Kiddushin 6b — the Talmud in English

He did not say [he did not write] her a bill of divorce properly,

and

it did not

benefit, this bill of divorce,

anything!

For this is the language of freeing a maidservant from her servitude, and this is not the language of divorcing a woman.

Likewise, there is no doubt that if

he said to his maidservant—

he wrote to his Canaanite maidservant in a bill of divorce:

“Behold, you are permitted to every person”—

then certainly

he did not say anything.

For this is the language of divorce, and not the language of freeing a maidservant.

[And even though one who frees his Canaanite maidservant—she is from then onward permitted to marry Israelites, nevertheless this is not the language of freeing, for, on the contrary, there is also an aspect of prohibition in the matter, since a maidservant is permitted to slaves, and from the moment she is freed, she becomes forbidden to them.] Rashi.

But if

he said to his wife

“Behold, you are for yourself,”

in such a case there is a doubt—

what

is the law?

Do we say: He said it with regard to labor—

do we interpret that he intended that only her labor [the product of her hands] should belong to herself?

Or perhaps [perhaps]

perhaps

he said it completely—

that she should belong entirely to herself, even with regard to marrying another, and this is the language of divorce.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear;

come and hear a proof from a Mishna in tractate Gittin, that “Behold, you are for yourself” is the language of complete divorce:

As we learned

Gittin 85b]:

A Canaanite slave’s body is acquired by the owners. That is, besides the fact that the product of his hands belongs to his master, his body too belongs to him, and he is like his ox and his donkey. And as a result of the fact that his body belongs to his owner, he is forbidden to marry a free woman.

And we learned:

The body [the essential part]

[the principal expression]

of a bill of freeing—

this is what is written in it:

“Behold, you are a free man,”

or

“Behold, you are for yourself.”

Now—

and now there is proof from here that “Behold, you are for yourself” is the language of complete divorce also with regard to a woman:

For,

just as, in the case of a Canaanite slave, whose body he acquires,

nevertheless,

when

when

he said to him, “Behold, you are for yourself,” —

he said it completely,

that his body is freed, and he is permitted to a free woman, and he did not say it to him only with regard to the product of his hands—

with regard to

a woman, whose body he does not acquire,

and

is it not all the more so

that the intention of this language is not only with regard to the product of her hands, but also with regard to marriage?!

And from here it is proven that “Behold, you are for yourself” is the language of complete divorce.

And now, while we have spoken here concerning the language of a deed of freeing, the Gemara brings the language of a deed of freeing concerning which it must be considered whether it is effective or not:

He said to him,

he asked

Ravina

a question

to Rav Ashi:

A person who

said to his slave

the Canaanite

“I have no business with you” —

what?

What is his law?

And the sides of the doubt are:

Do [do we]

[we perhaps]

we say: “

I have no business with you at all,”

he said it to him,

for this is the meaning of his words, and the slave becomes completely free and is permitted to a free woman.

Or perhaps,

perhaps

with regard to labor

alone

he said it to him—

perhaps the meaning of the master’s words is that he has no business with the labor of his slave, but his body is still acquired by the master, and the slave is forbidden to a free woman.

Rav Nahman said to Rav Ashi, and some say

and there are those who say that

Rav Hanin of Mehoza

was the one who said

to Rav Ashi: Come and hear,

come and hear a proof that “I have no business with you” is the language of complete freeing:

One who sells his slave to a gentile—the Sages penalized him and obligated him to redeem him even if the gentile demands ten times his value, because through selling him to a gentile he caused the gentile to prevent the slave from fulfilling mitzvot.

And we learned in a beraita:

One who sells his slave to a gentile,

and the slave fled from the gentile, or the seller redeemed him as required — the Sages penalized the seller, that

the slave went out

the slave

to freedom.

And the first master can no longer subject him to servitude.

And

even though the slave went out to freedom,

he must

receive

a bill of freeing from his first master [the Israelite who sold him], so that he will be permitted to a free woman.

[the Israelite who sold him], so that he will be permitted to marry a free woman.

And

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said:

This which we said, that he needs a bill of freeing from his first master—

in what case are these words said? When he did not write upon him

his master

“Onu” [

a deed of freeing, in the wording that will be explained in the Gemara immediately].

But

if after he sold him,

his master wrote upon him

his first master

“Onu” [

a deed]—

this is his freeing.

And the Gemara explains:

What are the circumstances of

“Onu,”

what is that “Onu” of which Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said?

Rav Sheshet said: That he wrote to him

the first master in the deed:

“When you flee from him,”

from the gentile —

“I have no business with you!”

And it is proven from here that “I have no business with you” is the language of complete freeing, and the slave is permitted to a free woman.

And the Gemara returns to dealing with betrothal by money [as we learned in our Mishna: “A woman is acquired by money and by an object worth money”], and it brings a statement of Abaye concerning betrothal with money that is not present, such as one who betroths with loan money, or with the benefit that there is in forgiving a loan—

Abaye said: One who betroths

the woman

with a loan

that he lent her, for example, in the past he lent her money, and now he comes to betroth her with that same money, when he says to her that the loan money will be hers and she will not have to repay it—

she is not betrothed!

Because the loan money is acquired by the borrower, and he may spend it for his needs, and he is not obligated to return it itself, but may repay other money. And betrothal by money is learned through a gzera shava, “taking” “taking,” from the field of Ephron, where the purchaser gives the seller money or an object worth money belonging to the purchaser. Therefore the woman is not betrothed with the loan money, since it no longer belongs to the lender. But one who betroths the woman

with the benefit of a loan—

she is betrothed.

[And the Gemara will immediately explain what “the benefit of a loan” is].

And

however,

it is forbidden to do so,

to betroth with the benefit of a loan,

because

there is in this a prohibition of

the appearance of interest

by rabbinic enactment, as will be explained below:

And we raised an objection concerning it:

This benefit of a loan,

with which he betrothed the woman—

what are the circumstances?

What is being discussed?

If you say that he established it,

if it is said that initially, at the time when he lent the woman the money, he established upon her an obligation of interest for the loan, such as

he said to her:

I am lending you

four

zuz, and you will repay me

with

for them

five

zuz [for the benefit that you enjoy from the fact that I lent to you]. And afterward, at the time when he comes to betroth her, he forgives her the fifth zuz that she had undertaken to pay him for the benefit of the loan—

It is impossible to say this, for two reasons:

1.

This—

this fifth zuz—

is full-fledged interest,

and not the appearance of interest! Since at the time of the loan the woman undertook to pay more than she received, this is full-fledged interest, which is forbidden by Torah law, and it is impossible that Abaye would call it merely “the appearance of interest” [that is, that a person employs a ruse and takes interest that is not forbidden by Torah law]!

b.

Furthermore,

since the lender betroths the woman with the fifth zuz that she owes him, and this zuz, too, is not present, just as the loan itself is not present, if so,

this is

betrothing with

a loan!

And since Abaye has already said that one who betroths with a loan is not betrothed, why did he say that one who betroths with the benefit of a loan is indeed betrothed?

Therefore, the Gemara explains “the benefit of a loan” differently:

It is necessary [to state this], for he extended the time for her.

The case is one in which the lender extends the time of the loan for her. For example, he lent her [money] on the condition that she repay him after a year the same amount that she borrowed from him, and now, at the time of the betrothal, he extends the repayment time, so that she may repay the debt after two years, and he says to her: “Be betrothed to me through this benefit, for you would agree to pay a peruta to another person so that he would persuade me to extend the time of the loan.” Or, you would pay that same peruta to me myself, so that I would be persuaded to extend the repayment time for you.

And since the lender does not betroth the woman with the money itself [which does not presently exist], but with the benefit that comes to the woman because of the extension of the time, therefore she is betrothed, for this benefit exists now, and it is worth a peruta.

And this is not full-fledged interest, because the woman did not give the man any money in exchange for the extension of the time, but only became betrothed to him instead of giving him a peruta to persuade him to agree to extend the repayment time for her. And betrothal to him is not “money,” and this is not considered interest by Torah law; rather, its prohibition is rabbinic, on account of “the appearance of interest.”

And all the more so, if the lender forgave the woman the entire debt and betrothed her through the benefit, she is betrothed. Only when he betroths her with the loan money itself is she not betrothed, because the betrothal money does not presently exist. Rashi

And the Gemara brings a statement of Rava concerning another case of giving money, regarding which it must be considered whether it is effective for betrothal:

Rava said:

A person who says to another:

Here is a maneh

as a gift

on condition that you return it to me

after some time —

If he gave that same maneh

in a sale [

for purchasing land, which is acquired with money]—

he did not acquire

the land with that maneh, because “a gift on condition of returning” is not a gift, and there is no giving of money.

And likewise, if he gave the maneh

for

the purpose of betrothing

a woman—

she is not betrothed,

for the same reason.

And likewise, if he gave the maneh to a priest

for

the purpose of fulfilling the mitzva of

the redemption of the firstborn—

his son is not redeemed,

for the same reason.

But,

with teruma,

if he gave the teruma to a priest on condition that he return it to him afterward—

he has fulfilled

through this

the obligation

of the mitzva of

giving.

And after the priest returns it to him, it is his, and he may sell it to priests and use its proceeds.

And the Gemara below asks how teruma differs from the other things.

And it is forbidden to do so,

to give the teruma to a priest on condition that he return it to him,

because

he

appears as a priest who assists

the owners in threshing and winnowing the grain while it is

in the threshing floors [

in the granary], so that afterward, when the grain becomes obligated in terumot and tithes, the owners will give him the teruma for his assistance and will not give it to another priest.

And similarly, a priest who receives teruma from an Israelite on condition of returning does so so that on another occasion the Israelite will give him teruma as a complete gift.

And it is forbidden for priests to assist an Israelite in order afterward to receive the teruma from him, because of the disgrace involved in the matter. And concerning priests who do so it is said [Malachi 2]: “You have corrupted the covenant of Levi.”

Thus far are Rava’s words.

And the Gemara has difficulty with his words: how does teruma differ from the other things mentioned?

And we ask:

What does Rava hold?

If he holds that “

a gift on condition of returning”

is called a gift,

and therefore Rava said that one who gives teruma to a priest on condition of returning has fulfilled his obligation, then this is difficult:

Even

with

all of them—

with all the things Rava mentioned—

also

it should be said that a gift on condition of returning is like a complete gift!

And why did Rava say that in a sale he did not acquire, with a woman she is not betrothed, and in the redemption of the firstborn his son is not redeemed?

And if Rava holds

that a gift on condition of returning

is not called a gift,

and therefore he said that in a sale he did not acquire, with a woman she is not betrothed, and in the redemption of the firstborn he is not redeemed—then this is difficult:

a.

Even

with

teruma too,

even one who gives teruma to a priest as a gift on condition of returning—

not

has he fulfilled his obligation through this! Why, then, did Rava say that with teruma he has fulfilled it?

b.

Furthermore, Rava himself

himself

is the one who said: A gift on condition of returning is called a gift!

For Rava said:

One who says to his fellow during the festival of Sukkot:

Here is this etrog

as a gift, so that you can fulfill the mitzva of taking the lulav and etrog,

on condition that you return it to me

after fulfilling the mitzva—

if

he took it

his fellow

and returned it

afterward—

he has fulfilled

the obligation of the mitzva of taking the lulav.

But if not,

if he did not return it after taking it—

he has not fulfilled

the obligation of taking the lulav and etrog, because it became clear retroactively that the etrog was stolen property in his possession at the time of fulfilling the mitzva. For the giver gave it to him only on condition that they receive it back afterward. And from these words of Rava it is proved that a gift on condition of returning is called a gift, and if so this is difficult: why, when one gives a maneh to his fellow on condition of returning, in a sale did he not acquire, with a woman is she not betrothed, and in redemption is his son not redeemed?

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

It is unavoidable that Rava did not state the above teaching. Rather, this is what Rava said:

With all of them,

with all the things we mentioned above [in a sale, in the redemption of the firstborn and in teruma], if he gave a gift on condition of returning—

you acquire.

For a gift given on condition of returning it is called a gift.

Except

outside

from

that which is the betrothal of a

woman, because a woman is not betrothed through an

acquisition of

barter.

And when one gives a woman a gift on condition of returning it, this is similar to an acquisition of barter. For such is the usual practice in an acquisition of barter: the purchaser gives a cloth to the transferor, the transferor takes hold of it, and immediately returns it to the purchaser.

Rav Huna son of Rav Nehemiah said to Rav Ashi: This is how we say in the name of Rava, in accordance with you.

Thus they say in our beit-midrash in his name, in accordance with you, as you explained his words.

And now the Gemara brings another statement of Rava, which speaks of several ways of giving the money of betrothal: