Meilah 2b — the Talmud in English

The sugya of “if they went up, they shall not be taken down”

Introduction

We learned in tractate Zevachim [83a]: “The altar sanctifies that which is fit for it,” meaning: even an invalid item that is forbidden to be offered upon the altar, and it happened that it went up onto the altar, after the fact the altar sanctified it to become the altar’s food, and it is not taken down; rather, it is offered. This is expounded from a verse that was stated concerning an olah, and the same law applies to all the sacrifices.

And there we learned [84a]: “These, if they went up, shall not be taken down: that which remained overnight [blood or sacrificial portions that remained overnight until morning], and that which went out [outside the Temple courtyard], and the impure, and that which was slaughtered outside its proper time and outside its proper place.”

And we learned there that this is the view of Rabbi Shimon, who says: “Anything whose disqualification occurred within the sacred domain [which became disqualified after its entry into the Temple courtyard], the sacred domain accepts it; but if its disqualification did not occur within the sacred domain, the sacred domain does not accept it.”

Rabbi Judah disagreed with him concerning three disqualifications, namely: it was slaughtered at night, its blood was spilled, and its blood went outside the curtains; and concerning all three he holds: if they went up, they shall be taken down—that is, they must be taken down from the altar.

The Gemara discusses animals slaughtered in the south, concerning which we learned in our Mishna with regard to meila. The discussion is whether, if they went up, they are to be taken down, or whether they are not to be taken down.

They raised a question before them:

Sacrifices of the most sacred order that were slaughtered in the south,

if they went up

after the fact,

what is the law: shall they be taken down

from the altar—are they to be taken down, or not?

And we resolve it:

Rabba said: If they went up, they shall be taken down. Rav Yosef said: If they went up, they shall not be taken down.

And the Gemara explains:

According to Rabbi Judah,

who holds, concerning an animal slaughtered at night, that if it went up, it shall be taken down,

everyone agrees—

Rabba and Rav Yosef did not disagree, and both hold that Rabbi Judah would hold concerning animals slaughtered in the south

that if they went up, they shall be taken down.

For if, even when it was slaughtered at night and its place was not changed, Rabbi Judah holds that if it went up, it shall be taken down, all the more so when its place was changed.

They disagree, in what do Rabba and Rav Yosef disagree? According to Rabbi Shimon,

who holds concerning an animal slaughtered at night that if it went up, it shall not be taken down.

Rav Yosef

holds

like Rabbi Shimon: just as according to Rabbi Shimon, when its time was changed and it was slaughtered at night, it is not taken down, so too with regard to changing its place: an animal slaughtered in the south is not taken down.

But

Rabba could say to you: Rabbi Shimon said only up to this point;

Rabbi Shimon himself also did not leniently rule concerning all disqualifications that they are not taken down,

but concerning sacrifices that are

given—whose blood is required to be given

below the crimson line [which was the mark on the altar separating its upper part from its lower part]. For example, an animal olah, a bird sin-offering, a guilt-offering, and peace-offerings, and it happened

that they were given above the crimson line.

Or,

in what other case did Rabbi Shimon rule leniently?

Concerning sacrifices whose blood is

given above the crimson line, such as an animal sin-offering, and it happened

that they were given below the crimson line—

and why does Rabbi Shimon rule leniently concerning them?

And in fact, they were slaughtered and their blood was received in the north,

but the place was changed from above to below and from below to above; and since their disqualification occurred within the sacred domain, after their entry into the Temple courtyard, the altar sanctified them, and they are not taken down.

But here, since they were slaughtered in the south,

Rabba holds that even Rabbi Shimon agrees that if they went up, they shall be taken down, for they are considered

as though they were strangled,

since the place of their slaughter was changed from the north to the south, they are considered as though they had been slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, and the law that the altar sanctifies them was not stated concerning them.

The Gemara cites our Mishna to challenge Rabba. We learned: Sacrifices of the most sacred order that were slaughtered in the south—one commits meila with them. Granted, according to Rav Yosef, who holds concerning an animal slaughtered in the south that if it goes up, it shall not be taken down, it is satisfactory: it is well understood why one commits meila with it, since it has not departed from its sanctity, and after the fact it is not taken down; it is not considered as though it had been strangled. Therefore, one commits meila with it. But according to Rabba, who holds that if it went up, it shall be taken down, it is difficult: why does one commit meila with it? Rabba holds that it is considered “as though they were strangled,” and for this reason he holds that even according to Rabbi Shimon it shall be taken down. And we answer: Indeed, according to Torah law it has no sanctity whatsoever; if it went up, it shall be taken down, and it is considered as though it had been strangled [and like sacrifices that died, concerning which one who derives benefit from them does not pay even the principal]. And what is meant by what we learned, “one commits meila with them,” is only by rabbinic ordinance. For the Sages imposed stringency concerning it and imposed upon one who derives benefit from it the law of meila. The Gemara clarifies: what is there—what distinction is there between meila by Torah law and meila by rabbinic ordinance? With meila by Torah law, those who derive benefit from them pay a fifth in addition to the principal, and they also bring a guilt-offering for meila. But with meila by rabbinic ordinance, those who derive benefit from them do not pay the additional fifth, but only the principal. For the Sages have no “power” to obligate a guilt-offering, since according to Torah law he is not obligated to bring a sacrifice; it follows that this animal is unconsecrated, and it is forbidden to bring unconsecrated matter into the Temple courtyard. And since he is not obligated to bring a sacrifice, he is not obligated to pay a fifth, because the fifth is paid on account of the guilt-offering. And we question: is there indeed such a thing as meila by rabbinic ordinance ?!

they gave its blood below

the red line—

Why does Rabbi Shimon permit these offerings to remain?

And in all cases, they slaughtered the offering and received its blood in the north,

but then they changed the place, giving the blood above instead of below or below instead of above. Since their disqualification occurred within the sacred area, after they had entered the Temple courtyard, the altar sanctified them, and they are not removed.

But here, since they slaughtered the offering in the south,

Rabba holds that even Rabbi Shimon agrees that, if it was placed on the altar, it is removed, because it is considered

as though they had strangled it.

Since they changed the place of slaughter from the north to the south, it is considered as though it had been slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, and the law that the altar sanctifies such offerings does not apply to it.

The Gemara cites our Mishna to challenge Rabba.

We learned: In the case of offerings of the most sacred order that they slaughtered in the south, one is liable for misuse of sacred property.

Granted, according to Rav Yosef,

who holds that an offering slaughtered in the south is not removed if it is placed on the altar,

it is understandable: It is clear why one is liable for misuse of sacred property, since the offering did not lose its sanctity, and after the fact it is not removed. It is therefore not considered as though it had been strangled, and consequently one is liable for misuse of sacred property.

But according to Rabba,

who holds that, if it was placed on the altar, it is removed,

there is a difficulty: Why is one liable for misuse of sacred property? Rabba holds that it is considered “as though they had strangled it,” and it is for this reason that he holds that even according to Rabbi Shimon it is removed.

And we answer: Indeed, by Torah law it has no sanctity at all. If it was placed on the altar, it is removed, and it is considered as though they had strangled it [like offerings that died, from which one who derives benefit does not have to repay even the principal]. And

what,

that which we learned,

“one is liable for misuse of sacred property”

is only

by rabbinic law. The Sages imposed stringency in this matter and made one who derives benefit from it subject to the law of misuse of sacred property.

by Torah law and

The Gemara clarifies:

What difference is there—

what distinction is there—

between

misuse of sacred property

by Torah law and

misuse of sacred property

by rabbinic law?

In a case of misuse

by Torah law,

one who derives benefit from the sacred property

repays an additional fifth, in addition to the principal, and also brings a guilt-offering for misuse. But in a case of misuse

by rabbinic law,

one who derives benefit from the sacred property

does not

repay an additional fifth; he repays only the principal. The reason is that the Sages have no authority to make him liable to bring a guilt-offering, since by Torah law he is not liable for such an offering. The animal is therefore considered ordinary, unconsecrated property, and it is forbidden to bring unconsecrated property into the Temple courtyard. Since he is not liable to bring an offering, he is not liable for the additional fifth either, because the additional fifth is brought because of the guilt-offering.

And we ask:

Is there—

is there such a law as

rabbinic misuse of sacred property ?!

And we answer:

No,

indeed there is a rabbinic law of meila!

For Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: sacred offerings,

sacrifices,

that died,

and were not slaughtered at all,

were exempted from meila

“by Torah law.”

Thus it is evident,

that

by Torah law, they do not have,

they do not have meila, whereas

rabbinically

they do have it ,

they have the law of meila. If so,

here too,

with an offering slaughtered in the south, its meila is

rabbinic.

And we challenge:

Let us say,

should we say that

we already learned this statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yohanan,

that this innovation—that sacred offerings that died are subject to meila rabbinically—was already taught in our Mishna? For we learned: Sacred offerings of the highest sanctity that one slaughtered in the south are subject to meila, even though they are considered as though they strangled them, and like sacred offerings that died. And we explained, according to Rabba, that the intention is rabbinic meila, while by Torah law they do not have meila, since their law is that if they ascended [the altar] they do not descend. And these are the words of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yohanan. If so, what does Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yohanan teach us ?

And we answer:

Even though we learned it,

that our Mishna said that one is subject to meila in it rabbinically, nevertheless

the statement of Ulla was necessary,

there is an innovation in Ulla’s words,

because

it might have entered your mind to say:

that one could have reasoned as follows:

here,

in the law of the Mishna, concerning sacred offerings of the highest sanctity that were slaughtered in the south—the Sages instituted meila for them, because

people do not keep apart from them,

people do not keep away from them, because although they slaughtered them not in accordance with their mitzva, nevertheless they were slaughtered validly, and people might come to derive benefit from them, thinking that through their slaughter they became permitted like other non-sacred animals. Therefore, the Sages instituted meila for them,

but sacred offerings that died, since they

in any event,

are kept apart from them,

because they are carcasses and repulsive , and people will not come to derive benefit from them,

Say,

there is reason to say:

even rabbinic meila—not,

the Sages did not institute meila for them, since there was no need to institute it—

it teaches us,

Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yohanan teaches us that nevertheless the Sages instituted meila for them.

[In the following sugya there are two versions, and since the Rishonim did not decide between them, with the help of Heaven we shall explain both.]

According to the first version, the Gemara challenges the preceding answer, that Ulla came to teach us that despite the fact that they died, and people keep away from them, they are subject to rabbinic meila,

and concerning this we challenge: Sacred offerings that

died—

we also already learned it,

we already learned in another Mishna that one is subject to meila in them rabbinically. What, then, does Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yohanan teach us?

We learned below, in the fifth chapter: Sacred offerings with a blemish whose sanctity is for their value—that is, they are intended to be sold, and with their value another offering will be purchased, and hekdesh has benefit from their value—are not subject to meila until one derives benefit from them in a manner that causes a deficiency in them, that is, diminishes their value by a peruta’s worth.

When does this apply? To an object whose usual manner is to become defective. But in the case of an object whose usual manner is not to become defective when it is used—for example, a golden cup of hekdesh—one is subject to meila even when one did not cause a deficiency in it, when the benefit from it is worth a peruta.

And there we learned:

One who derives benefit from the sin-offering,

a blemished one, which is intended to be redeemed, like all sacred offerings in which a blemish occurred, if one derives benefit from it

while it is alive, he has not committed meila until he causes a deficiency in it

for example, by pulling out some of its wool, or plowing with it and weakening it by a peruta’s worth,

and

if one derives benefit from it

when it is dead,

and it is not intended to be redeemed, because carcasses of sacred offerings, which are fit only for the consumption of dogs, are not redeemed, and since hekdesh has no possibility of making use of its value,

since he derived benefit

from it

in any amount,

even though he did not diminish it,

he has committed meila.

Now, this meila is not by Torah law, for it died, and after it died there is no meila in it by Torah law according to all opinions; it is clear that its meila is rabbinic,

and this is difficult for Ulla: What does he teach us? After all, in this Mishna we learned that sacred offerings that died have rabbinic meila.

And we answer: This Mishna cannot be used to challenge Ulla, because from it we have still not heard that all sacred offerings that died are subject to rabbinic meila, because,