Makkot 15b (טו:) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Is this the reason?

The verse would not have needed to teach that “all his days he stands ready to restore her,”

except according to Rabbi Yohanan,

because he held that one is liable to lashes for a prohibition preceded by a positive mitzva, and he found it difficult that the positive mitzva, “she shall be his wife,” precedes the prohibition against divorcing her. Therefore, he established that this prohibition is severed by a positive mitzva throughout all his days.

According to his approach, this exposition is understandable, because

he

said to the tanna

, the amora who had recited a beraita before him [below]:

Teach

: “Only if he

nullified

the positive mitzva by an action is he

liable

for lashes. But if he

did not nullify

the positive mitzva by an action, but merely has not yet fulfilled it, he is

exempt

from lashes.” And he can rectify the prohibition throughout all his days, as long as he has not permanently forbidden himself to derive benefit from her through a vow that cannot be annulled, and has not actively nullified the positive mitzva. [

But Reish Lakish, who below cites a beraita stating “fulfilled it or did not fulfill it,” does not expound that “all his days he stands ready to restore her.” He holds that the positive mitzva applies before the divorce, and that the law of a prohibition preceded by a positive mitzva is equivalent to the law of a prohibition severed by a positive mitzva. According to his approach, if he restores her immediately when the court warns him, he is not lashed. But if he delays fulfilling the positive mitzva, he is immediately lashed, even though the possibility of restoring her still exists].

A tanna taught

, an amora recited a beraita

before Rabbi Yohanan:

Every prohibition mitzva that contains

also a

positive mitzva,

then—

a. If he

fulfilled the positive mitzva contained within it

, he is

exempt

from lashes for committing the prohibition.

b. But if he

nullified the positive mitzva contained within it

—he is

liable for lashes.

He said to him

, Rabbi Yohanan said to the tanna who had recited it before him:

What are you saying?

How can you recite the beraita in such a version? In either case—

If you recite at its beginning: “He

fulfilled

the positive mitzva contained within it and is

exempt

from lashes,” then it necessarily follows that only actual fulfillment of the positive mitzva exempts him from lashes for violating the prohibition. As long as he has not fulfilled the positive mitzva, the court lashes him for violating the prohibition, even if the possibility of fulfilling the positive mitzva still lies before him.

If so, when you come to recite the opposite case at the end of the beraita, you should recite it as follows: “But if he

did not fulfill

the positive mitzva contained within it, he is

liable

for lashes”!

That is, he should be lashed immediately for the prohibition as long as he has not fulfilled the positive mitzva, even if he has not actively nullified the possibility of fulfilling the positive mitzva that rectifies the prohibition.

If so, why did you recite the beraita in a formulation stating that only if he “actively nullified [the positive mitzva contained within it, and can no longer fulfill it and thereby rectify the prohibition] is he liable”?

Conversely, if you deliberately recite at the end of the beraita: “He

nullified

the positive mitzva contained within it and is

liable

for lashes,” then it necessarily follows that only actively nullifying the positive mitzva that rectifies the prohibition renders him liable for lashes.

If so, you should recite the opposite case at the beginning of the beraita as follows:

He did not nullify

by an action the positive mitzva that rectifies the prohibition [although he has not fulfilled it]—he is

exempt

from lashes!

And why do you recite at the beginning of the beraita: “He fulfilled the positive mitzva contained within it and is exempt”?

Therefore Rabbi Yohanan said to the amora who had recited the beraita before him: Do not recite this beraita in the manner you have recited it thus far. Rather,

teach

, you should recite the words of the beraita in the following formulation:

a. Only if he

nullified

the positive mitzva contained within it by an action is he liable for lashes.

b.

And

if he

did not nullify

the positive mitzva by an action, even though he has not yet fulfilled it, he is exempt from lashes until he actively nullifies the positive mitzva. For in the case of a prohibition severed by a positive mitzva, one is liable for lashes only if he subsequently actively nullifies the possibility of rectifying the prohibition.

And

if

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish

disagreed with Rabbi Yohanan and

said

that liability for lashes in the case of a prohibition severed by a positive mitzva does not depend on actively nullifying the positive mitzva; rather, it depends on whether or not the positive mitzva has been fulfilled at the time the court warns him to fulfill it.

For Reish Lakish holds that liability for lashes for a prohibition severed by a positive mitzva takes effect immediately, at the time the prohibition is committed. However, since the prohibition was severed by a positive mitzva, the Torah allowed him to fulfill the positive mitzva instead of receiving lashes. But, as stated, he had already become liable for lashes at the time he violated the prohibition! Therefore Reish Lakish recites the words of this beraita as follows:

a. He

fulfilled

the positive mitzva contained within it at the time the court warned him to fulfill it; he is not lashed with the lashes for which he became liable, because the Torah allowed him to fulfill the positive mitzva instead of being lashed.

b.

And

if he

did not fulfill

the positive mitzva contained within it at the time the court warned him to fulfill it, and he did not fulfill it, he is lashed with the lashes [for which he had already become liable when he violated the prohibition]. This is so even though he is still commanded to fulfill the positive mitzva.

The Gemara explains their dispute:

With regard to what do they disagree,

Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish?—

They disagree with regard to an uncertain warning—

One master

, Rabbi Yohanan,

holds that an uncertain warning

is considered a warning.

Therefore he said that he is lashed when he nullifies the positive mitzva, because according to his approach his violation is completed, with regard to liability for lashes, only when he nullifies the positive mitzva. Consequently, when he is warned not to commit the prohibition severed by a positive mitzva, there is still uncertainty at the time of the warning as to whether he will also nullify the positive mitzva. Nevertheless, if he ultimately nullified it, he is lashed on account of this uncertain warning [and it is impossible to issue the warning at the time of nullifying the positive mitzva, because the time for the warning is only when he violates the prohibition].

And

if

one master

, Reish Lakish,

holds that an uncertain warning is not considered a warning.

Therefore he was compelled to say that he is lashed for the prohibition, which is completed immediately at the time it is committed, and the warning concerning it is certain; only, he was given the possibility of fulfilling a positive mitzva instead of receiving lashes. When he comes before the court, it becomes clear whether he fulfills the positive mitzva, and if he does not, he is lashed.

And they followed

, Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish,

their respective approaches

as it was stated

: If one says,

“An oath that I will eat this loaf today!”

and he transgressed

the entire

day and did not eat it—

Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish both say: He is not lashed.

But each gave a different reason for his exemption from lashes.

Rabbi Yohanan says: He is not lashed—