksgiving-offering became sacred even though the sacrifice was slaughtered with a pigul thought, since the sacrifice is not pigul until the sprinkling. The Gemara discusses this novelty of Rabbi Abba. And Rav Ashi proves from Ulla’s words that the designation of pigul takes effect immediately after the slaughter.

A meal-offering requires four services: the handful-taking, placing the handful in a vessel, carrying it to the altar, and burning the handful upon the fires.

These four services correspond to the four services of the blood in an animal sacrifice: the handful-taking corresponds to slaughter, placing the handful in a service vessel corresponds to receiving the blood, carrying corresponds to carrying, and burning corresponds to sprinkling the blood.

The laws of pigul in all their details were stated with regard to meal-offerings just as they were stated with regard to animal sacrifices. One who eats from a meal-offering that is pigul [apart from the handful] is liable for karet [if he formulated a thought concerning beyond its designated time during its service]. And if he formulated during its service a thought concerning beyond its designated place, he is liable for lashes alone for eating it.

Rav Ashi said to Rava: But Ulla said: A handful that is pigul,

in which he formulated the pigul thought during the handful-taking,

which he brought up

to the altar, its pigul was removed from it .

And the reason will be explained below.

And from the expression “its pigul was removed” it follows that it had already been pigul immediately after the handful-taking, even before the burning, except that it was removed from it.

And the handful-taking is equivalent to slaughter,

it is the service in meal-offerings corresponding to slaughter. It follows that Ulla holds that immediately after the handful-taking, or slaughter, with a pigul thought, the designation of pigul takes effect even before bringing it up to the altar. This is difficult according to Rabbi Abba’s statement that the designation of pigul does not take effect until the sprinkling.

And we answer:

He said to him,

Rava said to him: The truth is according to Rabbi Abba’s words: the designation of pigul does not take effect until the time of sprinkling the blood or the time of burning the handful [and therefore sprinkling with a pigul thought does not bring lesser sacred offerings to the status of meila, according to Rav Giddel’s words, and therefore the bread became sacred],

and as for what Ulla said, “its pigul was removed from it,” he meant that

the prohibition that brings about pigul was removed from it,

the prohibition of pigul that was destined to take effect at the time of burning.