Makkot 7a (ז.) — the Talmud in English

Ile'a and Tuvya

were two witnesses to a loan. And both of them

were relatives

relatives

of the guarantor

of the guarantor for the loan

were.

Rav Pappa thought to say that

they are not disqualified because they are relatives of a litigant, since

with regard to

the plaintiff and the defendant, who are

the borrower and the lender—

they are distant from one another.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav

Pappa:

The guarantor is also a litigant, since

if the borrower does not have

money with which to repay the debt,

does the lender not pursue the guarantor

to demand repayment of the debt!?

Since the guarantor is a litigant in this loan, his relatives are not qualified to testify concerning it.

Mishna:

1.

One whose verdict was finalized and who fled

before the judgment and punishment were carried out, and then returned

and came before the same court

that had convicted him—

they do not overturn his verdict!

They do not need to reconsider his case, perhaps they will find a basis for acquitting him.

This is because the rule that a defendant has the right to request that his case be reconsidered applies [in tractate Sanhedrin 42] only to one who is being led out to be executed: If he says, “I have a way to establish my innocence,” they bring him back and reconsider his verdict. But if he fled without making such a claim, his flight is not a reason to reconsider his case.

However, some explain that because he fled, the Sages penalized him by ruling that his case would not be reconsidered. Arukh LaNer.

But if he comes before another court, they must reconsider his case.

2.

Every place

where two people stand and say: “We testify concerning so-and-so that his verdict was finalized in the court of so-and-so,

for execution,

and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses” —

he shall be executed!

The Gemara establishes the law in the latter clause as referring to outside Eretz Yisrael, where even before another court there is no need to reconsider his case, and the law in the first clause as referring to one who entered Eretz Yisrael; therefore, when he comes before another court, they overturn his verdict.

And since this is so, the Mishna concludes with the law of Sanhedrin everywhere:

3.

Sanhedrin—

operates in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael.

That is, as long as there is a Great Court in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, judges who received semikha adjudicate capital cases everywhere.

4.

A Sanhedrin that executes one person in seven years,

seven years,

is called “

destructive.”

For it destroys the world, since the judges should have been deliberate in judgment and should have sought grounds for acquittal in capital cases.

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: Once in seventy years.

The Gemara discusses his intention: Does he mean that even when it executes one person in seventy years, it is called destructive, or does he mean the opposite—that if it executes one person in seventy years, this is the norm and it is not called destructive?

Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva say: Had we been members of the Sanhedrin

at the time when it adjudicated capital cases,

not

would

a person ever have been executed.

For we would have examined the witnesses with questions to which they would not know how to respond, as explained in the Gemara.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

If they acted in this manner,

they too

would have

increased the number of bloodshedders in Israel,

because people would not be deterred by the punishment imposed by the court.

Gemara:

The Gemara infers from the first clause of our Mishna, where we learned that if one who fled returned and came before the same court, they do not overturn his verdict.

It follows that specifically

before the same court they do not overturn it,

and they do not reconsider his case.

But

if the defendant comes

before another court—

they overturn

his verdict and reconsider his case.

The Gemara raises a contradiction between the clauses of the Mishna:

But the latter clause teaches: “Every place where two people stand and say: ‘We testify concerning so-and-so that his verdict was finalized in such-and-such a court, and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses,’ he shall be executed.”

This implies that even before another court they do not overturn his verdict!

The Gemara answers:

Abaye said: This is not difficult.

Here,

in the first clause, the second court before which the defendant came was

in Eretz Yisrael,

while the original judgment was rendered by a court outside Eretz Yisrael.

Therefore, if he comes before another court in Eretz Yisrael, they overturn the verdict rendered against him outside Eretz Yisrael.

Whereas

here,

in the latter clause, the second court was also

outside Eretz Yisrael,

and therefore they do not overturn his verdict.

Abaye brings a source for this distinction:

As it was taught in a beraita, Rabbi Yehuda ben Dostai said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Shetah:

A defendant who

fled from

a court in

Eretz

Yisrael

to outside Eretz Yisrael,

after his verdict was finalized, and came there before another court—

they do not overturn his verdict.

But if he fled

from

a court

outside Eretz Yisrael

and came

to

another court in

Eretz

Yisrael—

they overturn

his verdict, because of the merit of Eretz Yisrael,

perhaps a defense will be found for him in the Holy Land.

We learned in the Mishna:

Sanhedrin operates

in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael.

The Gemara asks:

From where are these matters derived?

The Sages taught: “

And these shall be for you a statute of judgment throughout your generations

in all your dwelling places” [Numbers 35:29].

[Rashi, in his commentary on the Torah there, cited that the Sifrei derives this from the end of the verse, which states: “in all your dwelling places.”]

We learn that Sanhedrin operates

in all the dwelling places,

in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael.

The Gemara objects:

If so,

if we learn from here that Sanhedrin operates also outside Eretz Yisrael,

what is the meaning of

the verse in the section concerning judges [Deuteronomy, chapter 16], “Judges and officers shall you appoint for yourself

in all your gates,”

which implies only in your gates—that is, in the gates of the towns in Eretz Yisrael, but not in the gates of the towns outside Eretz Yisrael, which are not “the gates of your towns”?

This verse teaches that

in “

your gates,”

in Eretz Yisrael alone,

you shall establish courts in every district,

district by district,

and in every city.

And

if

outside Eretz Yisrael

you are obligated to establish courts only

in every district, and you are not

obligated to be

establishing

courts

in every city.

We learned in the Mishna:

A Sanhedrin that executes

one person in seven years is called destructive.

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: Once in seventy years.

It was asked of them:

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, who said, “Once in seventy years”—does he mean that a Sanhedrin that executes even

once in seventy years is called destructive

just as, according to the Rabbis, one that executes once in seven years is called destructive?

Or perhaps

once in seventy years

is the way of

the world,

that people will be executed and no grounds for acquittal will be found; only a Sanhedrin that executes more frequently than this is called destructive.

The Gemara concludes:

The matter remains unresolved.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva say: Had we been members of the Sanhedrin, and so forth.

The Gemara asks:

How would they act,

how would they acquit the defendant even though witnesses had testified that he had killed?

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar both say

that they would ask the witnesses:

Did you see

whether the person whom

the presumed tereifa killed

the murderer, or whether it was a

healthy

person who

killed him?

That is, did you examine the murdered person after his death to determine whether he was healthy? Perhaps he was a “tereifa,” someone with a condition that would cause him not to live for more than a year, in which case one is not liable for killing him by execution.

Rav Ashi said:

Even

if you should say

that the witnesses would answer that indeed they examined him after death to determine whether he was a tereifa, and found that he was a

healthy

and sound person who

was,

testifying that they had examined him for all the conditions that render him a tereifa, they would still hesitate to execute him, because

perhaps in

the

place

where the murderer struck him with a

sword—

there had already been a perforation!

That is, perhaps the perforation that renders a person a tereifa was located precisely where the murderer struck the victim with the sword, and it is now impossible to know whether there was a perforation at that place that rendered him a tereifa.

Therefore, it is never possible to execute a murderer who killed with a sword.

Yet we still wonder: This exemption applies only to a death penalty to which murderers are liable.

But

in the case of one who has intercourse with a forbidden relation

who is liable to a court-imposed death penalty,

how would they act

that they could exempt him from the death penalty?

And we explain:

Abaye and Rava, both say:

They would ask the witnesses: Did you

see

that he had intercourse with the forbidden relation

like

one who inserts

a paintbrush into a tube?

This is a metaphor for the manner of intercourse. Since the witnesses do not look closely enough to see this, the man who had intercourse would be exempt from the death penalty.

And we challenge this: If so,

but the Rabbis

who maintained that one who had intercourse with a forbidden relation was indeed put to death

how would they judge?

On what testimony do they rely in order to execute him, when the witnesses do not see the act in precise detail?

And we answer:

And we answer:

In accordance with the statement of Shmuel—

The law concerning testimony

Shmuel said: The law concerning testimony regarding

adulterers is:

Once they see them acting like adulterers. It suffices for the witnesses to see that they are acting in the manner of intercourse in order to make the man and the woman liable; they need not testify that they saw them acting like a paintbrush in a tube. We have completed [the study of] you, chapter “How the Witnesses [Testify].”

We have completed Chapter “How the Witnesses”

Mishna:

These are those who go into exile

to the cities of refuge:

One who kills a person unintentionally,

and the law differs according to the manner in which the action that caused him to kill his fellow was performed:

If

he was smoothing with a ma'agilah,

he was plastering his sloping roof with mortar, and smoothing it with a piece of wood used by plasterers, called a “ma'agilah,” pushing it before him down the slope of the roof,

and it fell upon him and killed him.

Or if

he was lowering a barrel,

bringing it down from the roof, and certainly taking care that it would not break, so that he would not lose the barrel,

and it fell upon him and killed him.

Or if he himself

was descending a ladder,

on its steps, taking great care not to fall and injure himself,

and he fell upon him and killed him

with the weight of his body—

In all these cases,

he goes into exile!

The wording of Maimonides [chapter 6 of the Laws of Murderers] is: For falling is commonly likely to cause damage, and it is something close to happening, since it is the nature of a heavy object to descend rapidly. Since he did not exert himself and properly correct his actions while descending, he must go into exile.

Each example contains a new point beyond the preceding one: even if he took greater care, he is still not considered an ones but an inadvertent offender.

But if he was pulling

toward himself

with a ma'agilah,

as he was occupied pulling the smoothing board toward himself and it slipped from his hand,

and it fell upon him and killed him.

Or if

he was drawing up a barrel

and raising it from below upward,

and the rope snapped, and it fell upon him and killed him.