Makkot 8a (ח.) — the Talmud in English

But didn’t Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi, Rabbi Yehuda ben Ro’etz, Beit Shammai, Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Akiva -

all hold that the primary consideration is the reading,

and they proved this from the Mishna of each of these tannaim, as cited in tractate Sanhedrin (4a).

If so, how can we say that Rabbi expounds the phrase “and it slips away” to mean that the tree caused the iron to slip, because he holds that the primary consideration is the transmitted spelling? After all, he holds the opposite

! And we answer :

This is what Rabbi said to them

to the Rabbis:

“Furthermore, the verse states ‘tree’ below,” and so on. His intention was that he retracted his first proof from the wording of the verse, since he himself holds that the primary consideration is the reading. He therefore had to prove his position from the second reason: that an unclear expression is interpreted through an explicit one.

Rav Pappa said:

This one,

who throws a clod at a date palm,

one who throws a clod of earth at a date palm, thereby

causes dates to be dislodged

from the tree, and

the dates go,

the dates fly away and fall upon a person,

and kill him,

and in a case such as this they cause the person’s death,

we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis,

as this case resembles the case of the splintering tree, from which a chip was propelled and killed someone. In both cases, as a result of his blow, the person caused a second body to kill. In this matter Rabbi obligates him in exile, while the Rabbis exempt him.

And we question this

: Is it obvious!

The two cases are similar, so what new point is taught by this case of dislodging dates beyond the case of the splintering tree?

And we answer: Rav Pappa reasoned ,

lest you say

that perhaps, in the case of dislodging dates, even Rabbi would exempt him from exile, because

it is considered a force derived from a force,

since the clod that he threw is the primary force, while the dates that flew away are a secondary force. This is unlike an axe that a person holds in his hand and uses to split wood, where the act is considered as though the person himself struck the tree with his hand. Therefore he is liable to exile even when a piece of the tree, propelled by the blow of the axe, kills someone.

And in order that we not distinguish in this manner

, the Gemara teaches us

that Rav Pappa considers the clod equivalent to an axe. According to Rabbi, one is liable for the dates that killed, just as he is liable for the splintering tree that killed.

And we challenge this :

Rather,

if so,

a force derived from his force,

for which we have established that one is exempt

according to Rabbi, where can we find such a case?

And we explain :

For example, he threw a clod and struck a branch,

throwing a clod that struck the branches from which the clusters of dates hang,

and the branch went and struck the cluster,

as a result of the clod striking the branches, the branches struck the clusters,

and dislodged

the dates,

and the dates went and killed.

In such a case, the striking of the branches [which strike the clusters] by means of the clod is considered a primary force, whereas the dates, which fall as a result of the branches striking the clusters and strike a person as they travel, are considered a force derived from his force. If they kill a person, the thrower of the clod is exempt from exile according to everyone.

Mishna:

a.

One who throws a stone into the public domain and kills

a person inadvertently

must go into exile.

The Gemara will explain in what manner he is considered an unwitting offender.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: If, just as the stone left his hand,

of the thrower

the other man raised

the victim

his head and received

the stone on his head, and was killed

he,

the thrower of the stone

is exempt

from exile.

The Gemara will derive from a verse that he is exempt.

b.

If he threw the stone into his courtyard,

his private courtyard [of the thrower]

, and killed

a person inadvertently

if the injured party has permission to enter there

whenever he wishes, he

goes into exile.

But if not -

he does not go into exile.

As it is stated: “

And one who comes with his fellow into the forest.”

And we expound,

just as

a forest,

is a place where there is

permission

both

for the injured party and

for the injuring party

to enter there -

so too, every

place where one is liable to exile for inadvertent killing is only when there is

permission for the injured party

and for the injuring party to enter there.

The homeowner’s courtyard is excluded,

for if the injured party entered his courtyard without permission and was killed by a stone thrown by the homeowner, since

the injured party has no permission to enter there -

the homeowner does not go into exile for killing him.

Abba Shaul says:

An additional law can be derived from the fact that the Torah assigned the law of exile to one who kills inadvertently in the example of one who kills while chopping wood:

Just as chopping wood

is

permitted,

so too, every

person liable to exile for inadvertent killing is liable only when he was engaged in matters of

permitted activity.

This excludes a father who strikes his son,

in order to turn him from an evil path to the path of truth,

and a teacher who disciplines his student,

for the sake of his instruction and education,

and an agent of the court

who administers forty lashes to one liable to lashes by order of the court, for if the person struck dies inadvertently at their hands, they do not go into exile, because their killing, which is a mitzva, is unlike chopping wood, which is a permitted activity.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who throws a stone

into the public domain,

goes into exile.

And we question this :

He is close to intentional,

since at every moment many people are present in the public domain, and it is reasonable that he will strike a passerby!

Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said,

the reference is not to one who literally throws a stone.

Rather,

it concerns one demolishing his wall,

not one who throws a stone into the midst of the public, but a person happened to be near the wall while he was demolishing it, and a stone fell from it and killed him.

We still challenge this: One who demolishes his wall is also close to intentional, since

he should have inspected,

he should have checked whether a person had approached the wall.

And we answer: The Mishna is speaking

of one demolishing his wall at night.

But it is still unclear what this interpretation has accomplished.

For

at night as well, he should have inspected!

Since the wall is beside the public domain, perhaps a person happened to be there.

Therefore the Gemara establishes that the case is

one who demolishes his wall onto a garbage heap.

And we ask about this: In either event,

this garbage heap -

what are its circumstances?

If many people are commonly found

there,

on it -

he is negligent!

If many people are not commonly found there -

he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control!

If so, how can we find a case in which one who demolishes his wall onto a garbage heap is liable to go into exile?

Rav Pappa said: No, it is necessary to state that the garbage heap was intended for people to relieve themselves there

for their bodily needs,

at night,

but was not intended for people to relieve themselves there during the day.

And occasionally someone happens to come and sit there,

and on rare occasions a person happens to relieve himself there during the day.

Therefore, if one throws a stone at this garbage heap during the day, or demolishes a wall onto it,

he is not negligent, since it is not intended for people to relieve themselves there during the day.

But neither is he

a victim of circumstances beyond his control, since occasionally someone happens

to come there,

and sit there;

therefore he is considered an inadvertent offender and goes into exile.

We learned in the Mishna

: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says, and so on.

The Sages taught:

The Torah says in the passage concerning one who kills inadvertently: “And the iron slips from the wood and finds his fellow.”

And the Sages expounded: “

And finds” -

the person who was killed was present there, and the iron found him there;

this excludes one who causes himself to be present.

From here Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said: If, after the stone had left his hand, the other man brought out

the victim

his head, and it received

the stone on his head and was killed,

he is exempt.

And we raised an objection:

Does this mean that the word “found”

that his fellow was already present there

initially,

at the time the stone was thrown,

implies,

and the iron found him and killed him, and therefore, if the victim had not been present there but had placed himself there, this is not considered that the stone found him, and the one who threw the stone is not killed for throwing it?

And we raise a contradiction

to what we said, that “found” means that he was already present, from a beraita that we learned in tractate Arakhin [30b], to the contrary:

As it is taught: One who sells his ancestral field during the period when the Jubilee is in effect is entitled to redeem his field from the purchaser by returning the sale price. However, a condition is stated concerning him: “And his means shall suffice

and he finds

enough for its redemption.” And we expound:

excluding one who already has the means

to redeem it!

That is, if already at the time of the sale the seller had sufficient money to redeem the field, but nevertheless sold it, then he has no right to return and redeem the field with that money.

And from here they derived

that a person should not sell

an ancestral field that he owns

in a distant

place

and redeem

with the money from the sale his ancestral property that he sold

in a

place

nearby.

And similarly, a person should not sell

a

poor-quality ancestral field

and redeem with

an ancestral field

of good quality.

That is, since in both of these cases he had the option, at the time he sold his field, of avoiding the sale of the nearby or higher-quality field, because he could have sold the distant or inferior field and used the money for his needs, but he did not do so and instead sold the nearby or higher-quality field, if he now comes to sell the distant or inferior field in order to redeem the nearby or higher-quality field with the money, I do not now apply to him the words “and finds enough for its redemption.”

This proves the opposite: The meaning of “finds” is what he will find from this point onward, and not what he already had previously!

And we answer:

Rava said: Here, it is according to the context of the verse, and there, it is according to the context of the verse,

as each verse is interpreted according to the context in which it was stated.

There,

in the case of one who sells an ancestral field,

according to the context of the verse,

we expound

“and finds”

as analogous

to

“and his means shall suffice.”

Just as

“his means shall suffice”

means only

from now on,

when his circumstances improve and he has the means to redeem it,

so too, “finds”

also

only

from now on

does it apply; it excludes money that he had in his possession from the time of the sale.

Here,

in the case of one who kills inadvertently,

according to the context of the verse,

“finds” is

analogous to

“forest”—

Just as a forest

is

something that exists from the outset,

something that was present beforehand—

so too, “

finds”

also

is

something that exists from the outset.

Before the stone left his hand. Therefore, one who places himself there only afterward, after the stone has left his hand, and was not present there beforehand, is excluded.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who throws a stone,

and so on. Abba Shaul says: With regard to what is stated, “And one who comes upon his fellow in the forest,” the verse teaches: Just as chopping wood in a forest is optional, so too every case involving an optional activity; it excludes a father who strikes his son, a teacher who disciplines his son, and an agent of the court, who are performing a mitzva and are not engaged in an optional activity.

One of the Sages said to Rava:

How does Abba Shaul understand that “one who comes in the forest” refers to an optional activity, and not to a mitzva?

From where

does Abba Shaul know

that chopping wood is optional,

that the verse speaks only of chopping wood for an optional purpose, and not of chopping wood for a mitzva?

Perhaps it speaks of chopping wood for a sukka

for the purpose of building the sukka,

and of chopping wood for

the wood of

the pyre

on the altar, where there is a mitzva in chopping it,

and even so the Merciful One said

that if he killed a person inadvertently while engaged in the mitzva of chopping wood

let him be exiled!

And if so, the same law should apply to others engaged in mitzvot, such as a father who strikes his son and the like: They too should be exiled.

He said

in reply

to him:

Rava: The chopping of wood mentioned in the verse must be chopping for an optional purpose, and not chopping for a mitzva.

Since, if he found wood already chopped—

it is not a mitzva

to chop other wood for the sukka or the pyre—

now too,

even when he has no wood for the sukka or the pyre,

it is not

an act

of a mitzva

to chop the wood; rather, only building the sukka is the mitzva. Therefore, we learn from one who chops wood in a forest—which must involve an optional activity [and cannot be an act of a mitzva]—that the obligation of exile applies only when one is engaged in an optional activity.

Ravina raised an objection to Rava

from the continuation of the Mishna, as we learned:

Excluded

from the obligation of exile are

the father who strikes his son, the teacher who disciplines his student, and the agent of the court,

who are not exiled, since they killed while engaged in an act of a mitzva.

Yet seemingly, according to the reasoning that Rava stated concerning chopping wood in a forest, in these cases too this is not a mitzva but an optional activity. For even regarding the blows administered by the father or teacher

let us say,

it may be said,

since, if he had learned

if the son or student had learned on his own and there had been no need to strike him,

it would not be a mitzva

to strike him—

now too,

when he strikes him so that he will learn or be educated,

it is not a mitzva

to administer the blow; rather, it is optional, and only the learning is the mitzva.

And we answer:

There,

in the case of a father striking his son and a teacher striking his student,

even though he has learned, it is a mitzva

to strike him!

Because

it is written [Proverbs 29]: “

“

Discipline your son, and he will give you rest, and provide delicacies for your soul.”

Therefore, the father and the teacher are not exiled when they struck him in order to educate and teach him, and he died inadvertently.

Rava then returned

and again

said: What I said is not correct!

There was no need for the reasoning I stated above—that the verse necessarily refers to chopping wood for an optional purpose, because if he found wood already chopped he would not chop it, and it is not a mitzva.

Rather, it must be proved from the verse itself that it refers to an optional activity and not to a mitzva.

For it is written in it: “

And one who comes upon his fellow in the forest,”

which implies that it speaks of a person who enters the forest of his own free will,

for if he wishes, he enters, and if he wishes, he does not enter,

as the choice is in his hands: If he wishes, he enters the forest, and if he does not wish, he does not enter. Necessarily, this is what the verse is discussing, for—

If it enters your mind

that the verse speaks of chopping wood for a

mitzva—

is it possible

that

he would not enter

the forest to chop it? But he is commanded to do so!

Rather, necessarily, the obligation of exile stated by the verse applies only to one engaged in an optional activity.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava:

But

whenever it is written, “who”

does its meaning

necessarily become “if he wishes”

?

That is, does the verse speak only where the matter depends solely on his will, and not where performing it is a mitzva?

But if so, the following difficulty arises:

If so,

with regard to that which is written in the passage concerning the prohibition against entering the Sanctuary while impure with corpse impurity [Numbers 19]: “

And a man who becomes impure and does not purify himself

[and does not purify himself],” and enters the Sanctuary while impure, he is liable to karet.

Should we say here too that this law applies only if the person became impure through an optional impurity, regarding which it is possible to say,

“If he wishes, he becomes impure, and if he wishes, he does not become impure.”

But if he became impure through an impurity that he is obligated to contract, such as in order to engage in the burial of a

met mitzva, where it is not possible for him not to become impure,

since it is impossible for him not to become impure for the met mitzva,

is it likewise the case that he is exempt

from the punishment of karet if he enters the Sanctuary with this impurity!?

But this is impossible, since the person is impure!

Rather, certainly, even where “who” is written, the intention is not specifically an optional activity. If so, how did you expound and prove that entering the forest referred only to an optional activity?

And Rava answers:

That case is different,

the case of an impure person entering the Sanctuary,

as the verse says: