Makkot 7b — the Talmud in English

Or

he was ascending a ladder, and it fell upon him and killed him—

he does not go into exile.

This is the rule—

Anyone who, in the course of his descent,

killed unintentionally,

goes into exile.

And

anyone who killed

not in the course of his descent

3, does not go into exile.

And the wording of Maimonides [there]: The path of “ascent” is not something close to occurring most of the time; rather, it is like a wonder, and he is like one who is coerced.

And in the Gemara we derive this law from the wording of the verse.

Gemara:

And we raise it as a matter of discussion:

From where are these matters

that one who kills unintentionally goes into exile only if he killed through descent [falling], whereas if he killed through ascent he is exempt from exile?

And we answer:

Shmuel said: For the verse says

[Numbers 35] “

and it fell upon him, and he died”—

the verse teaches that he does not go into exile

until it falls

upon him in

a manner of falling.

The Sages taught: “

Unintentionally”—

to exclude one who acts intentionally,

who does not go into exile, since exile does not atone for intentional murder. “

Without knowledge”—

to exclude one who intended.

And we raise it as a matter of discussion: Why did we need to exclude

one who acts intentionally

from what is written, “unintentionally”?

But

it is obvious

that one who acts intentionally does not go into exile, since he

is liable for execution,

for the court is obligated to kill him!

And we explain:

Rabba said: Say that “unintentionally” comes to exclude

“

to exclude”

one who says, ‘It is permitted.’”

And this is the meaning of the exclusion: Specifically, if he killed unintentionally, he goes into exile. But if he intended to kill him, yet thought that it was permitted to kill him, he does not go into exile, for he is like one who acts intentionally.

Abaye said

to Rabba:

If

according to your words, that the intention of the beraita is to exclude one who says “it is permitted” from exile, how did we learn, “unintentionally” to exclude one who acts intentionally? Is not “

one who says, ‘It is permitted’”

a coerced person!

And his exemption is not because he is close to intentional.

He said to him

Rabba to Abaye: This is how I explain the exclusion in the beraita, according to my view:

for I say: the “

one who says, ‘It is permitted,’”

is close to intentional!

Since he should have learned that this matter is forbidden, but did not learn.

For he performed the act intentionally, and his error is only in not knowing the prohibition involved in his act; and this is not considered complete inadvertence, since had he studied, he would have known that this matter is forbidden. Therefore, even when he erred, he is considered like one who acted intentionally.

Now the Gemara discusses the second exclusion in the beraita: “

Without knowledge”—

to exclude one who intended.

And we raise it as a matter of discussion:

One who intended—

is it not

obvious

that he does not go into exile, for he

is liable for execution,

and why did the verse need to exclude him from exile?

Rabba said:

The intention of the beraita is that the verse comes to exclude:

to exclude one who intended to kill the animal,

and killed the person.

Or he intended to kill

a gentile, and killed an Israelite.

Or he intended

to

kill

a stillborn,

for whose killing one is not liable,

and killed a viable child.

For even though his intention was to kill someone, he is exempt for killing him; since he intended an act of killing, he does not go into exile, because he is not

like one who is completely inadvertent and goes into exile, for completely inadvertent person did not intend to kill

at all,

and did not intend to kill.

The Sages taught:

This is how the section concerning one who kills unintentionally is to be expounded: The Torah said [Numbers 35:22]: “And if suddenly, without enmity, he pushed him; or he cast upon him any vessel, without lying in wait.”

Тора сказала [Числа 35:22]: «А если он столкнул его внезапно, без вражды, или бросил в него какой-либо предмет без намерения».

“If suddenly”—

the verse comes to exclude:

to exclude

one who emerged from an alleyway and turned to exit

around a corner,

at the corner of the street, with his knife in his hand, while the killed person was walking toward him in the public domain.

If the victim was killed by the impact of the knife in his hand, he does not go into exile for him.

Since the victim, walking in the street, sees the killer emerging from the alleyway and realizes that the killer emerging around the corner cannot see him, while he himself can protect himself from the knife, the killer is considered close to coercion.

“Without enmity”—

the verse comes to exclude:

to exclude an enemy

who does not go into exile, since he has the status of one who acts intentionally [and see the explanation of this below, 9b].

“He pushed him”—

that he pushed him with his body

without intention, and for this he goes into exile.

“Or he cast upon him”—

the verse comes

to include

that one is liable even for

descent for the sake of ascent.

For example, he bent his body in order to raise his hand forcefully, and through lowering his body or hand he unintentionally killed a person. The verse teaches a novelty: that he is liable for exile even though the act of descent was for the sake of ascent, in order to raise his hand forcefully; but since he killed through descent, he is liable for exile.

“Without lying in wait”—

to exclude one who intended to throw a stone

in this direction, and it went in another direction and killed a person there. For in this manner he is exempt from exile, since he is close to coercion.

And this is the meaning of the verse: only when the killer did not direct his throw toward another side from the place toward which he threw, does he go into exile; but when he directed his throw toward the side opposite him, and the stone went to the opposite side, he does not go into exile.

The Torah further said in the section of Mishpatim

Exodus 21:13

“but he did not lie in wait” —

if the killer knew that the killed person was there, but intended to throw near him and not at him himself, and accidentally struck him and killed him, he does not go into exile.

And he is liable for exile only when he does not know that the killed person is there, and intends to throw to that place.

And the verse came to exclude:

except for one who intends to throw

a stone a distance of

two

cubits,

but threw four

cubits.

Since he directed himself to throw two cubits to his side, and the stone went four cubits, he is near to being coerced, when he killed in another place that he did not desire.

And it was further said in the section of Shoftim [Deuteronomy 19:5],

“And one who comes with his fellow into the forest

to chop wood, and his hand pushes with the ax, and he cuts his fellow, and he dies—he shall flee”—the verse came to teach:

just as a forest

is a place where there is

permission for the injured party and the damager to enter there, so too every

place in which one becomes liable for exile is when he killed him in a place where there is

permission for the injured party and the damager to enter there.

And thereby excluded is a homeowner who kills accidentally in his courtyard. For if the murdered person entered it, and the homeowner killed him accidentally, he does not go into exile.

Rabbi Abbahu asked Rabbi Yohanan: If one was ascending a ladder, and its

rung

slipped out from beneath him, and fell, and killed

what is the law?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Is it that

in such a case

the manner is

ascent,

for he is ascending the ladder, and we follow the action of the person who kills, and he is exempt from exile?

Or

perhaps, the manner is

descent,

and he is liable for exile!

For perhaps we do not follow the person’s ascent or descent, but rather follow the manner of the act of killing. And since it was done by means of the rung, which was pushed by the person ascending upon it and fell downward, his killing is in the “manner of descent

” He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan:

you have already touched upon

this uncertainty, in what was already included above, that one is liable for exile even for a killing that was done

in a descent that is for the sake of ascent.

For the pushing of the rung was done for the sake of ascending the ladder.

He raised an objection to him

Rabbi Abbahu raised an objection to Rabbi Yohanan from our Mishna, from which it is implied in its latter clause that in such a case of descent for the sake of ascent, he is exempt.

For we learned:

This is the general rule —

a.

Anyone whose manner is descent —

goes into exile.

b.

One whose manner is not descent —

does not go into exile.

And Rabbi Abbahu infers: the second general rule, that everyone

whose manner is not descent

does not go into exile —

what does it come to include

?

Is it not,

does it not come in order to

include such a case,

where even though the act of killing was done through the descent of the rung, nevertheless, since the killer was in the manner of ascent, he is exempt for this from exile.

And the Gemara rejects this: no proof may be brought from our Mishna concerning this matter, for, on the other hand, one can raise an objection:

And according to your reasoning,

that the second general rule came to exclude one who is ascending and a rung slipped from beneath him, then the first general rule, “

Anyone whose manner is descent

goes into exile,”

what does it come to include?

What does it come to say?

Rather,

necessarily, it comes

to include a butcher,

as will be explained shortly.

If so, you must say that

here too,

the general rule concerning one whose manner is not descent comes

to include a butcher.

And not to exempt in a descent for the sake of ascent, for from the laws of the butcher it will be explained below that the rule “whose manner is not descent” comes to exempt even ascent for the sake of descent, whereas “anyone whose manner is descent” comes to impose liability even in descent for the sake of ascent.

And the Gemara explains what the law of a “butcher

” is — For it was taught,

as follows:

A butcher who was cutting,

cutting the flesh of the animal and breaking its bones: in order to cut the animal’s flesh with the force of the cleaver [a large knife of butchers], he must lift it from in front of him and bring it backward, until the cleaver first descends behind his back; then he lifts it from behind and lowers it in front of him. And with this force he cuts up the flesh.

But in order first to lift it from in front of him to behind him, he must first lower it in front of him, and then lift it with force backward; and from behind he again lifts it with force from in front of him and lowers it upon the flesh before him.

And if in the course of his work the iron slipped and killed accidentally —

Four beraitot of tannaim were stated concerning the matter —

a.

One [beraita] taught,

he killed at the time when the cleaver was

in front of him—he is liable.

And if he killed at the time when the cleaver was

behind him, he is exempt.

b.

And another [beraita] taught: behind him—he is liable; in front of him—he is exempt.

c.

And another [beraita] taught: whether in front of him or behind him, he is liable.

d.

And another [beraita] taught: whether in front of him or behind him, he is exempt.

And it is not difficult —

The Gemara explains that there are no contradictions among the four laws taught by four tannaim. Rather, in every manner of descent he is liable, and in every manner of ascent he is exempt.

Rather, the matter depends on the place where the iron slipped from the cleaver.

a.

Here,

the matter that was taught in the first beraita, “in front of him he is liable; behind him he is exempt,” is speaking

of a descent in front of him and an ascent behind him.

For if he lowered the cleaver in front of him in order to lift it with force, and lifted it with force behind him, the beraita distinguished concerning this that if he killed when he lowered it in front of him, he is liable, since he killed in the manner of descent.

But if he killed in the manner of his forceful ascent [in order to bring it back behind him], he is exempt.

b.

Here,

in the second beraita, which taught “behind him he is liable and in front of him he is exempt,” it is speaking

of an ascent in front of him and a descent behind him.

For if he killed when he lowered the cleaver behind him, he is liable for exile, since this is the manner of descent. But if he had already reached the stage at which he again raises the cleaver in order to bring it back in front of him, and then killed accidentally, he is exempt, for he killed in the manner of ascent.

c.

Here,

in the third beraita, which taught “whether in front of him or behind him, he is liable,” it is speaking

of descent in front of him and behind him,

for he is liable for both.

d.

Here,

in the fourth beraita, which taught “whether in front of him or behind him, he is exempt,” it is speaking

of ascent in front of him and behind him.

And now the Gemara returns to discuss Rabbi Abbahu’s question: what is the law of a person ascending a ladder, when a rung slipped from beneath him, fell downward, and killed a person—does this matter count as the manner of ascent or the manner of descent? —

Let us say that it is a dispute among tannaim,

whether we should say that the law in this question is stated as a dispute among tannaim.

For it was taught:

If he was ascending a ladder, and a rung slipped from beneath him

One [beraita] taught: he is liable.

And another [beraita taught

: he is exempt.

Is it not,

is it not the case that

this is what they disagree about,

the two tannaim in the two beraitot:

That one,

the tanna who holds him liable,

holds

that the manner is

descent,

and therefore he is liable.

And the other,

the tanna who exempts him,

holds

that the manner is

ascent,

and therefore he is exempt.

And it is proven that tannaim disagreed concerning the two sides of Rabbi Abbahu’s question.

And we reject this:

No,

in the case where the rung fell and killed, concerning which Rabbi Abbahu was uncertain, he is certainly exempt from exile without dispute, since

everyone

holds that the manner is

ascent.

And it is not difficult

from the tanna in the beraita who holds him liable for exile, since that beraita is not dealing with the law of exile.

Rather,

here,

the tanna who holds him liable is speaking

concerning

concerning

torts,

for one is liable for them whether he caused damage accidentally or intentionally. And with liability for torts there is no distinction at all between the manner of descent and the manner of ascent.

Whereas

here,

the tanna who exempts is speaking

concerning the obligation of

concerning liability for

exile

for one who killed a person accidentally, since concerning liability for exile there is a distinction between the manner of ascent and the manner of descent.

If you wish, say another answer:

it is possible to say another answer, that in fact both beraitot are dealing with exile, in the case of a ladder rung that fell and killed.

and

this one and that one —

the two beraitot are dealing

the law of

with the law of

exile.

And it is not difficult

how it can impose liability, when he killed during his ascent, and this is the manner of ascent —

since the beraitot deal with two different cases:

this one,

the beraita that imposes liability, is speaking of a case

where it was worm-eaten,

the rung, and as a result it bends when one steps upon it, and this is the manner of descent.

Whereas

this one,

the beraita that exempts is speaking of a case

where it was not worm-eaten.

And since the killer was ascending, this is the manner of ascent, and he does not go into exile.

And if you wish, say

in fact

this one and that one

in the two beraitot it is speaking

of a case where it was not worm-eaten.

And it is not difficult

why, then, does he go into exile, when this is the manner of ascent? Since the beraitot deal with two different cases —

this one,

the one that exempts is speaking

of a case where the rung is firmly secured

firmly in the hole, and there is no descent in it.

Whereas

this one,

the one that imposes liability is speaking of a rung

that is not firmly secured,

and therefore there is descent in it, and he goes into exile.

Mishna:

The Torah said in the section of Shoftim: “And one who comes with his fellow into the forest to chop wood, and his hand pushes with the ax to cut the tree, and the iron slips from the wood and finds his fellow, and he dies—he shall flee.” And the Sages and Rabbi disagreed in explaining the case concerning which the Torah imposed exile, as will be explained in our Mishna:

If

the iron slipped from its handle,

and fell,

and killed

a person —

Rabbi says: he does not go into exile,

because the Torah did not speak of such a case, but of another case, as follows.

And the Sages say: he goes into exile.

And this is the case concerning which it was said, “and the ax slips from the wood

” But if a splinter was projected

from the splitting wood,

and the splinter, projected far away, killed a person —

Rabbi says: He goes into exile,

for the verse spoke of a case such as this.

And the Sages say: He does not go into exile,

since this is considered the force of his force, and not his force, and for this the Torah did not obligate exile.

Gemara:

Rabbi said to the Sages:

How do you interpret the words of the verse specifically in a manner in which the iron slips from its handle?

And is it stated "

and the iron slipped from its wood,"

the meaning of which would be that the iron fell from its wooden handle?

But is it not stated אלא "

and the iron slipped

from the wood."

And it is thereby demonstrated that my position is correct: the iron stripped a splinter from the wood, and it was the splinter of wood that was flung and killed, and for this the Torah obligated exile!

And furthermore,

Rabbi brought a proof for his words:

Wood is stated below: "

and the iron slipped from the wood,"

and wood is stated above: "

and he drove back his hand with the ax to cut the wood," and we derive one from the other:

Just as with the wood stated above ["

to cut the wood"], its meaning is that the one who kills unintentionally came to cut

from the wood being split,

so too, with the wood stated below ["

and the iron slipped from the wood"], its explanation is that the iron stripped a splinter

from the wood being split,

and it was the splinter of wood that was flung from the wood being split that killed, and not the iron; and for this, the one who stripped the splinter from the wood goes into exile.

Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: And both,

Rabbi and the Rabbis,

expounded a single verse,

and not that they expounded it in two different ways: it is written, "

and the iron slipped from the wood."

Rabbi holds "

there is a mother for the written tradition."

That is to say, when we come to expound from the words of the verse, we must expound the words of the verse according to the way its writing was transmitted to Moses at Sinai, and not according to the way it is read by us.

The word "and-slipped" can be read with a hiriq beneath the nun [and then we read it, "and the iron caused to slip"], and it can also be read with a kamatz beneath the nun [and then we read, "and the iron slipped"].

When we read "and the iron slipped," if we do not take into consideration the manner of reading that was transmitted to us, but only the tradition of the word as it is written, we must read it as though it were vowelized with a hiriq and not with a kamatz. For in order to read it with a kamatz, it is necessary to add a syllable that is not written in it, as though it were written in it, "and-it-slipped."

But if we read the word according to its form, it is as though

"and-it-caused-to-slip"

[with a hiriq]

is the written form.

For when we read "and-it-caused-to-slip," there is no need to add a syllable that is not written.

And the meaning of "and-it-caused-to-slip" is that the iron stripped something from the wood and flung it at the one who was killed.

And the Rabbis hold,

that also in expounding the verse

there is a mother for the reading,

and we expound according to the meaning of the word in its reading, and here

we read, "and it slipped,"

and its meaning is that the iron slipped off its wood. And we raise a difficulty:

And

is it so that

Rabbi holds, "there is a mother for the written tradition"?