Meilah 20b — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: He said to him, “Give meat to the guests,” and he gave them liver; [or,] “liver,” and he gave [them] meat—the agent committed meila. Because he did not carry out the householder’s agency.

It follows that our Mishna holds that liver and meat are two species. The Gemara discusses whether this is everyone’s view, or whether according to Rabbi Akiva liver and meat are one species.

This discussion—whether they are two species or one species—does not concern only meila through an agent, but also the other laws of the Torah, such as with regard to vows, as will be explained.

And the rule concerning this is: every matter about which the agent does not consult the sender—for example, one who sends an agent to purchase vegetables for him—everything that the agent purchases without consultation is included within “vegetables.”

And likewise, one who sends an agent to purchase vegetables, and the agent found only legumes, and does not purchase them, and does not even return to consult the sender whether to purchase legumes, this is a sign that legumes are certainly not included within “vegetables.”

But “a matter about which the agent consults,” meaning, a matter concerning which the agent returns and consults with the sender—for example, when he did not find vegetables, he returns to ask whether to purchase gourds—in this matter the Sages dispute with Rabbi Akiva. The Sages hold that his very consultation proves that gourds are not one species with vegetables: if they were one species, what need would he have to consult? Why does he not purchase them immediately? Whereas Rabbi Akiva proves from the consultation the opposite: that gourds are a species of vegetable. For if they are not a species of vegetable, why should he consult? After all, he sent him to purchase vegetables, just as he does not consult whether to purchase legumes.

And now, liver in relation to meat is a matter about which the agent consults. One who sends an agent to purchase meat and he found only liver does not purchase it immediately, but consults with the sender.

And our Mishna, which stated that the agent committed meila, is because it holds that they are two species, since liver in relation to meat is a matter about which the agent consults, and therefore he did not carry out his agency.

Which tanna,

who is the tanna of our Mishna who holds

that every matter about which the agent consults—

every matter concerning which the agent consults—

is two matters,

they are two species?

Rav Chisda said:

Our Mishna was taught according to the view of the Sages,

not according to Rabbi Akiva,

as we learned,

we learned in tractate Nedarim:

One who vows [to abstain] from vegetables,

who prohibits to himself by a vow the eating of vegetables,

is permitted to eat

the eating of

gourds,

because gourds are not a species of vegetable, since they are “a matter about which the agent consults,” as explained. These are the words of the Sages.

But Rabbi Akiva prohibits

the eating of gourds, because according to his view gourds are included within vegetables, since they are “a matter about which the agent consults,” as explained.

It follows that our Mishna is according to the view of the Sages, for according to Rabbi Akiva, since the agent consults about liver, he did carry out his agency, and the householder committed meila .

Abaye rejects Rav Chisda’s words:

Abaye said: Even if you say,

it is possible to establish the Mishna according to

Rabbi Akiva,

and indeed, if the agent had consulted and the householder had agreed to bring liver to the guests, and he carried out his agency, the meila would have been through the householder’s agency, and he would have committed meila,

but in our Mishna he brought them liver without consultation.

And did he not need to consult?

Surely he needed to consult! Therefore, he brought something concerning which he had not been commanded, and the agent committed meila .

And the Gemara relates:

When the Sages said

Abaye’s answer,

before Rava,

before Rava, Rava responded and

said to them: “

Nahmani has spoken well.”

Rava called him “Nahmani,” because Abaye grew up in the home of Rabbah bar Nahmani .

And the Gemara clarifies:

Which tanna disputes Rabbi Akiva,

who is the tanna in that Mishna who disputes Rabbi Akiva?

It is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel [

it is necessary to read:

“he is” ],

as it was taught,

as we learned in a beraita:

One who vows [to abstain] from meat is forbidden all kinds of meat,

whether of domesticated animal or wild animal,

and is forbidden the head and the feet, the windpipe, the liver, and the heart,

because all these, even the liver, are included within meat .

And he is forbidden bird meat.

And he is permitted fish meat and locusts;

these are the words of the Sages.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits the head and the feet, the windpipe, the liver, and birds,

because all these are not included within meat, and the agent needs to consult concerning them, as above.

And it is unnecessary to say

that he is permitted

fish meat and locusts .

Thus Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is the one who holds that a matter about which the agent consults is another species and is not included in the vow.

And the beraita continues:

And likewise Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel used to say: The innards

[the internal parts of the animal]

are not meat, and those who eat them are not human beings,

one who eats them is not a human being! Meaning, they are not food for a person .

The Gemara clarifies the view of the first tanna of the beraita [who holds like Rabbi Akiva, that every matter about which the agent consults is one species]:

And according to the first tanna, what is different about bird meat,

that one who vows [to abstain] from meat is forbidden it?

Because it is usual for a person to say,

it is customary for people to say:

“I did not find the meat of an animal,”

I did not find the meat of a domesticated animal in the market,

“and I brought the meat of a bird,”

and I brought bird meat,” which indicates that bird meat is included within meat ,

If so,

if so, this is difficult:

here too, a person acts by saying,

a person says:

“I did not find the meat of an animal, and I brought fish.”

And what is the reason for permitting him fish meat?

And we answer:

Rav Pappa said: We are dealing with the day of bloodletting,

the beraita is speaking of a vow made on the day when he had blood let,

for

in any event

a person does not eat fish,

on that day, because fish are harmful [that is, unhealthy] for bloodletting.

And since this is so, he did not intend fish in his vow.

And we challenge:

If so,

if so,

he should also eat birds,

so that eating bird meat should also be permitted .

For Shmuel said: One who has blood let,

one who had blood let from his shoulders,

and ate bird meat,

and eats bird meat,

his heart flutters like a bird,

his heart flutters like a bird; that is, he thereby endangers himself.

And why did the first tanna forbid eating bird meat, since he did not intend this in his vow?

And further, it was taught,

we learned a beraita:

One does not have blood let over fish, over birds, or over salted meat.

Thus, bird meat too is not eaten on the day of bloodletting ?

Rather

Rav Pappa said

It is indeed not speaking of the day of bloodletting, and therefore he is forbidden bird meat. Rather,

we are dealing with a day on which his eyes hurt,

the beraita speaks of a vow made on a day when his eyes hurt,

when he does not eat fish,

therefore, at the time of his vow he did not intend fish .

We learned in our Mishna: He said to him, “Give them one piece at a time,” and he says, “Take two each,” and they took three each; all of them committed meila.

He said to him, “Give them one piece each,” and he said to them, “Take two each,” and they took three each; all incurred sacrilege.

In tractate Ketubot [98b], the Gemara leaves unresolved a question concerning one who says to his agent to sell a litkha [half a beit kor] from his fields, and the agent went and sold a beit kor, while the owner of the field wishes to retract from the entire sale, even from what he commanded the agent, claiming that the agent did not carry out his agency. The question is whether the agent “added to his words,” meaning, the agent indeed carried out his agency and sold a litkha, but added by selling what he had not been commanded [to sell]. Consequently, the householder cannot retract. Or whether we say, “he passed beyond his words,” and he did not carry out his agency, and the sale is entirely void.

The Gemara there and here resolves the question from our Mishna:

Learn from this,

from our Mishna, which stated that the sender also committed meila, it follows that the agent

is one who adds to his agency .

For if we say that the agent “passes beyond his words,” it follows that he did not carry out his agency, and the sender did not commit meila .

And we reject this:

Rav Sheshet said:

Our Mishna cannot resolve the question, because it is speaking in a case

where he said

to them,

the agent to the guests, and explained to them: “

Take

one piece

at the householder’s discretion, and one at my discretion,”

and they took three,

and they took three: the first on account of the householder’s agency, the second on account of the agent’s command, and the third on their own initiative .