Meilah 2b (ב:) — the Talmud in English

The sugya concerning “if they ascended, they need not be taken down”

Introduction

We learned in tractate Zevahim [83a]: “The altar sanctifies that which is fit for it.” That is to say, even an unfit offering that is forbidden to be burned on the altar, if it happened to ascend the altar after the fact, the altar sanctified it to become the altar’s food, and it is not taken down; rather, it is burned. This is derived from a verse stated with regard to an olah, and the same law applies to all offerings.

And there we learned [84a]: “These, if they ascended, are not taken down: an offering whose blood or sacrificial parts remained overnight [until morning], and one that went out [beyond the courtyard], and one that became impure, and one that was slaughtered outside its appointed time or outside its designated place.”

And there we learned that this is the view of Rabbi Shimon, who says: Any offering whose disqualification occurred within the sacred precincts [that became disqualified after entering the courtyard], the sacred realm accepts it; but if its disqualification did not occur within the sacred precincts, the sacred realm does not accept it.

Rabbi Yehuda disagreed with him concerning three disqualifications: an offering slaughtered at night, one whose blood was spilled, and one whose blood went outside the curtains. With regard to all three, he maintains: If they ascended, they must be taken down—that is, they must be taken down from the altar.

The Gemara discusses offerings of the most sacred order that were slaughtered in the southern part of the courtyard, concerning which our Mishna taught a law of me’ila. The question is whether, if they ascended, they must be taken down or need not be taken down.

They raised a dilemma before them:

Offerings of the most sacred order that were slaughtered in the south:

if they ascended

after the fact,

what is the law as to whether they must be taken down

from the altar? Must they be taken down, or not?

And we resolve it:

Rabba said: If they ascended, they must be taken down. Rav Yosef said: If they ascended, they need not be taken down.

And the Gemara explains:

According to Rabbi Yehuda,

who maintains with regard to an offering slaughtered at night that if it ascended, it must be taken down,

everyone agrees

that Rabba and Rav Yosef did not disagree, and that both maintain that Rabbi Yehuda would rule with regard to an offering slaughtered in the south

that if it ascended, it must be taken down.

For if Rabbi Yehuda maintains that even when it was slaughtered at night, although the place of slaughter was not changed, if it ascended it must be taken down, then all the more so when its place was changed.

Where they disagree, this is the subject of Rabba and Rav Yosef’s disagreement: according to Rabbi Shimon,

who maintains with regard to an offering slaughtered at night that if it ascended, it need not be taken down.

Rav Yosef

maintains

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon: Just as according to Rabbi Shimon an offering whose time was changed, having been slaughtered at night, need not be taken down, so too with regard to a change of place: an offering slaughtered in the south need not be taken down.

But

Rabba would say to you: Rabbi Shimon stated his ruling only

that Rabbi Shimon himself did not permit all disqualified offerings to remain on the altar,

but with regard to offerings

whose blood is given

whose blood is supposed to be given

below

the sikra line [the line on the altar separating its upper and lower sections], such as an animal olah, a bird sin offering, an asham, and a shelamim, and it happened

that they were given above

the sikra line.

Or,

what else did Rabbi Shimon permit?

With regard to offerings whose blood

is given above

the sikra line, such as an animal sin offering, and it happened

that it was given below

the sikra line—

and why did Rabbi Shimon permit them to remain?

It is always the case that they were slaughtered and their blood was received in the north,

but the place was changed, from above to below or from below to above. Since their disqualification occurred within the sacred precincts, after they entered the courtyard, the altar sanctified them, and they need not be taken down.

But here, since they were slaughtered in the south,

Rabba maintains that even Rabbi Shimon agrees that if they ascended, they must be taken down, since they are

considered as though they had been strangled,

because the place of their slaughter was changed from north to south. It is considered as though they had been slaughtered outside the courtyard, and the law that the altar sanctifies them was not stated with regard to them.

The Gemara cites our Mishna to challenge Rabba. We learned: Offerings of the most sacred order that were slaughtered in the south—one commits me’ila with regard to them. Granted, according to Rav Yosef, who maintains that in the case of an offering slaughtered in the south, if it ascended it need not be taken down, it is understandable: It is clear why one commits me’ila with regard to it, since it has not lost its sanctity. After the fact it need not be taken down; it is not considered as though it had been strangled. Therefore, one commits me’ila with regard to it. But according to Rabba, who maintains that if it ascended it must be taken down, it is difficult: Why does one commit me’ila with regard to it? Rabba maintains that it is considered “as though they had been strangled,” and it is for this reason that he maintains that even according to Rabbi Shimon it must be taken down. And we answer: Indeed, by Torah law it has no sanctity whatsoever. If it ascended, it must be taken down, and it is considered as though it had been strangled [like offerings that died, with regard to which one who derives benefit from them does not even pay the principal]. And what is the meaning of what we learned, “one commits me’ila with regard to them”? It is only by rabbinic ordinance. The Sages imposed a stringency upon it and subjected one who derives benefit from it to the law of me’ila.

But here, since they slaughtered the offering in the south,

Rabba holds that even Rabbi Shimon agrees that, if it was placed on the altar, it is removed, because it is considered

as though they had strangled it.

Since they changed the place of slaughter from the north to the south, it is considered as though it had been slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, and the law that the altar sanctifies such offerings does not apply to it.

The Gemara cites our Mishna to challenge Rabba.

We learned: In the case of offerings of the most sacred order that they slaughtered in the south, one is liable for misuse of sacred property.

Granted, according to Rav Yosef,

who holds that an offering slaughtered in the south is not removed if it is placed on the altar,

it is understandable: It is clear why one is liable for misuse of sacred property, since the offering did not lose its sanctity, and after the fact it is not removed. It is therefore not considered as though it had been strangled, and consequently one is liable for misuse of sacred property.

But according to Rabba,

who holds that, if it was placed on the altar, it is removed,

there is a difficulty: Why is one liable for misuse of sacred property? Rabba holds that it is considered “as though they had strangled it,” and it is for this reason that he holds that even according to Rabbi Shimon it is removed.

And we answer: Indeed, by Torah law it has no sanctity at all. If it was placed on the altar, it is removed, and it is considered as though they had strangled it [like offerings that died, from which one who derives benefit does not have to repay even the principal]. And

what,

The Gemara clarifies:

What difference is there

between

me’ila

by Torah law and

me’ila by rabbinic ordinance? With me’ila by Torah law, one who derives benefit from them pays an additional fifth, in addition to the principal, and also brings a me’ila asham offering. But with me’ila by rabbinic ordinance, one who derives benefit from them does not pay the additional fifth, but pays the principal alone. This is because the Sages have no authority to obligate him to bring an asham offering, since by Torah law he is not liable for an offering; the animal is therefore non-sacred, and it is forbidden to bring a non-sacred offering into the courtyard. And since he is not liable to bring an offering, he is not liable to pay the fifth, because the fifth is paid on account of the asham offering. And we wonder: Is there such a thing as rabbinic me’ila?

What difference is there—

what distinction is there—

between

misuse of sacred property

by Torah law and

misuse of sacred property

by rabbinic law?

In a case of misuse

by Torah law,

one who derives benefit from the sacred property

repays an additional fifth, in addition to the principal, and also brings a guilt-offering for misuse. But in a case of misuse

by rabbinic law,

one who derives benefit from the sacred property

does not

repay an additional fifth; he repays only the principal. The reason is that the Sages have no authority to make him liable to bring a guilt-offering, since by Torah law he is not liable for such an offering. The animal is therefore considered ordinary, unconsecrated property, and it is forbidden to bring unconsecrated property into the Temple courtyard. Since he is not liable to bring an offering, he is not liable for the additional fifth either, because the additional fifth is brought because of the guilt-offering.

And we ask:

Is there—

is there such a law as

rabbinic misuse of sacred property ?!

And we answer:

No;

indeed, there is a rabbinic law of me'ila.

As Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Consecrated offerings,

sacrifices,

that died,

and were not slaughtered at all,

are no longer subject to me'ila

“by Torah law.”

This proves,

it is evident that

by Torah law they have no me'ila,

they are not subject to me'ila, whereas

rabbinically

they are subject to it ,

they have the status of me'ila. If so,

here too,

in the case of an offering slaughtered in the south, its me'ila is

rabbinic.

And we challenge this:

Let us say,

shall we say that

we have already learned the statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yohanan,

that this novel point—that one is liable for rabbinic me'ila when benefiting from consecrated offerings that died—was already taught in our Mishna? For we learned: One who benefits from offerings of the most sacred order slaughtered in the south is liable for me'ila, even though they are considered as if they had been strangled, and thus as offerings that died. And we explained, according to Rabba, that this refers to rabbinic me'ila, while by Torah law there is no me'ila for them, since their law is that if they were placed on the altar, they need not be removed. These are the words of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yohanan. If so, what is Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yohanan teaching us ?

And we answer:

Even though we have learned it,

even though our Mishna stated that one is liable for me'ila rabbinically, nevertheless

Ulla’s statement was necessary;

there is a novel point in Ulla’s teaching,

because

it might enter your mind to say,

one might have thought:

Here,

in the case addressed by the Mishna, offerings of the most sacred order slaughtered in the south, the Sages instituted me'ila because

people do not keep away from them,

people do not distance themselves from them, since although they were slaughtered improperly, they were nevertheless slaughtered validly, and people might come to benefit from them, thinking that their slaughter rendered them permitted like other non-sacred animals. Therefore, the Sages instituted me'ila for them.

But consecrated offerings that died, since

in any event

people keep away from them,

because they are carcasses and repulsive , and people would not come to benefit from them,

Let us say,

there is reason to maintain:

there is not even rabbinic me'ila,

the Sages did not institute me'ila for them, since there is no need to institute it—

This teaches us,

Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yohanan teaches us that nevertheless the Sages instituted me'ila for them.

[In the following sugya there are two versions, and since the early authorities did not determine between them, with the help of Heaven we will explain both.]

According to the first version, the Gemara challenges the preceding answer, that Ulla came to teach that although the offerings died and people keep away from them, they are nevertheless subject to rabbinic me'ila.

And concerning this we challenge: Consecrated offerings that

died—

we have also already learned this;

we already learned in another Mishna that one is liable for rabbinic me'ila in their case. What, then, is Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yohanan teaching us?

We will learn below, in the fifth chapter: Consecrated offerings with a blemish whose sanctity is only for their value—that is, they are intended to be sold, and another offering is to be purchased with the proceeds, so that the consecrated property benefits from their value—one is not liable for me'ila until he derives benefit from them that causes them to diminish in value, meaning that it reduces their value by a peruta’s worth.

When does this apply? To an item that is normally diminished through use. But with regard to an item that is not normally diminished when it is used, such as a golden cup belonging to consecrated property, one is liable for me'ila even if he did not diminish its value, provided that the benefit is worth a peruta.

And there we learned:

One who derives benefit from a sin-offering,

one with a blemish that is awaiting redemption, like all consecrated offerings in which a blemish developed, if he derives benefit from it

while it is alive, he is not liable for me'ila until he causes it to diminish in value,

for example, by shearing some of its wool or plowing with it and thereby weakening it by a peruta’s worth,

but

if he derives benefit from it

when it is dead,

and it is not awaiting redemption, because the carcasses of consecrated offerings, which are fit only for consumption by dogs, may not be redeemed, and since consecrated property has no possibility of deriving use from their value,

once he derives benefit

from it

in any amount,

even though he did not diminish its value,

he is liable for me'ila.

Now, this me'ila is not by Torah law, for the animal died, and after it dies there is no me'ila by Torah law according to all opinions. Clearly, its me'ila is rabbinic.

And this is difficult for Ulla: What is he teaching us? Surely in this Mishna we learned that consecrated offerings that died are subject to rabbinic me'ila.

And we answer: This Mishna does not pose a difficulty for Ulla, because we still have not learned from it that all consecrated offerings that died are subject to rabbinic me'ila, because,