Meilah 21a (כא.) — the Talmud in English

You may say: It is obvious that if he says this to them, the owner has committed misuse of consecrated property; so what is the novel point of the Mishna?

Lest you say

that even when the agent says to them, “Take one according to the owner’s instructions and one according to my own judgment,”

the agent has uprooted the owner’s agency,

since he revealed to them that he was not acting in accordance with the owner’s instructions,

and

therefore

, the owner should not commit misuse

of consecrated property. Therefore,

it teaches us

, the Mishna teaches us that the owner has committed misuse, since the agent told them that the first item was according to the owner’s instructions, and they indeed took it according to his instructions.

Mishna:

The Mishna continues defining the case of an agent who carried out his agency, and discusses an agent who is deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor.

He said to him

the owner said to the agent:

Bring me

money

from the window

[a square opening in a wall that does not open through to the outside, made for placing objects in it] .

Or

he said to him: Bring me

from the daluska

[a sack]. He did not tell him from which window or from which daluska, and there were many of them there,

and

the agent

brought it to him

, and both the agent and the owner mistakenly failed to know that the money was consecrated,

even though the owner said, “It was not in my mind”

from this window

“but from this one!” And

the agent

brought it from this one

, which had not been in his mind and therefore he had not carried out his agency, nevertheless

the owner committed misuse.

For we do not take into consideration what was in his heart, since “matters in the heart are not considered matters”; rather, we take into consideration only what he said.

But if he said to him, “

Bring me

money

from the window,”

and he brought it to him from the daluska, or

he said to him, “Bring me

from the daluska,”

and he brought it to him from the window, the agent has committed misuse .

Since he did not carry out his agency as he had been instructed .

The owner sent

consecrated money

in the hands of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor

to purchase from the shopkeeper:

if they carried out his agency, the owner committed misuse

, in accordance with the law governing an agent who carried out his agency. And the Gemara raises a difficulty: A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor are not legally capable of agency.

And if

they did not carry out his agency, the shopkeeper committed misuse.

Since the owner did not commit misuse, for his agency had not been carried out, and the deaf-mute, imbecile, and minor did not commit misuse, because they are not legally capable of committing misuse . Therefore, the consecrated money had not yet become unconsecrated until it came into the shopkeeper’s possession; consequently, the shopkeeper committed misuse .

He sent it by an adult of sound understanding

[that is, one legally capable of agency]

and remembered

the owner remembered that the money was consecrated

before it reached

the

shopkeeper,

and the Gemara will explain that this means that the agent also remembered. Consequently, neither of them committed misuse, since they were intentional offenders, whereas misuse applies only in a case of inadvertence, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda [Kiddushin 54b]. Therefore:

the shopkeeper committed misuse,

since his error was that he did not know that the money was consecrated; he, therefore, was the one who committed misuse,

and when he spends it

the money, he commits misuse.

The owner who remembered that the money was consecrated can save the shopkeeper from the prohibition of misuse before the shopkeeper spends it .

And the Mishna explains:

What should he do?

He takes a peruta or an object

, belonging to non-sacred property,

and says

“The consecrated peruta

that I gave to the agent,

wherever it may be, is redeemed onto

this object

this

, or onto this peruta,” and the money in the shopkeeper’s possession becomes unconsecrated, because

consecrated property is redeemed with money or an object of equivalent value.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna:

“He said to him, ‘Bring me from the window,’ and he brought it to him.”

“Even though the owner said, ‘It was not this one that was in my mind, but that one,’ and he brought it from this one, the owner committed misuse.”

And the Gemara explains:

What does it teach us?

What is the Mishna teaching us? “

Matters in the heart are not considered matters.”

As explained in the Mishna.

We learned in our Mishna:

“He sent it by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor; if they carried out his agency, the owner committed misuse.”

And we ask: Why did the owner commit misuse on account of their actions?

“Are they not legally capable of agency?”

Are a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor not legally capable of agency, since they lack full understanding?

The Gemara answers that although they are not legally capable of agency, nevertheless, since the misuse was carried out and their actions were satisfactory to the owner, the owner consequently committed misuse.

More specifically: There is no need for “agency” here, meaning that the agent’s act should be attributed to the sender; it is sufficient that the sender’s intention was fulfilled through the agent’s act .

And the Gemara cites two statements of amoraim that explain this. Rabbi Elazar compares the act of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor to the halakha concerning preparations for ritual impurity.

Any food fit for human consumption does not become susceptible to ritual impurity unless it was first “prepared” to receive impurity, by having water or one of the other six liquids come upon it, as it is stated [Leviticus 11]: “Of all food that may be eaten, upon which water comes, it shall be impure.”

Liquids prepare food to receive ritual impurity only when they were placed upon it with the consent of the owners. As it is stated [there]: “And if water be put upon seed,” and the Sages expounded: It is written yiten, “he shall put,” meaning: with his consent; but it is read yutan, “it shall be put,” meaning that water came upon it by itself. “It shall be put” is analogous to “he shall put”: Just as “he shall put” means with his consent, so too, when water came upon it by itself, it renders it prepared for impurity, provided that it came upon it with his consent and that he is pleased with this water. Therefore, if dew fell upon food and he is pleased with this, it is prepared to receive ritual impurity. [As explained in Bava Metzia 22a].

Now, in this case of dew falling, at the very least an act was performed by Heaven. Nevertheless, even when it was prepared without any act at all, as will be explained, if the owner is pleased with it, it is likewise prepared to receive ritual impurity.

And Rabbi Elazar derived from this that the same applies to me'ila: an act of “agency” is not necessary, just as in the laws of preparations for impurity the liquids are not the agents of the owner of the produce; it is sufficient that the act was performed with the owner’s consent.

Rabbi Elazar said: They rendered them

The Sages made the halakha of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor equivalent

to an olive press.

As we learned

(Tractate Taharot, chapter 9, mishna 1):

The olives

that he gathered from the field and placed in a vessel—

from when

were they prepared, and through this preparation

become susceptible to ritual impurity,

when one of those who are impure touches them?

From

the time

that they exude the juice of the olive press.

That is, when they are inside a vessel in which olives are placed and juice begins to emerge from them, they become prepared through the juice. For the owner of the olives is pleased with the juice that emerges from them.

But not the juice of the basket

[a perforated wicker basket], since it does not retain the juice, which is lost. Therefore, the owner of the olives does not take the juice into consideration.

Likewise, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor are equivalent to an olive press, which has no understanding. That is, an act of “agency” is not necessary; it is sufficient that the act be performed with the owner’s consent.

Rabbi Yohanan compares the halakha of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor to the halakha stated with regard to an eruv.

this is not an eruv, but if he said to another person to receive it from the animal, it is an eruv. And it was with regard to this latter clause that Rav Hisda and Rav Yehiel explained that he is standing and watching it, and that there is a presumption that an agent performs his agency. Tosafot explain there that this beraita is not the beraita cited in our passage, nor does it have the same wording. That beraita [in its first clause] speaks of a case in which he is not standing and watching it, but relies on the intelligence of the elephant and monkey [sometimes they are trained. Rashi there]; therefore it is not an eruv— and not because it is an act performed by a monkey, but because one cannot rely on its intelligence, and perhaps they did not place it. But the beraita cited in our passage speaks of one who stands and watches, and the concern that perhaps they did not place it is thereby removed. And the fact that the acquisition of a place of residence is effected through a monkey is immaterial, since “their agency was performed.” As explained in our passage, Rabbi Yohanan learned from this that the same applies to me'ila. Just as it is possible to acquire a domain by means of the monkey’s placement of the object, so too, when the minor carried it out, this is considered “his carrying it out,” and not an act of agency. In summary: When Rabbi Yohanan compared the halakha of me'ila to this beraita, he learned from it that agency is entirely unnecessary in me'ila. The essential point is the result, that “he” effects the removal through their act. Tosafot further asked there: Why did Rav Hisda and Rav Yehiel not actually explain it with regard to that Mishna which states: “One who sends it by means of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor—it is not an eruv; but if he said to another person to receive it, it is an eruv”? And they answered: Rav Hisda and Rav Yehiel interpret the Mishna as follows: The reason that the deaf-mute does not acquire a place of residence [is not that he is unreliable, but] that a minor does not have the “capacity” to effect acquisitions, as Rashi said above. And that Mishna indeed disagrees with the beraita cited in tractate Me'ila, which maintains that an act of acquisition is unnecessary. For if even a minor lacks the “capacity” to acquire a place of residence, all the more so a monkey and an elephant. If so, Tosafot ask: According to this, Rabbi Yohanan’s proof in our passage from the beraita about the monkey and elephant is undermined, since the Mishna does not accept this view. Rather, Tosafot write, we must say that that Mishna follows specifically the view of Rabbi Elazar, specifically, who derives the halakha of me'ila from the olive press: “For the fact that he is pleased with it is considered an act.” That is, me'ila requires an act, but a minor’s act, combined with the sender’s consent, suffices for it to be considered the sender’s act. It is clear from the words of Tosafot that Rabbi Yohanan learned from the monkey and elephant that an act is unnecessary, whereas Rav Elazar learned from the olive press that although an act is necessary, nevertheless, the consent of the owner of the olives is equivalent to an act. This matter requires discussion. One who wishes to walk on Shabbat more than two thousand cubits places bread at the end of two thousand cubits and acquires a place of residence there; he may then walk another two thousand cubits from the place of his eruv. This is called an eruv tehumin.

Rabbi Yohanan said:

The act of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor is

like that

beraita

that we learned:

If they placed

the eruv,

on the monkey, and it carried it

the monkey, to the place where he wishes to acquire a place of residence,

or on the elephant, and it carried it,

and he stands at a distance and watches it place the bread there, and says, “Let my place of residence be acquired for me in that place”—

this is an eruv.

It follows that although the elephant is not fit to serve as an agent, nevertheless,

even though an elephant is not legally capable of acting as an agent, nevertheless,

it performs his agency,

its agency was performed.

So too,

with regard to me'ila, although the agent is a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor—

his agency was performed,

its agency was performed. Therefore, the sender is liable for me'ila.

We learned in our Mishna:

He sent it by means of a competent person, and he remembered before it reached the shopkeeper—

the shopkeeper commits me'ila when it leaves his possession.

The Gemara had thought that only the homeowner remembered, while the agent did not remember and was carrying out his agency inadvertently—

and therefore it asks:

Even though he did not remember

[remember],

the agent?!

And it poses a contradiction,

as the following beraita contradicts this. We learned

If the homeowner remembered but the agent did not remember, the agent commits me'ila.

The homeowner is exempt, as explained in the Mishna, since he acted intentionally, and there is no me'ila for an intentional act. The agent is liable because he inadvertently removed consecrated money into the non-sacred realm. [

Indeed, that is so: When both acted inadvertently, the sender is liable, because in me'ila “there is agency for a transgression.” But when the sender is exempt because he remembered, the me'ila falls upon the agent, as in all the halakhot of the Torah: “There is no agency for a transgression,” and the one who performs the act is liable. ]

And it answers:

Rav Sheshet said: Our Mishna

our Mishna indeed speaks

when both remembered,

the sender and the agent; and since neither of them committed me'ila, the shopkeeper committed me'ila, as explained in the Mishna.

Mishna:

The Mishna continues with the laws of me'ila through an agent.

He gave him

the homeowner gave the agent

a peruta, and said

to him: “

Bring me with half of it candles

[an earthenware vessel in which one lights]

and with half of it wicks.”

And he went

the agent,

and brought him with all of it

with the entire peruta,

candles, or with all of it, wicks ,

Neither of them committed me'ila. The homeowner did not commit me'ila, since an act of me'ila worth a peruta was not performed through his agency , and likewise the agent did not deviate from the homeowner’s instructions by the value of a peruta .

and likewise the agent did not deviate from the master of the house’s instructions by a peruta’s worth .

Or, if he

gave him a peruta and

said to him: "

Bring me candles with all of it,"

or

said to him: "Bring me

wicks with all of it,"

and he went and brought back candles with half of it and wicks with half of it, neither of them misused the consecrated property,

as explained.

But if

he gave him a peruta and

said to him: "

Bring me candles with half of it from a certain place, and wicks with half of it from a certain place,"

and he went and brought him candles from

wicks and wicks from the place of candles, the agent misused the consecrated property,

for he deviated from the owner's instructions by the value of a peruta and took them from another place, concerning which he had not been instructed.

If he gave him two perutot and said to him: "

Go and bring me an etrog

with two perutot,"

and he went and brought him with

one

peruta an etrog, and with the other a pomegranate, both misused the consecrated property.

The owner, since his agency was fulfilled with one peruta; and the agent, because he spent the second peruta on his own initiative and deviated from his mission.

Rabbi Yehuda says: The owner did not misuse the consecrated property,

because

he says to him: "

I had been seeking a large etrog

and that is why I gave you two perutot,

yet you brought me

an etrog

that is small and inferior."

The Gemara will explain in what matter the Sages disagree with Rabbi Yehuda.

Likewise,

if he gave him a gold dinar,

which is worth twenty-five silver dinars, which are six sela,

and said to him: "

Go and bring me

from it

a garment."