Makkot 9a (ט.) — the Talmud in English

Rather, Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: Here we are dealing with a case where he struck him with a blow

that does not involve

a payment of

the value of a peruta.

In that case, there is no obligation to pay; rather, he is flogged for violating the prohibition: “He shall not add to strike him.”

This is not the case with a blow for which he must pay more than a peruta, since by making that payment he is exempt from lashes. For the Torah explicitly included one who injures another as subject to monetary payments, and a person does not both pay and receive lashes.

And even an Israelite who strikes a gentile or a slave is flogged when he does not pay a peruta for the blow.

And similarly we find

that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he struck him with a blow that does not involve the value of a peruta, he is flogged.

And we do not derive striking from cursing.

That is: Although one is not flogged for cursing a gentile or a slave, because of the exclusion “one who performs the deed of your people,” he is flogged for striking a gentile or a slave, even though they do not perform the deed of your people, because this exclusion was not stated with regard to striking. [

And in Sanhedrin 85b, they disagreed over this, whether striking is derived from cursing or not. Therefore, the tanna had to teach us that he is flogged, and he holds that we do not derive striking from cursing.]

We learned in the Mishna:

“Except for a resident alien.”

Et cetera.

A “resident alien” is a gentile who accepted upon himself the seven mitzvot of the descendants of Noah. He is permitted to dwell among us, and we are commanded to sustain him.

And we infer from the Mishna, which states that, on the one hand, Israelites do not go into exile for killing a resident alien, while, on the other hand, when a descendant of Noah kills an Israelite, he does not go into exile but is executed for it.

Evidently,

it is demonstrated from here that

a resident alien—

is a gentile.

Therefore, on the one hand, one does not go into exile for killing him; and, on the other hand, if he kills an Israelite, exile does not atone for his having unintentionally killed an Israelite; rather, he is executed.

And we challenge this:

Say the latter clause: A resident alien goes into exile through [killing] a resident alien.

We find that he too goes into exile when he kills unintentionally. If so, his law with regard to exile is like that of an Israelite and not like that of an idolater, contradicting what is demonstrated from the first clause, that his law with regard to exile is like that of an idolater.

We do not derive striking from cursing.

And we answer:

Rav Kahana said: It is not difficult.

There is no contradiction here, because with regard to exile he is neither a fully-fledged Israelite nor a fully-fledged gentile. Therefore:

Here,

in the latter clause, where his law is to go into exile, this is referring to

a resident alien who killed a resident alien,

whose status is equal to his own. Therefore, when he killed him unintentionally, exile atones for him, because in this regard his law is equal to that of an Israelite who kills an Israelite.

Whereas

here,

in the first clause, where he is executed, this is referring to

a resident alien who killed an Israelite.

Exile is not sufficient for him; rather, even for his unintentional act he is executed. In this regard, his law is like that of a gentile.

There are those who raise a contradiction,

some who apparently raise a contradiction between

verses against one another,

and for this purpose they cite Rav Kahana’s statement:

It is written: “

For the children of Israel, and for the resident alien and the settler among them, shall be the six cities,”

the cities of refuge, for those who kill unintentionally. This implies that cities of refuge were also designated for a resident alien.

And it is written,

on the other hand: “

And the cities shall be for you as a refuge.”

And we expound:

“For you,” and not for converts.

This is an apparent contradiction between the verses concerning the law of a resident alien who kills unintentionally: Does he go into exile or not?

Concerning this,

Rav Kahana said

the statement cited above:

It is not difficult.

Here,

the verse that states that a resident alien does not go into exile is referring to

a resident alien who killed an Israelite,

for whom exile does not provide atonement.

Whereas

here,

the verse that speaks of the resident alien and the settler who go into a city of refuge is referring to

a resident alien who killed a resident alien.

Since he killed one of his own kind—that is, a resident alien like himself—he goes into exile and atones for his unintentional act.

And we raise a contradiction,

between the beraita and our Mishna, for the descendants of Noah—their warning is their execution; when they transgress one of their mitzvot, they are executed.

And the beraita said concerning this:

“Therefore, when a resident alien and an idolater kill”—

“they are executed,”

in every case, even unintentionally, since descendants of Noah do not require forewarning in order to become liable.

And we infer:

It teaches resident alien analogous to idolater,

indicating that their laws are equal—

Just as with an idolater, it makes no difference whether he killed one of his own kind,

an idolater like himself,

or whether he killed one who is not of his own kind,

an Israelite, his law is that he

is executed

and exile does not provide atonement for him—

So too, a resident alien,

a resident alien,

it makes no difference whether he killed one of his own kind,

a resident alien,

or whether he killed one who is not of his own kind,

namely, an Israelite, his law is that he

is executed.

If so, why did our Mishna state that he is executed only when he killed an Israelite, whereas when he kills a resident alien like himself, he goes into exile and atones?

And we answer:

Rav Ḥisda said:

It is not difficult.

Here,

our Mishna, which says that he goes into exile, is speaking of a case in which

he killed him while descending.

Whereas here, the beraita, which says that he is executed, is speaking of a case in which

he killed him while ascending.

And the reason for the distinction depends on the laws governing Israelites.

In the case of one who kills

while descending—

an Israelite

who kills in this manner

goes into exile—

he,

a resident alien,

too,

when he kills a resident alien of his own kind,

it is sufficient for him,

it is enough for him to atone

through exile.

But one who kills

while ascending, an Israelite

who kills in this manner

is exempt—

he,

a resident alien who kills one of his own kind,

is executed.

And Rav Ḥisda’s reason is that killing while ascending is more severe, since exile was not given as atonement for it. Therefore, a gentile resident alien is executed for this severe unintentional act.

But Rabba disagrees with him, because in his view, killing while ascending is less severe than killing while descending, and an Israelite is exempt because it is close to an unavoidable accident. [Tosafot] Therefore, he challenged and

Rabba said to him

to Rav Ḥisda:

But

if so,

is this not a kal va-chomer—

If, with regard to killing while descending, an Israelite goes into exile—

he,

a resident alien,

too, is sufficiently atoned for through exile.

With regard to killing while ascending, an Israelite is exempt,

since it is close to an unavoidable accident; how can it be possible to say that

he,

a resident alien who killed a resident alien,

is executed?!

Rather, Rabba said,

what they said in the beraita, that he is executed, refers to

a case of “

one who believes it is permitted.”

Since his act was performed knowingly, even though he thought it was permitted, he should have clarified the law. And since he did not study and therefore erred, he is close to intentional. In such a case, an Israelite is exempt from exile, since exile does not help provide him with atonement, whereas a resident alien is executed.

Abaye said

to Rabba: If so, if you have established the beraita as referring to “one who believes it is permitted,” on the contrary, he should be exempt, since

“one who believes it is permitted”

is considered anus!

He should be exempt, like an Israelite, who does not require the atonement of exile when he believes it is permitted.

He said to him,

Rabba:

I say differently: “

One who believes it is permitted” —

is close to intentional.”

And they followed,

Rav Ḥisda and Rabba, who disputed here concerning the interpretation of the beraita—whether it refers to killing while ascending or to one who believes it is permitted—

their respective positions,

because they had already disputed elsewhere whether one who believes it is permitted is close to intentional or close to an unavoidable accident.

For it was stated: A resident alien threw a stone in order to kill, and

and

thinking

that he was killing with it

an animal, it turned out to be a person.

Or he thought that he was killing

a Canaanite, and it turned out to be a resident alien—

Rabba said: He is liable

to death, since he should have carefully examined whom he was striking, because

“one who believes it is permitted is close to intentional,”

since he should have studied but did not study. And this person too, who did not check whom he would kill, is like one who acted intentionally. And a resident alien is executed when he is close to intentional.

And an Israelite is exempt, since above [7b] we exclude “one who believes it is permitted” from the word “unintentionally,” because the punishment of exile is insufficient to provide him with atonement.

Rav Ḥisda said: He is exempt,

even from exile, because in his view

“one who believes it is permitted”

is anus.

Rabba raised an objection to Rav Ḥisda

from the verse describing what the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Abimelech when he took Sarah from Abraham: “

Behold, you are to die because of the woman whom you have taken.”

Although Abimelech was in the category of “one who believes it is permitted,” since he thought that Sarah was Abraham’s sister and not his wife.

And Rabba proves this:

Is it not that when the Holy One, blessed be He, told Abimelech that he was liable to death, the intention was that he was liable to death

that when the Holy One, blessed be He, told Abimelech that he was liable to death, He meant that he was liable to death

at the hands of man,

as is the law of a descendant of Noah? And if “one who believes it is permitted” is an anus, why should he be executed?

And the Gemara rejects Rabba’s proof:

No!

According to the law, he was exempt, since he was “one who believes it is permitted,” and he is anus.

Rather, he told him that he should die

at the hands of Heaven.

This is also indicated by

the fact that he was warned concerning heavenly judgment,

as it is written, “

by sinning against Me,” which

means that the sin is only against Heaven, and that he did not violate the laws applying to descendants of Noah.

And we challenge this:

but according to your reasoning,

should we also interpret in this manner what Joseph said to Potiphar’s wife, “

and I would sin against God,”

meaning that the sin would be

against God and not against a human being?

But this cannot be interpreted in that manner, because Potiphar’s wife was a married woman.

Rather,

necessarily, in every place the sin is indeed against God, but

its legal judgment is entrusted to human beings.

Here too,

in the incident involving Abimelech, it is possible to interpret that

its legal judgment is entrusted to human beings.

It follows that Abimelech’s liability to death cannot prove whether his liability was under human law or not.

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba:

Abimelech then returned and argued before the Almighty, “

Will You also kill a righteous nation?”

The Gemara—the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna—now assumed that the Almighty conceded his point, since He said to him, “I, too, know that you did this with an innocent heart.” If so, we should prove the opposite: that one who mistakenly thinks an act is permitted is considered to have acted under duress.

And we reject this:

there, in the course of responding to his claim,

the Almighty told him that he was liable to death because he had not learned, even though he had performed the act in good faith, out of lack of knowledge. And this is how we expound God’s response to Abimelech: “

And now, return the man’s wife, for he is a prophet.”