Meilah 2a — the Talmud in English

Introduction The sprinkling of the blood of most holy sacrificial offerings removes the flesh from the category of meila, whereas with lesser sacrificial offerings it brings the sacrificial portions into the category of meila. The Mishna comes to teach us the law of most holy sacrificial offerings that became invalid before the sprinkling of their blood—for example, if the sacrificial rites were performed upon them, but were not performed as prescribed and thereby became invalid, and consequently they have no permission for the priests; therefore they do not leave the category of meila, and one who derives benefit from them has committed meila. [ And in the following Mishna the law of lesser sacrificial offerings will be explained.] Mishna:

Most holy sacrificial offerings,

whose law is that they are to be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, as explained in Tractate Zevachim [47a],

which he slaughtered in the south,

even though they became invalid, nevertheless did not leave their sanctity with regard to the law of meila, and still

one commits meila with them.

And the Mishna explains how:

how:

Which he slaughtered in the south,

not as prescribed,

and received their blood in the north,

as prescribed; and likewise, if he slaughtered them

in the north

as prescribed,

and received their blood in the south,

not as prescribed,

And likewise, if he

slaughtered

them

during the day,

as prescribed [ all the sacrificial rites—slaughter, receiving the blood, carrying it, and sprinkling it—must be performed during the day],

and sprinkled

their blood

at night,

not as prescribed,

And likewise if he slaughtered

at night,

before the light of morning, not as prescribed,

and sprinkled

their blood

during the day,

as prescribed,

Or if he slaughtered them

during the day and in the north, but at the time of slaughter he had the intention concerning them to sprinkle their blood, burn their sacrificial portions, or eat of their flesh

outside its time,

and the offering became invalid and thereby became pigul, and one who eats it, even within its time, is liable for karet [as we learned in Tractate Zevachim 27b],

Or

if at the time of slaughter he had the intention concerning them to sprinkle their blood, burn their sacrificial portions, or eat of their flesh

outside its place,

and the offering became invalid, but did not thereby become pigul for which one is liable for karet when eating it.

In all these cases

one commits meila with them,

since the offering is invalid and they have no permission for the priests; therefore they are still called “offerings of the Lord.”

The Gemara will explain what novelty the Mishna teaches, and likewise it will explain why the Mishna mentioned these invalidities and what novelty there is in each one of them.

Rabbi Joshua stated a general rule: Every

sacrificial animal

that had a time of permission for the priests,

when the rites were performed validly and the flesh was permitted to the priests even for one hour, although afterward it became invalid, as will be explained,

one does not commit meila with it,

and it is no longer called “the Lord’s offerings,” since it had already been permitted to the priests —

And anything that did not have a time of permission for the priests,

which became invalid before the rites permitting it to be eaten were completed,

one commits meila with it,

since it was never permitted for eating, it is called “the Lord’s offerings,” even though it is invalid, as explained.

What is one that had a time of permission for the priests

with which one does not commit meila?

For example:

one that remained overnight,

after the flesh had been permitted to the priests, it “remained overnight” until morning [most holy sacrificial offerings are eaten on the day of their offering and during the night until morning; if dawn passed over them, they become invalid—and this is called “remaining”].

And one that became impure,

the animal after it had been permitted to the priests,

and one that went out [

which they removed] outside the Temple courtyard, which is the place where most holy sacrificial offerings are eaten, and thereby became invalid [and this is called “that which went out”],

In all these cases, if one derived benefit from them, one has not committed meila.

And what is one that did not have permission for the priests

with which one commits meila?

For example,

one that was slaughtered

with the intention

outside its time, or with the intention

or with the intention

outside its place,

and became invalid immediately through its slaughter, as explained.

And when

priests received its blood,

who were invalid, or

its blood, or

invalid people sprinkled

its blood

.

And since it did not have permission for the priests, one commits meila with it.

And Rabbi Joshua mentioned these invalidities, and the same law applies to slaughtering in the south and slaughtering at night.

Gemara:

It teaches

we learned in our Mishna:

Most holy sacrificial offerings that he slaughtered in the south—one commits meila with them.

And we object:

It is obvious

that one commits meila with them!

But

because he slaughtered them

in the south—

did we remove them

from the category of

meila?!

After all, the offering is invalid and never came within the category of permission for the priests; by what did they leave the category of “the Lord’s offerings”? And we answer:

It was necessary,

the tanna needed to teach us that

it might have entered your mind to say,

it could have occurred to one’s mind to say:

Since Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Sacrificial offerings that died leave the category of meila, by Torah law,

because since they are going to be lost, they are no longer called “the Lord’s offerings” by Torah law [but rabbinically they still have the law of meila]—it might have entered one’s mind to say:

Here too, with regard to most holy sacrificial offerings in relation to the south,

which he slaughtered or received their blood in the south and thereby rendered invalid, and they are going to be lost,

as what

does it seem? As though he strangled them, their law is as though he strangled them—

meaning that their law is as though he had strangled them —

and for this reason, seemingly, they would immediately leave the category of misuse,

it teaches us

the Mishna teaches us that this is not so, and they do not leave the category of misuse!

If you should say: Why in fact are they not like consecrated animals that died? Your answer is:

Consecrated animals that died are not fit at all.

They have no permission whatsoever in any offering, and therefore they are not included among “the sacred things of the Lord,”

but the south, although

even though

the

south

is not

a place

fit for most-sacred offerings, nevertheless,

the south

is fit for lesser-sacred offerings,

whose slaughter is valid anywhere in the Temple courtyard. Since some service was performed on them that renders them fit in another place, their law is not the same as that of consecrated animals that died, and they are still called “the sacred things of the Lord.”

Shita Mekubetzet asked: What difference does it make that they are fit for lesser-sacred offerings? Here we are speaking of most-sacred offerings, which have no south at all, and when they were slaughtered in the south they are invalid! And he answers in the name of our teacher Peretz: What the Gemara said, “but it is fit for lesser-sacred offerings,” does not mean that because of this they have an association with “the sacred things of the Lord.” Rather, it means that because of this they have the law of “if they ascended, they do not descend,” that is, if they slaughtered them in the south, although they are invalid, after the fact, if they mistakenly placed their sacrificial portions [or the flesh of an olah] on the altar, they do not descend from the altar. And it is explained in tractate Zevahim [84a] that the general rule in these laws is: Any offering whose disqualification occurred within the sacred sphere, any offering that became invalid after it was brought into the courtyard, if it ascended, does not descend, and the sacred [the altar] accepts it. But any offering whose disqualification did not occur within the sacred sphere, such as an animal that copulated, one that was copulated with, or a tereifa, if it ascended, it descends, and the sacred does not accept it. And since the slaughter of lesser-sacred offerings is valid in the south, and the south is a place with regard to consecrated offerings, and is not like outside the courtyard, therefore even with most-sacred offerings “if they ascended, they do not descend.” And since they do not descend, they are therefore called “the sacred things of the Lord,” and there is misuse with them. [In note 31 the continuation of the Gemara’s words concerning an animal slaughtered at night will be explained.] And the Sefat Emet explains: Since all the sanctity of an offering is because it stands to be offered to the Most High, and therefore there is misuse with it before the offering, since in the end it is to be brought to the Lord. Therefore, with consecrated animals that died, “it was removed” from them, their sanctity, because it became clear that they do not stand to be offered. [And if he committed misuse before its death, he is liable, because in any event, at the time he committed misuse, it stood to be an offering.] Therefore, when they were slaughtered for the sake of an offering, despite the fact that the service was performed invalidly, nevertheless, where did the sanctity that was in them go? And therefore there is misuse with them. And similar to these words wrote the Rav, Rabbi Yosef Dov Soloveitchik [Zevahim, p. 159], and this is his language: The fundamental distinction between consecrated animals that died and consecrated animals that became invalid after slaughter is that with those slaughtered and already sanctified, the law of their being “the sacred things of the Lord” has already been completed, and even if they became invalid, it no longer ceases. And the Avi Ezri [on Maimonides’ Laws of Misuse, chapter 5, halakha 14] resolves with this reasoning a fundamental difficulty in this halakha. For according to what is explained on page 2 [and see there, note 42], it was stated that the law of misuse applies to them as a result of the law that “if they ascended, they do not descend”; that is, since they possess sanctity, at least a lesser sanctity, such that if they ascended after the fact onto the altar, they would not descend from the altar, therefore there is misuse with them. And seemingly it is difficult: Granted, the sacrificial portions possess this sanctity, that if they ascended they do not descend, but the flesh has no permission whatsoever for the priests, and is fit for nothing, and its law is that it must be burned—so why does sanctity remain upon it? According to the above explanation, this is very well understood: Since the sacrificial portions have the status of being offered on the altar, at least after the fact, the imposition of sanctity takes effect upon the entire offering, so that it is considered “the sacred things of the Lord.” And it is not comparable to consecrated animals that died, which are not called “the sacred things of the Lord,” since they are not fit at all for offering. And there [in note 42] the connection between the law of misuse and the law that “if they ascended, they do not descend” will be explained. And the Gemara explains:

