Makkot 8b (ח:) — the Talmud in English

“He shall be impure”.

The word “shall be” is superfluous, and comes to teach that although the meaning of the verse is one who became impure for an optional matter, since “which” is written in it, nevertheless entry into the Temple is prohibited even to one who “shall be impure

in any event,

even if his impurity resulted from becoming impure for a met mitzva, whose impurity is not impurity for an optional matter.

And we raise an objection: But

that

additional term “he shall be impure”

is needed

for another exposition—

as it was taught: “He shall be impure”—

to include one who immersed that day, who is also liable to karet if he enters the Temple, even though he has already immersed, since he still lacks sunset for the completion of his purification.

“His impurity is upon him”—

to include one who lacks atonement offerings.

That is, a zav and a zava, a woman after childbirth, and a metzora are required by the Torah to bring an offering after they have become purified through immersion and sunset, and they are prohibited from eating consecrated food until they bring their atonement offerings to the Temple. The verse “his impurity is upon him” comes to make them liable to karet if they enter the Temple, even if they have become pure, so long as they have not brought their offerings. If so, from where is it derived that one who became impure through a met mitzva is prohibited?

And if so, it is impossible to say as you answered, that the verse “shall be” comes to teach that although “which” is written here, the verse does not exclude impurity incurred for a mitzva. For there is no additional term in the verse, since these words are expounded to teach this.

And it is proven that “which” is not stated specifically with regard to an optional matter, but also with regard to something that includes, among other things, a mitzva-related matter; and again, no additional term is needed for one who became impure through a met mitzva.

And we answer:

He said to him

Rava:

I was referring to “

still

his impurity is upon him,”

I said

my statement!

That is, the word “still,” stated before “his impurity is upon him,” is superfluous, and comes to include liability to karet also for one who became impure through a met mitzva. The verse needed to include this case because “which” is stated here, whose meaning is only an optional matter. And indeed, everywhere that the expression “which” is stated, it refers to an optional matter.

Some teach this entire give-and-take,

concerning the source of Rava’s position and Ravina’s objection,

with regard to this—

with regard to the matter in which the tannaim dispute what the verse “For six days you shall work, and on the seventh day you shall rest

from plowing and harvesting you shall rest” concerns.

Rabbi Akiva says:

The verse must be speaking of the cessation of work during the seventh year, and not of the cessation of work on Shabbat. For on Shabbat all labors are prohibited, so why did the verse mention specifically “plowing and harvesting”?

Rather, the meaning of the verse must be as follows: For six days you shall work, and on the seventh, on Shabbat, you shall rest. But during the seventh year, even on those six days on which you work throughout all the other years, you shall refrain from plowing and harvesting, which are agricultural labors, in the seventh year, because of the mitzva of shemitta.

And this verse is superfluous. For

the verse does not need

this

to say

that there is a prohibition against

plowing in the seventh year and harvesting in the seventh year, for it has already been stated

explicitly concerning the seventh year, in the passage of shemitta [Leviticus 25]: “

You shall not sow your field, and you shall not prune your vineyard”!

Rather,

this verse concerns the addition to the seventh year.

It teaches you that a person may not plow his field

even

in the sixth year,

the plowing before the seventh year that extends

[and benefits]

the seventh year.

And

this verse likewise prohibits

the harvesting of

produce of

the seventh year that extends into the year after the seventh.

For if the produce reached one-third of its growth during the seventh year, so that it was already fit to be harvested, then even if it was harvested in the eighth year, it possesses the sanctity of the seventh year, and it is prohibited to harvest it in the manner of harvesters, just as it is prohibited to harvest produce that grew entirely during the seventh year in the manner of harvesters.

Whereas

Rabbi Yishmael

disagrees and

says

that the verse speaks of Shabbat, according to its simple meaning, and not of shemitta.

And the reason the verse mentioned specifically the labors of “plowing and harvesting” is to teach us that the labor was not prohibited in every circumstance. Rather, the verse juxtaposed plowing with harvesting, to teach you:

Just as

the

plowing

prohibited on Shabbat is only plowing for

an optional purpose

and not for a mitzva—for plowing for a mitzva can never be possible on Shabbat, and consequently plowing for a mitzva was not prohibited on Shabbat—

so too, harvesting

on Shabbat is prohibited only when it is harvesting for

an optional purpose.

The harvesting of the omer is excluded,

on the night of the sixteenth of Nisan,

which is

a mitzva,

for if its time falls on the night of Shabbat, it must be harvested on Shabbat.

The Sages said to Rava: From where

is it obvious to Rabbi Yishmael

that the plowing

mentioned in this verse is plowing

for an optional purpose,

so that you said that the verse juxtaposed harvesting with plowing, to tell you: Just as plowing is for an optional purpose, so too harvesting is for an optional purpose, with the harvesting of the omer, which is a mitzva, excluded?

Perhaps

the verse also speaks of

plowing for the omer—that is, the verse prohibited plowing a field even when one plows it in order to sow seeds from which grain will grow, from which they will bring the omer offering; and that is plowing

for a mitzva,

and even so the Merciful One said “

You shall rest!”

And if so, the same law applies to harvesting for a mitzva, namely, harvesting the omer: It too is prohibited on Shabbat!

Rava said to them

Rava:

Since if he found

a

plowed

field, he does not plow another field for the omer, since there is no plowing “for the sake of the omer,” even when he did not find a plowed field,

the plowing is not a mitzva,

even if he plows it for the sake of the omer.

Therefore, plowing is always plowing for an optional purpose, whereas harvesting the omer is harvesting for a mitzva.

For with regard to harvesting the omer, even if he found harvested grain, he does not bring the omer offering from it [ab initio]. Rather, it is a mitzva to harvest for the sake of harvesting the omer, as it is written: “You shall harvest, and you shall bring the omer.” Therefore, harvesting the omer is permitted on Shabbat.

Ravina raised an objection to Rava

from what we find in our Mishna:

The father who strikes his son, the teacher who disciplines his student, and an agent of the court

are exempt from exile for their inadvertent killing, because they are engaged in a mitzva.

And according to Rava’s reasoning, one can object:

But why

are the father and the teacher exempt from exile? Let us

say,

let it be stated:

Since if he had mastered

his learning and conduct,

it would not be a mitzva

to strike him; if so, according to Rava,

now also,

when he has not been properly educated and needs to be struck,

it is not a mitzva

to strike him!

And Rava answered:

There, even though he had mastered [his learning], he

is performing a mitzva

by striking him.

As it is written: “

Discipline your son, and he will give you rest,”

in order to remove from him every trace of evil.

He then

returned and

said: Rava said: What I said is not correct!

That is, I should not have said what I said. Rather, from the verse itself it is evident that harvesting for a mitzva is not included in the prohibition, and I could have given him a decisive answer!

For the prohibition stated in the verse “from plowing and harvesting you shall rest” is

harvesting analogous to plowing.

And if so,

just as plowing

mentioned in the verse is always plowing that is not essential—for even plowing for the omer, if he

found

a

plowed

field, he

does not plow,

since we do not find a mitzva in the Torah to plow for the sake of the omer—

so too harvesting

prohibited in this verse

likewise

was prohibited only when it is not essential, and not harvesting for a mitzva, concerning which it is said: “If he

found it harvested”—

“he does not harvest.”

And if it should enter your mind

that the verse speaks also of harvesting for

a mitzva,

such as harvesting the omer, would you also then expound and say, “

If he found it harvested”—

“he does not harvest,”

just as “if he found it plowed, he does not plow”?

But

it is a mitzva

to

harvest

for the sake of the omer

and to bring

specifically from that harvest!

And this is Rabbi Yishmael’s source: The verse does not concern harvesting for a mitzva. From here he learned that harvesting the omer is permitted on Shabbat.

Mishna:

The father goes into exile because of his son,

if he unintentionally killed his son.

And

likewise,

the son goes into exile because of his father,

if he unintentionally killed his father.

Everyone goes into exile because of an Israelite,

if they unintentionally killed an Israelite.

And an Israelite goes into exile because of them,

if an Israelite unintentionally killed them. The Gemara explains that this general principle comes to include a Samaritan.

Except

for a resident convert,

for if an Israelite unintentionally killed him, the Israelite does not go into exile for this. [And if a resident convert unintentionally killed an Israelite, exile does not benefit him, and a city of refuge does not receive him, as will be explained in the Gemara].

And a resident convert does not go into exile

if he killed an Israelite or a gentile,

but only because of

having unintentionally killed

a resident convert.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

The father goes into exile because of his son.

And we raise an objection:

But you said

above:

The father who strikes his son is excluded,

when he intended to discipline him, and does not go into exile even if the son died accidentally under his hand! But our Mishna too must necessarily be speaking even of a father who strikes his son in order to discipline him, since if he strikes him without such intent, it is obvious that he goes into exile because of him, and there would be no need for the Mishna to teach this. [Tosafot]

And we answer: Our Mishna is speaking of a case in which the son

had mastered

his studies, and it was not necessary to strike him in order to teach him.

And we challenge this:

But you said

above:

Even though he had mastered

his studies,

he is performing a mitzva

by striking him, as it is written: “Discipline your son”!

And we answer: Here we are speaking of

a

son who was

a carpenter’s apprentice,

an assistant to a carpenter. The father taught his son not Torah, but woodworking, and there is no mitzva to teach him and strike him for the sake of this instruction.

But we still raise an objection: When the father teaches his son to become

a carpenter’s apprentice,

he is nevertheless

teaching him

[a trade by which he will live and earn his livelihood]

a means of sustenance.

This too is a mitzva: to teach him a trade so that he will have a livelihood [as we learned in Kiddushin 30b], and he should therefore be exempt for striking him as one who strikes for the sake of a mitzva, if he killed him while teaching him a trade.

And we answer: Here we are speaking of one who

had mastered another trade,

as the son had already learned another trade and did not need this instruction for his livelihood. There was no mitzva incumbent upon the father in this, and therefore he goes into exile for striking him.

We learned in the Mishna:

And the son goes into exile because of his father, etc.

And we juxtapose

an apparent contradiction to the words of the Mishna from the words of a beraita.

As it was taught: “To flee there, anyone who

kills a person

unintentionally” —

excluding one who strikes his father!

For the obligation of exile applies only to one whose entire liability is due solely to having killed a person. But one who strikes his father is liable to death even when he merely inflicted a wound on his father and did not kill him. Therefore, the verse excluded him from exile, which does not atone for his offense.

The Gemara now understood that the meaning of the exclusion “excluding one who strikes his father” is that if the son killed his father, he does not go into exile. This is contrary to what is explained in the Mishna, that the son goes into exile for killing his father.

And we answer:

Rav Kahana said: This is not difficult.

This

that we learned in the beraita, that the son does not go into exile for killing his father, is according to

Rabbi Shimon.

And this

that we learned in our Mishna, that the son goes into exile, is the view of

the Rabbis.

And we explain in what they disagree:

According to Rabbi Shimon, who says [Sanhedrin 49b] that the punishment of

death by

strangulation is more severe than decapitation,

one who intentionally kills his father is liable to strangulation because of striking his father, and to decapitation because of murder. If he had killed him intentionally, he would be executed by the court through strangulation, which is more severe than decapitation, since he is judged by the most severe of the deaths to which he is liable.

Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon, in an unintentional case he does not go into exile, because only

the unintentional violation

of the death of

decapitation

[for murder]—

is given for atonement

through exile.

But

the unintentional violation of strangulation

by a son who wounds his father—

is not given for atonement,

since it is more severe than decapitation, and exile does not atone for the unintentional violation of this severe offense. But

according to the Rabbis, who say

that the punishment of

decapitation is more severe than strangulation,

and even if the son had intentionally killed his father, his execution would have been by decapitation, which is the more severe of the two deaths to which he is liable, then

one who unintentionally kills his father—

it is an unintentional violation involving decapitation.

And an unwitting act subject to decapitation -

is atoned for

through exile.

And our Mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

And the beraita that says that one who strikes his father is exempt from exile is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. For if he had done so intentionally, he would be executed by strangulation, and therefore, if he did so unwittingly, he is not atoned for through exile.

Rava said:

The beraita that excluded one who strikes his father from the phrase “one who takes a life” is also in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that one who unintentionally kills his father goes into exile, since his act was an unwitting act subject to decapitation.

The intention of the beraita is not to exclude one who kills his father from exile. Rather, we interpret it as follows:

excluding one who unintentionally wounds his father,

whose punishment, if he did so intentionally, is strangulation.

It was necessary to exclude him from exile for unintentionally wounding his father because

it might have entered your mind to say: Since, if he did so intentionally, he is liable to execution -

if he did so unwittingly as well, he should go into exile,

and we would not distinguish between decapitation and strangulation.

Therefore,

it teaches us

that the exclusion derived from this verse establishes that exile applies only to an unwitting act of killing.

We learned in the Mishna:

Everyone goes into exile through an Israelite

etc.

And we analyze the wording: The Mishna stated the general rule that

“everyone goes into exile through an Israelite” - what does it come to include?

And we explain:

It comes to include a slave and a Samaritan.

If a slave or a Samaritan [according to the one who says that Samaritans are true converts] unintentionally killed an Israelite, their law is that they go into exile for it.

And

we have also learned this

that “everyone” serves to include a slave and a Samaritan, in a beraita:

The Sages taught: A slave and a Samaritan -

go into exile through an Israelite.

And an Israelite -

goes into exile and receives lashes through a Samaritan or a slave.

And we raise a question:

Granted, with regard to a slave and a Samaritan,

we find both a case in which he

goes into exile through an Israelite,

and a case in which he

receives lashes

through an Israelite.

He goes into exile -

for example,

when he kills

an Israelite.

And he receives lashes -

in a case

where he curses him,

where he cursed an Israelite.

But

with regard to what the Sages taught, that

an Israelite goes into exile and receives lashes through a Samaritan,

this is apparently difficult:

Granted, he goes into exile,

we find this, for example,

when he kills

the Samaritan unintentionally.

But he receives lashes

for cursing him -

why?

Lest you say that it is because

he cursed him,

that the Israelite cursed the Samaritan -

the Torah said: “

You shall not curse a prince among your people.”

And we derive that this applies specifically to one

who performs the deeds of your people;

one who observes Torah and mitzvot, you are forbidden to curse. But one who curses a Samaritan who does not observe the mitzvot does not receive lashes.

Rather, Rav Aḥa bar Ya'akov said,

we find a case in which an Israelite receives lashes for a Samaritan:

For example, where he testified against him,

where the Israelite testified against the Samaritan that he was liable to lashes,

and he was proven a conspiring witness,

and receives lashes for plotting to have him lashed.

And we raise an objection: If the statement that an Israelite receives lashes for a Samaritan means that he testified against him and was proven a conspiring witness, then in the first clause, where it was stated that a Samaritan and a slave receive lashes for an Israelite, it means

similarly

that the statement in the first clause

with regard to a slave,

that he receives lashes for an Israelite, also refers to a case in which

he testified against him,

where the slave testified against the Israelite that he was liable to lashes,

and he was proven a conspiring witness,

and for that he receives lashes.

But this cannot be said, since after all, a

slave -

is he fit to serve as a witness!?