Kiddushin 7a — the Talmud in English

Rava said:

A woman who said to a man:

“Give a maneh to so-and-so”

[not to me myself]

“and I will be betrothed”

I

“to you”

with that same maneh.

And the man went and gave a maneh to that so-and-so, and said to the woman: “Be betrothed to me with the maneh that I gave to so-and-so at your request, to give it to him, and to become betrothed to me with it”—this woman is

betrothed,

even though she herself received nothing.

And the possibility of an act of acquisition of betrothal in this manner is learned

from the law of a guarantor.

Just as we find in the Torah that a guarantor becomes obligated to the lender to repay the borrower’s debt, even though he himself received nothing, so the woman becomes betrothed to the man with money that he gave to another man at her instruction, just as she becomes betrothed when he gives the money to her herself.

For

a guarantor,

is it not

not so—

does he not

even though benefit did not reach his hand

—the benefit of the money did not reach his hand, but rather the borrower’s hand—nevertheless

he obligates himself

he is able to obligate himself to the lender, without receiving benefit, but only through the fact that the lender gave the money to the borrower at his request—

This woman too

so too this woman,

even though it did not reach

which did not reach

the benefit

of the money

her hand,

nevertheless

she obligates herself and acquires

she acquires

herself

to her husband, through the fact that the husband gave the money to another person at her request. A person who sent his fellow to betroth a woman for him, and the agent took money from his own pocket, and the agent said to the woman:

“Here is a maneh”

of mine,

“and become betrothed”

with it

“to so-and-so”

the sender—she is

betrothed

to the sender, even though the betrothal money was given to her from the agent’s pocket and not from her husband.

And this matter is learned

from the law of a Canaanite slave.

Just as we learned below [22b] that a Canaanite slave acquires himself [goes free] with money, by others giving the owners money as his redemption price, and through this he acquires himself and goes free.

For

a Canaanite slave,

is it not

not so—

does it not mean—

even though he does not diminish

the slave from his own property

anything at all

[anything], nevertheless

he acquires himself

he acquires himself with money that others gave on his behalf.

If so,

this man too

this man who betroths the woman as well,

even though he does not diminish

from his property

anything at all

[anything], nevertheless

he acquires this woman

he acquires this woman with money that others gave her for her betrothal to him.

A woman who said to a man:

“Give a maneh to so-and-so”

from your money,

“and I will be betrothed to him”

[to so-and-so who receives the maneh], with that maneh that you give him because of my request—

she is

betrothed.

Even though there are here two deficiencies: a. the woman received nothing; b. the betrother was diminished by nothing.

And this matter is learned

from the law of both,

from the combination of these two laws, the law of a guarantor and the law of a Canaanite slave: a. concerning the first deficiency, that the woman received nothing, it is learned from a guarantor that this is not a deficiency—

For

a guarantor, is it not

does it not mean

even though it does not reach

[reach]

benefit to his hand,

nevertheless

he obligates himself

through the fact that the lender gave his money to the borrower at his request.

And if so,

this woman too

this woman as well,

even though it does not reach

that benefit does not reach

her hand,

nevertheless

she acquires herself

with money that was given to her husband at her request.

And should you say:

“Are they comparable?!”

Is this comparable to the law of a guarantor? For

with a guarantor, the one who acquires him

the person who acquires a guarantee from the guarantor [the lender]

diminishes property

his property was diminished by giving it to the borrower at the guarantor’s request, and therefore the guarantor became obligated to him.

But

this man,

who was told by the woman to give money to him and that she would become betrothed to him, only

acquires this woman

this man acquires this woman,

and does not diminish, anything at all!

He was diminished by nothing, so how does the woman become acquired to him, after he spent no money from his side?

Your answer is—

b.

A Canaanite slave proves it: he does not diminish property, and

nevertheless

he acquires himself,

he acquires himself through others giving money on his behalf. From here you learn that even one who betroths a woman can acquire her, although he himself was not diminished by any money at all, but rather others gave money on his behalf.