Why do I need the Mishna to teach all these?

Why did the Mishna need to teach all these invalid cases [slaughter in the south, receiving the blood in the south, slaughter at night, throwing the blood at night, outside its appointed time, and outside its designated place]? It would have been sufficient for the Mishna to teach one case, and to derive the other invalid cases from it: that although they became invalid, there is misuse with them?

They are necessary,

It is necessary to teach us all of these, for if it had taught us one of them, we could not have derived the other invalid cases from it—

If it taught

if it taught only the law of

they slaughtered it in the south and received its blood in the north,

one could say:

Here is where there is misuse with them, because the receiving was in the north ,

and since the receiving, which is the principal service, was performed as prescribed, it is not considered as though they strangled them, and they are still called “the sacred things of the Lord,” and therefore there is misuse with them,

Shita Mekubetzet. But,

when

they slaughtered it in the north and received its blood in the south,

since he received their blood in the south,

and their principal service was performed not as prescribed,

I might say,

one could say,

that they leave

that they leave

the category of misuse,

and it is like one who strangled them. Therefore the Mishna teaches us that it does not leave the category of misuse, and it is not like one who strangled them; as explained, this is because the south is fit for lesser-sacred offerings.

Shita Mekubetzet. And if it taught these,

slaughter or receiving in the south,

I might have thought,

I would say: It is therefore not like one who strangled them

because daytime

is the time of offering,

at the very least, he performed the services during the day, which is the time of the service; therefore they were considered “the sacred things of the Lord,” and they did not leave the category of misuse,

Shita Mekubetzet. the commentary attributed to Rashi. But

when

he slaughtered it at night and threw the blood during the day, since night is not the time of offering,

it is not the proper time for offering,

I might say,

one could say that it should be considered as though he performed no service on them at all, but rather as though he strangled them, and

there is no misuse with them,

therefore the Mishna teaches us that they do not leave the category of misuse, and it is not like one who strangled them.

Shita Mekubetzet. explains: Because night is not a lack of time. And the later authorities wrote that Rashi did not mean what is explained in tractate Keritot [8a], for there the amoraim disagree as to whether “night is a lack of time”; see there. Is our Mishna then not according to the view of all the amoraim?! And in the novellae of the Griz”s the words of Rashi are explained with a different intention. But the Shita Mekubetzet explains: Since night is a time fit for burning the limbs and the fat, they are therefore not like one who strangled them. [As explained in note 25.] And this reasoning was stated by the Gemara in tractate Zevahim [68b], concerning the law of “impurity in the place of swallowing.” See there. And if

it taught: he slaughtered at night and threw the blood during the day, I might have thought

there is misuse with it

because the throwing was during the day,

and the principal services were performed during the day; therefore they are not like one who strangled them.

Shita Mekubetzet. But he slaughtered during the day and threw the blood at night, since the throwing was at night

and its principal service was performed at night,

it is considered as one who strangled them,

as though he strangled them, and as though no service had been performed on them, and there is no misuse with them,

it teaches us

the Mishna that nevertheless they do not leave the category of misuse, because it is not like one who strangled them .

commentary attributed to Rashi. And the reason is as explained: Once we have already been taught that if he threw the blood at night, it is not like one who strangled them, there is no need at all to teach us that if he slaughtered at night—for if even when he threw at night there is misuse with them, all the more so when he slaughtered at night. According to this version, the arguments establishing the necessity are not in the order of the Mishna [and see note 13 in the name of Tosafot, that the version in the Mishna is also reversed]. But in the commentary of Rabbeinu Gershom a view is brought that holds that the Gemara first gave the argument establishing the necessity for “he threw at night,” according to the order of the version of the Mishna, and that which is stated in the Mishna, “he slaughtered at night and threw the blood during the day,” indeed contains no novelty at all; it was taught in this manner, and it is not necessary to say this regarding “he slaughtered during the day and threw the blood at night.” And see the Shita Mekubetzet [in the omissions at the end of the tractate, before tractate Tamid], which explains the necessity in another way. [And part of this approach is explained in note 13.] Now we ask: Regarding all these cases that the Mishna taught—south and night—it is explained why there is misuse with them and they are not like one who strangled them: the south, since it is fit for lesser-sacred offerings, and likewise night, as explained,

But when he slaughtered with the intention of eating or burning

outside its appointed time, and outside its designated place,

it is difficult: Why is there misuse with them? Their slaughter rendered them invalid, and

for what are they fit,

for what purpose are they fit?

The sacrificial portions are not fit to be burned on the altar, nor is the flesh fit for the priests; why are they not considered like one who strangled them, so that there would be no misuse with them?

And we answer:

Since

the throwing of their blood

makes atonement for an offering with an invalid intention.

One who slaughters, or performs one of the services of the offerings, with the intention of outside its appointed time—that is, he intends to eat the flesh or burn the sacrificial portions after the time permitted for eating them or the time permitted for burning them—thereby renders the offering invalid, and it is called “an offering with an invalid intention.” Likewise, if he performed the services with the intention of outside its designated place, the offering becomes invalid. In addition to the offering being invalid, it is forbidden to eat the flesh even within its appointed time, and one who eats it is liable to excision. But if he performed the service with the intention of “outside its designated place,” he is not liable to excision for eating it. “Provided that the permitting service was performed as prescribed,” that is, at the time of throwing the blood, he throws it with that same invalid intention, or throws it silently, without an intention of an offering with an invalid intention. But if he throws the blood with another invalid intention—for example, he slaughtered with the intention of outside its appointed time and threw it with the intention of outside its designated place, or he slaughtered with the intention of outside its appointed time and threw it with the intention of not for its sake [with those offerings that become invalid when offered with the intention of not for their sake]—the offering is not an offering with an invalid intention. And as long as the blood has not been thrown, it is not “established” as an offering with an invalid intention, so as to make him liable to excision for eating it.

commentary attributed to Rashi. It follows that, in any event, one who eats it is liable to lashes. But from the words of Rashi in tractate Zevahim [22b, s.v. “it will not be accepted” and s.v. “what”], it follows that he holds that until the time of throwing, the offering with an invalid intention has not been established, and it is not an offering with an invalid intention at all. And this is his language: Until the time of throwing, the intention of an offering with an invalid intention remains pending; once the blood is thrown, the offering with an invalid intention is established. And this likewise follows from the ancient commentary [printed at the end of the Gemara], in the name of Rabbeinu Elyakim. And the Mishna LeMelekh [chapter 18 of the Laws of Disqualified Consecrated Offerings, halakha 7] is uncertain regarding this question: In the case of one who eats an offering with an invalid intention—that is, he formed an intention of outside its appointed time or outside its designated place at slaughter—and ate it before its permitting services were performed, namely, before its blood was thrown, so that there is no liability to excision: Does it at least have the designation “an offering with an invalid intention,” so that he is punished with lashes for eating disqualified consecrated offerings? And in greater explanation: The Rambam [there, halakhot 3–4] wrote: Every offering concerning which it is said that it is invalid—whether it became invalid through an intention, through an act, or through something that occurred to it that invalidated it—whoever eats an olive-sized portion of it receives lashes, as it is stated: “You shall not eat any abomination”; through oral interpretation they learned that Scripture warns only regarding disqualified consecrated offerings. Therefore the Mishna LeMelekh was uncertain: It is possible that an offering with an invalid intention before the throwing is not included in this category, and that its invalidity takes effect at the time of throwing, even with regard to liability to lashes, and one who eats it before the throwing would be exempt even from lashes. Seemingly, his uncertainty depends on the above dispute between the commentary attributed to Rashi and Rashi and Rabbeinu Elyakim. And the Mishna LeMelekh cites several passages to resolve his uncertainty. See also the responsa Ahiezer [part 2, section 27], which proves from Tosafot in our Gemara [3b] that it is explained that the Gemara itself is uncertain about this question. And there [in note 78] the view of the Hazon Ish will be explained. One of the proofs of the Mishna LeMelekh is from our passage: His proof concerns outside its designated place, for regarding eating outside its designated place, he is not liable to excision, even after the throwing, as explained. And if we say that there is liability to lashes even before the throwing, why did the Gemara say that the throwing makes atonement for an offering with an invalid intention? For through this throwing no new liability has been added. See what the Sefat Emet [Zevahim 34b] wrote, and in the responsa Ahiezer [letter 3], and in the Hazon Ish Keritot [subsection 10]. And the Rav, Rabbi Yosef Dov Soloveitchik [Zevahim 34a] deduces from the words of the Rambam that the throwing establishes the offering with an invalid intention only with regard to excision: he is liable to excision only if he eats it after the throwing. But with regard to violating the prohibition “You shall not eat any abomination,” from which the Rambam learned that one receives lashes for all disqualified consecrated offerings, he transgresses and receives lashes even if he eats it before the throwing. However, he holds [there, on the facing page] that in the case of outside its designated place, although there is no practical difference between before the throwing and after the throwing, and in both cases he is liable to lashes and not to excision, nevertheless there is a practical difference between after the throwing, when his liability is on account of not in its designated place, and before the throwing, when his liability is on account of disqualified consecrated offerings. See there the practical difference regarding the reason for which he receives lashes. And see note 88, the words of the Minhat Hinukh, concerning whether, if they warned him regarding the prohibition of misuse, he receives lashes.

But if he sprinkles the blood with a different invalid thought—for example, he slaughtered with a thought of outside its designated time and sprinkled with a thought of outside its designated place, or he slaughtered with a thought of outside its designated time and sprinkled with a thought of not for its sake [in those offerings that become invalid when performed with a thought of not for its sake]—the offering is not pigul. And as long as the blood has not been sprinkled, the pigul has not been “established” so as to make him liable to karet for eating it.

And this matter is explained at length in tractates Zevahim and Menahot, and is derived from what the Torah said [Leviticus 19]: “It is an offering with an invalid intention; it will not be accepted.” And we expound: Just as the acceptance of a valid offering, so is the acceptance of an invalid offering. That is, just as the throwing of the blood effects atonement [for that for which the offering comes to effect atonement, each offering according to its atonement], and the throwing effects the atonement of the offering, and the offering is not valid until all its permitting services are performed—that is, until the blood is thrown for the sake of the offering—and it is this that establishes the validity of the offering, so too, with an offering with an invalid intention, the throwing of the blood is the act that “effects acceptance,” and the offering is not yet “established” as forbidden because of an invalid intention until its blood is thrown for the sake of that same invalid intention, or silently.

We learn from this that the throwing of the blood that follows an intention of an offering with an invalid intention is what “establishes” the flesh as an offering with an invalid intention, making one liable to excision for eating it; and before it, at the time of slaughter, it has not left its sanctity. Until the throwing, the offering remains in doubt, lest he form another invalid intention during a service and thereby remove from it the designation of an offering with an invalid intention. Therefore, slaughter with the intention of an offering with an invalid intention is not considered like strangling the offering, but like the slaughter service of consecrated offerings, and there is misuse with it . Pesahim 61b, and Menahot 22b. Rabbeinu Gershom and the commentary attributed to Rashi [according to the emendation of the Rashash]. And the Sefat Emet adds an explanation: Since until the throwing the designation of consecrated offerings still applies to it with regard to an offering with an invalid intention, therefore one might have thought that it is not appropriate to say that it is as though he strangled it at the time of slaughter. For if not, why would there be liability for an offering with an invalid intention? And the Tosafot in their conclusion also use this version, but according to them the Gemara’s question is the reverse. We shall bring their words [according to the version of the Shita Mekubetzet and the Tzon Kedashim]: The questioner knew that when the Mishna said “outside its appointed time and outside its designated place,” it came to teach that invalid throwing does not remove them from the category of misuse [as explained in note 20], and that there is misuse with them; we learned this from Rabbi Yehoshua. And since we have already learned that invalid throwing does not remove them from the category of misuse, the Gemara asks: Is it obvious that there is misuse with them? For “for what are they fit,” for what purpose are they fit? They are not like lesser-sacred offerings, just as the south is valid for lesser-sacred offerings; nor are they like the case of night, as we concluded [in note 31], that night is valid for the limbs and the fat. Therefore it is difficult: For what need did the Mishna teach us that there is misuse with them? What removes them from the category of misuse? And what was the initial assumption that led us to say that they leave the category of misuse? [Interim summary: According to Rashi, the Gemara’s question is: Why in fact are they not like one who strangled them, and why is there misuse with them? According to Tosafot, the Gemara’s question is: It is obvious that there is misuse with them. According to Rashi, “for what are they fit” means: Is the offering fit for anything at all? According to Tosafot, “for what are they fit” means: What “disqualification within the sacred sphere” is there in the intention of an offering with an invalid intention of outside its appointed time and outside its designated place; for what other purpose are they fit?] And the Gemara answers: Since this throwing has the possibility and prospect of removing the designation of an offering with an invalid intention, it might have entered one’s mind to say that the throwing likewise removes the category of misuse, and it is not so obvious to say that there is misuse with them. [Summary: According to Rashi, the answer is: Since “the slaughter” with an offering with an invalid intention does not complete its disqualification, and the offering is still pending, therefore it is not like one who strangled them. And according to Tosafot: the novelty of the Mishna is that throwing when invalid does not remove it from the category of an offering with an invalid intention.] This interpretation, which the Tosafot explained—that the Gemara’s question is: It is obvious that there is misuse with them, since they are far from being a valid offering, and there is nothing that removes them from the category of misuse—is the conclusion of Tosafot. However, the Tosafot in the middle of their words explain in another manner. This is it: The Gemara’s question is: It is obvious that they are not like one who strangled them, since they are close to a valid offering, as will be explained. See Tosafot for their explanation of the Gemara’s answer according to this interpretation, and what they raised against this intermediate interpretation. Tosafot brought this intermediate interpretation in order to resolve another major difficulty, namely: According to what is implied in the Gemara on page 2 [see notes 25 and 42], the law of misuse is connected with the law that “if they ascended, they do not descend.” That is, wherever the halakha is “if they ascended, they do not descend,” it is proven that they possess sanctity and are not considered like one who strangled them; therefore there is misuse with them. And it is explained in tractate Zevahim [84a] and in the following passage that with outside its appointed time and outside its designated place there is no dispute, and according to all views “if they ascended, they do not descend”! This implies that their disqualification is lighter than that of the other invalid cases, such as night and south, concerning which there is no agreed-upon view that their law is that if they ascended they do not descend, and there is the view of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if he slaughtered at night and they ascended, they descend! And if, according to Rashi, the Gemara’s question is “for what are they fit,” since they are fit for nothing and certainly are like one who strangled them, this is difficult—what is the certainty? Is their disqualification not lighter than all the other disqualifications? But according to the intermediate interpretation of Tosafot, it is explained well: Indeed, this was the Gemara’s question: With outside its appointed time and outside its designated place, since if they ascended they do not descend, it is obvious that they are not like one who strangled them; why then did the Mishna need to teach us this? And the later authorities ask: What will Tosafot answer according to their interpretation in their conclusion, that the Gemara’s question is the reverse, namely, that outside its appointed time and outside its designated place they are far from a valid offering? Does the difficulty not arise again? For in fact they are closer to a valid offering, since with them the law certainly is that if they ascended they do not descend? The Shita Mekubetzet answers [apparently in the name of the Tosafot]: Because we find that the prohibition of outside its appointed time is exceedingly severe, and one who eats it is liable to excision, whereas we do not find this with the other invalid cases taught in our Mishna, therefore far are they from a valid offering. And outside its designated place was compared with outside its appointed time, as is known. And see the commentary attributed to Rashi s.v. “or.” And see the Keren Orah and Takanat Ezra, what they answered.