Makkot 15a — the Talmud in English

They said to him

to Rabbi Yoḥanan:

That is, others who had heard it in his name asked Rabbi Yoḥanan: “Did you

say

this matter?”

He said to them: No!

That is, he retracted, and now he does not hold this way, as follows.

Rabbah said: By God!

[an expression of an oath], indeed

Rabbi Yoḥanan said it

but now he has retracted!

Yet in truth, he need not retract. For we find that

it is written

in the Torah a prohibition that a positive commandment preceded,

and

nevertheless

we learned

that one receives lashes for this prohibition, and the positive commandment does not sever it.

And it is proven that this is the halakha: one receives lashes for a prohibition that a positive commandment preceded. And Rabbi Yoḥanan did not need to retract.

And the Gemara explains:

it is written

the positive commandment that precedes the prohibition:

“And they shall send out from the camp”

the impure.

And only afterward is the prohibition written:

“And they shall not defile their camps.”

And

we learned here

in our Mishna that one who comes

to the Temple

when he is

impure

receives lashes!

That is, because it is a prohibition that a positive commandment preceded, and this is not a prohibition severed by a positive commandment.

But now, since it is proven in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s words from the Mishna, it is difficult:

But for what reason did he retract?

Why did Rabbi Yoḥanan retract?

And we answer:

Because it was difficult for him

the law that we find regarding

the violator of

a woman.

For it was taught:

The

violator of

a virgin girl has a positive commandment and a prohibition.

The positive commandment is to marry her, as it is stated: “She shall be his wife.”

And the prohibition is that he is forbidden to divorce her all his days, as it is stated: “He may not send her away all his days.”

And if the violator married the woman he violated, and afterward transgressed and

divorced

her, and thereby transgressed the prohibition that he may not send her away—

If he is an Israelite,

he

returns

her, and thereby rectifies the prohibition that he transgressed through divorcing her,

and he does not receive lashes.

But

if he is a kohein—

he

receives lashes,

and

he does not return

her as a wife after her divorce, for a kohein is forbidden to [marry] a divorced woman.

And it was difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan: concerning what the beraita said, that

if

the violator

is an Israelite,

he

returns

his violated woman

and does not receive lashes

for divorcing her, one must wonder:

Why?

Why does he not receive lashes?

But this prohibition

is a prohibition that a positive commandment preceded!

For the commandment “She shall be his wife” was written before the prohibition “He may not send her away all his days,” and it is possible to fulfill it before him,

and

therefore

let him receive lashes

for it! And since the beraita nevertheless exempts him from lashes, Rabbi Yoḥanan retracted from the principle that says, “For a prohibition that a positive commandment preceded, one receives lashes,” and considered it like a prohibition severed by a positive commandment, for which one does not receive lashes.

Ulla said:

An Israelite who violated a virgin girl and divorced her must return her and does not receive lashes, since the positive commandment was written in order to sever the prohibition. And although Scripture placed the positive commandment before the prohibition, it did not need to write it for its own matter, for in order to obligate him to marry her there is no need for this verse, because—

the verse would not say

“She shall be his wife”

to the violator of

a virgin girl,

and let us derive

and learn the commandment to marry her by a kal va-chomer

from one who spreads an evil report

[about the woman whom he married, claiming that he did not find her signs of virginity, and that she had committed adultery with another while she was betrothed to him and remained in her father’s house]:

And with regard to one who spreads an evil report, who did not perform an act,

but merely slandered her verbally,

the Merciful One said

the positive commandment

“And she shall be his wife”—

The

violator of

a woman, who performed an act with her—

all the more so

that he is obligated to take her as a wife all his days!

And necessarily this verse is superfluous, and it comes to teach a novel matter.

And

if it does not apply

to teach concerning what was said

before it

to take her, before the divorce,

assign it to apply afterward,

meaning

that

even

if he divorced her, he must return her, and since the positive commandment was written for the purpose of rectifying the prohibition, one does not receive lashes for the prohibition, even though the positive commandment preceded it in writing and in fulfillment.

And we challenge:

But still, the case of the violator is not derived from the case of one who spreads an evil report, for it can be refuted:

What is so about one who spreads an evil report

that we find in him a stringency absent from the violator,

for he receives lashes and pays!

And therefore it is impossible to derive from him to obligate the violator, who is less stringent than he, to take the woman he violated; and consequently the Torah needed to write concerning him “And she shall be his wife,” and it is not a positive commandment that severs the prohibition, and he should receive lashes.

And we answer: We derive the severing of the prohibition in another manner—

Rather, the verse would not say “And she shall be his wife” concerning one who spreads an evil report, and let us derive it from the violator,

by a kal va-chomer:

And if the violator, who does not receive lashes and pay, the Merciful One said, “And she shall be his wife”; one who spreads an evil report,

who receives lashes and pays,

all the more so

that he is obligated to marry her.

And necessarily it comes to teach [something],

and why was it said

concerning one who spreads an evil report?

If it does not apply to one who spreads an evil report,

for he is learned by a kal va-chomer,

assign it to apply to the violator.

And if it does not apply before it,

as it is explicitly written,

assign it to apply afterward

. Even if he divorced her, he must return her all his days, and through this the prohibition is severed by a positive commandment.

And we challenge again:

And the case of one who spreads an evil report is also not derived from the case of the violator

by a kal va-chomer

, because

it can be refuted,

on the other side:

What is so about the violator, who performed an act

and is therefore obligated to marry her, whereas it is impossible to derive from him to obligate one who spreads an evil report, who did not perform an act.

And we answer:

Rather,

in another manner it is possible to learn that the positive commandment severs the prohibition—

For even if

the verse

would not say

“And she shall be his wife”

concerning one who spreads an evil report,

we would know this,

for she is his wife,

since the spreading of the evil report occurred after he betrothed and married her.

And

why was it said?—

If it does not apply to one who spreads an evil report—

assign it to apply to the violator.

And if it does not apply before it—

assign it to apply afterward,

for a violator who divorced her is obligated to return her, and through this he rectifies the prohibition.

And we challenge:

But say: If it does not apply before it concerning one who spreads an evil report,

for she is his wife,

assign it to apply afterward concerning him.

For if one who spreads an evil report divorced his wife, he is obligated to return her, and to say

that he does not receive lashes,

for through this he rectifies his prohibition.

And it would again be difficult: From where do we know that the violator rectifies his prohibition when he returns his divorced woman, for he has no separate positive commandment after the prohibition?

And we answer:

Indeed so,

that the positive commandment stated concerning one who spreads an evil report comes to obligate him to return his wife if he divorced her and to rectify his prohibition.

And the violator comes and derives from it

that if he returns her he does not receive lashes, just as we find concerning one who spreads an evil report.

We inquire about this:

By what does he derive from it?

If by a kal va-chomer

from one who spreads an evil report, who receives lashes and pays, and even so, if he divorced her, he does not receive lashes, all the more so a violator, who does not receive lashes, should not receive lashes for divorcing her.

If by a mah matzinu,

that the two are similar—

In any event,

it can be refuted:

What is so about one who spreads an evil report, who did not perform an act,

and he is not similar to the violator, and it is impossible to derive from him by a kal va-chomer concerning the violator.

Rather, Rava said,

the reason for what was taught in the beraita, that a violator who divorced must return her and does not receive lashes, is that it is a prohibition severed by a positive commandment.

And we infer this from the fact that the Torah added to obligate him

“all his days,”

although it is included in “He may not send her away,” indicating that Scripture came to teach us that the command is that she not be sent away from him all his days, but rather

he stands and returns her.

And the entire verse revolves around the one who divorces: she shall be his wife if he sent her away, so that the sending away should not last all his life. Thus, the positive commandment comes after the prohibition and rectifies it.

And likewise, when Ravin came, he said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: “All his days” means he stands and returns her.

And we return to the beginning of the sugya:

Rav Pappa said to Rava:

According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that one receives lashes for a prohibition that a positive commandment preceded,

the following is seemingly difficult: This

prohibition is not similar to the prohibition of muzzling,

from which we learn for which prohibition one receives lashes, since it is adjacent to the section of lashes, and since there is no positive commandment in it, from where do we know that one receives lashes for a prohibition that has a positive commandment, even when it preceded it?

He said to him

Rava: Is it so that

because the Merciful One wrote an extra positive commandment in it

as an addition to the prohibition,

it becomes less?

It is certainly the case, then, that the addition of the positive commandment does not distinguish it from the prohibition of muzzling!

And we challenge:

If so,

even

a prohibition severed by a positive commandment as well, let us say

this reasoning: Is it so that

because the Merciful One wrote an extra positive commandment in it, it becomes less?

Why does he not receive lashes?

He said to him

Rava:

That

positive commandment does not strengthen the prohibition; rather,

it came to sever the prohibition.

Since it is fulfilled only after the act of the prohibition, necessarily it comes to rectify it and sever it from lashes, and therefore one does not receive lashes for it.

And we challenge Rava, who said that the positive commandment “She shall be his wife” places the violator under the command to stand and return her all his days, and he never receives lashes, since he can say that he wishes to return her.

However,

this works according to the one who says

below that liability for lashes for a prohibition severed by a positive commandment depends on

“he nullified it and did not nullify it.”

For if he actively nullified the possibility of fulfilling the positive commandment that severs the prohibition, he receives lashes; and if he did not nullify the positive commandment, he is exempt even though he did not fulfill it.

For he holds that the completion of the transgression of the prohibition does not occur until he also nullifies the positive commandment. And according to his words, this works well concerning the violator: he has a remedy all his days, to return her, and he receives lashes only if he renders her mudar hanaa, through a vow that cannot be annulled, and thereby nullifies the possibility of returning her.

But according to the one who says

that liability for lashes for a prohibition severed by a positive commandment takes effect from the moment he transgressed the prohibition; rather, since he has the possibility of fulfilling a positive commandment and thereby removing the liability for lashes, the matter depends on

“he fulfilled it and did not fulfill it,”

so that when he is summoned to the court he can fulfill the positive commandment and be exempt from lashes, and if he refuses to fulfill it, he receives lashes. According to his words, it is difficult concerning the positive commandment of the violator, for “She shall be his wife all his days”—

what can one say?

For it is impossible to say, as Rava does, that all his days he stands under the obligation to take her back, since if, when he comes before the court, he immediately refuses to take her back, they administer lashes to him.

For it is impossible to say according to Rava that he stands under the command to return her all his days, since if, when he comes to court, he immediately refuses to return her, they give him lashes. [

And according to his method, the sinner cannot say that he will fulfill it later, for he receives lashes for not fulfilling it; and if he could postpone the fulfillment, he would never receive lashes. ]