Kiddushin 7b (ז:) — the Talmud in English

1. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree as to when the law of deḥuy—rejection—takes effect with regard to a sacrifice.

Rabbi Shimon maintains that the law of deḥuy applies only after the sacrifice has been slaughtered. But while the animal is alive, the law of deḥuy does not apply to it; and if the animal becomes fit for a sacrifice again, it may be offered. Rabbi Yehuda, however, maintains that the law of deḥuy applies even while the animal is alive.

Rabbi Yoḥanan in our sugya is speaking about a living animal, and says that the law of deḥuy takes effect with regard to it. Therefore,

infer from this

from his statement that, in his view, even

living animals,

living sacrifices that have not yet been slaughtered,

are rejected.

2. Some say that the law of deḥuy applies only to a sacrifice that was fit to be offered at the time it was consecrated, and afterward, once it was consecrated, became rejected; in that case it is disqualified forever. But with regard to a sacrifice that was unfit to be offered at the time of its consecration, the law of deḥuy does not apply. Therefore, if the reason that prevented its offering at the time of its consecration later disappears, the sacrifice becomes fit to be offered [Sukka 33b].

Rabbi Yoḥanan in our sugya says that an animal which, at the time of its consecration, was rejected from being offered—for at that time only half of it was consecrated, and it could not then be offered—is subject to the law of deḥuy—

infer from this,

that in his view

an initial rejection,

at the beginning of the consecration,

is considered a rejection.

3.

And infer from this that there is rejection with regard to monetary sanctity.

That is, an animal upon which kedushat haguf, intrinsic sanctity requiring the animal itself to be offered, did not originally take effect, but only kedushat damim, monetary sanctity requiring that another sacrifice be brought with its value, is also rejected forever, even if its entirety is subsequently consecrated and it becomes fit to be offered in its entirety on the altar.

For example, if one of the partners in an animal consecrated his share of the animal, then it could not be offered at the time of its consecration, because its other half remained unconsecrated. In that case, only monetary sanctity took effect with regard to its consecrated half.

That is, the sanctity of half the animal is expressed by the fact that it must be sold, and with half of its proceeds another sacrifice must be brought.

It is evident from Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement here that although this animal was not destined to be offered when half of it was consecrated, nevertheless the law of deḥuy takes effect with regard to it, and it is rejected forever from the altar, even when its other half is consecrated.

And this is novel.

For it could have been said otherwise: that the law of deḥuy applies only to something upon which intrinsic sanctity took effect, so that it itself was to be offered. In that case, since its intrinsic sanctity was rejected from being offered, it is rejected forever. But not when the animal cannot become sanctified with intrinsic sanctity at all, so that it itself could be offered; in that case, one might say that this is not a “rejection” occurring with regard to the sanctity of the sacrifice, since no sanctity of individual offering took effect in the animal at all, and there is nothing that was “rejected.” The Gemara now cites the continuation of Rava’s statement [who said above: “‘Half of you is consecrated to me’—she is not betrothed]: One might have said that the law of deḥuy applies only to an animal possessing intrinsic sanctity and designated for offering, because its sanctity is a more stringent sanctity. But an animal sanctified only with regard to its value does not possess significant sanctity; it is like an unconsecrated animal. Even if there were a reason causing it to become disqualified as a sacrifice, the law of deḥuy would not take effect with regard to it, and if the reason for its disqualification disappeared, it could be consecrated and offered. Therefore, it was necessary to learn from Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that even with regard to something sanctified only with regard to its value, the law of deḥuy takes effect.

Rava raised a dilemma

He was uncertain

Rava:

One who gives a woman a peruta and says to her:

“Half of you”

is betrothed to me

with half a peruta,

and your other half

is betrothed

with

another

half a peruta—

what

is the law in this case?

The sides of the dilemma are:

Is it

since he said to her

twice, “Be betrothed to me

with half a peruta,”

with regard to each half of her body, he has

divided

thereby

his statement,

so that he divided his betrothal of her into two, as though these were two separate acts of betrothal, each of which by itself accomplishes nothing?

Or perhaps,

he may be betrothing the entire woman in a single act, with one whole peruta. What he said twice—“Half of you with half a peruta, and half of you with half a peruta”—

is a calculation in progress,

counting the two halves of the peruta and combining them into one peruta. But in total, his intention is to betroth the entire woman at one time, with one peruta.

