Meilah 3a — the Talmud in English

It might enter your mind to say ![](pamud.bmp "

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I would say,

it might enter your mind to say that specifically with regard to a

blemished sin-offering

that died,

since it is not fit for atonement,

since already during its lifetime it was not fit for atonement,

people do not withdraw from it,

people do not withdraw from it; therefore, the Rabbis had to decree upon it the law of meila, so that they would not come to treat it lightly,

but unblemished sacred animals

that died, and during their lifetime were fit to be sacrificed, it might enter your mind to say

since they are fit for atonement,

since they were fit for atonement,

and people withdraw from them,

and even without the decree of the Rabbis people withdraw from them,

say

it should be said

no,

the Rabbis decreed upon them the law of meila, because there is no need to decree concerning them. Therefore,

it teaches us,

Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan teaches us that nevertheless the Rabbis decreed upon them the law of meila. [

Second version]:

And we raise an objection against Ulla, who holds that sacred animals that died are subject to meila by rabbinic law:

“They died” too, have we not learned it?!

But have we learned that sacred animals that died “are” subject to meila by rabbinic law? Surely we learned a Mishna from which it is precise that they “are not” subject to meila even by rabbinic law!?

For we learned,

One who derives benefit from a sin-offering while it is alive has not committed meila until he causes a deficiency in it.

And when it is dead, once he derives any amount of benefit, he has committed meila,

as explained above.

And it should be inferred from the fact that the Mishna said “sin-offering” that only with regard to a sin-offering did the Rabbis decree meila when it died, because its sanctity is more stringent, since it comes for atonement; but with regard to the other most-sacred offerings, such as a burnt-offering, a guilt-offering, and communal peace-offerings, once they die, one who derives benefit from them has not committed meila, even by rabbinic law.

And this is difficult for Ulla’s words

? And we answer: Ulla could say to you: We should not make such an inference from the Mishna. The truth is that the Rabbis also decreed meila concerning the other most-sacred offerings that died,

And why did the Mishna say: One who derives benefit from the “sin-offering”?

Because

it might enter your mind to say,

it might enter your mind to say that the Rabbis did not decree meila concerning it

since it comes for atonement,

during its lifetime it stood to be sacrificed for atonement for a sin,

people withdraw from it,

people withdraw from it during its lifetime until it effects its atonement; therefore, when it dies as well people withdraw from it, and there is no need for the Rabbis to decree meila concerning it,

it teaches us,

the Mishna teaches us that nevertheless they decreed meila concerning it. And all the more so concerning the other most-sacred offerings, which do not stand for atonement, and people do not withdraw from them as much; all the more so did the Rabbis decree meila concerning them, in accordance with Ulla’s words.

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning what we learned, that with regard to a sin-offering that died, one commits meila concerning it by rabbinic law.

And is there meila in a sin-offering that died,

but does it have the law of

meila

even by rabbinic law?!

And it was taught,

we learned in a beraita:

Sin-offerings destined to die

the five disqualified sin-offerings whose law is that they must die—that is, their law is not that they graze until a blemish occurs in them and they are redeemed; rather, they are confined in a pen and deprived of food until they die, and this is a halakha given to Moses at Sinai. And these are they: the offspring of a sin-offering, the substitute of a sin-offering, its owners died, its owners achieved atonement through another offering, and its year passed—

and

so too

money that goes to the Dead Sea

if one set aside money for his sin-offering and died, the money goes to the Dead Sea to be lost, for just as the sin-offering dies, so its money goes to be lost.

One may not derive benefit

from them; it is forbidden initially to derive benefit from them,

and one does not commit meila

after the fact, if one derived benefit from them, he is not required to repay even the principal, and the Rabbis did not decree the law of meila concerning one who derives benefit from them

. And this is difficult for Ulla’s words, who holds that with regard to a sin-offering that died, one commits meila concerning it by rabbinic law ? And we answer: A distinction must be made between a sin-offering that was fit for sacrifice and died, and the five sin-offerings that were not fit for sacrifice even during their lifetimes,

They said,

the members of the academy said: The five

sin-offerings destined to die,

even

during their lifetimes people withdraw from them,

since they do not stand to be sacrificed, and all the more so after their death, when they are repulsive, and people will not come to derive benefit from them; therefore, the Rabbis did not decree the law of meila concerning them,

to exclude here

, in contrast to a valid sin-offering,

from which people do not withdraw during its lifetime,

since it was fit for sacrifice, and the Rabbis were concerned that people would come to derive benefit from it when it died; therefore, the Rabbis decreed the law of meila concerning it

. The Gemara returns to clarifying the law of most-sacred offerings that were slaughtered in the south, concerning which Rabbah and Rav Yosef disagreed: after the fact, if they went up, must they come down?

Rav Yosef raised an objection to Rabbah,

Rav Yosef brings several Mishnayot from tractate Zevahim to raise a difficulty against Rabbah’s words,

one from within one,

one Mishna from the other, and

one from within one,

and the third from the second. That is, one of them alone does not provide proof with which to raise a difficulty against Rabbah’s words; rather, the proof is from all three, which were taught one after the other.

In the seventh chapter of tractate Zevahim, the Mishna discusses a bird sin-offering in which one altered its procedure and performed its procedures in the manner of the bird burnt-offering, and likewise conversely, a bird burnt-offering in which he performed it in the manner of a sin-offering.

For the bird sin-offering and the bird burnt-offering, slaughter is not performed as the slaughter of non-sacred animals, but melika, as it is written in the Torah [the portion of Leviticus]. Melika is: the priest cuts with his fingernail opposite the nape of the bird, until he cuts through the neckbone, and cuts the windpipe and the gullet.

These changes can occur, a.

in the place:

for the law of the bird sin-offering is that its blood is sprinkled below the sikra line, but its melika is valid anywhere on the altar, whereas all the procedures of the bird burnt-offering, including the melika, are performed above the sikra line. b.

in the form of their melika:

the melika of the bird sin-offering is performed on one sign, either the windpipe or the gullet, and he does not separate the head from the body, whereas in the bird burnt-offering they perform melika on both signs, and separate the head from the bird. c.

in the form of the blood presentations:

in the bird sin-offering, he sprinkles the blood from the body of the bird upon the wall of the altar [he holds the bird and sprinkles its blood], whereas in the bird burnt-offering there is no sprinkling, but only pressing out of the blood; that is, he brings the body close to the altar and presses out [squeezes] the blood upon the altar.

There is also a fundamental difference between a sin-offering and a burnt-offering: a sin-offering—even an animal sin-offering—if he did not perform its procedures for the sake of a sin-offering, but for the sake of another offering, is invalid, whereas a burnt-offering for which he performed its procedures not for the sake of a burnt-offering is valid, except that the offering did not fulfill its owners’ obligation for them.

Likewise, there is a difference concerning meila, which is relevant to our matter: since the flesh of the bird sin-offering was permitted to the priests, there is no meila involving its flesh after its procedures were completed validly. But the bird burnt-offering, which is entirely burned as a kaleil upon the altar, is subject to meila involving its flesh until it is burned and goes out to the ash-removal place.

And we learned there: a bird sin-offering in which he made one of the aforementioned changes, or in which he performed its procedures according to their law but intended it for the sake of a burnt-offering—in all these cases the offering is invalid, and it is valid only when he performed it below, as the act of a sin-offering, for the sake of a sin-offering.

And likewise the bird burnt-offering, if he changed its form of procedures or its place, and performed it as the act of a sin-offering, is invalid.

But a bird burnt-offering that he performed according to its mitzva, except that he intended it for the sake of a sin-offering, is valid, except that it did not fulfill its owners’ obligation for them.

After the Mishna explains all the above, we learned:

and all of them,

all the bird offerings in which these changes were made, even when they are invalid,

do not render garments impure in the house

in the house

of swallowing.

A pure bird does not have the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass, and its carcass does not render one impure through contact or carrying, like the carcass of an animal. Rather, the carcass of a pure bird—for example, one that died or that was not slaughtered according to the law—renders one impure in the house of swallowing. That is, one who swallows an olive-sized portion of the carcass of a pure bird, as long as the olive-sized portion is in his house of swallowing [his throat], becomes impure, and renders garments impure—that is, vessels that he touches at that time.

But a bird that was slaughtered according to its law does not render one impure with this impurity, which is called “renders garments impure in the house of swallowing.”

And likewise, a bird offering upon which melika was performed does not render garments impure in the house of swallowing. Even though if one performed melika on a non-sacred bird it would be an unslaughtered carcass, and one who ate it would be liable for lashes and it would render one impure in the house of swallowing, nevertheless, in the case of sacred offerings, it is not an unslaughtered carcass.

And bird offerings in which he made a change—even though their melika is invalid and they are not permitted for eating—the one who eats them does not become impure, and he does not render garments impure in the house of swallowing. For their melika purifies them and removes them from the impurity of unslaughtered carcasses, in accordance with the law of valid sacred offerings upon which melika was performed.

And there is meila involving them,

since they became invalid and have no permission for the priests, as we learned in our Mishna [whereas a bird burnt-offering that he performed as the act of a burnt-offering for the sake of a sin-offering, and it is valid—in any event there is meila involving it, as it was explained that there is meila involving the flesh of a burnt-offering until it is burned and goes out to the ash-removal place].

Except for a bird sin-offering that he performed

it

below as the act of a bird sin-offering, for the sake of a sin-offering,

and he did not change anything in it, there is no meila involving it, even if a non-priest benefited from it, because it has permission for the priests, as was explained in our Mishna.

This is the first Mishna.

And it teaches upon it,

and further on in the Mishna we learned:

any whose invalidity was in the sacred domain,

for when they brought it to the Temple courtyard it was valid and it became invalid in the courtyard, such as those in which he changed their place, or changed the form of the blood presentations, or performed melika with the left hand or at night,

does not render garments impure in the house

in the house

of swallowing,

And any whose invalidity was not in the sacred domain,

but the invalidity occurred before it was sanctified, or before it was brought to the courtyard—for example, its time passed [turtledoves and young pigeons upon which melika was performed not during the time in which they are valid; see Hullin 22a], or the wing dried up, the eye was blinded, and the leg was severed [which are invalid because of lacking a limb],

renders garments impure in the house

in the house

of swallowing,

as though he had performed melika on a non-sacred bird.

.

One of the things that does not render garments impure in the house of swallowing is the bird burnt-offering that he performed below [and it is one of those taught in the first Mishna], while in this Mishna it is defined as “one whose invalidity was in the sacred domain.”

Its law concerning impurity in the house of swallowing is explained: “one whose invalidity was in the sacred domain.” And what is its law if they placed it upon the altar—does it descend or does it not descend? Concerning this, Rav Yosef brings a third Mishna,

and it teaches,

and we learned there in the following chapter: [Rabbi Shimon says:]

any whose invalidity was in the sacred domain, if they went up, they do not descend!

And this also includes a bird burnt-offering that he performed below, and consequently the same is true of most-sacred offerings that were slaughtered in the south.

The tiyufta against Rabba,

the arrangement of these Mishna passages is a refutation of Rabba’s words, who holds that one slaughtered in the south, if it went up, descends.

A refutation! And that concerning which Rabba and Rav Yosef disagreed was obvious to Rabbi Elazar.

The Gemara

explains that this law over which Rabba and Rav Yosef disagreed concerning most-sacred offerings that were slaughtered in the south—whether, if they went up, they descend: according to Rabba, they descend, and according to Rav Yosef, they do not descend—was obvious to Rabbi Elazar, and he had no doubt about it.

Rather, the Gemara is uncertain which view was clear to him: whether that of Rabba or that of Rav Yosef, as will be explained.

As Rabbi Elazar said: a burnt offering of a private altar that he brought inside,

to a public altar,