Meilah 20b (כ:) — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: He said to him, “Give meat to the guests,” and he gave them liver; or “liver,” and he gave them meat—the agent commits me'ila, because he did not carry out the owner's agency.

It follows that our Mishna holds that liver and meat are two species. The Gemara discusses whether this is everyone's view, or whether, according to Rabbi Akiva, liver and meat are one species.

This discussion—whether they are two species or one species—is relevant not only to me'ila through an agent, but also to other laws of the Torah, such as the laws of vows, as will be explained.

The general rule in this matter is: Anything about which an agent does not consult the sender—for example, one who sends an agent to purchase vegetables for him—whatever the agent purchases without consultation is included within the category of vegetables.

Similarly, if one sends an agent to purchase vegetables, and the agent finds only legumes, and does not purchase them, and does not even return to the sender to consult him as to whether he should purchase legumes, this is a sign that legumes certainly are not included within the category of vegetables.

But with regard to “a matter about which the agent consults,” that is, something concerning which the agent returns and consults with the sender—for example, when he did not find vegetables, he returns to ask whether he should purchase gourds—the Sages and Rabbi Akiva disagree. The Sages hold that the very fact that he consults proves that gourds are not the same species as vegetables; for if they were the same species, why would he need to consult? Why would he not simply purchase them at once? Rabbi Akiva, however, derives the opposite from the consultation: Gourds are a species of vegetable. If they were not a species of vegetable, why would he consult? After all, he had been sent to purchase vegetables; just as he does not consult about whether to purchase legumes, so too he would not consult about gourds.

Accordingly, liver in relation to meat is a matter about which the agent consults. One who sends an agent to purchase meat, and the agent finds only liver, does not purchase it immediately, but consults with the sender.

Our Mishna, which states that the agent commits me'ila, holds that they are two species, because liver in relation to meat is a matter about which the agent consults, and therefore he did not carry out his agency.

Who is the tanna,

who is the tanna of our Mishna who holds

that every matter about which the agent consults—

everything concerning which the agent consults—

constitutes two matters,

that is, two species?

Rav Hisda said:

Our Mishna was taught according to the view of the Sages,

not according to Rabbi Akiva.

As we learned,

in tractate Nedarim:

One who vows against vegetables,

forbidding himself by a vow from eating vegetables,

is permitted to eat

—

gourds,

because gourds are not a species of vegetable, since they are “a matter about which the agent consults,” as explained. This is the view of the Sages.

But Rabbi Akiva forbids

eating gourds, because in his view gourds are included within the category of vegetables, since they are “a matter about which the agent consults,” as explained.

It follows that our Mishna is in accordance with the view of the Sages, because according to Rabbi Akiva, since the agent consults about liver, he has carried out his agency, and the owner commits me'ila .

Abaye rejects Rav Hisda's statement:

Abaye said: You may even say—

it is possible to establish the Mishna according to

Rabbi Akiva,

and indeed, if the agent had consulted and the owner had agreed that he should bring liver to the guests, and he had carried out his agency, the me'ila would have been through the owner's agency, and he would have committed me'ila.

But in our Mishna he brought them liver without consulting;

and was he not required to consult?

Was he not required to consult?! Therefore, he brought something that he had not been instructed to bring, and the agent commits me'ila .

The Gemara relates:

When the Rabbis said—

when the Sages stated Abaye's answer—

before Rava,

Rava responded and

said to them: “

Nahmani has spoken well.”

Rava called him “Nahmani” because Abaye grew up in the house of Rabba bar Nahmani .

The Gemara clarifies:

Who is the tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Akiva,

that is, who is the tanna in that Mishna who disagrees with Rabbi Akiva?

It is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel [

one must read:

“he is”],

as it was taught,

as we learned in a beraita:

One who vows against meat is forbidden to eat all types of meat,

whether the meat of domesticated animals or wild animals,

and is forbidden to eat the head, the legs, the windpipe, the liver, and the heart,

because all of these, including liver, are included within the category of meat .

And he is forbidden to eat poultry.

