Kiddushin 7b — the Talmud in English

1. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagreed as to when the law of rejection applies to the offering.

Rabbi Shimon’s view is that the law of “rejection” applies only after the offering has been slaughtered. But while the animal is still alive, the law of rejection does not apply to it; and if the animal again becomes fit for an offering, it may be offered. Whereas Rabbi Yehuda holds that even while the animal is still alive, the law of rejection applies to it.

Rabbi Yohanan in our sugya is speaking of a living animal, and says that the law of rejection applies to it. Therefore,

infer from this

from his words, that in his view also

living animals,

living offerings that have not yet been slaughtered,

are rejected.

2. Some say that the law of rejection applies only to an offering that was fit to be offered at the time it was consecrated, and afterward, once it was consecrated, it was rejected; then it is disqualified forever. But with an offering that at the time of its consecration was not fit to be offered, the law of “rejection” does not apply to it. Therefore, if after some time the reason that prevented its being offered at the time of its consecration is removed, the offering becomes fit to be offered [Sukka 33b].

And Rabbi Yohanan in our sugya says that an animal which at the time of its consecration was rejected from being offered—for only half of it was consecrated then, and it was impossible to offer it then—the law of rejection applies to it—

infer from this,

that in his view

rejection from the outset,

at the beginning of the consecration,

is rejection.

3.

And infer from this that there is rejection with regard to money.

That is, an animal upon which kedushat ha-guf did not initially apply—that they would offer the animal itself—but only kedushat damim applied to it, that they should bring another offering with its monetary value, is also rejected forever, even if afterward they consecrate all of it and it becomes fit to be offered in its entirety upon the altar.

And this is the case, for example, if one of the partners in an animal consecrated his share in the animal, so that it was impossible to offer it at the time of its consecration, because its other half remained ordinary, unconsecrated property; only “kedushat damim” applied to it [to its consecrated half].

That is, the consecration of half of the animal is expressed in that it must be sold, and with half of the money another offering is brought.

And it is proven from Rabbi Yohanan’s words here that although this animal was not designated to be offered at the time its half was consecrated, nevertheless the law of rejection applies to it, and it is rejected from the altar forever, even when he consecrates its other half.

And this is an innovation.

For it could have been said otherwise: that the law of rejection applies only to something upon which kedushat ha-guf applies, so that it itself is to be offered; for then, since kedushat ha-guf has been rejected from being offered, it is rejected forever. But not when the animal cannot become consecrated at all with kedushat ha-guf so that it itself may be offered; for then it could have been said that this is not “rejection” occurring in the consecration of the offering, since no consecration of self-offering applied to the animal at all, and there is nothing that was “rejected.” And now the Gemara brings the continuation of Rava’s words [who said above: “Half of you is consecrated to me”—she is not betrothed]:

He raised a question

and Rava was uncertain:

Rava:

One who gives a woman a peruta and says to her:

Half of you

is betrothed to me

with half a peruta.

And your other half

is betrothed

with

another

half a peruta—

what

is the law in this matter?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Whether

since he said to her

twice, “Become betrothed to me

with half a peruta”

for each half and half of her body, he has

divided

thereby

his matter, in that he divided his betrothal of her into two, as though these were two separate acts of betrothal, and neither one of them by itself is effective at all.

so that he divided his betrothal of her into two, as though these were two separate acts of betrothal, each of which by itself accomplishes nothing?

Or perhaps,

it is possible that he betroths the entire woman in one act, with a complete peruta. And what he said twice, “Your half with half a peruta, and your half with half a peruta,”—

he is counting progressively

the two halves of the peruta and combining them into one peruta. But altogether, his intention is to betroth the entire woman at one time, with one peruta.

And Rava continues and is uncertain:

If you can say

if you resolve this uncertainty and say that he

is counting progressively,

and his betrothal is a betrothal, then another uncertainty arises: One who gives a woman two perutot, and says to her:

Half of you

is betrothed to me

with one peruta,

one,

and your half

the other

with another peruta—

—

what

is the law in this matter?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

It is possible that specifically when he says, “Your half with half a peruta, and your half with half a peruta,” the matter is considered that he is counting progressively the two halves of the perutot, because everyone knows that it is impossible to betroth a woman for less than the value of a peruta, and therefore it is known that he intended one act of betrothal, and necessarily he is counting progressively.

But one who says, “Your half with a peruta, and your half with a peruta,” has given a complete peruta in exchange for each half of a woman.

And

since he said to her

that he is betrothing her half

with a peruta, and

then said that he is also betrothing her other half

with a peruta—

he divided his matter!

It is possible that he thereby divided his betrothal of her into two acts of betrothal, each with one half, and did so because he mistakenly thought that it is possible to betroth half a woman and then another half a woman in two separate acts of betrothal.

According to this side, his betrothal is not a betrothal. For one who says to a woman, “Half of you is betrothed to me,” she is not betrothed.

Or perhaps

perhaps

every

person who intends to complete the betrothal

on that day

[on that same day], we say that from the outset he intended to perform one act of betrothal, and

he is counting progressively

his act of betrothal with her two halves as one continuous act, and therefore his betrothal is a betrothal.

And Rava continues and is uncertain:

If you can say,

if you resolve this uncertainty and say that

every

person who intends to complete the betrothal

on that day is counting progressively, and she is betrothed through one act of betrothal, there is still another uncertainty:

One who gives a woman two perutot and says to her: Become betrothed to me

One who gives a woman two perutot and says to her: Be betrothed to me

with a peruta for your half

one

today, and with a peruta for your half

the second

tomorrow—

what

is the law in this matter?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Whether

since he said to her, “

Your other half

tomorrow,”

he does not intend to complete the betrothal today, but

he divided,

he thereby divided his acts into two separate acts of betrothal, one of which will take effect today upon half of the woman, and the other will take effect tomorrow upon her other half; and if so, his betrothal did not take effect, since it is impossible to betroth half a woman.

Or perhaps

perhaps

this is what he said to her:

this is what he intended to say to her: I betroth you in one act of betrothal, with

betrothal

that

begins from now, but is not completed until tomorrow.

That the beginning of the act of betrothal will begin today with your first half, but it will not take effect upon you until tomorrow, when it will take effect upon both your halves. And it follows that everything is one act of betrothal upon a complete woman, and therefore his betrothal is a betrothal.

And Rava raises another uncertainty:

One who gives a woman a peruta and says to her: Become betrothed to me

with your two halves for a peruta—

what

is the law in this matter?

Is it possible that

here—

here, where he said to her in one statement, “Your two halves,”

he certainly said it at one time,

he intended to betroth her at once.

Or perhaps

perhaps

a woman cannot be betrothed by halves at all,

even when he mentioned both her halves in one statement.

And we conclude:

The question shall stand unresolved!

Let this question stand in doubt.

And now the Gemara brings additional uncertainties that Rava and the other amoraim raised concerning betrothal with money, similar to the uncertainties above:

He raised a question

and was uncertain,

Rava:

Two adult sons made their father an agent to betroth women for them, and the father went and gave a peruta to another man, the father of two minor daughters, whose father has the right to betroth them, and said to him:

Your two daughters

the minors

are betrothed to my two sons with this peruta

this one—

what

is the law in this matter?

Whether

we follow the giver and the recipient,

in betrothal with money we follow the giver of the betrothal money and the one who receives it. And here, the father of the sons gave a complete peruta, and the father of the daughters received a complete peruta,

and there is money,

for here there is a complete peruta, which is included in the category of “money,” with which it is possible to betroth a woman.

Or perhaps

perhaps [there is doubt]: in betrothal we do not follow the giver and the recipient, but

we follow them,

we follow the men who are betrothing and the women who are being betrothed,

and there is not,

for here there is not a complete peruta from the side of each one of them [but only half a peruta from one son for one daughter].

And we conclude:

The question shall stand unresolved!

Let this question stand in doubt.

Rav Pappa raised a question:

One who gives a peruta to a man and says to him:

Your daughter and your cow

are acquired by me

with this peruta

[I betroth your daughter, and I acquire your cow]—

what

is the law in this matter?

Do we say,

do we say that he intended to say:

Your daughter with half a peruta, and your cow with half a peruta?

And he acquired nothing.

Or perhaps

perhaps we say that certainly one who betroths a woman knows that betrothal does not take effect with less than the value of a peruta. Therefore, he intended to say:

Your daughter

will be betrothed to me

with a peruta, and

whereas

your cow

shall be acquired by me

through pulling.

And we conclude:

The question shall stand unresolved.

Rav Ashi raised a question:

One who gives a peruta to a man and says to him:

Your daughter and your land

are acquired by me

with this peruta

this one—

what

is the law in this matter?

Do we say that he intended to say:

Your daughter with half a peruta, and your land with half a peruta.

And he acquired nothing.

Or perhaps

perhaps we say that certainly one who betroths a woman knows that betrothal does not take effect with less than the value of a peruta, and this is what he intended to say:

Your daughter

is betrothed to me

with a peruta, and your land

shall be acquired by me

through

the acquisition of

possession,

when I take possession of it [after some time].

And we conclude:

teyku.

That man betrothed [a woman] with silk garments.

It was an incident involving a man who betrothed a woman with silk garments, which certainly were worth more than a peruta, but their value was not clearly known at the time of the betrothal.

Rabba said: They do not require valuation.

There is no need for appraisers to assess the value of the silk garments before the woman receives them.

Rav Yosef said: They require valuation.

The appraisers must assess them before the woman receives them. And here, since the woman received them without valuation, she is not betrothed. And the reason for this will be explained immediately below.

And the Gemara explains in which case Rabba and Rav Yosef disagreed:

if,

if it was a case

that

the one betrothing

said to her

the woman: “Be betrothed to me with these silk garments,”

with anything whatsoever,

according to whatever they are worth — then

everyone agrees that they do not require valuation.

Everyone agrees that there is no need to assess the silk garments before the woman receives them, since they are certainly worth more than a peruta, and the woman becomes betrothed with the value of a peruta.

And

if

it was a case

that he said to her, “

Be betrothed to me with

fifty

zuz, and here are these silk garments for their value,”

and

after she received them it became clear that they

were not worth fifty—

Certainly, in this case as well there is no disagreement that she is not betrothed, because

they are not worth it!

For the silk garments are not worth fifty zuz, and the woman consented to become betrothed only with fifty zuz and not with less. Therefore everyone agrees that she is not betrothed.

They disagreed

in this:

that he said

to her: “Be betrothed to me with

fifty

zuz, and here are these silk garments for their value.”

And

after the betrothal it became clear that the silk garments indeed

were worth fifty.

Rabba said: They do not require

the silk garments

valuation

before the betrothal,

for

since in the end it became clear that they indeed

were worth fifty.

Rav Yosef said: They require valuation

before the betrothal—

since the woman

[that is, a woman]

is not expert in valuation,

therefore, if the value of the silk garments was not assessed before the betrothal,

she did not rely

the woman

on her judgment

at the time of the betrothal to believe that the silk garments indeed were worth fifty zuz, and she does not make up her mind to become betrothed to him.

And the Gemara brings another opinion in explaining the disagreement between Rabba and Rav Yosef:

There are those who say,

there are those who say that even when the one betrothing said to her, “Be betrothed to me

with anything whatsoever”—

they also disagree!

Rav Yosef said,

even in this case it requires valuation before the betrothal, because

an object worth money is like money —

This is the version found in the books before us. It also appears from the words of Ritba. However, Maharsha [on Tosafot beginning “From where I derive it”] inferred from Tosafot that they did not have the word “also” in their version. According to the latter formulation, Rabba and Rav Yosef disagree only in a case of “in any amount” [but when he said “fifty,” everyone agrees that appraisal is required].

Just as money is fixed in value,

just as the value of money is fixed and known to everyone—