And should you say:

“Are they comparable?”

Is a husband who betroths without giving money comparable to a Canaanite slave who acquires himself without giving money from his side?!

For

there,

with a Canaanite slave,

the one who makes the acquisition—

acquires!

The master, who transfers the slave to himself, acquires [receives] as his payment the money of his redemption [although the money reaches him from other people for the slave’s release, and not from the slave himself].

But

here,

here, the woman is the one who transfers herself, and the husband is the one who acquires her; and if the woman says to another person, “Give a maneh to so-and-so, and I will become betrothed to him”—

this woman

this woman

transfers herself, and does not acquire anything at all!

This woman, who transfers herself to the husband in such a manner, does not acquire [receive] anything for her transfer!

And from where do we know that even in such a manner a money acquisition is effective?

Your answer is—

A guarantor proves it,

that

even though it does not reach,

that

benefit does not reach his hand

[but rather the borrower’s hand], nevertheless

he obligates

his

self.

Similarly, a woman, even if she receives nothing for transferring herself to her husband, can become betrothed to him with money that others gave him at her request.

And now the Gemara continues and presents Rava’s doubt concerning another manner of giving betrothal money—what is its law:

He inquired

[asked]

Rava:

A woman who gave money to a man and said to him:

“Here is a maneh, and I will become betrothed to you.”

And the man received the maneh from her hand and said to her, “Become betrothed to me with it”—

what is it?

What is the law in this case?

Mar Zutra said in the name of Rav Pappa: She is betrothed.

And Rav Ashi understood that the reason for the matter is because of an acquisition “along with.”

That is, since the man acquires the maneh from the woman, he also acquires the woman herself along with it.

And similar to what we learned below [26a], that movable property is acquired along with land. That is, a person who wishes to acquire land and movable property from his fellow can perform an act of acquisition with the land, and along with it the movable property is also acquired by him without his performing any acquisition with the movable property [as will be brought in the Gemara shortly].

Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra:

According to what you said in the name of Rav Pappa, that a woman who gives money to a man and says to him, “Here is a maneh, and I will become betrothed to you,” is betrothed,

if so

there is a difficulty—

For the acquisition of a person was compared to the acquisition of land, as it is stated concerning the acquisition of slaves [Leviticus 25]: “And you shall take them as an inheritance [the Canaanite slaves] to inherit as a holding [like a land holding].” From this one learns that the law of a person is like the law of land.

And if so, according to your words, when the man acquires the woman [whose law is like land] along with his acquisition of the money that he receives from her [whose law is like movable property]—

it would be

behold, his act of acquisition is like

property that has security,

land, which

is acquired along with

through an acquisition performed with

property that has no security

[movable property].

That is, through the acquisition performed with the money, which is movable, the land is acquired.

And it is difficult:

but

behold,

we learned the opposite!

Behold, we recite [below, 26a], the opposite:

For we learned:

property that has no security

[movable property]

is acquired along with

through

property that has security

[land], through acquiring the land

with

an acquisition

of money, by a document, or by possession.

And it is implied from this Mishna that specifically movable property is acquired along with land, whereas land is not acquired along with movable property.

And if so, how is it possible that the woman [whose law is like land] is acquired along with the maneh [which is movable property]?

He said to him

Mar Zutra gave him an answer:

Do you think

do you think that this refers to a case in which

the

woman

said to him

to the man, “Acquire me ‘along with’ the acquisition of the maneh”?

That is not so!

Rather,

here

[here]

we are dealing with an important person,

who is not accustomed to receiving gifts,

we are dealing.

The woman wishes to become betrothed to him, and she derives benefit from the fact that he consented to receive a gift from her. That benefit is worth a peruta to her, because she would agree to give a peruta to a person to persuade him [the important person] to accept a gift from her.

For through that benefit which he receives

the important person

a gift from her,

from her,

she resolves,

the woman resolves in her mind,

and acquires herself to him.

Through this she transfers herself to him by the law of a money acquisition [since that benefit that comes to her from him accepting her gift is important to her and worth a peruta, and it is therefore as though he gave her money for her betrothal].

And the Gemara returns to discuss Rava’s words, who learns from a guarantor and a Canaanite slave concerning a woman’s betrothal—

it was also stated in the name of Rava: And likewise

the law

concerning monetary matters.

That is, we learn from the law of a guarantor’s obligation in a loan, and from the law of a Canaanite slave’s release with money through others, concerning a money acquisition of land—

a. One who sells a field to his fellow and says to him: “Give money to so-and-so, and my field is sold to you with it”—even though the seller did not receive the money, nevertheless the field is acquired by the buyer through the law of a “guarantor.”

[Just as a guarantor becomes liable for money to the lender, even though the money that the lender gave reaches the borrower’s hand and not his.]

b. One who says to his fellow: “Here is my maneh, and your field shall be sold to so-and-so”—even though the buyer did not pay the money, nevertheless he acquired the field through the law of a “Canaanite slave.”

[Like a Canaanite slave who goes free through others redeeming him with their money, while he himself paid nothing at all.]

c. One who says to his fellow: “Give a maneh to so-and-so, and acquire my field for him with that maneh,” acquires through the law of both.

For there are two deficiencies here: a. The seller received nothing. b. The buyer paid nothing from his money. And therefore they learn from the law of both of them.

And the Gemara explains why Rava needed to teach us these laws both concerning kiddushin and concerning monetary matters: And we say:

And it was necessary,

Rava needed to teach this in both places:

Because

if he had taught us

that if Rava had taught us only concerning

kiddushin,

it would have been possible to say that these acquisitions are effective only for kiddushin

because the woman, it is pleasing to her with anything whatsoever.

Because a woman agrees to become betrothed through any acquisition whatsoever, even through the acceptance of benefit alone.

And

so

said

Resh Lakish:

For Resh Lakish said: It is good for her to dwell as two, rather than to dwell as a widow.

It is good for a woman to sit together with any husband, so that two bodies will be together, rather than to sit alone as a widow. And even though the husband is not good in her eyes, nevertheless she agrees to his kiddushin, so that she will not be alone.

And since it is pleasing for a woman to become betrothed so that she will not be alone, even to a man who is not good in her eyes, likewise one can say that for this reason she is prepared to transfer herself to her husband even through benefit alone, even though she does not receive outright money through her kiddushin.

But

concerning

monetary matters—

perhaps not.

I would say that it is impossible to acquire land without the buyer giving outright money to the seller.

And therefore Rava needed to teach us his words concerning monetary matters.

And if he had taught us

only concerning

monetary matters

alone, it would have been possible to say that the law of a guarantor and a Canaanite slave are effective only for the acquisition of property,

because it is given

because the money is given

for release.

That is, a person may relinquish money that is owed to him [and therefore the seller can agree to the acquisition even if he does not receive money from the buyer, but rather it is given according to the law of a guarantor or according to the law of a Canaanite slave].

But

concerning

kiddushin, perhaps,

I would say that the laws of a guarantor and a Canaanite slave

do not

apply to them; rather, the husband must give kiddushin money to the woman.

Therefore

it was necessary.

Rava needed to teach us his words in both places [both concerning kiddushin and concerning monetary matters].

And now the Gemara brings another statement of Rava, which discusses the wording of kiddushin. And subsequently, Rava is uncertain concerning kiddushin money:

Rava said:

One who says to a woman:

Become betrothed to me for half of me

she is

betrothed.

But one who says to a woman:

Half of you is betrothed to me

she is not betrothed.

And below it will be explained what Rava said and what his reason is.

Abaye said to Rava

there is cause for wonder concerning your words:

What is different,

for in what way is the one who says “

Half of you is betrothed to me,”

whom you said

she is not betrothed,

different, for concerning kiddushin, “When a man takes

a woman”

the Merciful One said [

Deuteronomy 22], and it implies that one can betroth only a complete woman,

and not half a woman!

If so,

so too,

the one who says, “Become betrothed to me for half of me,” should likewise not have valid kiddushin, for “When

a man”

the Merciful One said, and not “when

he takes

half a man

a woman”! For if he betroths a woman for half of himself, the meaning of the words is that only half of him betrothed her.

And why did you say that if a man says, “Become betrothed to me for half of me,” she is betrothed?

Rava said to him: Is this now comparable!?

What is the comparison between the two matters:

For when a man says to a woman, “Half of you is betrothed to me,” he intended thereby to permit her to marry another man besides him. And it is as though half of her belongs to him and half belongs to another.

And similarly, when one says, “Become betrothed to me for half of me,” he intended that he should have permission to marry an additional woman. And it is as though half of him is hers and half is another woman’s.

And wherever it is possible to interpret his words in a manner in which he did not intend an actual half of the body, we interpret them in this manner, and if so—

There,

in that case, when he says, “Half of you is betrothed to me,” it is impossible to interpret that his intention was to betroth all of her and nevertheless permit her to marry another man, for

a woman for two

is not fit.

A woman cannot marry two men. Necessarily, he intended to betroth only half of the woman’s body and leave her other half to another.

And it is impossible to do this, for Scripture said “a woman,” and not half a woman!

Rather,

but when one says, “Become betrothed to me for half of me,” it is possible to interpret his words in a manner in which he did not intend an actual half of his body.

For

a man

is he not fit for two?

Is a man not able to marry two women?!

And

since a man is permitted to marry two women, one can say that

this is what he said to her,

this is what he intended to say to the woman:

Indeed, you are betrothed to all of my body, but

if I desire to marry another, I will marry her.

That if I desire to marry another woman, I will marry her.

And he called this figuratively, as though she were betrothed to only half of him.

And since he betrothed the woman to all of his body, therefore his kiddushin is valid.

Mar Zutra raises a difficulty concerning what Rava said regarding one who says, “Half of you is betrothed to me,” that she is not betrothed:

He said to him,

he raised

Mar Zutra son of Rav Mari

a difficulty

to Ravina:

Indeed, it is impossible for half of a woman’s body to be betrothed, for it is said “a woman,” and not half a woman. But since the betrother said to the woman, “Half of you is betrothed,” in the language of consecration,

if so—

the kiddushin should spread through all of her!

The kiddushin that he performed on half of the woman should spread through the woman’s entire body, as with one who consecrates half an animal as a sacrifice, where the consecration spreads through the animal’s entire body and it all becomes a sacrifice—

For

is it not taught,

did we not learn thus—

one who says

concerning the leg of an animal:

The leg of

this

animal

shall be consecrated with the sanctity of

an burnt offering—

shall it be,

the animal shall thereby become

entirely

consecrated with the sanctity of a sacrifice

an burnt offering!

And similarly, it should be appropriate to say concerning one who betroths half a woman that she is entirely betrothed, because the kiddushin that he performed on half of her spread through all of her, just as his consecration of half an animal spreads through the entire animal!

And why did Rava say that she is not betrothed?

And

perhaps you will answer that Rava holds that even when one consecrates half an animal, the entire animal is not consecrated, for the beraita in Tractate Temura [11b] brings the view of those who disagree, who hold that one who says, “The leg of this animal is an burnt offering,” does not make the entire animal an burnt offering!

It is impossible to say this.

For

even according to the one who says

that one who says, “The leg of this animal is an burnt offering,”

the entire animal does not become an burnt offering, this applies

the matter applies specifically

where

where

he consecrates something upon which life does not depend,

such as a leg, for even if that limb is removed, the animal will not die.

But

one who

consecrates something upon which life depends [

such as one who consecrates the animal’s heart, or half of the animal’s body, for if it is removed from the animal, it will die]—according to everyone

the entire animal becomes an burnt offering!

And similarly, in the case of one who says to a woman, “Half of you is betrothed to me,” he betrothed her through something upon which life depends [for if half of her body were removed from the woman, she would die], and it would be appropriate that his kiddushin spread through all of her, according to everyone!

And if so, the difficulty returns: Why did Rava say, concerning one who says, “Half of you is betrothed to me,” that she is not betrothed!?

And Ravina answered Mar Zutra son of Rav Mari:

Is it comparable!?

Is it possible to compare the kiddushin of a woman to consecration and say that just as consecration of half an animal spreads through the animal’s entire body, so kiddushin of half a woman spreads through the entire woman?

But there is a distinction between them:

There,

in the case of one who consecrates half an animal, there is no one who will prevent his consecration from spreading, for

it is an animal,

and it belongs to him, and it has no power to prevent him from doing anything he wishes with it.

But

here,

in the case of one who betroths half a woman, the woman has

another mind,

and she is considered his equal, and she has the power to oppose her kiddushin to him [for if she does not wish to become betrothed to him, his kiddushin is not valid].

And since he betrothed half of her, and the woman agreed only that half of her should become betrothed to him, his speech does not have the power to acquire all of her against her will.

And Ravina proves that when there is “another opinion,” his speech does not have the power to extend beyond what he consecrated:

This is not comparable,

the betrothal of half a woman is not comparable to one who consecrates half of his animal,

but rather to that which Rabbi Yohanan said [below],

below, from which it is proven from his words [of Rabbi Yohanan] that an animal belonging to two partners, one of whom consecrated his share, the consecration does not extend over his fellow’s share, and the animal is consecrated only in half of it.

And the reason for the matter is that the animal’s other half belongs to another opinion [to the second partner], and this prevents the consecration from extending throughout it.

And similarly, one who betroths half a woman: since the woman is another opinion, which has the right to oppose the betrothal, therefore the betrothal does not extend throughout her.

And the Gemara brings Rabbi Yohanan’s words as they are:

An animal that was consecrated as an offering, and it happened that it was rejected [disqualified] for one moment from being offered upon the altar, the law of dichuy from offering takes effect in it. Therefore, even if afterward it becomes fit to be offered, it remains rejected forever, and is disqualified from being offered forever.

And thus said Rabbi Yohanan:

an animal belonging to two partners,

which

one partner consecrated

one

half of it

that belongs to him,

and

afterward

he went back and purchased it,

he purchased the half belonging to the second partner,

and consecrated it

a second time, so that the entire animal would be consecrated—

a. This is

consecrated

in its entirety.

b.

And

although the entire animal is now consecrated, nevertheless it

is not offered

upon the altar. For when he consecrated its first half, the animal was not fit to be offered, since half of it was then unconsecrated. And since the sanctity that took effect in the animal at first was in the category of “rejected sanctity” [which was then rejected from being offered upon the altar], the law of “dichuy” took effect in the animal.

For since the sanctity was rejected for one moment from being offered, it is rejected forever.

And what is its remedy?—That it be sold, and another be purchased with its proceeds, and he offer it.

c.

and it effects temura.

If he said of another animal, “This is its temura,” the laws of temura took effect in it. That is, the first animal remains in its sanctity, and the second animal also becomes consecrated [and is called “temura”].

And its temura—

it is

like it!

For it too is not fit for offering, since, because its sanctity came through its being exchanged for rejected sanctity, the sanctity that took effect in the temura is also “rejected sanctity,” with all its laws.

These are Rabbi Yohanan’s words up to here.

And from Rabbi Yohanan’s words we learned that at first, when one partner consecrated his share, the sanctity did not extend throughout the entire animal, but only half of it was consecrated.

And the reason for the matter is that the other half of the animal belongs to another opinion [that is, to the second partner]. And from here I will learn that when there is another opinion that has the ability to oppose this, the sanctity does not extend [and therefore, even one who says to a woman, “Half of you is betrothed to me,” the betrothal does not extend throughout her, because she has the ability to oppose this].

And since the Gemara brought Rabbi Yohanan’s dictum, it brings the laws that are to be learned from his words:

And we say:

Learn from this three things.

We have to learn from Rabbi Yohanan’s dictum three novelties: