Makkot 8b — the Talmud in English

“he shall be impure”.

And the word “shall be” is superfluous, and it comes to reveal that although the meaning of the verse is one who became impure for an optional matter, since “which” is written in it, nevertheless entry into the Temple is forbidden even to one who “shall be impure

in any event,

even if his impurity is due to his having become impure for a met mitzva, whose impurity is not impurity for an optional matter.

And we raise an objection: But

that

redundancy of “he shall be impure”

is needed

for another exposition—

as it was taught: “he shall be impure”—

to include one who immersed that day, who is also liable to karet if he enters the Temple, despite having already immersed, since he still lacks sunset for his purification.

“His impurity is in him”—

to include one who lacks atonement offerings.

That is, a zav and a zava, a woman after childbirth, and a metzora: Scripture requires them to bring an offering after they have become purified through immersion and sunset, and they are forbidden to eat sacrificial food until they bring their atonement offerings to the Temple. And the verse “his impurity is in him” comes to make them liable to karet if they entered the Temple, even if they became purified, as long as they had not brought their offerings. If so, from where is it derived to forbid one who became impure for a met mitzva?

And if so, it is impossible to say as you answered, that the verse “shall be” comes to say that although “which” is written here, the verse does not exclude impurity for a mitzva matter. For there is no redundancy in the verse here, since these words are expounded in order to teach this.

And it is proven that “which” is not stated specifically concerning an optional matter, but also concerning a matter that has, among other things, an aspect of mitzva; and again there is no need for a redundancy concerning one who became impure through a met mitzva.

And we answer:

He said to him

Rava:

I was speaking of the

additional

“his impurity is in him”;

I am saying

I said my words!

That is, the word “additional,” stated before “his impurity is in him,” is a superfluous word, and it comes to include the punishment of karet also for one who became impure through a met mitzva. Scripture needed to include this, since “which” is stated here, whose meaning is only an optional matter. And indeed, everywhere that the expression “which” is stated, it refers to an optional matter.

There are those who teach it,

the entire give-and-take, concerning the source of Rava and Ravina’s claim,

with regard to this,

concerning the matter in which tannaim disagreed regarding what the verse [Exodus 34] “Six days you shall work, and on the seventh day you shall rest

from plowing and from harvesting you shall rest” refers to.

Rabbi Akiva says:

The verse necessarily speaks of resting in the seventh year, and not of resting on the day of Shabbat. For on Shabbat all labor is forbidden, so why did Scripture mention specifically “plowing and harvesting”?

Rather, necessarily, this is the meaning of the verse: Six days you shall work, and on the seventh, on Shabbat, you shall rest. But in the seventh year, even on those six days on which you work in all the years, in plowing and harvesting, which are fieldwork, you shall refrain from doing them in the seventh year, because of the mitzva of shemitta.

And this verse is superfluous. For

the verse does not need

this

to say

that there is a prohibition against

seventh-year plowing and seventh-year harvesting, for it has already been explicitly stated in the seventh year, in the passage of shemitta [Leviticus 25]:

“

You shall not sow your field, and you shall not prune your vineyard”!

Rather,

this verse comes concerning the matter of the “addition to the seventh year.”

To teach you that a person may not plow his field

even

in the sixth year,

the plowing of the eve of the seventh year that extends [that is, is effective]

into

the seventh year.

And

likewise this verse forbids

the harvesting of

the produce of

the seventh year, which extends into the conclusion of the seventh year.

For if the produce reached one-third of its growth in the seventh year, when it is already fit to be harvested, then even if it was harvested in the eighth year, it possesses the sanctity of the seventh year, and it is forbidden to harvest it in the manner of harvesters, just as it is forbidden to harvest produce that grew entirely in the seventh year in the manner of harvesters.

But

Rabbi Ishmael

disagrees and

says that the verse speaks of Shabbat, according to its plain meaning, and not of shemitta.

And the fact that Scripture mentioned specifically the labors of “plowing and harvesting” is to teach us that the labor was not forbidden in every circumstance. Rather, Scripture juxtaposed plowing with harvesting, in order to teach you:

As for the fact that the verse mentioned specifically the labors of “plowing and harvesting,” this teaches that the labor is not prohibited in every circumstance. Rather, the verse juxtaposes plowing with harvesting, to teach you:

Just as,

just as

plowing

that is forbidden on Shabbat is only plowing of

an optional matter

and not of a mitzva, since plowing for a mitzva can never be possible on Shabbat, and consequently plowing for a mitzva was not forbidden on Shabbat—

so too harvesting

on Shabbat is forbidden only when it is harvesting of

an optional matter.

The harvesting of the omer is excluded,

on the night of the sixteenth of Nisan,

which is

a mitzva,

for if its time falls on the night of Shabbat, it must be harvested on Shabbat.

The Sages said to Rava: From where

is it obvious to Rabbi Ishmael

that the plowing

mentioned in this verse is plowing

of an optional matter,

so that you said that the verse juxtaposed harvesting with plowing, in order to say to you: Just as plowing is optional, so too harvesting is optional; the harvesting of the omer is excluded, for it is a mitzva?

Perhaps

the verse also speaks of

plowing for the omer,

that is, Scripture forbade plowing the field even if he plows it in order to sow seeds from which produce will grow, and from it they will bring the omer offering—which is plowing

for a mitzva, and even so the Merciful One said “

you shall rest!”

And if so, the same is true of harvesting for a mitzva, the harvesting of the omer: it too is forbidden on Shabbat!

Rava said to them

Rava:

Since, if he found

a field

plowed, he does not plow

another field for the omer, since there is no plowing “for the sake of the omer,” then even when he did not find a plowed field,

it is not a mitzva

to plow it, even if he plows it for the omer.

Therefore, plowing is always plowing for an optional matter, whereas the harvesting of the omer is harvesting for a mitzva.

For with regard to the harvesting of the omer, even if he found harvested produce, he does not [ideally] bring the omer offering from it; rather, it is a mitzva to harvest for the sake of harvesting the omer, as it is written: “And you shall harvest, and you shall bring the omer.” Therefore the harvesting of the omer was permitted on Shabbat.

Ravina raised an objection to Rava,

from what we find in our Mishna:

The father who strikes his son, the teacher who disciplines his student, and an agent of the court are excluded,

for they are exempt from exile for their unintentional acts, because they are occupied with a mitzva.

And according to Rava’s reasoning, one may object:

But why

are the father and teacher exempt from exile? For

let us say,

let it be said:

Since, if he had learned,

if the son or student were complete in his learning and conduct,

it would not be a mitzva, there would be no mitzva to strike him—if so, according to Rava,

to strike him, according to Rava’s approach

now also,

when he is not properly educated and needs to be struck,

it is not a mitzva

to strike him!

And Rava answered:

There, even though he had learned—

he is performing a mitzva

by striking him.

As it is written,

“

Discipline your son, and he will give you rest,” in order to remove from him every trace of evil.

He then

returned and

said: Rava said: The matter I said is not correct!

That is, I should not have said what I said. Rather, it is proven from the body of the verse that harvesting for a mitzva is not included in the prohibition, and I could have given him a decisive answer!

For the prohibition stated in the verse “from plowing and harvesting you shall rest” is

harvesting analogous to plowing.

And if so,

just as plowing

mentioned in the verse is always plowing that is not essential, for even plowing for the omer, if he

found

a field

plowed, he

does not plow,

since we do not find a mitzva in the Torah to plow for the sake of the omer—

because we do not find a Torah mitzva to plow specifically for the omer—

so too harvesting

forbidden in this verse

also

includes only harvesting that is not essential, and not harvesting for a mitzva, as it is said: “If he

found it harvested—

he does not harvest.”

And if it should enter your mind

that the verse speaks also of harvesting for a

mitzva,

such as the harvesting of the omer, would you object, and even then expound and say: “

If he found it harvested—

he does not harvest,” just as “If he found it plowed, he does not plow”?!

just as “if he finds it already plowed, he does not plow”?

But

it is a mitzva

to

harvest

for the sake of the omer,

and to bring

specifically from that harvesting!

And this is Rabbi Ishmael’s source: that the verse does not speak of harvesting for a mitzva. And from here he learned that the harvesting of the omer is permitted on Shabbat.

Mishna:

The father goes into exile through the son,

if he unintentionally killed his son.

And

likewise

the son goes into exile through the father,

if he unintentionally killed his father.

Everyone goes into exile through an Israelite,

if they unintentionally killed an Israelite.

And Israelites go into exile through them,

if Israelites killed them. And the Gemara explains that this principle comes to include a Samaritan.

Except

for a resident convert,

for if an Israelite unintentionally killed him, the Israelite does not go into exile for it. [And if a resident convert unintentionally killed an Israelite, exile does not benefit him, and a city of refuge does not receive him, as will be explained in the Gemara].

And a resident convert does not go into exile

if he killed an Israelite or a gentile,

but through

having unintentionally killed

a resident convert.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

The father goes into exile through the son.

And we raise an objection:

But you said

above:

The father who strikes his son is excluded,

with the intention of disciplining him, that he does not go into exile even if the son died under his hand unintentionally!? But our Mishna too necessarily speaks even of a father striking his son with the intention of disciplining him, since if he strikes him without any particular purpose, it is obvious that he goes into exile through him, and the Mishna would not need to teach this. [Tosafot]

And we answer: Our Mishna speaks of a case

in which the son had learned,

and it was not necessary to strike him in order to teach him.

And we challenge:

But you said

above:

Even though he had learned,

even then

he is performing a mitzva

by striking him, as it is written: “Discipline your son”!

And we answer: Here it speaks of

a

son who is

a carpenter’s apprentice,

an assistant to a carpenter, for the father taught his son not Torah but woodworking, and there is no mitzva to teach him and strike him for the sake of this study.

But we still object: When the father teaches his son to be

a carpenter’s apprentice,

also

it is a livelihood

[a trade by which he will live and support himself]

that he is teaching him.

And this too is a mitzva, to teach him a trade so that he will have a livelihood [as we learned in Kiddushin 30b], and he should be exempt for striking him as a striking for a mitzva, if he killed him while teaching him a trade.

And we answer: Here it speaks of one

who had learned another trade,

for the son had already learned another trade and did not need this instruction for his livelihood, and there is no mitzva for the father in this; therefore he goes into exile for striking him.

We learned in the Mishna:

And the son goes into exile through the father, and so forth.

And we raise a contradiction

apparently against the words of the Mishna from the words of a beraita.

For it was taught: “For every

killer

who flees there unintentionally” —

except for one who strikes his father!

For the obligation of exile applies only to one whose entire liability is solely because he struck a person and killed him. But one who strikes his father: the son is liable to death even when he merely inflicted a wound on his father and did not kill him. Therefore Scripture excluded him from exile, for he is not atoned for by it.

And now the Gemara understood that the meaning of the exclusion “except for one who strikes his father” is that if the son killed his father, he does not go into exile. This is unlike what is explained in the Mishna, that the son goes into exile for killing his father.

And we answer:

Rav Kahana said: It is not difficult.

This

that we learned in the beraita, that the son does not go into exile for killing his father, is according to

Rabbi Shimon.

And this

that we learned in our Mishna, that the son goes into exile, is the view of

the Rabbis.

And we explain in what they disagree:

According to Rabbi Shimon, who says [in Sanhedrin 49b] that the punishment of death by

[in Sanhedrin 49b] that the punishment of

strangulation is more severe than decapitation, one who intentionally kills his father is liable to strangulation because of striking his father, and to decapitation because of murder. But if he killed him intentionally, his judgment before the court would be to be killed by strangulation, which is more severe than decapitation, since he is judged by the most severe of the deaths to which he became liable.

one who intentionally kills his father is liable to strangulation because he struck his father, and to death by the sword because he committed murder. If he intentionally killed him, he would be executed by the court through strangulation, the more severe of the two punishments to which he is liable.

Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon, in an unintentional case he does not go into exile, since only an

unintentional

death by

decapitation [

for murder]

was given for atonement

through exile.

But

an unintentional strangulation

of a son who wounds his father

was not given for atonement,

because it is more severe than decapitation, and exile does not atone for the unintentional commission of this severe transgression. But

according to the Rabbis, who say

that the punishment of death by

decapitation is more severe than strangulation, and even if the son had killed his father intentionally, his death would have been by decapitation, which is the more severe of the two deaths to which he became liable,

even if the son had intentionally killed his father, his execution would be by the sword, which is the more severe of the two punishments to which he is liable. Therefore,

one who unintentionally kills his father—

it is an unintentional decapitation.

And the inadvertence of sword -

was given for atonement

through exile.

And our Mishna is that of the Rabbis.

And the beraita that says that one who strikes his father is exempt from exile is according to Rabbi Shimon, for intentionally he would be executed by strangulation, and unintentionally he is not atoned for through exile.

Rava said:

the beraita that excluded from “one who strikes a person” one who strikes his father is also according to the method of the Rabbis, for one who kills his father unintentionally is exiled, because it is the inadvertence of sword.

And the intention of the beraita is not to exclude one who kills his father from exile; rather, we expound:

except for one who makes a wound in his father unintentionally,

whose intentional punishment is strangulation.

And we needed to exclude him, for making a wound unintentionally, from exile, because

it might have entered your mind to say: since intentionally he is liable to execution -

unintentionally too, let him be exiled,

and let us not distinguish between sword and strangulation.

Therefore,

it teaches us

the exclusion from this verse, that there is exile only for the inadvertence of killing.

We learned in the Mishna:

Everyone is exiled through Israelites

etc.

And we scrutinize: This general rule that the Mishna stated,

“Everyone is exiled through Israelites”—what does it come to include?

And we explain:

It comes to include a slave and a Kuti.

If a slave or a Kuti [according to the one who says that they are genuine converts] killed an Israelite unintentionally, their law is to be exiled for this.

And

we also learned this,

that “everyone” means to include also a slave and a Kuti, in a beraita:

For the Sages taught: A slave and a Kuti -

are exiled through an Israelite.

And an Israelite -

is exiled and receives lashes through a Kuti and a slave.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

Granted, a slave and a Kuti,

we find also a case in which he

is exiled through an Israelite,

and also a case in which he

receives lashes

through an Israelite.

He is exiled -

for example,

where he killed

an Israelite.

And he receives lashes -

in a case

where he cursed

an Israelite.

But

what the Sages taught, that

an Israelite is exiled and receives lashes through a Kuti,

is apparently difficult:

Granted, he is exiled

we find, for example,

where he killed

the Kuti unintentionally.

But he receives lashes

for him -

why?

Perhaps you will say: because

he cursed him,

that the Israelite cursed the Kuti -

The Torah said: “

And you shall not curse a prince among your people.”

And we expound: specifically

one who acts as your fellow,

one who observes Torah and mitzvot—you are forbidden to curse him. But one who curses a Kuti who does not observe mitzvot does not receive lashes.

Rather, said Rav Aha bar Yaakov,

we find a case in which an Israelite receives lashes for a Kuti:

For example, where he testified against him

the Israelite testified against the Kuti that he was liable to lashes,

and he was found to be a conspiring witness,

and he receives lashes for what he plotted to have him lashed.

And we raise a difficulty: If “an Israelite who receives lashes for a Kuti” means that he testified against him and was found to be a conspiring witness, then in the first clause, where they said that a Kuti and a slave receive lashes for an Israelite, it means

similarly,

the statement in the first clause

concerning a slave,

that he receives lashes for an Israelite, also refers to a case

where he testified against him,

the slave testified against the Israelite that he was liable to lashes,

and he was found to be a conspiring witness,

and for this he receives lashes.

But surely it is impossible to say so, since a

slave -

is he fit to testify!?