Kiddushin 8a — the Talmud in English

Even an item worth money as well, when its value is fixed.

Its value must be fixed by an appraisal before the betrothal.

For the fact that an item worth money is like money is learned from the additional wording of the verse, “he shall return,” and therefore an item worth money must have a fixed value, like money.

And

said

about this

Rav Yosef: From where do I say it,

from where did I learn that an item worth money must have a fixed value, like money?

I learned this from the following beraita—

as it was taught:

It is stated [Leviticus 25], concerning a Hebrew slave sold to a “resident foreigner” [a gentile who accepted upon himself to fulfill the seven Noahide commandments]: “He shall return his redemption

from the money of his purchase.”

That is, he may redeem himself from him with money, with which he was acquired.

And the Sages expounded from here: The verse teaches that only

with money is he—

the Hebrew slave—

acquired

by the resident foreigner to be his slave,

but he is not acquired

by him

with produce and utensils.

And one must ask:

This “

produce and utensils”

with which a Hebrew slave is not acquired by a gentile—

what are the circumstances?

What is being discussed?

If you say that they cannot be acquired with at all,

if the beraita wishes to say that it is impossible to acquire a slave with them at all, that cannot be!

For so it is stated in this verse, which deals with a Hebrew slave sold to a resident foreigner [who does not leave him after six years, but at the Jubilee]: if one of the slave’s relatives comes to redeem him, or the slave himself gains the means to pay money and redeem himself, then the number of years remaining until the Jubilee is calculated for him, and the slave is redeemed according to the value of the years remaining until the Jubilee— “

If there are still many years, according to them he shall return his redemption from the money of his purchase.”

The word “he shall return” is superfluous, for the verse could have said: “According to them, his redemption is from the money of his purchase.”

And the Sages expounded: “

He shall return his redemption”—

the Merciful One said—

to include an item worth money,

which also has the status

of money.

This teaches us that the slave may be redeemed from the gentile even with an item worth money.

And since he is redeemed with an item worth money, he is also acquired with it, as it is stated: “He shall return his redemption from the money of his purchase.” From here: the redemption [the ransom] must be from the same money with which he was acquired.

And from here it follows that acquisition with money is not with money alone; rather, an item worth money is also like money!

And now let us return to the aforementioned beraita:

“From the money of his purchase”—the verse teaches that “with money is he acquired, but he is not acquired with produce and utensils.”

And if you explain that the intention of the beraita is that it is impossible to acquire with them in any manner, it is difficult: “he shall return” includes that an item worth money is like money!

And if

you will answer that it is speaking of produce and utensils

that do not contain

that is, that do not contain

the value of a peruta,

and therefore they are unfit for acquisition with them, then this objection may be raised against your words:

Why specifically,

why does the tanna speak specifically of

produce and utensils

that are not worth a peruta? For

even money

that is not worth a peruta

as well

does not acquire!

And Rav Yosef concludes and says:

Rather, is it not

necessarily speaking

of which there is the value of a

peruta,

of produce and utensils that contain the value of a peruta,

and since their value is not fixed—

no!

The verse “from the money of his purchase” teaches that if the value of the produce and utensils was not fixed at the time of the acquisition, the slave is not acquired with them!

And from here there is a difficulty against Rabbah, who holds that it is unnecessary for the money of betrothal to have a fixed value!

But the other

—Rabbah will answer: it is possible to acquire with produce and utensils even though their value is not fixed.

And this is what he said,

and this is what the tanna intended to say:

By the category of

acquisition

with money

alone

is he acquired,

the slave, whether one gives money for him or pays for him with an item worth money, provided that one gives them for the purpose of acquisition with money.

And

the Hebrew slave

is not acquired

by the resident foreigner

by the “

category of produce and utensils.”

And what are they?

What is the meaning of the acquisition called “the category of produce and utensils”?—

Acquisition

by exchange!

Since ordinarily acquisition by exchange is performed by exchanging produce and utensils, acquisition by exchange is called “the category of produce and utensils”!

And we object to this answer:

Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet disagreed whether it is possible to perform acquisition by exchange with produce. That is, that the buyer gives the seller a fruit, and through this acquires the purchase:

Rav Naḥman holds that acquisition by exchange is only with a utensil, while Rav Sheshet holds that produce also performs exchange.

Accordingly, what we answered—that “produce and utensils” means exchange—is indeed resolved according to Rav Sheshet, who says that produce is effective for acquisition by exchange.

But

however,

according to Rav Naḥman, who says that produce does not perform exchange,

it cannot be said that the tanna calls exchange “produce and utensils,” since produce is not effective in exchange!

And if so,

what is there to say?

How can the beraita be explained according to Rabbah, who says that one acquires with produce and utensils even though their value is not fixed?

And we answer:

Rather, in truth,

the beraita necessarily excludes produce and utensils

that do not contain

that is, that do not contain

the value of a peruta,

for it is impossible to acquire with them under the category of money.

And as for what you said,

and regarding the objection you raised,

why specifically,

why does the tanna speak specifically of

produce and utensils

that are not worth a peruta? Yet

even money,

when it is less than a peruta,

also does not acquire!

The answer to this is:

The tanna spoke in the manner of

“it is not necessary”

he says.

That is,

“It is not necessary,”

it is unnecessary to say with

money

itself,

that

only

if it contains the value of a peruta, it does,

only if it contains the value of a peruta does one acquire with it, but

if not, no,

one does not acquire with it.

But with

with regard to

produce and utensils, let it be said,

I might have said that even with less than the value of a peruta one can acquire with them, because

since their benefit is near,

since their benefit is immediately available, as they are ready for a person to benefit from them more than from money, therefore

he resolves and acquires himself,

he resolves in his mind to be acquired in exchange for them as a slave, even though they are not worth a peruta.

It teaches us,

the verse teaches us that even with produce and utensils, one does not acquire with them if they are not worth a peruta.

In summary: Rav Yosef attempted to prove his position—that an item worth money acquires only when its value is fixed—from the beraita that says: “From the money of his purchase”—with money is he acquired, but he is not acquired with produce and utensils. That is, with produce and utensils whose value is not fixed.

His proof was rejected, because the intention of the beraita is to say that he is not acquired with produce and utensils when they are not worth a peruta.

And now Rav Yosef brings another proof for his position:

Rav Yosef said: From where do I say it,

from where did I learn that an item worth money must have a fixed value like money?

I learned this from the words of the following beraita:

As it was taught:

It is stated in the Book of Numbers [18:15–16]: “Every opener of the womb [firstborn] shall be yours [for Aaron and his sons]. But you shall surely redeem the firstborn of man. And its redemption, from one month shall you redeem it, according to your valuation, five shekels of silver, according to the sacred shekel.”

And from here we learn that a person to whom a firstborn son is born must redeem him with five sela and give them to a koen.

The five shekels according to the sacred shekel are five state sela.

And we learned in a beraita concerning this:

The father of a firstborn son who says to the koen: Take for yourself

this calf for the redemption of my son.

Or he says to him: Take for yourself

this garment for the redemption of my son—

he has said nothing.

And even if he gave them to the koen, he has not fulfilled the mitzva of redeeming the son.

But if he said to the koen: Take for yourself

this calf

valued

at five sela for the redemption of my son.

Or he said: Take for yourself this garment

which

is valued

at five sela for the redemption of my son—

his son is redeemed!

And one must ask:

This redemption—

what are the circumstances?

In what manner was this redemption performed?

If you say that it is not worth

if it is speaking of a calf and a garment that were not worth five sela, then it is difficult: why, when he valued the calf and the garment at five sela, is his son redeemed?

Is it entirely in his power!?

Does the father or the koen have the power to transform them into a value of five sela?!

Rather, is it not

necessarily speaking of a cow and a garment worth five sela, and nevertheless the beraita says in its first clause, “This calf for the redemption of my son—

—he has said nothing,”

even though it is worth

five sela!

And

what is the reason for the matter?

Since its value is not fixed—

no,

it is not fit to perform the redemption of the firstborn with them.

And it is demonstrated from here that wherever an item worth money was included, it is like money; and just as money has a fixed value, so an item worth money must have a fixed value! And we reject Rav Yosef’s proof:

No,

this beraita is not speaking of a calf and a garment worth five sela!

Rather,

in truth

it is speaking

of one that is not worth

five sela, and therefore one who says, “This calf for the redemption of my son,” has said nothing.

And why, when he valued the calf and the garment at five sela, is his son redeemed?

And for example, the koen accepted it upon himself.

The koen who received the redemption agreed that the calf and the garment were indeed worth five sela to him, and it is as though the father gave him five sela.

And a proof for this is:

As with that of Rav Kahana, who took a cloth for the redemption of the firstborn,

just as Rav Kahana accepted a garment that was not worth five sela in exchange for the redemption of the firstborn, and

said to him

the father:

To me it is fit,

it is fitting for me to pay for such a cloth

five sela,

and I accept it in place of five sela.

And similarly, the beraita may be explained as speaking of one who says, “This calf at five sela for the redemption of my son”: his son is redeemed, even though it is not worth five sela. And Rav Yosef’s proof is rejected.

The Gemara explains when the koen has the authority to accept something that is not worth five sela and say, “To me it is worth five sela.”

Rav Ashi said: We said this only:

we said that the priest has the right to say, “To me it is worth [more than that],”

but

specifically

for example Rav Kahana, who is a great man, and requires a cloth on his head,

for he is a great man and does not go bareheaded; therefore, the cloth is worth more to him than it is worth to other people.

But everyone,

the other people,

cannot

say about a cloth, “To me it is worth five sela.”

A proof of this is that a great man is accustomed to pay for a cloth more than its value:

as here [

as we found ],

for Mar bar Rav Ashi bought [

bought ]

a cloth from the mother of Rabba of Kovei [

a place-name], and the cloth

was worth ten

zuz, and he paid for it

thirteen,

thirteen zuz.

And now the Gemara brings statements of amoraim concerning betrothal with money:

Rabbi Elazar said:

One who says to a woman:

“Be betrothed to me

with a maneh” [

one hundred dinars ],

and he gave her a dinar

one

she is betrothed

immediately, and on condition that he give her another ninety-nine dinars

and complete

thereby the maneh.

What is the reason

what is the reason for the matter?

Since he said to her “

be betrothed to me with a

maneh”

and

gave [

gave ]

her a dinar

one alone, this is

as one

who said to her,

as though he said to her: “Be betrothed to me with one dinar

on condition

that I complete for you a maneh”—

it resembles

the matter resembles this.

And

behold,

Rav Kahana said in the name of Rav: Anyone who says “

on condition that”

is like

“from now”

it resembles.

Every person who made an acquisition on condition and stated the condition with the wording “on condition that,”

this is

like one who says

that the acquisition will take effect

from now, it resembles.

Even though the condition has not yet been fulfilled, provided that in the end the condition is subsequently fulfilled.

And one who says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” and gives her a dinar, is as though he said to her: “Be betrothed to me with one dinar now, on condition that I complete for you a maneh.” Therefore, the betrothal takes effect immediately, on condition that in the end he gives her a maneh.

It objects

a contradiction to the words of Rabbi Elazar from what we learned in a beraita: For it was taught: One who says to a woman

“Be betrothed to me with a maneh, and”

did not give her the entire maneh immediately all at once, but

was counting

dinar by dinar

and going along, and one of them wanted [

the husband or the woman ]

to retract

from the betrothal,

even

if he wanted to retract

with the last dinar—

he has the right

to retract, because the betrothal does not take effect until he completes the entire maneh.

And this is a contradiction to the words of Rabbi Elazar, who said: “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” and he gave her a dinar”—she is betrothed immediately, provided that he completes it!

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing,

what did the beraita speak about?—

With a case

where he said

to her: “Be betrothed to me

with this maneh.”

And he showed her the maneh. Therefore, her intention was to be betrothed with the entire maneh, and not with one dinar alone.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this answer:

But from the latter clause,

from the fact that the latter clause of the beraita [which the Gemara brings immediately] speaks explicitly of one who betroths

“with this maneh,”

it necessarily follows that the

first clause

of the beraita speaks of one who said to her, “Be betrothed

with a maneh,”

without specification—

for it teaches

in the

latter clause: He said to her “

Be betrothed to me with this maneh,”

and gave her the maneh,

and it was found that the maneh was lacking one dinar.

Or

it became clear that one of the dinars was

a copper dinar

and not silver—

she is not betrothed.

But if he gave her one hundred dinars, and it was found that

one dinar

was

bad [

defective ],

she is betrothed

immediately,

and he shall replace

for her that bad dinar with a good dinar. And if we say that the first clause spoke of one who said “this maneh,” and the woman is not betrothed until he gives her the entire maneh, then this is difficult: Why did the beraita repeat and say again in the latter clause, concerning one who says “this maneh,” that the woman is not betrothed until he gives all of it?

Rather, necessarily, the first clause speaks of a case where he said merely “a maneh,” and nevertheless the woman is not betrothed until he gives a complete maneh. And this is contrary to Rabbi Elazar!

And we reject this:

No.

The first clause does not speak of one who says merely “a maneh”!

Rather, both

the first and

both

the latter clause

speak of one who

said “with this maneh.”

And

the tanna in the latter clause

is explaining

the first clause, and the tanna said as follows: One who says, “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” and was counting and going along—if

one of them wanted to retract

from it,

even with the last dinar, he has the right.

How so?—

For example, he said to her “with this maneh,”

and it was found in her possession that the maneh was lacking one dinar. Or it was found to contain a copper dinar.

And this too is logically indicated,

it is logical that the first clause indeed also speaks of one who says “this maneh”—

For if it enters your mind

that if it should occur to you to say that the

first clause

speaks

of a mere maneh,

one may ask:

Now,

now that we have already learned that

with a mere maneh there is no betrothal

until she receives the entire maneh,

with this maneh—

is it necessary to say so?!

Would it be necessary to inform us that even when he says “this maneh,” the woman is not betrothed until he gives all of it?! And why did the beraita trouble itself to teach this in the latter clause?

Rather, from here there is a proof that the first clause also speaks of one who says “this maneh,” as we answered above.

And we reject the proof:

If [you argue] because of this,

if you come to prove from this proof alone that the first clause speaks of “this maneh,”

it is not so!

There is no proof in this.

For it is possible to say that the first clause speaks of a mere maneh, and nevertheless the beraita repeated and taught this law also with “this maneh,” since

the tanna taught the latter clause to reveal the first clause,

the latter clause was taught in order to reveal what the first clause was speaking about—

lest you say that the

first clause

spoke specifically

of

“this maneh,” but with a mere maneh there is betrothal,

therefore

the tanna taught the latter clause with “

this maneh” —

and

from this

you learn

that the first clause

did not speak of “this maneh,” but

of a mere maneh, and even so there is no betrothal.

And although the Gemara rejected the proof that the first clause spoke of “this maneh,” the answer itself was nevertheless not rejected.

And in order to reconcile the words of Rabbi Elazar [who said, “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” and he gave her a dinar—she is betrothed immediately], it must be said that the entire beraita spoke of “this maneh,” and the latter clause explains the first clause.

Rav Ashi said

another answer:

The first clause spoke of a mere maneh, and this is what we learned in the first clause: “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” and he was counting and going along, and one of them wanted to retract from it—he has the right.”

But this is not a contradiction to the words of Rabbi Elazar, because the beraita spoke of one who was counting and going along.

And

counting and going along is different,

different from one who gave her only one dinar, because when the woman sees that he is counting and going along, certainly

her intention is upon all of it [

the entire maneh ]; therefore, she is not betrothed until he gives her all of it.

And the Gemara discusses the substance of the beraita:

We learned in a beraita: He said to her, “Be betrothed to me with this maneh,” and it was found that the maneh was lacking one dinar, or it became clear that one dinar was copper—she is not betrothed. And if one dinar was found to be bad, she is betrothed, and he shall replace it.

And we raise the matter:

This “copper dinar”—

what are the circumstances,

in what manner are we dealing?

If she knew of it,

if the woman noticed at the time she received the dinar that it was copper,

she reasoned,

behold, she knew this,

and accepted

it in order to be betrothed with it as it was! Why is she not betrothed?

And we resolve:

No, it is necessary—

it is necessary to establish the beraita in one of the following two cases:

A.

That he gave it to her at night,

so that the betrother gave the dinar to the woman at night in the darkness, and she did not notice that it was made of copper.

B.

Alternatively, that it was found among the coins.

The copper dinar was mixed together with silver dinars, and the woman did not notice it.

We learned in a beraita: If a bad dinar is found, she is betrothed.

And we inquire about it:

This bad dinar, what are the circumstances?

What is being discussed?

If it does not circulate,

if the dinar does not circulate in commerce, since it passes to no merchant at all, then

that is

its law should be like the law of

a copper dinar!

And why, in the case of a bad dinar, is the woman betrothed, whereas in the case of a copper one she is not betrothed?

Rav Pappa said

as a resolution: It is referring to

one that circulates with difficulty.

she is not betrothed.

And the Gemara brings another statement concerning betrothal with money:

Rava said in the name of Rav Nahman: He said to her

to the woman,

“Become betrothed to me with a maneh,” and

he did not give her the maneh, but rather

placed a pledge for it,

for the maneh,

she is not betrothed.