Makkot 9a — the Talmud in English

Rather, Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: Here we are dealing with a case where he struck him with a blow ![](pamud.bmp "

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that does not contain

payments of

the value of a peruta.

For then there is no obligation of payments; rather, he is flogged for the prohibition of “he shall not add to strike him.”

This is not so with regard to a blow for which he must pay more than a peruta, for through this he is exempt from lashes, since the Torah explicitly included one who injures his fellow among those liable for payments, and a person does not pay and receive lashes.

And even an Israelite who struck a gentile or a slave is flogged, when he does not pay a peruta for the blow.

And likewise we find

that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he struck him with a blow that does not contain the value of a peruta, he is flogged.

And we do not juxtapose striking with cursing.

That is, although he is not flogged for cursing a gentile or a slave, because of the exclusion of “one who performs the deed of your people,” he is flogged for striking a gentile or a slave even though they do not perform the deed of your people, because this exclusion was not stated with regard to striking.

In tractate Sanhedrin 85b, the Sages disagree about this: whether striking is derived from cursing or not. Therefore, the tanna taught us that he is flogged, as he holds that we do not derive striking from cursing.]

We learned in the Mishna:

Except for a ger toshav.

Etc. “

Ger toshav” is a gentile who accepted upon himself the seven mitzvot of the descendants of Noah, and he is permitted to dwell among us, and we are commanded to sustain him.

And we infer from the Mishna, which says that, on the one hand, Israelites do not go into exile for killing a ger toshav, while, on the other hand, when a descendant of Noah kills an Israelite, he does not go into exile but is executed for it.

Evidently,

it is proven from here that

a ger toshav—

is a gentile.

Therefore, on the one hand, one does not go into exile for him, and, on the other hand, if he killed an Israelite, exile does not atone for him for having killed an Israelite unintentionally; rather, he is executed.

And we challenge this:

Say the latter clause: A ger toshav goes into exile through a ger toshav.

For we find that he too goes into exile when he killed unintentionally. If so, his law is like that of an Israelite with regard to exile and not like that of a gentile, and this contradicts what is proven from the first clause, that his law is like that of a gentile with regard to exile.

We do not juxtapose striking with cursing,

and we answer:

Rav Kahana said: It is not difficult.

There is no contradiction here, since with regard to exile he is neither a complete Israelite nor a complete gentile. Therefore:

Here,

in the latter clause, where his law is to go into exile, this refers to

a ger toshav who killed a ger toshav,

whose levels are equal. Therefore, when he killed him unintentionally, he is atoned for through exile, because in this regard his law is equal to that of an Israelite who kills an Israelite.

Whereas

here,

in the first clause, where he is executed, this refers to

a ger toshav who killed an Israelite.

Exile is not sufficient for him; rather, even for his unintentional act he is executed. For this matter, his law is like that of a gentile.

There is one who raises a contradiction,

there are those who apparently raise a contradiction between

verses against one another,

and concerning this they bring the words of Rav Kahana:

It is written, “

For the children of Israel, and for the stranger and for the settler among them, shall the six cities be,”

the cities of refuge, for those who kill unintentionally. This implies that the cities of refuge were designated also for a ger toshav.

And it is written,

on the other hand, “

And the cities shall be for you for refuge.”

And we expound:

“For you,” and not for strangers.

Here is an apparent contradiction between the verses concerning the law of a ger toshav who killed unintentionally: whether he goes into exile or not.

And concerning this

Rav Kahana said

his words mentioned above:

It is not difficult.

Here,

the verse in which it is written that the stranger does not go into exile speaks of

a ger toshav who killed an Israelite,

who is not atoned for through exile.

Whereas

here,

the verse stated concerning the stranger and the settler who go into a city of refuge speaks of

a ger toshav who killed a ger toshav.

Since he killed one of his own kind, that is, a stranger like himself, he goes into exile and is atoned for his unintentional act.

And we raise a contradiction,

from the beraita against our Mishna, for as for the descendants of Noah, their warning is their execution, and when they transgress one of their mitzvot they are executed.

And concerning this they said in the beraita: “Therefore, a stranger and a gentile who killed him”

are executed,

even,

in every case, even unintentionally, for descendants of Noah do not require a warning in order to become liable.

And we infer:

It teaches a stranger analogous to a gentile,

implying that their laws are equal—

Just as with a gentile, it makes no difference whether he killed one of his own kind,

a gentile like himself,

or whether he killed one who is not of his own kind,

an Israelite, his law is that he

is executed

and is not atoned for through exile—

so too a stranger,

a ger toshav,

it makes no difference whether he killed one of his own kind,

a ger toshav,

or whether he killed one who is not of his own kind,

that is, an Israelite, his law is that he

is executed.

And if so, why did our Mishna say that he is executed only when he killed an Israelite, but when he kills a ger toshav like himself, he goes into exile and is atoned for?

And we answer:

Rav Ḥisda said:

It is not difficult.

Here,

our Mishna, which said that he goes into exile, speaks of a case where

he killed him by way of descent.

Whereas here, the beraita, which said that he is executed, speaks of a case where

he killed him by way of ascent.

And the reason for the distinction depends on the laws of Israelites.

With one who kills

by way of descent—

for an Israelite,

one who kills in this manner,

goes into exile—

he,

a ger toshav,

also,

when he killed one of his own kind, a ger toshav,

it is sufficient for him,

it is enough for him to be atoned for

through exile.

But one who kills

by way of ascent—for an Israelite,

one who kills in this manner,

is exempt—

he,

a ger toshav who killed one of his own kind,

is executed.

And Rav Ḥisda’s reason is that killing by way of ascent is more severe, for atonement through exile was not given for it; therefore, a gentile ger toshav is executed for this severe unintentional act.

But Rabba disagrees with him, for according to his view, way of ascent is more lenient than way of descent, and an Israelite is exempt because it is close to an accident. [Tosafot] Therefore, he challenged him and

Rabba said to Rav Ḥisda:

And

is it not

so that

it is a kal va-chomer?

And if with way of descent, for an Israelite he goes into exile,

he,

a ger toshav,

also has exile suffice for him,

with way of ascent, for an Israelite he is exempt,

since it is close to an accident, how is it possible to say that

he,

a ger toshav who killed a ger toshav,

is executed!?

Rather, Rabba said,

what they said in the beraita, that he is executed, refers to

an “

one who mistakenly thinks it is permitted.”

Since his act is deliberate, although he thought it was permitted, he should have clarified the law. And since he did not learn and therefore erred, he is close to intentional. In such a case an Israelite is exempt from exile, since it does not help him to atone for him, whereas a ger toshav is executed.

Abaye said to Rabba

if so, since you established the beraita as referring to “one who mistakenly thinks it is permitted,” on the contrary, he should be exempt, for

“

one who mistakenly thinks it is permitted”—

is coerced!”

And he should be exempt, like an Israelite, who does not require the atonement of exile when he mistakenly thinks it is permitted.

He said to him Rabba:

I hold: “

One who mistakenly thinks it is permitted” -

is close to intentional.

And they followed,

Rav Ḥisda and Rabba, who disputed here in the interpretation of the beraita, whether it refers to way of ascent or to one who mistakenly thinks it is permitted,

their own principles,

since they disputed elsewhere whether one who mistakenly thinks it is permitted is close to intentional or close to coerced.

For it was stated:

A ger toshav threw a stone to kill, and

thinking

that he was killing with it

an animal, and it turned out to be a person.

Or he thought that he was killing

a Canaanite, and it turned out to be a ger toshav—

Rabba said: He is liable,

for death, since he should have carefully examined whom he was striking, because

“one who mistakenly thinks it is permitted is close to intentional,”

since he had the opportunity to learn but did not learn. And this one too, who did not check who would be killed through him, is like one who acts intentionally. And a ger toshav is executed when he is close to intentional.

And an Israelite is exempt, for above [7b] we exclude from “unintentionally”: except one who mistakenly thinks it is permitted, because the punishment of exile is not sufficient for him to be atoned.

Rav Ḥisda said: He is exempt

even from exile, because according to his view, “

one who mistakenly thinks it is permitted”

is coerced.

Rabba raised an objection to Rav Ḥisda,

from the words of the verse, in which the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Abimelech when he took Sarah from Abraham: “

Behold, you are dying because of the woman whom you took.”

Even though Abimelech was in the category of “one who mistakenly thinks it is permitted,” for he thought that Sarah was Abraham’s sister and not his wife.

And Rabba proves: What, is it not

the meaning of what the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Abimelech—that he is liable for death—that he is liable for death

at the hands of man,

as is the law of a descendant of Noah?

And if one who mistakenly thinks it is permitted is coerced, why should he be executed?

And the Gemara rejects Rabba’s proof: No!

According to the law he was exempt, for he was one who mistakenly thought it was permitted, and he was coerced.

not so!

By law, he would have been exempt, since he believed that the act was permitted and therefore acted under duress.

But rather, that he said to him that he should die

by the hands of Heaven.

Dika nami

that he warned concerning the laws of Heaven,

for it is written, “

from sinning against Me,”

and its meaning is that the sin is only toward Heaven, and not that he transgresses the laws of the descendants of Noah.

And we challenge:

But according to your reasoning,

shall we likewise interpret what Joseph said to Potiphar’s wife, “

and I would sin against God,”

that the meaning is that it is a sin

against God and not against man?

But it is impossible to interpret it this way, for Potiphar’s wife was a married woman.

Rather,

necessarily, everywhere the sin is indeed against God, but

its judgment is entrusted to man.

Here too,

in the act of Abimelech, it is possible to interpret that

its judgment is entrusted to man.

And it follows that one cannot prove from Abimelech’s liability to death whether his liability is under human law or not.

Abaye raised an objection to Rava:

Behold, Abimelech returned and argued before the Almighty, “

Will You even kill a righteous nation?”

The Gemara now assumed that the Almighty conceded to him, for He said to him, “I too knew that you did this in the integrity of your heart.” If so, we should prove the opposite: that one who says, “It is permitted,” is under duress.

And we reject this:

There, as He was replying to him concerning it,

the Almighty told him that he was liable to death because he had not learned, although he had performed the act in the integrity of his heart, through lack of knowledge. And as we expound in the response of the Almighty to Abimelech: “

And now return the man’s wife, for he is a prophet.”