Rava continues to raise a dilemma:

If you should say,

if you resolve this dilemma and say that he

is calculating in progress,

and his betrothal is valid, then another dilemma arises: One who gives a woman two perutot and says to her:

“Half of you”

is betrothed to me

with one peruta

one,

and your other half

is betrothed

with another peruta

—

what

is the law in this case?

The sides of the dilemma are:

Perhaps only when he says, “Half of you with half a peruta, and half of you with half a peruta,” is it considered that he is calculating in progress the two halves of the perutot, because everyone knows that a woman cannot be betrothed with less than the value of a peruta. Therefore, it is clear that he intended one act of betrothal, and necessarily he is calculating in progress.

But when one says, “Half of you with a peruta, and half of you with a peruta,” he has given one whole peruta for each half of the woman.

And

since he said to her

that he was betrothing half of her

with a peruta, and

then said that he was also betrothing her other half

with a peruta—

he divided his statement!

Perhaps he thereby divided his betrothal of her into two acts of betrothal, each concerning one half, and did so because he mistakenly thought that it was possible to betroth half a woman and then another half a woman through two separate acts of betrothal.

According to this side of the dilemma, his betrothal is invalid, since one who says to a woman, “Half of you is betrothed to me,” does not betroth her.

Or perhaps,

perhaps

every

person who intends to complete the betrothal

that same day

[on that day], we say that from the outset he intended to perform one act of betrothal, and he

is calculating in progress

his act of betrothal with her two halves as one continuous act; therefore, his betrothal is valid.

Rava continues to raise a dilemma:

If you should say,

if you resolve this dilemma and say that

every

person who intends to complete the betrothal

that same day is calculating in progress,

and she is betrothed through one act of betrothal, another dilemma still arises:

One who gives a woman two perutot and says to her: Be betrothed to me

with one peruta for half of you

one

today, and with a peruta for half of you

the second

tomorrow—

what

is the law in this case?

The sides of the dilemma are:

Is it

since he said to her, “

Your other half

tomorrow,”

he does not intend to complete the betrothal today, but

he divided it;

he thereby divided his acts into two separate acts of betrothal, one taking effect today with regard to half the woman, and the other taking effect tomorrow with regard to her other half? If so, his betrothal does not take effect, since it is impossible to betroth half a woman.

Or perhaps

[perhaps]

this is what he said to her

and this is what he intended to say to her: I am betrothing you in one act of betrothal, with

a betrothal

that

begins now but is not completed until tomorrow.

The beginning of the act of betrothal will take place today with your first half, but it will not be completed and take effect with regard to you until tomorrow, when it takes effect with regard to both your halves. It follows that the entire matter is one act of betrothal concerning a complete woman; therefore, his betrothal is valid.

Rava raises another dilemma:

One who gives a woman a peruta and says to her: Be betrothed to me

with your two halves for one peruta—

what

is the law in this case?

Is it possible that

here—

here, where he said to her in a single statement, “Your two halves,”—

he certainly said it at one time,

intending to betroth her all at once?

Or perhaps

[perhaps]

a woman cannot be betrothed by halves at all,

even when he mentioned both her halves in a single statement.

And we conclude:

Teyku!

Let this question remain unresolved.

The Gemara now presents additional uncertainties raised by Rava and the other amoraim concerning betrothal through money, similar to the uncertainties above:

Rava raised a dilemma

He was uncertain

Rava:

Two adult sons appointed their father as an agent to betroth women for them. The father went and gave a peruta to another man, the father of two minor daughters, over whose betrothal the father has authority, and said to him:

“Your two daughters”

the minors

“are betrothed to my two sons with this peruta”

—

what

is the law in this case?

Is it

after the giver and recipient that we follow,

meaning that with regard to betrothal through money we follow the giver of the betrothal money and the person who receives it? Here, the father of the sons gave one whole peruta, and the father of the daughters received one whole peruta;

and there is money,

for there is one whole peruta here, which is considered “money” with which a woman may be betrothed.

Or perhaps

[perhaps] [there is no following the giver and recipient in betrothal, but

after them we follow,

we follow the men who are betrothing and the women who are being betrothed;

and there is not,

for there is not a whole peruta on behalf of each of them [but only half a peruta from one son for one daughter].

And we conclude:

Teyku!

Let this question remain unresolved.

Rav Pappa raised a dilemma:

One who gives a peruta to a man and says to him:

“Your daughter and your cow”

are acquired by me

with this peruta

[I am betrothing your daughter, and I am acquiring your cow]—

what

is the law in this case?

Do we say,

do we say that he intended to say:

“Your daughter with half a peruta, and your cow with half a peruta”?

And he acquired nothing.

Or perhaps

[perhaps] we say that certainly the man betrothing the woman knows that betrothal does not take effect with less than the value of a peruta. Therefore, he intended to say:

“Your daughter

shall be betrothed to me

with a peruta, and

whereas

your cow

shall be acquired by me

through pulling.

And we conclude:

Teyku.

Rav Ashi raised a dilemma:

One who gives a peruta to a man and says to him:

“Your daughter and your land”

are acquired by me

with this peruta

—

what

is the law in this case?

Do we say that he intended to say:

“Your daughter with half a peruta, and your land with half a peruta.”

And he acquired nothing.

Or perhaps

[perhaps] we say that certainly the man betrothing the woman knows that betrothal does not take effect with less than the value of a peruta, and this is what he intended to say:

“Your daughter”

is betrothed to me

with a peruta, and your land

shall be acquired by me

through

the acquisition of

possession,

when I take possession of it [afterward].

And we conclude:

Teyku.

There was a certain man who betrothed a woman with silk garments.

There was an incident involving a man who betrothed a woman with silk garments, which were certainly worth more than a peruta, but their precise value was not known at the time of the betrothal.

Rabba said: They do not require appraisal.

There is no need for appraisers to assess the value of the silk garments before the woman receives them.

Rav Yosef said: They require appraisal.

The appraisers must assess them before the woman receives them. Here, since the woman received them without an appraisal, she is not betrothed. The reason for this will be explained immediately below.

The Gemara explains the case in which Rabba and Rav Yosef disagree:

If

the case was that

the man who betrothed her

said

to her

the woman: “Be betrothed to me with these silk garments”

in any amount,

whatever their value may be — then

everyone agrees that they do not require appraisal.

Everyone agrees that there is no need to appraise the silk garments before the woman receives them, since they are certainly worth more than a peruta, and a woman is betrothed with the value of a peruta.

And

if

the case was that he

said to her: “

Be betrothed to me with

fifty

zuz, and here are these silk garments in their monetary value,”

and

after she received them, it became clear that they

were not worth fifty—

Certainly, in this case as well, there is no dispute that she is not betrothed, because

they were not worth it!

For the silk garments were not worth fifty zuz, and the woman consented to become betrothed only for fifty zuz and not for less. Therefore, everyone agrees that she is not betrothed.

The disagreement is

concerning the case in which he

said

to the woman: “Be betrothed to me with

fifty

zuz, and here are these silk garments in their monetary value.”

And

after the betrothal, it became clear that the silk garments indeed

were worth fifty.

Rabba said: They do not require

the silk garments

appraisal

before the betrothal,

for

since it ultimately became clear that they indeed

were worth fifty.

Rav Yosef said: They require appraisal

before the betrothal—

since a woman [

that is, a woman]

is not knowledgeable about appraisal,

therefore, if the value of the silk garments was not assessed before the betrothal,

she did not rely

the woman

on her judgment

to believe at the time of the betrothal that the silk garments were indeed worth fifty zuz, and she did not fully resolve in her mind to become betrothed to him.

The Gemara offers another explanation of the dispute between Rabba and Rav Yosef:

There are those who say,

some say that even when the man who betrothed her said to her, “Be betrothed to me

in any amount”—

they too disagree!

Rav Yosef said,

even in this case they require appraisal before the betrothal, because

movable property of monetary value is equivalent to money

This is the version found in the books before us. It also appears from the words of Ritba. However, Maharsha [on Tosafot beginning “From where I derive it”] inferred from Tosafot that they did not have the word “also” in their version. According to the latter formulation, Rabba and Rav Yosef disagree only in a case of “in any amount” [but when he said “fifty,” everyone agrees that appraisal is required].

Just as money has a fixed value,

just as the value of money is fixed and known to everyone—