Makkot 15b — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Is this the reason?

Was it not necessary to expound that “all his days he stands and returns,”

only according to Rabbi Yohanan,

because he held that one is flogged for a prohibition that a positive commandment preceded, and it was difficult for him that the positive commandment “she shall be his wife” precedes the prohibition of divorcing her; therefore he established that this prohibition is detached to a positive commandment all his days.

And according to his method this exposition is understood, because

he

did

not say to the tannay,

to the amora who recited a beraita before him [below]:

Recite: “

Only if he

nullified

the positive commandment by an action,

he is liable

for lashes. But if he

did not nullify

the positive commandment by an action, but he has still not fulfilled it,

he is exempt

from lashes.” And he can repair the prohibition all his days, as long as he has not forever rendered himself mudar hanaa from her, by a vow that cannot be annulled, and has not nullified the positive commandment by an action.

But Resh Lakish, who later recites in the beraita “fulfilled it and did not fulfill it,” does not expound that “all his days he stands and returns.” And he holds that the positive commandment is before the divorce, and the law of a prohibition preceded by a positive commandment is equivalent to the law of a prohibition linked to a positive commandment. And according to his method, if he returns her immediately when the court warns him, he is not flogged. But if he delays fulfilling the positive commandment, he is flogged immediately, even though the possibility of returning her still exists.

For a tannay recited

a beraita—an amora recited a beraita

before Rabbi Yohanan:

Every prohibition of “you shall not do” in which there is

also a

positive commandment,

therefore—

a. If he

fulfilled the positive commandment in it,

he is

exempt

from lashes for committing the prohibition.

b. And if he

nullified the positive commandment in it—he is

liable

for lashes.

He said to him

Rabbi Yohanan to the tannay who recited before him:

What are you saying?

How can you recite the beraita in such a version? For, whichever way you look at it—

If you recite at its beginning, “he

fulfilled

the positive commandment in it,

he is exempt

from lashes,” then necessarily only actual fulfillment of the positive commandment exempts him from lashes for violating the prohibition, and as long as he has not fulfilled the positive commandment, the court flog him for violating the prohibition, even if at present the possibility of fulfilling the positive commandment still exists before him.

And if so, when you come to recite at the end of the beraita the opposite side, you must recite it thus: “And if he

did not fulfill

the positive commandment in it—he is

liable

for lashes”!

That is to say, he should be flogged immediately for the prohibition, as long as he is not fulfilling the positive commandment, even if he has not nullified by an action the possibility of fulfilling the positive commandment that repairs the prohibition.

And if so, why did you recite the beraita in language saying that only if he “nullified [by an action] the positive commandment in it, [and he can no longer fulfill it and repair the prohibition,] he is liable”?

And conversely, if you specifically recite at the end of the beraita, “he

nullified

the positive commandment in it,

he is liable

for lashes,” then necessarily only nullification by an action of the positive commandment that repairs the prohibition makes him liable for lashes.

And if so, you must recite at the beginning of the beraita the opposite side as follows:

He did not nullify

by an action the positive commandment that repairs the prohibition [although he did not fulfill it]—he is

exempt

from lashes!

And why do you recite at the beginning of the beraita, “he fulfilled the positive commandment in it—he is exempt”!?

Therefore Rabbi Yohanan said to the amora who recited the beraita before him: Do not recite this beraita as you have recited it until now. Rather,

recite,

you must recite the words of the beraita in this language:

a. Only if he

nullified

the positive commandment in it by an action—he is liable for lashes.

b.

And

however, if he

did not nullify

the positive commandment by an action, even though he has still not fulfilled it, he is exempt from lashes until he nullifies the positive commandment by an action. For with a prohibition linked to a positive commandment, one is liable for lashes only if he subsequently nullified by an action the possibility of repairing the prohibition.

And

if

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish

disagreed with Rabbi Yohanan, and

said

that liability for lashes for a prohibition linked to a positive commandment does not depend upon nullifying the positive commandment by an action; rather, it depends upon whether or not he fulfills the positive commandment at the time when the court warns him to fulfill it.

For Resh Lakish holds that liability for lashes for a prohibition linked to a positive commandment takes effect immediately at the time of committing the prohibition. But since the prohibition was linked to a positive commandment, the Torah enabled him to fulfill the positive commandment instead of receiving lashes. But, as stated, he had already become liable for lashes at the time of violating the prohibition! Therefore Resh Lakish recites the words of this beraita as follows:

a.

If he fulfilled

the positive commandment in it at the time when the court warned him to fulfill it, he does not receive the lashes for which he became liable, because the Torah enabled him to fulfill the positive commandment instead of being flogged.

b.

And

if he

did not fulfill

the positive commandment in it at the time when the court warned him to fulfill it, and he did not fulfill it, then he receives the lashes [for which he had already become liable when he violated the prohibition]. This is so even though he is still commanded to fulfill the positive commandment.

And the Gemara explains their dispute:

In what do they differ,

Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish?—

They differ with regard to an uncertain warning—

One master,

Rabbi Yohanan,

holds: an uncertain warning

is considered a warning.

And therefore he said that he is flogged when he nullifies the positive commandment, because according to his method his transgression is completed with regard to liability for lashes only through nullifying the positive commandment. Therefore, when they warn him not to commit the prohibition linked to a positive commandment, it is still uncertain at the time of the warning that perhaps he will not also nullify the positive commandment. Nevertheless, if in the end he nullified it, he is flogged because of this uncertain warning [and it is impossible to warn him at the time of nullifying the positive commandment, because the time of the warning is only at the time when he violates the prohibition].

And

if

one master,

Resh Lakish,

held that an uncertain warning is not considered a warning.

Therefore he was compelled to say that he is flogged for the prohibition, which was completed immediately at the time of its commission, and the warning concerning it was definite; only, he was given the possibility of fulfilling a positive commandment instead of lashes, and when he comes before the court it becomes clear whether he fulfills the positive commandment, and if not, he is flogged.

And they proceeded

Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish

according to their methods—

for it was stated:

One who says,

“An oath that I will eat this loaf, today!”

and he passed

the entire

day, and did not eat it—

Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish, both say: he is not flogged.

But each one stated a different reason for the reason of his exemption from lashes.

Rabbi Yohanan says: he is not flogged—