Meilah 3a (ג.) — the Talmud in English

It might enter your mind

I would say:

It might have entered one's mind to say that specifically in the case of

a blemished sin-offering

that died,

since it is not fit to effect atonement,

as it was already unfit to effect atonement during its lifetime,

people do not distance themselves from it: people do not distance themselves from it, and therefore the Sages had to decree the status of me'ila for it, so that people would not come to treat it contemptuously,

people do not refrain from using it. Therefore, the Sages had to decree that deriving benefit from it constitutes misuse of consecrated property, so that people would not come to treat it lightly,

but unblemished sacrificial animals

that died, and during their lifetime were fit to be sacrificed, it might have entered one's mind to say

since they are fit to effect atonement,

as they were fit to effect atonement,

and people distance themselves from them,

and even without a decree of the Sages people distance themselves from them,

say

that is to say,

no,

the Sages did not decree the status of me'ila for them, since there was no need to issue such a decree. Therefore,

it teaches us

Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan that, nevertheless, the Sages did decree the status of me'ila for them. [

Second version ]:

And we raise an objection to Ulla, who holds that sacrificial animals that died are subject to me'ila by rabbinic law:

“That died” too, we already learned it?!

Did we indeed learn that sacrificial animals that died “are” subject to me'ila by rabbinic law? We learned a Mishna from which it is precise that they are “not” subject to me'ila, even by rabbinic law?!

As we learned:

One who derives benefit from a sin-offering while it is alive has not committed me'ila until he causes it to lose value.

But when it has died, once he derives any benefit from it, he has committed me'ila,

as explained above.

And one should infer from the fact that the Mishna said “sin-offering” that it was only with regard to a sin-offering that the Sages decreed me'ila when it died, because its sanctity is more stringent, since it comes to effect atonement. But with regard to the other most-sacred offerings, such as an elevation-offering, a guilt-offering, and the communal peace-offerings, once they have died, one who derives benefit from them has not committed me'ila, even by rabbinic law.

And this is difficult for Ulla's statement ?

And we answer: Ulla could say to you: We should not make this inference from the Mishna. In truth, the Sages also decreed me'ila for other most-sacred offerings that died.

And why, then, did the Mishna say: One who derives benefit from the “sin-offering”?

Because

it might enter one's mind to say

that the Sages did not decree me'ila for it

since it comes for atonement,

as during its lifetime it was destined to be sacrificed to effect atonement for a sin,

people distance themselves from it,

as people distance themselves from it during its lifetime until it effects atonement; therefore, when it dies, they too distance themselves from it, and there is no need for the Sages to decree me'ila for it.

It teaches us

the Mishna teaches us that, nevertheless, they decreed me'ila for it. And all the more so with regard to other most-sacred offerings, which are not destined to effect atonement and from which people do not distance themselves to the same extent; all the more so did the Sages decree me'ila for them, in accordance with Ulla's statement.

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning what we learned: With regard to a sin-offering that died, one commits me'ila by deriving benefit from it by rabbinic law.

But is there me'ila with regard to a sin-offering that died?

Is there indeed a law of

me'ila

with regard to it, even by rabbinic law?!

And it was taught

in a beraita:

Sin-offerings that are to die [

the five disqualified sin-offerings whose law is that they must die; that is, their law is not that they are left to graze until they develop a blemish and are redeemed. Rather, they are confined in a pen and denied food until they die, and this is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. These are: the offspring of a sin-offering, the substitute of a sin-offering, one whose owner died, one whose owner obtained atonement through another offering, and one whose second year has passed]

and

likewise

money destined for the Dead Sea [

if one set aside money for his sin-offering and then died, the money is to be lost in the Dead Sea, for just as the sin-offering must die, so too its monetary equivalent is to be lost].

One may not derive benefit

from them; it is prohibited initially to derive benefit from them,

and one does not commit me'ila,

after the fact, if one derived benefit from them, he is not required to repay even the principal, and the Sages did not decree the status of me'ila for one who derives benefit from them .

And this is difficult for Ulla, who holds that one commits me'ila by rabbinic law with regard to a sin-offering that died ? And we answer: A distinction must be made between a sin-offering that was fit to be sacrificed and died, and the five sin-offerings that were not fit to be sacrificed even during their lifetime,

They said:

The members of the academy said: The five

sin-offerings that are to die,

even

during their lifetime people distance themselves from them,

since they are not destined to be sacrificed, and certainly after their death they are repulsive, and people will not come to derive benefit from them. Therefore, the Sages did not decree the status of me'ila for them.

Unlike here ,

in contrast to a valid sin-offering,

from which people do not distance themselves during its lifetime,

since it was fit to be sacrificed, and the Sages were concerned that people would come to derive benefit from it after it died; therefore, the Sages decreed the status of me'ila for it .

The Gemara returns to clarifying the law of most-sacred offerings that were slaughtered in the south, concerning which Rabba and Rav Yosef disputed: If, after the fact, they ascended the altar, do they descend?

Rav Yosef raised an objection to Rabba:

Rav Yosef cites several Mishnayot in tractate Zevaḥim to challenge Rabba's statement,

one from within another,

one Mishna from the next, and

one from within another,

and the third from the second. That is, no single Mishna provides proof with which to challenge Rabba; rather, the proof emerges from all three, which were taught one after the other.

In the seventh chapter of tractate Zevaḥim, the Mishna discusses a bird sin-offering in whose sacrificial service one deviated, performing its rites in the manner of a bird elevation-offering, and conversely, a bird elevation-offering in which he performed the rites in the manner of a sin-offering.

In the bird sin-offering and the bird burnt-offering, slaughter is not performed as it is for unconsecrated birds; rather, melika is performed, as the Torah writes [in the portion of Vayikra]. Melika is as follows: The kohen cuts with his fingernail opposite the bird’s nape, until he cuts through the spine, and he cuts the windpipe and the gullet.

These differences may occur: a

in terms of location:

The blood of the bird sin-offering must be sprinkled below the sikra line, but its melika is valid anywhere on the altar, whereas all the procedures of the bird burnt-offering, including its melika, are performed above the sikra line. b

in the form of their melika:

The melika of the bird sin-offering is performed by cutting one of the two signs, either the windpipe or the gullet, and the head is not separated from the body, whereas in the bird burnt-offering both signs are cut, and the head is separated from the bird. c

in the form of the blood applications:

In the bird sin-offering, the blood is sprinkled from the body of the bird onto the wall of the altar [one holds the bird and sprinkles its blood], whereas in the bird burnt-offering there is no sprinkling, but only pressing out the blood; that is, the body is brought close to the altar and the blood is pressed out [squeezed] onto the altar.

There is another fundamental difference between a sin-offering and a burnt-offering: A sin-offering, even an animal sin-offering, that was performed not for the sake of a sin-offering but for the sake of another offering, is invalid. By contrast, if a burnt-offering’s procedures were performed not for the sake of a burnt-offering, the offering is valid, but the offering does not fulfill its owners’ obligation.

There is likewise a difference with regard to me’ilah, which is relevant to our discussion: Since the flesh of the bird sin-offering is permitted to the kohanim, there is no me’ilah involving its flesh after its procedures have been completed validly. But since the bird burnt-offering is entirely burned on the altar, there is me’ilah involving its flesh until it is burned and taken out to the place of the ashes.

And we learned there: In the case of a bird sin-offering with which one made one of the above-mentioned changes, or whose procedures one performed correctly but with the intention that it be a burnt-offering, in all these cases the offering is invalid. It is valid only when one performed it below, in the manner of a sin-offering, for the sake of a sin-offering.

Likewise, in the case of a bird burnt-offering, if one changed the form of its procedures or its location, and performed it in the manner of a sin-offering, it is invalid.

But a bird burnt-offering that one performed in accordance with its mitzva, but with the intention that it be a sin-offering, is valid; it simply does not fulfill its owners’ obligation.

After the Mishna explains all of the above, we learn:

And all of them,

all the bird offerings with which these changes were made, even when they are invalid,

do not render garments impure in the house of swallowing

[in the house]

of swallowing.

A kosher bird does not have the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass, and its carcass does not render one impure through contact or carrying, as does the carcass of an animal. However, the carcass of a kosher bird, for example, one that died or was not slaughtered properly, renders one impure in the house of swallowing. That is, one who swallows an olive-bulk of the carcass of a kosher bird becomes impure as long as that olive-bulk is located in his house of swallowing [his throat], and he renders garments impure—that is, vessels—with which he comes into contact at that time.

But a bird that was slaughtered properly does not impart this impurity, which is called “rendering garments impure in the house of swallowing.”

Likewise, a bird offering that underwent melika does not render garments impure in the house of swallowing. Although if one performed melika on an unconsecrated bird, it would be an unslaughtered carcass, and one who ate it would be liable for lashes and it would render him impure in the house of swallowing, nevertheless, with regard to consecrated offerings, it is not an unslaughtered carcass.

And bird offerings with which one made a change, although their melika is invalid and they are not permitted to be eaten, do not render the person who eats them impure, and he does not render garments impure in the house of swallowing. For their melika purifies them and removes them from the status of unslaughtered carcasses, as is the law with regard to valid consecrated offerings that underwent melika.

And there is me’ilah involving them,

since they became invalid and are not permitted to the kohanim, as we learned in our Mishna [whereas in the case of a bird burnt-offering that one performed in the manner of a burnt-offering for the sake of a sin-offering, and which is valid, there is nevertheless me’ilah involving it, as explained: there is me’ilah involving the flesh of a burnt-offering until it is burned and taken out to the place of the ashes].

Except for a bird sin-offering that one performed

it

below, in the manner of a bird sin-offering, for the sake of a sin-offering,

and made no change in it at all: there is no me’ilah involving it, even if a non-kohen derives benefit from it, because it is permitted to the kohanim, as explained in our Mishna.

This is the first Mishna.

And it teaches upon it,

and later in the Mishna we learned:

Anyone whose disqualification occurred in the sacred domain,

meaning that when it was brought into the courtyard it was valid, and it became invalid in the courtyard , for example, one who changed their location, changed the form of the blood applications, or performed melika with the left hand or at night,

does not render garments impure in the house

[in the house]

of swallowing,

But anyone whose disqualification did not occur in the sacred domain,

but the disqualification occurred before it was consecrated or before it was brought into the courtyard, for example, its time had passed [turtledoves and young pigeons that underwent melika outside the period in which they are valid; see Hullin 22a], or its wing had withered, its eye had been blinded, or its leg had been severed [for which they are disqualified due to being lacking a limb],

does render garments impure in the house

[in the house]

of swallowing,

as though one had performed melika on an unconsecrated bird.

.

One of the things that does not render garments impure in the house of swallowing is a bird burnt-offering that one performed below [and this is one of those cases taught in the first Mishna]; in this Mishna it is defined as “one whose disqualification occurred in the sacred domain.”

The law of “whose disqualification occurred in the sacred domain” with regard to impurity in the house of swallowing is thus explained. But what is its law if it was brought up onto the altar? Must it be taken down, or need it not be taken down? Concerning this, Rav Yosef cites a third Mishna,

and it teaches,

and we learned there in the following chapter: [Rabbi Shimon says:]

Anyone whose disqualification occurred in the sacred domain—if they were brought up, they are not taken down!

This includes a bird burnt-offering that one performed below, and consequently the same law applies to most holy offerings that were slaughtered in the south.

The refutation of Rabba,

the arrangement of these Mishnayot constitutes a refutation of Rabba’s statement, who holds that in the case of an offering slaughtered in the south, if it was brought up, it is taken down. Refutation! And concerning the matter over which Rabba and Rav Yosef disagree, it was obvious to Rabbi Elazar

.

The Gemara

explains that this halakha over which Rabba and Rav Yosef disagreed—concerning most holy offerings slaughtered in the south, if they were brought up, whether they must be taken down—was obvious to Rabbi Elazar, and he had no doubt about it.

Rather, the Gemara is uncertain which view was obvious to him: whether Rabba’s or Rav Yosef’s, as will be explained.

As Rabbi Elazar said: a burnt offering of a private altar that one brought inside,

to a public altar,