But he is permitted to eat the meat of fish and locusts;

these are the words of the Sages.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits the head, the legs, the windpipe, the liver, and poultry,

because all of these are not included within the category of meat, and the agent must consult about them, as stated above.

And there is no need to say

that he is permitted to eat

the meat of fish and locusts .

Thus, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that something about which the agent consults is considered another species and is not included within the vow.

The beraita continues:

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would likewise say: The innards—

the internal parts of an animal—

are not meat, and those who eat them are not human,

meaning that one who eats them is not a human being; that is, they are not human food .

The Gemara clarifies the view of the first tanna of the beraita [who holds like Rabbi Akiva that every matter about which an agent consults is one species]: And according to the first tanna, what is different about poultry,

that one who vows against meat is forbidden to eat it,

because

it is common for a person to say,

as people commonly say: “

I did not find the meat of an animal,”

that is, I did not find the meat of a domesticated animal in the marketplace, “

so I brought poultry meat,” meaning that poultry meat is included within the category of meat .

meaning that poultry is included within the category of meat.

If so,

this is difficult:

so too, a person may say,

a person may say, “

I did not find the meat of an animal, so I brought fish.”

Why, then, is he permitted to eat fish?

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said: We are dealing with the day on which he underwent bloodletting,

the beraita is speaking of a vow made on the day he underwent bloodletting,

for

in any event,

a person does not eat fish

on that day, because fish are harmful—that is, unhealthy—for one who has undergone bloodletting.

Since that is the case, he did not have fish in mind when he made his vow.

The Gemara objects:

If so,

if that is the reason,

he should also eat poultry,

so that he should likewise be permitted to eat poultry .

For Shmuel said: One who is “mesukar,”

one who underwent bloodletting from his shoulders,

and ate poultry,

and eats poultry meat,

his heart flutters like a bird,

meaning that he thereby places himself in danger.

Why, then, did the first tanna forbid eating poultry meat, since he did not have it in mind when he made his vow? Furthermore, it was taught,

we learned in a beraita:

One may not undergo bloodletting over fish, poultry, or salted meat.

Thus, poultry meat also may not be eaten on the day of bloodletting .

This shows that one does not eat poultry on the day of bloodletting as well.

Rather,

Rav Pappa said

It is indeed not speaking of the day of bloodletting, and that is why he is forbidden to eat poultry. Rather,

we are dealing with a day on which his eyes hurt,

the beraita speaks of a vow made on a day when his eyes hurt,

when he does not eat fish;

therefore, at the time of his vow he did not have fish in mind .

We learned in our Mishna: He said to him, “Give them one piece each,” and he said to them, “Take two each,” and they took three each; they all committed me'ila.

In tractate Ketubot [98b], the Gemara is uncertain regarding one who tells his agent to sell a litkha—half a beit kor—of his fields, and the agent goes and sells a full beit kor, while the owner of the field wishes to retract from the entire sale, including the portion he instructed the agent to sell, on the claim that the agent did not carry out his agency. The uncertainty is whether the agent “added to his instructions”—that is, the agent did indeed carry out his agency and sold the litkha, but added by selling what he had not been instructed to sell, in which case the owner cannot retract; or whether we say that he “deviated from his instructions,” did not carry out his agency, and the sale is entirely void.

The Gemara there and here resolves the question from our Mishna:

Infer from this,

from our Mishna, which states that the sender also commits me'ila, it follows that the agent

is one who adds to his agency .

For if we were to say that the agent “deviates from his instructions,” it would follow that he did not carry out his agency, and the sender would not commit me'ila .

And we reject this: Rav Sheshet said: Our Mishna cannot resolve the question, because it is speaking in a case where he said

to them—

the agent said to the guests, explaining to them: “

Take

one piece

at the owner's direction, and one at my direction,”

and they took three,

the first because of the owner's agency, the second because of the agent's instruction, and the third of their own volition .

one piece

on the authority of the homeowner, and one on my authority,”

and they took three,

the first because of the homeowner’s agency, the second because of the agent’s instruction, and the third on their own initiative.