Makkot 8a — the Talmud in English

But did not Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi, Rabbi Yehuda ben Ro'etz, Beit Shammai, Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Akiva -

all of them hold that the determining principle is the reading,

and they proved this from the Mishna of each of these tannaim [in Sanhedrin 4a].

And if so, how do we say that Rabbi expounds “and it was torn away”—that the tree tore it away—because the determining principle is the tradition? After all, he holds the opposite!

And we answer:

This is what he said to them

to the Rabbis:

“And furthermore, ‘tree’ is stated below,” and so on. His intention was that he retracted his first proof from the wording of the verse, for he himself holds that the determining principle is the reading. Therefore, he had to prove his words from the second reason: that the obscure may be learned from the explicit.

Rav Pappa said:

this

one who throws a clod at a palm tree,

one who threw a clod of earth at a palm tree, and thereby

caused dates to be torn away,

caused dates to fall from the tree, and

the dates went,

and the dates went [flew] and fell upon a person,

and killed,

and killed the person—in a case such as this,

we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis,

for this manner is similar to a tree being split, from which something was projected and killed. Both of them, as a result of his blow, caused a second body to kill. In this matter Rabbi obligates, and the Rabbis exempt.

And we raise a difficulty:

It is obvious!

After all, the two manners are similar, and what was renewed in this case of the dates being torn away more than in the case of the tree being split?

And we answer: Rav Pappa reasoned,

lest you say

that perhaps in the case of dates being torn away, even Rabbi would be exempt from exile, because

it is considered the force of his force,

since the clod that he threw is a first force, while the dates that flew are a second force. This is unlike an axe that a person holds in his hand and with which he splits wood, in which case the matter is considered as though the person himself struck the tree with his hand; therefore he is liable for exile even when the tree split by the blow of the axe is projected and kills.

And in order that we should not distinguish in this way,

he teaches us

Rav Pappa that the clod is like an axe, and according to Rabbi he is liable for the dates that killed, just as he is liable for the tree being split that killed.

And we challenge:

But

if so,

the force of his force,

for which we hold that he is exempt

according to Rabbi, where do you find it?

And we explain:

For example, he threw a clod, and it struck a branch,

he threw a clod and struck with it the branches from which the clusters of dates hang,

and the branch went and struck the cluster,

for through the force of the clod’s blow upon the branches, the branches struck the clusters,

and tore away

and caused

the dates to fall away, and the dates went, and killed.

In such a case, the striking of the branches [which strike the clusters] by means of the clod is considered a first force, whereas the dates, which fall through the force of the striking of the clusters and strike a person in their movement, are considered the force of his force. If they killed a person, the thrower of the clod is exempt from exile according to everyone.

Mishna:

a.

One who throws a stone into the public domain, and it kills

a person inadvertently—

he goes into exile.

And in the Gemara it will be explained in what manner he is considered inadvertent.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: If, when the stone left his hand

of the thrower,

the other one raised

the killed person

his head, and received it,

received the stone on his head and was killed—

this

thrower of the stone

is exempt

from exile!

And in the Gemara it will be learned from the words of the verse that he is exempt.

b.

If he threw the stone into his courtyard,

the private courtyard [of the thrower],

and it killed

a person inadvertently—

if the injured party has permission to enter there

whenever he wishes, he

goes into exile.

But if not—

he does not go into exile.

As it is stated: “

And one who comes upon his fellow in the forest.”

And we expound,

just as

a forest,

is a place where there is

permission

both

for the injured party and

both

for the one causing the injury to enter there—

so too every

place in which one is liable for exile for killing inadvertently is only when there is

permission for the injured party

and for the one causing the injury to enter there.

The homeowner’s courtyard is excluded,

for if the injured party entered his courtyard without permission and was killed by a stone that the homeowner threw, since

the injured party does not have permission to enter there—

the homeowner does not go into exile for killing him.

Abba Shaul says:

An additional law is to be learned from the fact that the Torah gave the law of exile to one who kills inadvertently in the example of killing through chopping wood—

Just as chopping wood

is

permitted—

so too every

case in which one is liable for exile for killing inadvertently is only when he was occupied with matters of

permission.

This excludes a father who strikes his son,

in order to direct him from an evil path to the path of truth,

and a teacher who disciplines his student,

for the purpose of his learning and education,

and an agent of the court

who administers forty lashes to one liable for lashes by order of the court, for if the one struck dies at their hands inadvertently, they do not go into exile, because their killing, which is a mitzva, is not similar to chopping wood, which is permitted.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who throws a stone

into the public domain,

goes into exile.

And we raise a difficulty:

He is close to intentional action,

since at every moment many people are present in the public domain, and it is reasonable that he will strike passersby!

Rav Shmuel bar Yitzhak said,

the intention is not one who literally throws a stone.

Rather,

in one who demolishes his wall,

who is not throwing a stone into the crowd, but a person happened to be near the wall while he was demolishing it, and a stone fell from it and killed him.

And we still challenge: Even one who demolishes a wall is close to intentional action, since

he should have examined,

he should have examined whether a person had approached the wall.

And we answer: The Mishna is speaking

of one who demolishes his wall at night.

But it is still not understood what we have accomplished with this establishment.

After all,

at night too, he should have examined!

For it is beside the public domain, and perhaps a person happened to be there.

Therefore the Gemara establishes that this concerns

one who demolishes his wall onto a refuse heap.

And we inquire about it: Whichever way you look at it,

this refuse heap—

what are its circumstances?

If many are commonly found

are present

there—

he is negligent!

If many are not commonly found there—

he is under duress!

And if so, how do we find a case in which one who demolishes his wall onto a refuse heap is liable for exile?

Rav Pappa said: It is necessary only for a refuse heap designated for people to relieve themselves there

for their bodily needs,

at night.

And it is not designated for them to relieve themselves there during the day.

And there is one who happens to come and sit,

and there are rare occasions when a person happens to be there and happens to relieve himself there during the day.

Therefore, one who throws a stone during the day onto this refuse heap, or demolishes a wall onto it,

is not negligent, for it is not designated for relieving oneself there during the day.

But he is also

not under duress, for there is one who happens,

who sometimes happens,

and sits,

and therefore he is considered inadvertent and goes into exile.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says, and so on.

The Sages taught:

The Torah said in the passage concerning one who kills inadvertently: “And the iron was torn away from the wood, and it found his fellow.”

And the Sages expounded: “

And it found”—

that the person who was killed was present there, and the iron found him there—

excluding one who causes himself to be present.

From here Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said: If, after the stone had left his hand, the one who was killed raised his head ,

the one who was killed,

and received

the stone on his head, and was killed,

he is exempt.

And we raised it:

Is it to say that “he encountered”

that his fellow had been present there

from the outset,

at the time of the throwing of the stone,

implies,

and the iron encountered him and killed him, and therefore, if the one who was killed had not been present there, but rather brought himself there, this is not considered that the stone encountered him, and the thrower of the stone is not killed on account of his throwing.

And we raise a contradiction

to what we said, that “he encountered” means that he had already been present, from a beraita that we learned in tractate Arakhin [30b], to the contrary:

For it was taught: One who sells his ancestral field during the time when the Jubilee is practiced is entitled to redeem his field from the purchaser by returning the money of the sale, but a condition was stated concerning him: “And his hand reaches [the means],

and finds

the money sufficient for his redemption.” And we expound:

excluding what is already present

in his possession with which to redeem!

That is, if already at the time of the sale the seller had in his possession enough money to redeem the field, and nevertheless sold it—then he has no right to return and redeem the field with that money.

And from here they learned

that a person should not sell

an ancestral field that he has

in a distant

place,

and redeem

with the money of the sale his ancestral field that he sold

in a

place

nearby.

And likewise, a person should not sell

a

ancestral field

that is poor, and redeem with a

ancestral field

that is fine.

And this is so: Since in both of these ways, at the time when he sold his field—the nearby one or the fine one—he had the possibility of refraining from selling it, because he could have sold the distant field or the poor one and used the money that he needed, and he did not do so, but rather sold the nearby one or the fine one, then if he now comes to sell the distant one or the poor one in order to redeem with the money the nearby one or the fine one, I do not now apply to him “and finds [the money] sufficient for his redemption.”

And it is proved from here to the contrary, that the meaning of “finds” is what he will find from now onward, and not what had been present previously!

And we resolve it:

Rava said: Here, [it is understood] from the context of the verse, and there, [it is understood] from the context of the verse,

for each verse is explained according to the context in which it was stated.

There,

in the case of one who sells an ancestral field,

from the context of the verse,

we expound

“and finds”,

analogous

to

“and his hand reaches [the means]”.

Just as

“his hand reaches [the means]”

means only

from now,

when his circumstances improve and he has the means to redeem,

so too, “finds”

also

means only

from now,

excluding money that was already present in his possession from the time of the sale.

Here,

in the case of one who kills unintentionally,

from the context of the verse,

“and finds”

is analogous to

“forest”—

Just as a forest

is

something that is present from the outset,

something that is present beforehand—

so

“and finds”

also

is

something that is present from the outset.

Before the stone left his hand. And therefore they exclude one who brings himself there now, after the stone has left his hand, and who had not been present there previously.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who throws the stone,

and so on. Abba Shaul says: What is stated, “And one who comes upon his fellow in the forest”—the verse teaches: Just as chopping wood in the forest is optional, so too everything [that is optional]; excluded are the father who strikes his son, the teacher who disciplines his son, and the agent of the court, who are performing a mitzva, and are not engaged in something optional.

One of the Sages said to Rava:

How is it implied to Abba Shaul that “one who comes in the forest” is for the purpose of something optional, and not for the purpose of a mitzva?

From where

does Abba Shaul know

that chopping wood is optional,

that the verse speaks only of chopping wood that is optional, and not of chopping wood for a mitzva?

Perhaps, it speaks of chopping wood for a sukka

for the purpose of constructing the sukka,

and of chopping wood for the wood of the

wood

arrangement

on the altar, in whose chopping there is a mitzva,

and even so the Merciful One said

that if he killed a person while engaged in the performance of the mitzva, unintentionally—

let him be exiled!

And if so, the same law applies to others engaged in mitzvot, such as the father who strikes his son and the like: they too should be exiled.

He said

he answered

to him,

Rava: The chopping of wood mentioned in the verse is necessarily chopping that is optional, and not chopping for a mitzva.

Since, if he found [wood] chopped—

it is not a mitzva

to chop other wood for the sukka or for the arrangement—

now too,

even now, when he has no wood for the sukka or for the arrangement,

it is not

an act of

mitzva

to chop the wood; rather, only constructing the sukka is the mitzva. And therefore, we learn from one who chops wood in the forest—which is necessarily optional [and it is impossible that it is an act of mitzva]—that the obligation of exile applies only when one is engaged in something optional.

Ravina raised an objection to Rava,

from the continuation of the Mishna: For we learned:

Excluded

from the general obligation of exile are

the father who strikes his son, the teacher who disciplines his student, and the agent of the court,

who are not exiled, since they killed while they were engaged in an act of mitzva.

And seemingly, according to the reasoning that Rava stated concerning chopping wood in the forest, in these cases too this is not a mitzva but something optional, for even concerning the striking of the father and the teacher

let us say,

it can be said:

Since, if he had learned,

if the son or the student had learned by himself and there had been no need to strike him,

it is not a mitzva

to strike him—

now too,

when he strikes him so that he will learn or be educated,

it is not a mitzva

to strike him, but something optional, and only the learning is the mitzva.

And we resolve it:

There,

in the case of a father who strikes his son and a teacher [who strikes] his student,

even though he has learned, it is a mitzva

to strike him!

Because

it is written [Proverbs 29]:

“Discipline your son, and he will give you rest, and he will give delights to your soul.”

And he will give delights to your soul.

And therefore, the father and the teacher are not exiled when they struck him in order to educate him and teach him, and he died unintentionally.

Afterward,

he returned and

said Rava: It is not a matter that I said!

There was no need for the reasoning that I stated above, that the chopping of wood must be for something optional, because if he found [wood] chopped, he would not chop, and it is not a mitzva.

Rather, one should prove from the verse itself that it speaks of something optional and not of a mitzva.

For it is written in it:

“And one who comes upon his fellow in the forest,”

and it implies that it speaks of a person entering the forest by his own free choice,

for if he wishes, he enters, and if he wishes, he does not enter,

that the choice is in his hands: if he wishes, he enters the forest, and if he does not wish, he does not enter. And necessarily the verse speaks of this, for—

And if it enters your mind

that the verse speaks of chopping wood for a

mitzva—

is it possible

that

he does not enter

the forest to chop them? But he is commanded to do so!

Rather, necessarily, the verse’s obligation of exile applies only to one engaged in something optional.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava:

But

everywhere that “which” is written,

does its meaning

necessarily mean “if he wishes”

?

That is, does the verse speak only where the matter depends solely on his will, and not where there is a mitzva in performing it?

But if so, this is difficult:

But from now, the verse that is written in the passage concerning the prohibition against entering the Temple while impure with corpse impurity [Numbers 19]—

“And a man who becomes impure and does not purify himself

[and does not purify himself], and enters the Temple while impure, becomes liable to karet.”

Would we also say here that this law applies only if the person became impure through an optional impurity, concerning which it is possible to say

“if he wishes, he becomes impure, and if he wishes, he does not become impure”?

But if he became impure with an impurity through which he is obligated to become impure, such as engaging in the burial of

a neglected corpse, for it is impossible that he not become impure,

and it is impossible that he not become impure for the neglected corpse, would

it likewise be that he is exempt

from the punishment of karet if he enters the Temple with this impurity!?

from the punishment of karet if he enters the Temple with this impurity!?

But this is impossible, for the person is impure!

Rather, certainly, even where “which” is written, the intention is not specifically something optional; and if so, it is difficult: how did you expound and prove that entering the forest was only for something optional?

And Rava answers:

There is a difference there,

with an impure person entering the Temple—

for the verse states: