Kiddushin 8a (ח.) — the Talmud in English

The same applies to an item of equivalent monetary value, as long as its value is fixed.

Its value must have been fixed through an appraisal before the betrothal.

The fact that an item of equivalent monetary value is considered like money is derived from the additional wording of the verse, “he shall return his redemption,” and therefore an item of equivalent value must have a fixed valuation, just as money does.

And

Rav Yosef

said

about this: From where do I say this?

From where did I learn that an item of equivalent value must have a fixed valuation, like money?

I learned this from the following beraita:

As it was taught:

It is stated, concerning a Hebrew slave sold to a resident alien—that is, a gentile who accepted upon himself the observance of the seven Noahide mitzvot—“he shall return his redemption

from the money of his purchase.”

That is, he may redeem himself from him with money, the money through which he was acquired.

And the Sages derived from here: The verse teaches that only

with money

the Hebrew slave

is acquired

by the resident alien to be his slave,

but he is not acquired

by him

with produce or utensils.

The following question arises:

This “

produce or utensils,”

with which a Hebrew slave is not acquired by a gentile—

what are the circumstances?

What case is being discussed?

If we say that they cannot be used for acquisition at all,

if the beraita means that a slave cannot be acquired with them under any circumstances, that cannot be so!

For this is what is stated in the verse concerning a Hebrew slave sold to a resident alien—who does not leave him after six years, but only at the Jubilee—that if one of the slave’s relatives comes to redeem him, or if the slave himself acquires sufficient means to pay money and redeem himself, the number of years remaining until the Jubilee is calculated, and the slave is redeemed according to the value of those remaining years: “

If there are still many years, according to them he shall return his redemption from the money of his purchase.”

The word “he shall return” is superfluous, since the verse could have said, “according to them, his redemption is from the money of his purchase.”

And the Sages derived: “

He shall return his redemption”—

the Merciful One said

to include an item of equivalent value,

which likewise has the status

of money.

This teaches us that the slave may be redeemed from the gentile even with an item of equivalent monetary value.

And since he is redeemed with an item of equivalent value, he is also acquired with such an item, as it is stated: “He shall return his redemption from the money of his purchase.” This indicates that the redemption must be with the same money with which he was acquired.

It follows that monetary acquisition is not effected only with money; an item of equivalent value is also considered like money!

Now let us return to the aforementioned beraita:

It states, “from the money of his purchase.” The verse teaches that “with money he is acquired, but he is not acquired with produce or utensils.”

And if you explain that the beraita means that it is impossible to acquire him with them under any circumstances, the difficulty is: “he shall return” includes an item of equivalent value, which is considered like money!

But if,

you explain that the beraita is referring to produce and utensils

that do not contain

an amount worth

a peruta,

and therefore they are unfit to effect the acquisition, then your words can be challenged:

Why specifically

does the tanna speak specifically of

produce and utensils

that are not worth a peruta?

Even money

that is not worth a peruta

also

does not effect an acquisition!

And Rav Yosef concludes:

Rather, is it not

necessarily referring to produce and utensils

that contain an amount worth

a peruta,

produce and utensils worth a peruta,

and since their value is not fixed—

no!

The verse “from the money of his purchase” teaches that if the value of the produce and utensils was not fixed at the time of the acquisition, the slave is not acquired with them!

This presents a difficulty for Rabba, who holds that the money of betrothal need not have a fixed value!

But the other,

Rabba, will explain: It is possible to acquire him with produce and utensils even when their value is not fixed.

And this is what the tanna said—

this is what the tanna intended to say:

By means of the category of

acquisition

with money

alone

he is acquired

as a slave, whether one gives money for him or pays for him with an item of equivalent value, provided that one gives them for the purpose of monetary acquisition.

And

the Hebrew slave

is not acquired

by the resident alien

by means of the category of “

produce and utensils.”

And what is that?

What is the meaning of the acquisition called “the category of produce and utensils”?—

An acquisition of

barter!

Since barter is generally effected by exchanging produce and utensils, barter is referred to as “the category of produce and utensils”!

The Gemara raises an objection to this resolution:

Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet disagreed whether barter can be effected with produce. That is, whether the purchaser may give the seller a fruit and thereby acquire the purchased item:

Rav Naḥman holds that barter can be effected only with a utensil, whereas Rav Sheshet maintains that produce can also be used for barter.

Accordingly, what we answered—that “produce and utensils” refers to barter—is indeed resolved according to Rav Sheshet, who holds that produce is effective for an acquisition through barter.

But

according to Rav Naḥman, who says,

“produce cannot be used for barter,”

it cannot be said that the tanna refers to barter as “produce and utensils,” since produce is ineffective for barter!

And if so,

what can be said?

How can the beraita be explained according to Rabba, who says that one can acquire with produce and utensils even when their value is not fixed?

And we answer:

Rather, actually,

the beraita necessarily excludes produce and utensils

that do not contain [

an amount

worth a peruta,

with which it is impossible to effect an acquisition through money.

And as for what you said,

concerning your question,

“Why specifically”,

why does the tanna speak specifically of

produce and utensils

that are not worth a peruta?

Even money,

when it is worth less than a peruta,

also does not effect an acquisition!

The answer is as follows:

The tanna is speaking in the manner of

“It is not necessary”

to state.

That is,

“It is not necessary”—

it need not be stated with regard to

money

itself

that

only

if it contains an amount worth a peruta does it effect an acquisition, but

if it does not,

it does not

effect an acquisition.

But

with regard to

produce and utensils, say

I might have said that even with less than a peruta one can acquire with them, because

since their benefit is immediately available,

as their benefit is readily accessible, since a person can use them for enjoyment more directly than money, therefore

he resolves in his mind to acquire himself,

he fully consents to being acquired as a slave in exchange for them, even though they are not worth a peruta.

It teaches us this:

the verse teaches us that even with produce and utensils, one cannot effect an acquisition if they are not worth a peruta.

In summary: Rav Yosef attempted to prove his position—that an item of equivalent value effects an acquisition only when its value is fixed—from the beraita that states: “from the money of his purchase”—with money he is acquired, but he is not acquired with produce and utensils. That is, with produce and utensils whose value is not fixed.

His proof was rejected, because the beraita means that he is not acquired with produce and utensils when they are not worth a peruta.

Rav Yosef now brings another proof for his position:

Rav Yosef said: From where do I say this?

From where did I learn that an item of equivalent value must have a fixed valuation like money?

I learned this from the following beraita:

As it was taught:

It is stated in the Book of Numbers: “Every first issue of the womb shall be yours, for Aaron and his sons. But you shall redeem every firstborn male. And its redemption, from one month of age you shall redeem it, according to your valuation, for five shekels of silver, according to the sacred shekel.”

From here we learn that a person whose firstborn son is born must redeem him with five sela and give them to a koen.

The five shekels according to the sacred shekel are five state sela.

And a beraita taught the following with regard to this matter:

The father of a firstborn son says to the koen, “Take

this calf for the redemption of my son.”

Or he says to him, “Take

this garment for the redemption of my son”—

he has said nothing.

Even if he gave them to the koen, he has not fulfilled the mitzva of redeeming his son.

But if he says to the koen, “Take

this calf,”

valued

at five sela for the redemption of my son,”

or he says, “Take this garment

which is

valued

at five sela for the redemption of my son,” -

his son is redeemed!

The following question arises:

This redemption—

what are the circumstances?

In what manner was this redemption effected?

If we say that it was not worth

five sela: If the calf and the garment were not worth five sela, the difficulty is: Why, when he valued the calf and the garment at five sela, is his son redeemed?

Is it in his power to do so?!

Do the father or the koen have the power to transform them into items worth five sela?

Rather, is it not

necessarily referring to a calf and a garment worth five sela, and nevertheless the beraita states in its first clause, “This calf for the redemption of my son— -

he has said nothing,”

even though it is worth

five sela!

And

what is the reason for this?

Since its value is not fixed—

no,

it is not fit for the redemption of the firstborn.

It is thus proven that wherever an item of equivalent value has been included, it is considered like money; and just as money has a fixed value, so too an item of equivalent value must have a fixed value! The Gemara rejects Rav Yosef’s proof:

No.

This beraita is not referring to a calf and a garment worth five sela!

Rather,

actually,

it is

not worth

five sela, and therefore one who says, “This calf for the redemption of my son,” has said nothing.

Why, then, when he valued the calf and the garment at five sela, is his son redeemed?

For example, the koen accepted it upon himself.

The koen who received the redemption agreed that the calf and the garment were indeed worth five sela to him, and it is therefore as though the father gave him five sela.

And there is proof for this:

As in the case of Rav Kahana, who accepted a cloth for the redemption of a firstborn,

just as Rav Kahana accepted a garment that was not worth five sela in exchange for the redemption of a firstborn, and

he said to him

the father:

“For me, it is worth

the amount I would pay for such a cloth,

five sela,”

and I accept it in place of five sela.

The beraita can be explained similarly: When one says, “This calf, valued at five sela, for the redemption of my son,” his son is redeemed, even though it is not actually worth five sela. Rav Yosef’s proof is therefore rejected.

The Gemara explains when the koen may accept an item that is not worth five sela and say, “For me, it is worth five sela.”

Rav Ashi said: We said this only:

that the kohen may say, “To me it is worth”

only

specifically

for example, Rav Kahana, who is a great man and requires a scarf on his head,

because he is a distinguished person and does not go bareheaded; therefore, the scarf is worth more to him than it is worth to other people.

But everyone else,

the other people,

cannot

say about a scarf, “To me it is worth five sela.”

Proof that a distinguished person is accustomed to pay more for a scarf than its value:

As in this case

as we found

that Mar bar Rav Ashi bought

acquired

a scarf from the mother of Rabba of Kovei

the name of a place, and the scarf

was worth ten

zuz, but he paid for it

thirteen,

thirteen zuz.

The Gemara now cites statements of amoraim concerning betrothal with money:

Rabbi Elazar said:

If a man says to a woman:

“Be betrothed to me

with a maneh”

one hundred dinars,

and he gave her one dinar

one

she is betrothed

immediately, on condition that he give her another ninety-nine dinars

and complete

the maneh in this manner.

What is the reason

what is the reason for this matter?

Since he said to her “

Be betrothed to me with

a maneh”

and

gave

gave

her one dinar

only one, this is

as though

he said to her,

as though he had said to her: “Be betrothed to me with one dinar

on condition

that I complete it for you to a maneh”—it

is comparable,

the matter is analogous.

And

indeed,

Rav Kahana said that Rav said: Anyone who says “

on condition that”

is like one who says “

from now”

it is comparable.

Anyone who makes an acquisition conditional and states the condition with the words “on condition that,”

this is

as though

he said that the acquisition should take effect

from now, it is comparable.

Even though the condition has not yet been fulfilled, provided that ultimately the condition is fulfilled afterward.

And when a man says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” and he gives her one dinar, this is as though he said to her: “Be betrothed to me with one dinar now, on condition that I complete it for you to a maneh.” Therefore, the betrothal takes effect immediately, on condition that ultimately he gives her a maneh.

Meytivi

a contradiction to the words of Rabbi Elazar from what we learned in a beraita: For it was taught: If a man says to a woman,

“Be betrothed to me with a maneh, and

he did not give her the entire maneh immediately all at once, but rather

he counted

one dinar at a time

and continued, and one of them wished

the husband or the woman

to retract

from the betrothal,

even

if he wished to retract

with the last dinar—

he has the right

to retract, because the betrothal does not take effect until he completes the entire maneh.

This contradicts the words of Rabbi Elazar, who said: “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” and he gave her one dinar—she is betrothed immediately, provided that he completes it!

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing,

what case did the beraita discuss?—

With a case

where he said

to her: “Be betrothed to me

with this maneh.”

He showed her the maneh. Therefore, she intended to become betrothed with the entire maneh, and not with only one dinar.

And we challenge this answer:

But from the latter clause,

from the fact that the latter clause of the beraita [which the Gemara immediately cites] explicitly discusses one who betroths

with this maneh,

it necessarily follows that the

first clause

of the beraita discusses one who said to her, “Be betrothed

with a maneh,”

without specification—

As it teaches

in the

latter clause: He said to her “

Be betrothed to me with this maneh,”

and he gave her the maneh,

and it was found that the maneh was missing one dinar.

Or

it became clear that one of the dinars was

a copper dinar

and not silver—

she is not betrothed.

But if he gave her one hundred dinars, and it was found that one

dinar

of them was

defective

faulty,

she is betrothed

immediately,

and he shall replace

that defective dinar for her with a proper dinar. And if we say that the first clause discussed one who said “this maneh,” and the woman is not betrothed until he gives her the entire maneh, this is difficult: Why did the beraita repeat and state again in the latter clause, concerning one who says “this maneh,” that the woman is not betrothed until he gives her all of it?

Rather, it necessarily follows that the first clause discusses a case in which he said “a maneh” without specification, and nevertheless the woman is not betrothed until he gives her a complete maneh. And this is contrary to the words of Rabbi Elazar!

And we reject this:

No.

The first clause does not discuss one who says “a maneh” without specification!

Rather, both

the first and

both

the latter clause

discuss a case in which he said

“with this maneh.”

And

the tanna in the latter clause

is explaining

the first clause, and this is what the tanna said: One who says, “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” and counted and continued—if

one of them wished to retract

from it,

even with the last dinar, he has the right to do so.

How so?—

For example, he said to her, “With this maneh,”

and the maneh in her possession was found to be missing one dinar, or a copper dinar was found among it.

And this is also logically evident,

it is logical that the first clause likewise discusses one who says “this maneh”—

For if you would think

that the

first clause

discusses

an unspecified maneh,

one could ask:

Now,

now that we have already learned that

with an unspecified maneh there is no betrothal

until she receives the entire maneh,

with this maneh—

is it necessary to say so?!

Would it need to inform us that even when he says “this maneh,” the woman is not betrothed until he gives her all of it? Why did the beraita take the trouble to teach us this in the latter clause?

Rather, from here there is proof that the first clause too discusses one who says “this maneh,” as we explained above.

And we reject the proof:

If this is the basis,

if you seek to prove solely from this evidence that the first clause discusses “this maneh,”

it is not so!

There is no proof in this.

For it is possible to say that the first clause discusses an unspecified maneh, and nevertheless the beraita repeated and taught this law also with regard to “this maneh,” since

the tanna stated the latter clause to reveal the meaning of the first clause,

the latter clause was taught in order to reveal what case the first clause discussed—

so that you should not say that the

first clause

spoke specifically

of

“this maneh,” but with an unspecified maneh there is a betrothal;

therefore,

the tanna stated the latter clause concerning “

this maneh”—

and

from this

you infer

that the first clause

did not discuss “this maneh,” but rather

an unspecified maneh, and even so there is no betrothal.

Although the Gemara rejected the proof that the first clause discussed “this maneh,” it nevertheless did not reject the explanation itself.

And in order to reconcile the words of Rabbi Elazar [who said that when he says, “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” and gives her one dinar, she is betrothed immediately], it must be said that the entire beraita discussed “this maneh,” and the latter clause explains the first clause.

Rav Ashi said

another answer:

The first clause discussed an unspecified maneh, and this is what we learned in the first clause: “Be betrothed to me with a [unspecified] maneh,” and he counted and continued, and one of them wished to retract from it—he has the right to do so.

But this does not contradict the words of Rabbi Elazar, because the beraita discussed a case in which he counted and continued.

And

counting and continuing is different,

different from a person who gave her only one dinar, because when the woman sees that he is counting and continuing, certainly

her intention is for the entire amount

for the entire maneh; therefore, she is not betrothed until he gives her all of it.

The Gemara now discusses the substance of the beraita:

We learned in the beraita: If he says to her, “Be betrothed to me with this maneh,” and the maneh is found to be missing one dinar, or it becomes clear that one dinar was copper—she is not betrothed. And if one dinar is found to be defective, she is betrothed, and he shall replace it.

And we inquire:

This “copper dinar”—

what are the circumstances?

In what case is this referring?

If she knew about it,

if the woman noticed at the time she received the dinar that it was copper,

then she understood,

she knew this,

and accepted

it on the understanding that she would become betrothed with it as it was! Why, then, is she not betrothed?

And we resolve:

No, it is necessary—

it is necessary to establish the beraita in one of the following two cases:

A.

That he gave it to her at night,

so that the betrother gave the dinar to the woman at night in the darkness, and she did not notice that it was made of copper.

B.

Alternatively, that it was found among the coins.

The copper dinar was mixed together with silver dinars, and the woman did not notice it.

We learned in a beraita: If a bad dinar is found, she is betrothed.

And we inquire about it:

This bad dinar, what are the circumstances?

What is being discussed?

If it does not circulate,

if the dinar does not circulate in commerce, since it passes to no merchant at all, then

that is

its law should be like the law of

a copper dinar!

And why, in the case of a bad dinar, is the woman betrothed, whereas in the case of a copper one she is not betrothed?

Rav Pappa said

as a resolution: It is referring to

one that circulates with difficulty.

And the Gemara brings another statement concerning betrothal with money:

Rava said in the name of Rav Nahman: He said to her

to the woman,

“Become betrothed to me with a maneh,” and

he did not give her the maneh, but rather

placed a pledge for it,

for the maneh,

she is not betrothed.