Kiddushin 7a (ז.) — the Talmud in English

Rava said:

a. If a woman says to a man:

“Give a maneh to so-and-so”

—not to me—,

“and I will be betrothed”

I

to you

with that same maneh,

and the man went and gave a maneh to that so-and-so, and said to the woman: “You are betrothed to me with the maneh that I gave to so-and-so at your request that I give it to him, and that you be betrothed to me through it”—she is

betrothed,

even though she herself received nothing.

The possibility of effecting kiddushin in this manner is derived

from the law of a guarantor.

Just as we find in the Torah that a guarantor becomes obligated to the creditor to repay the borrower’s debt, even though he himself received nothing, so too a woman becomes betrothed to a man through money that he gave to another person at her instruction, just as she becomes betrothed when he gives the money directly to her.

For

a guarantor,

is it

not

the case that

even though no benefit reaches his hand,

as the benefit of the money did not reach him but rather reached the borrower, nevertheless

he obligates himself,

as he can obligate himself to the creditor without receiving benefit, merely because the creditor gave the money to the borrower at his request —

This woman likewise,

as this woman too,

even though no

benefit

reached

from the money

her hand,

nevertheless

she obligates herself and acquires

herself for

herself

to her husband, through the husband’s giving the money to another person at her request. b. If a man sent his fellow to betroth a woman on his behalf, and the agent took money from his own pocket and said to the woman:

“Here is a maneh”

of

mine, and become betrothed

with

it to so-and-so,

the sender—she is

betrothed

to the sender, even though the betrothal money was given to her from the agent’s pocket and not from her husband.

This matter is derived

from the law of a Canaanite slave.

As we learned below [22b], a Canaanite slave acquires himself [he goes free] with money, by virtue of others giving his master money as his redemption price; through this he acquires himself and goes free.

For

a Canaanite slave,

is it

not

the case that

even though he does not diminish

the slave’s own assets

at all

[anything], nevertheless

he acquires himself,

acquiring himself with money that others gave on his behalf.

If so,

this man likewise,

this man who betroths the woman,

even though he does not diminish

his own money

at all

[anything], nevertheless

he acquires this woman,

acquiring this woman with money that others gave her for her betrothal to him.

c. If a woman says to a man:

“Give a maneh to so-and-so”

from your money,

“and I will be betrothed to him”

[to the so-and-so receiving the maneh], with that same maneh that you give him at my request —

She is

betrothed.

Even though there are two deficiencies here: a. The woman received nothing. b. The betrother was not deprived of anything.

This matter is derived

from the law of both—

from combining these two laws, the law of a guarantor and the law of a Canaanite slave. a. Regarding the first deficiency, that the woman received nothing, it is derived from a guarantor, from whom we learn that this is not a deficiency—

For

a guarantor—is it not

the case that

even though no

[benefit]

reaches his hand,

nevertheless

he obligates himself

through the creditor’s giving his money to the borrower at his request.

And if so,

this woman likewise,

this woman too,

even though no

benefit

reaches her hand,

nevertheless

she acquires herself

with the money given to her husband at her request.

But perhaps you will say:

“Are the cases comparable!?”

Is this comparable to the law of a guarantor? After all,

with a guarantor, the one who acquires a lien from him

that is, the person who acquires a lien on the guarantor [the creditor],

loses money,

as his money was diminished by giving it to the borrower at the guarantor’s request, and therefore the guarantor became obligated to him.

But

this man,

to whom the woman told him to give money so that she would become betrothed to him, merely

acquires this woman,

as this man acquires this woman,

but he does not lose anything—not a thing!

He was not deprived of anything; so how can the woman be acquired by him, when he did not spend any money of his own?

Your answer is:

b.

A Canaanite slave proves the point: he does not lose money, and yet

nevertheless

he acquires himself,

acquiring himself through others’ giving money on his behalf. From here you learn that one who betroths a woman can also acquire her even though he himself was not deprived of any money at all; rather, others gave money on his behalf.

But perhaps you will say:

“Are the cases comparable?”

Is a husband who betroths without giving money comparable to a Canaanite slave who acquires himself without giving money of his own?!

After all,

there,

with a Canaanite slave,

the one who transfers ownership—

acquires!

The master, who transfers ownership of the slave to himself, acquires [receives] his redemption money in exchange for him [although the money reaches him from other people for the slave’s release and not from the slave himself].

But

here,

here the woman is the one who transfers ownership of herself, and the husband is the one who acquires her; and if the woman says to another person, “Give a maneh to so-and-so, and I will be betrothed to him”—

this woman

this woman

transfers ownership of herself, but does not acquire anything at all!

This woman, who transfers ownership of herself to the husband in such a manner, receives nothing in exchange for transferring ownership of herself!

And from where do we know that a monetary acquisition is effective even in such a manner?

Your answer is:

A guarantor proves the point,

for

even though no

benefit

reaches his hand

[but rather reaches the borrower’s hand], nevertheless

he obligates

his

own person.

Similarly, a woman, even if she receives nothing in exchange for transferring ownership of herself to her husband, can become betrothed to him with money that others gave him at her request.

The Gemara now continues and presents Rava’s question concerning another manner of giving betrothal money and its ruling:

He raised a question

[asked]

Rava:

A woman who gives money to a man and says to him:

“Here is a maneh, and I will be betrothed to you.”

The man took the maneh from her hand and said to her, “Become betrothed to me through it”—

what is

the law in this case?

Mar Zutra said in the name of Rav Pappa: She is betrothed.

Rav Ashi understood that the reason is the acquisition known as “incidental acquisition.”

That is, since the man acquires the maneh from the woman, he acquires the woman herself along with it.

This is similar to what we learned below [26a], that movable property is acquired incidentally through land: If a person wishes to acquire land and movable property from his fellow, he can perform an act of acquisition with the land, and through it the movable property is also acquired by him, without his performing any act of acquisition with the movable property [as the Gemara will soon cite].

Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra:

According to your statement in the name of Rav Pappa, that a woman who gives money to a man and says to him, “Here is a maneh, and I will be betrothed to you,” is betrothed,

if so,

one can raise the following objection—

The acquisition of a person is compared to the acquisition of land, as it is stated concerning the acquisition of slaves [Leviticus 25]: “And you shall take them as an inheritance, to bequeath them as a possession” [like a landholding]. From here it is learned that the law of a person is like the law of land.

If so, according to your statement, when the man acquires the woman [whose legal status is like land] incidentally to his acquisition of the money that he receives from her [whose legal status is like movable property]—

it would be

that his act of acquisition is like

property subject to responsibility,

land, which

is acquired along with

through an incidental acquisition performed with

property not subject to responsibility

[movable property].

That is, through the acquisition performed with the money, which is movable property, the land is acquired.

But this is difficult:

and

after all,

we learned the opposite!

For we learned [below, 26a] the opposite:

For we learned:

Property not subject to responsibility

[movable property]

is acquired along with

incidentally to

property subject to responsibility

[land], through acquiring the land

with

an acquisition of

money, a document, or possession.

It follows from this Mishna that specifically movable property is acquired incidentally through land, whereas land is not acquired incidentally through movable property.

If so, how can the woman [whose legal status is like land] be acquired incidentally to the maneh [which is movable property]?

He said to him

Mar Zutra, in response:

Do you think

that this refers to a case in which

the

woman

said to him

to the man, “Acquire me ‘incidentally’ to your acquisition of the maneh”?

That is not the case!

Rather,

here

[in this case]

we are dealing with an important person

who is not accustomed to accepting gifts,

and

the case is one in which the woman wishes to become betrothed to him and derives benefit from his agreeing to accept a gift from her. That benefit is worth a peruta to her, because she would have agreed to give a peruta to a person to persuade him [the important person] to accept a gift from her.

For through the benefit that he receives

the important person

a gift from her,

from her,

she resolves

in her mind,

and transfers ownership of herself to him.

She thereby transfers ownership of herself to him through the law of monetary acquisition [since the benefit that comes to her from his accepting her gift is important to her and worth a peruta, it is as though he gave her money for her betrothal].

The Gemara returns to discussing Rava’s statements, in which he derives laws concerning a woman’s betrothal from the laws of a guarantor and a Canaanite slave—

it was also stated in the name of Rava: And likewise

the law

with regard to monetary matters.

That is, the laws of acquiring land with money are learned from the guarantor’s becoming obligated for a loan and from a Canaanite slave’s being freed with money given by others—

a. If one sells a field to his fellow and says to him: “Give money to so-and-so, and my field will be sold to you with it,” then even though the seller did not receive the money, the field is nevertheless acquired by the buyer through the law of a guarantor.

[Just as a guarantor becomes financially obligated to a creditor even though the money that the creditor gave reached the borrower’s hand and not his own.]

b. If one says to his fellow: “Here is my maneh, and your field will be sold to so-and-so,” then even though the buyer did not pay the money, he nevertheless acquired the field through the law of a Canaanite slave.

[Like a Canaanite slave who goes free when others redeem him with their money, while he himself pays nothing.]

c. If one says to his fellow: “Give a maneh to so-and-so, and acquire my field for him with that maneh,” he acquires it through the laws of both.

For there are two deficiencies here: a. The seller received nothing. b. The buyer paid nothing from his own money. Therefore, the law is derived from both of them.

And the Gemara explains why Rava needed to teach us these laws both with regard to kiddushin and with regard to monetary matters: And we say:

And it is necessary

Rava needed to teach this in both contexts:

Because

if he had taught us

had Rava taught us only with regard to

kiddushin,

it would have been possible to say that these methods of acquisition are effective only with regard to kiddushin

because, as for a woman, she is amenable to anything

because a woman agrees to become betrothed through any acquisition, even through the receipt of mere benefit.

And

twenty-four

said

Reish Lakish:

For Reish Lakish said: It is better to dwell as a pair than to dwell as a widow

It is better for a woman to live together with any husband, so that two people will be together, than to live alone as a widow. Although the husband is not pleasing to her, nevertheless she agrees to his kiddushin, so that she will not be alone.

And since a woman is amenable to becoming betrothed so that she will not be alone, even to a man who is not pleasing to her, likewise one can say that for this reason she is prepared to transfer herself to her husband even for mere benefit, although she does not receive outright money through her kiddushin.

But

with regard to

monetary matters—

say that it is not so

I would have said that land cannot be acquired without the buyer giving outright money to the seller.

Therefore, Rava needed to teach us his statement with regard to monetary matters.

And if he had taught us

only with regard to

monetary matters

alone, it would have been possible to say that the law of a guarantor and that of a Canaanite slave are effective only with regard to the acquisition of property,

because it is given

because the money is given

for remission

that is, a person may waive money that is owed to him. [Therefore, the seller can agree to the acquisition even if he does not receive money from the buyer, but the money is given in accordance with the law of a guarantor or the law of a Canaanite slave.]

But

with regard to

kiddushin, say

I would have said that the laws of a guarantor and a Canaanite slave

do not

apply to kiddushin; rather, the husband must give the woman kiddushin money.

Therefore

it is necessary.

Rava needed to teach us his statement in both contexts [both with regard to kiddushin and with regard to monetary matters].

Now the Gemara cites another statement of Rava, which discusses the wording of kiddushin. Subsequently, Rava raises a doubt concerning kiddushin money:

Rava said:

one who says to a woman:

Become betrothed to me with half of me

she is

betrothed.

But one who says to a woman:

Half of you is betrothed to me

she is not betrothed.

The Gemara will explain below what Rava said and what his rationale was.

Abaye said to Rava

that there is a difficulty with your statement:

What is the difference

for what reason is the statement

“Half of you is betrothed to me”

which you said

she is not betrothed

different? It is because with regard to kiddushin, “When a man takes

a woman”

the Merciful One said

[Deuteronomy 22], indicating that one can betroth only a complete woman,

and not half a woman!

If so,

so too

even one who says, “Become betrothed to me with half of me,” should not have effected kiddushin, since “When a

man”

the Merciful One said, and not

“when

half a man

takes a woman”! For if he betroths a woman with half of himself, the meaning of his words is that only half of him betrothed her.

Why, then, did you say that if a man says, “Become betrothed to me with half of me,” she is betrothed?

Rava said to him: How can these be compared!?

What is the comparison between the two matters?

For when a man says to a woman, “Half of you is betrothed to me,” he intended thereby to permit her to marry another man besides him. It is as though half of her belongs to him and half belongs to another.

Similarly, when one says, “Become betrothed to me with half of me,” he intended that he should be permitted to marry another woman. It is as though half of him belongs to her and half belongs to another woman.

Whenever it is possible to interpret his words in a manner indicating that he did not intend half of the actual body, we interpret them in that manner. If so—

There

in the case of one who says, “Half of you is betrothed to me,” it is impossible to interpret his intention as being to betroth all of her while nevertheless permitting her to marry another man, since

a woman is not fit for two

she is not fit

A woman cannot marry two men. Necessarily, he intended to betroth only half of the woman’s body and leave the other half to another man.

And this cannot be done, because the verse says “a woman,” and not half a woman!

Rather,

in the case of one who says, “Become betrothed to me with half of me,” it is possible to interpret his words in a manner indicating that he did not intend half of his actual body.

For

a man

is he not fit for two?

Is a man not capable of marrying two women?!

And

since a man is permitted to marry two women, one can say that

this is what he said to her

this is what he intended to say to the woman:

Indeed, you are betrothed to all of my body; however,

if I wish to marry another, I will marry her.

If I wish to marry another woman, I will marry her.

[He expressed this figuratively, as though she were betrothed to only half of him.]

And since he betrothed the woman to all of his body, his kiddushin is therefore valid.

Mar Zutra raises a difficulty concerning Rava’s statement that when one says, “Half of you is betrothed to me,” she is not betrothed:

He said to him,

Mar Zutra

son of Rav Mari

raised a difficulty

to Ravina:

It is indeed impossible for half of the woman’s body to be betrothed, since it is stated “a woman,” and not half a woman. But since the man effecting kiddushin said to the woman, “Half of you is betrothed,” using the language of consecration,

if so—

the kiddushin should spread throughout her entire body!

The kiddushin that he effected with half of the woman should spread throughout her entire body, just as when one consecrates half an animal as an offering, the sanctity spreads throughout the animal’s entire body, and it all becomes an offering—

For

is it not taught

did we not learn as follows—

one who says

concerning an animal’s leg:

“The leg of

this

animal

shall be consecrated with the sanctity of

an olah offering—

it shall be

the animal shall thereby become

entirely

consecrated with the sanctity of an offering

an olah offering!

Likewise, it should be appropriate to say that when one consecrates half a woman, she is entirely betrothed, because the kiddushin that he effected with half of her spreads throughout her, just as the consecration of half an animal spreads throughout the entire animal!

Why, then, did Rava say that she is not betrothed?

And

perhaps you will answer that Rava maintains that even when one consecrates half an animal, it does not all become consecrated, for the beraita in tractate Temura [11b] cites the view of those who disagree, maintaining that when one says, “The leg of this animal shall be an olah offering,” the entire animal does not become an olah offering!

It is impossible to say this.

For

even according to the one who says

that when one says, “The leg of this animal shall be an olah offering,”

the entire animal does not become an olah offering, this applies

only

where

where

he consecrates an object upon which life does not depend

such as a leg, for even if that limb is removed, the animal will not die.

But

one who

consecrates an object upon which life depends

[such as one who consecrates the animal’s heart, or half of the animal’s body, which, if removed from the animal, would cause it to die]—according to everyone,

the entire animal becomes an olah offering!

Similarly, in the case of one who says to a woman, “Half of you is betrothed to me,” he betrothed her through an object upon which life depends [for if half of her body were removed, she would die], and it would be appropriate for his kiddushin to spread throughout her, according to everyone!

If so, the question returns: Why did Rava say that when one says, “Half of you is betrothed to me,” she is not betrothed!?

Ravina answered Mar Zutra son of Rav Mari:

Are the cases comparable!?

Can the kiddushin of a woman be compared to consecration, so that just as consecration of half an animal spreads throughout the animal’s entire body, so too kiddushin of half a woman spreads throughout the entire woman?

There is a distinction between them:

There,

in the case of one who consecrates half an animal, there is no one who can prevent his consecration from spreading, for

it is an animal

and it belongs to him, and it has no power to prevent him from doing anything he wishes with it.

But

here,

in the case of one who betroths half a woman, the woman has

an independent opinion

and she is considered the equal of the man, with the power to oppose her kiddushin to him [for if she does not wish to become betrothed to him, his kiddushin is not valid].

And since he betrothed half of her, and the woman agreed only that half of her should become betrothed to him, his statement does not have the power to acquire all of her against her will.

And Ravina proves that when there is “another party’s דעת,” his verbal declaration does not have the power to extend beyond what he consecrated:

This is not comparable:

the betrothal of half a woman is not comparable to one who consecrates half of his animal,

but rather to that which Rabbi Yoḥanan said

below, from which it is proven that in the case of an animal owned by two partners, one of whom consecrated his share, the consecration does not extend to his partner’s share, and the animal is sacred only in half of it.

The reason is that the other half of the animal belongs to another party [the second partner], and this prevents the consecration from extending over all of it.

Similarly, one who betroths half a woman: Since the woman is another party, who has the right to object to the betrothal, the betrothal does not extend over all of her.

The Gemara cites Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement verbatim:

An animal that was consecrated as an offering, and it happened that for one period it was rejected [disqualified] from being offered on the altar, becomes subject to the law of rejection (deḥuy) from being offered. Therefore, even if it subsequently becomes fit to be offered, it remains rejected forever and is permanently disqualified from being offered.

And this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

An animal belonging to two partners,

such that

one partner consecrated

his

half

that belonged to him,

and

afterward

bought it back,

purchasing the half that belonged to the second partner,

and consecrated it

a second time, so that the entire animal would be sacred—

a. It is

sacred

in its entirety.

b.

And

although the entire animal is now sacred, nevertheless it

may not be offered

on the altar. For at the time when he consecrated its first half, the animal was not fit to be offered, since half of it was then non-sacred. And since the sanctity that initially took effect in the animal had the status of “rejected sanctity” [as it was then rejected from being offered on the altar], the law of rejection applies to the animal.

For once the sanctity was rejected from being offered for even one period, it is rejected forever.

And what is its remedy? It should be sold, and another one should be purchased with the proceeds, and that animal should be offered.

c.

And it effects temura.

If he said of another animal, “This is its substitute,” the laws of temura take effect upon it. That is, the first animal retains its sanctity, and the second animal also becomes sacred [and is called “temura”].

And its substitute—

it is

similar to it!

It too is not fit to be offered, because since its sanctity derives from its being exchanged for rejected sanctity, the sanctity that takes effect in the substitute is likewise “rejected sanctity,” with all the laws that apply to it.

This concludes Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement.

From Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement we have learned that initially, when the first partner consecrated his share, the sanctity did not extend over the entire animal; only half of it became sacred.

The reason is that the other half of the animal belonged to another party [namely, the second partner]. From this I learn that when there is another party who has the ability to object, the sanctity does not extend [and therefore, even when one says to a woman, “Half of you is betrothed to me,” the betrothal does not extend over all of her, because she has the ability to object].

And since the Gemara cited Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, it cites the laws that can be derived from his words:

And we say:

Learn from it three things.

We are to learn three novel points from Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement: