Meilah 21b (כא:) — the Talmud in English

and went and brought him for three

sela, which are half a dinar,

a cloak; and with regard to the three, both committed misuse

as explained above.

Rabbi Yehuda says: The owner did not commit misuse.

Because

he says to him: “

I was seeking a large cloak, but you brought me a small and inferior one.”

This will be explained in the Gemara.

The Gemara explains the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara in tractate Ketubot [99a] discusses the case of one who said to his agent: “Go and sell for me a beit kor of land from my fields.” The agent went and sold half a beit kor. The question is whether the agent’s sale is valid. The two sides of the uncertainty are as follows: The agent says to the seller: “This partial sale is to your advantage. Perhaps you will not need the money and will regret the sale, yet you would not have been able to retract it; it is therefore worthwhile for you to sell it piecemeal.” Conversely, the seller claims: “I do not want multiple deeds of sale to accumulate against me.”

Our Mishna can resolve this question [the same sugya also appears there, with slight changes; here it is explained according to Rashi there].

Gemara:

The Gemara asks: Is it possible to

infer from this

and resolve the question, according to this

one who says—

the one who said

to his agent: “

Go, buy

and sell

for me a kor of land

a beit kor from my fields”;

and he went—

the agent went—

and sold him half—he sold half a beit kor on his behalf—whether we can infer that

the

buyer acquires?

Just as in our Mishna, he instructed him to spend the entire dinar on a cloak, but the agent spent only half a dinar on his behalf, and the Mishna states [according to the Sages, whose view is the halakha] that the sale is valid and the owner committed misuse.

For if the sale is not valid for the owner, only the agent would have committed misuse, not the owner .

And we reject this:

They say:

Our Mishna cannot resolve the question, because

what are the circumstances here—

what case does our Mishna discuss?

For example, he brought him

a cloak that was

worth six

sela

for three

sela. He did, in fact, fulfill his agency and purchased for him a cloak worth six. Therefore, the owner committed misuse.

This is unlike a case in which he sold him only half a beit kor for the price of half a beit kor, in which he deviated from his instructions and the sale is void.

[The version of the Gemara there is: “And we challenge:

If so, why did the agent commit misuse?”

For he is an agent who fulfilled his agency. And we answer: He committed misuse

with regard to the cloak—

with regard to the additional three sela that he spent on his own initiative, rather than with the owner’s authorization.]

And we challenge:

If so,

if the case concerns his bringing him an item worth six for three,

say the latter clause

how will you explain the continuation of the Mishna:

“Rabbi Yehuda says: The owner did not commit misuse,”

because

he can say to him: “I was seeking a large cloak, but you brought me a small and inferior one.”

Why is it small and inferior? He brought him a large, superior cloak worth six sela!

And we answer: Indeed, our Mishna, even in its latter clause, speaks of his bringing him an item worth six for three.

And what is the meaning of

inferior?

Inferior in price,

for he purchased it for a small amount, whereas the owner had told him to spend six. And if you say: Why does this matter to him? It is because

the owner said to him

the following:

“Had you given him the entire dinar,”

had you purchased a cloak with the entire gold dinar,

you would have brought me—

you would have brought

one worth two dinars,

and certainly I would have gained more, because one who purchases a large quantity at once is given it at a reduced price. And we conclude: This interpretation of the Mishna is not merely a rejection; rather,

it is also logically evident

that the meaning is “inferior in price.”

As it is taught:

We learned in a beraita:

“Rabbi Yehuda concedes with regard to legumes,”

that if they sent him to purchase legumes for a dinar, and he purchased one kind worth a dinar for half a dinar, and with the other half he purchased another kind,

both committed misuse,

because

“legumes are sold by the sela, and legumes are sold by the peruta,”

meaning that they are sold by the sela at the same ratio at which they are sold by the peruta; the seller does not reduce the price because of a large purchase by the sela, as will be explained.

It is evident that Rabbi Yehuda’s reason with regard to the cloak is that the owner says: “Had you purchased with all six sela, you would have purchased more than twice as much.” For if not, what is the difference between a cloak and legumes, and why does Rabbi Yehuda concede ?

The Gemara clarifies:

What are the circumstances

of this sale of legumes?

If

the case is

in a place where they sell by estimation,

in a place where they sell according to an assessment, then

with regard to legumes as well, when one gives a sela,

one who purchases a large quantity for the value of a sela,

they reduce the price for him more

than the ratio of a sela to a peruta, as is customary among sellers who sell by estimation. Why, then, does Rabbi Yehuda concede that the owner also committed misuse? Could he not claim: “When you found legumes worth a dinar for half a dinar, you should have purchased them with the entire dinar, and then you would have purchased more than twice as much”?

And we conclude:

Rav Pappa said:

The beraita concerning legumes speaks

of a place where they sell by fixed measures,

a place where they sell according to measure or weight.

Measure by measure

measure by measure,

for a peruta; there their matter is fixed

the prices are fixed, and the sellers do not reduce the price for a large purchase. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the owner committed misuse, since he did not deprive him of the profit of purchasing more than twice as much with the entire dinar; no additional quantity is given for a large purchase.

Mishna:

The first clause of the Mishna is explained according to Rashi in tractate Bava Metzia [43a] and Kiddushin [53b]:

A Temple treasurer who deposits consecrated money

unintentionally [thinking that it is his own]

with a money changer,

who exchanges and makes change for money and is constantly in need of money,

if

the money was

tied up,

tied in a purse,

he may not use it

the money changer may not use it, because the knot reveals the depositor’s intention: He did not give it to him for use, but only deposited it with him for safekeeping.

Therefore, if he took it out

the money changer used it for non-sacred purposes,

he committed misuse,

the money changer, and not the treasurer.

If it was loose,

if the purse containing the money was not tied,

he may use it;

the money changer is permitted to use it

it. [

That is, under the laws of custodians, he is permitted to use it.]

Therefore, if he took it out, he did not commit misuse

the money changer did not commit misuse; rather, the treasurer did, because the money changer used the money with the treasurer’s authorization, as the treasurer knew that the money changer would use it.

But one who deposits money

with a householder,

who is not a money changer,

in either case,

whether it is tied or loose,

may not use it,

because a householder does not engage in exchanging and making change with money, and certainly the depositor gave it to him only for safekeeping.

Therefore, if he took it out,

the householder took it out,

he committed misuse,

the householder who received the deposit, and not the treasurer who deposited it .

A treasurer who deposits money with a

shopkeeper,

who does not constantly need money, since people give him produce and other items on credit and the small amount of money in his possession is sufficient for him, has the same law

as a householder.

These are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

But

Rabbi Yehuda says:

The shopkeeper’s law is

like that of a money changer , and when the money is loose, he may use it.

and when it is loose, he may use it.

If a peruta of consecrated property fell into his purse

and became mixed with the others.

Or, if he said

the one consecrating it: “

A peruta in this purse is consecrated,”

without specifying which peruta. Now every peruta is in doubt as to whether it is consecrated.

Once he took out the first one

for secular use,

he committed misuse.

These are

the words of Rabbi Akiva.

Although it is uncertain whether he benefited from consecrated property, nevertheless Rabbi Akiva follows his own view [Keritot 22b], that for uncertain misuse one brings an asham talui .

And the Sages say: He did not commit misuse

with regard to taking out the first one, nor with regard to the others, since each one is possibly consecrated, and there is no misuse based on uncertainty [ and likewise, one brings an asham talui only for something that, if one did it certainly, would require a hatat, and not for misuse, for certain misuse requires an asham],

until he takes out the entire purse,

down to the last peruta; then it is certain that one of them is consecrated, and he has committed misuse.

And Rabbi Akiva concedes to the Sages when one says

the one consecrating it:

“A peruta from this purse is consecrated,” and he goes on taking them out,

he is permitted to take out one peruta at a time

until he takes out the entire purse.

That is, until the last one; the last one is consecrated, and he commits misuse when he takes it out.

The Gemara will explain why Rabbi Akiva concedes and how this differs from the previous law.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna:

“And Rabbi Akiva concedes when one says: ‘A peruta from this purse is consecrated,’ that he goes on taking them out until he takes out the entire purse.”

The Gemara relates:

When Rav Dimi came,

when he arrived from Eretz Yisrael,

he said: He presented the following challenge:

he raised a difficulty—

Reish Lakish challenged Rabbi Yohanan: What is different in the first clause—what

is different about the first clause, in which Rabbi Akiva disagrees,

and what is different in the latter clause,

and what is different about the latter clause, in which he concedes to the Sages?

He said to him

Rabbi Yohanan:

The latter clause

is speaking

when he says

“This purse shall not be entirely released from the consecrated property,”

that is, “I will not finish using its money without one peruta being consecrated.” This wording certainly refers to the last peruta.

These are the words of Rav Dimi concerning the give-and-take between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish.

When Ravin came, he said: He presented to him the purse of oxen as a contradiction.

Reish Lakish challenged Rabbi Yohanan with a contradiction between our Mishna and the Mishna concerning “oxen.”

For we learned,

for we learned [Menahot 108b]:

one who says, “One of my oxen

is consecrated

to the sacred funds”,

and he did not say which of them,

and he had two, the larger of them is consecrated.

Because “one who consecrates, consecrates with a generous eye”.

And it is difficult: why should it not likewise be said in the seifa of the Mishna that he did not intend the latter, but rather the choicest?

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan:

the seifa,

it is speaking

of one who says, “This purse will not be exempt from the sacred funds”,

as stated above, and the meaning of this expression is only regarding the latter.