Kiddushin 6b (ו:) — the Talmud in English

He did not say [that he did not write her a properly formulated get],

but rather: he did not write her a properly formulated get,

and

this get was of no avail

at all!

For this is the wording used to emancipate a maidservant from her servitude, and it is not the wording of a woman’s divorce.

Similarly, there is no doubt that if

he said to his maidservant—

that is, he wrote a get to his Canaanite maidservant:

“You are hereby permitted to marry any man”—

then certainly

he did not say anything at all.

For this is the wording of divorce, and not the wording of the emancipation of a maidservant. [Even though one who emancipates his Canaanite maidservant thereby permits her from that point onward to marry Israelites, nevertheless this is not the wording of emancipation. On the contrary, there is also an aspect of prohibition involved, for a maidservant is permitted to slaves, whereas from the moment she is emancipated she becomes prohibited to them.

Rashi].

But if

he said to his wife, “

You are hereby free for yourself,”

in such a case the matter is uncertain:

what

is the law?

Do we say: He said this with regard to her labor—

do we interpret his intention as being that only the product of her labor would belong to her?

Or perhaps [perhaps]

perhaps

he said it with regard to her completely—

that she should belong to herself entirely, even with regard to marrying another man, and this is the wording of divorce?

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear—

come and hear a proof from a Mishna in tractate Gittin that “You are hereby free for yourself” is unequivocally the wording of divorce:

As we learned [in Gittin 85b]:

[Gittin 85b]:

A Canaanite slave’s body is acquired by his owners. That is, aside from the fact that the product of his labor belongs to his master, his body also belongs to him, and he is like his ox or donkey. As a result of his body belonging to his owner, he is prohibited from marrying a free woman.

And we learned:

The body [the essential wording]

[the principal expression]

of a bill of emancipation

is written as follows:

“You are hereby a free man,”

or

“You are hereby free for yourself.”

Now—

and now a proof can be brought from here that “You are hereby free for yourself” is also unequivocally the wording of divorce with regard to a woman:

For

if, with regard to a Canaanite slave, whose body he acquires,

nevertheless

when

he

says to him, “You are hereby free for yourself,” —

he is saying it to him completely,

meaning that his body is emancipated and he is permitted to marry a free woman, and he did not say it to him only with regard to the product of his labor—

with regard to

a woman, whose body he does not acquire,

is it

not all the more so

that this wording is not intended to refer only to the product of her labor, but also to the matter of marriage?!

It is therefore proven from here that “You are hereby free for yourself” is unequivocally the wording of divorce.

And now, since we have discussed here the wording of a bill of emancipation, the Gemara cites a wording of a bill of emancipation concerning which it must be considered whether or not it is effective:

He said to him,

he asked

Ravina

a question

of Rav Ashi:

What is the status of a man who

said to his

Canaanite

slave, “I have no dealings with you”? —

What

is the law?

The sides of the uncertainty are as follows:

Do

[we perhaps]

we say: “

I have no dealings with you whatsoever,”

he said to him,

for this is the meaning of his words, and the slave thereby becomes completely free and is permitted to marry a free woman?

Or perhaps,

perhaps he said it only

with regard to labor

alone

he said it to him—

perhaps the meaning of the master’s words is that he has no dealings with his slave’s labor, but the slave’s body is still acquired by the master, and the slave remains prohibited from marrying a free woman.

Rav Naḥman said to Rav Ashi—and some say

that

Rav Ḥanin of Meḥoza

was the one who said

to Rav Ashi: Come and hear—

come and hear a proof that “I have no dealings with you” is the wording of complete emancipation:

One who sells his slave to a gentile is penalized by the Sages, who obligate him to redeem the slave even if the gentile demands ten times the slave’s value, because by selling him to a gentile he caused the gentile to prevent the slave from performing mitzvot.

And we learned in a beraita:

One who sells his slave to a gentile,

and the slave flees from the gentile, or the seller redeems him as required by law — the Sages penalized the seller so that

the slave

would

go free.

The first master can no longer subjugate him.

And

even though the slave has gone free,

he must

receive

a bill of emancipation from his first master [the Israelite who sold him], in order to be permitted to marry a free woman.

[the Israelite who sold him], so that he will be permitted to marry a free woman.

; And

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said:

This statement, that the slave requires a bill of release from his first master,

applies when the master did not write on his behalf

his master

“Ono”

[a bill of release, in the wording that the Gemara will explain immediately].

But

if, after he sold him,

his first master wrote on his behalf

“Onu” [a

“Ono”

bill]—

this is his emancipation.

And the Gemara explains:

What are the circumstances of

“Onu,”

what is this “Onu” that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel mentioned?

Rav Sheshet said: It is where he wrote to him

the first master in the document:

“When you flee from him,”

from the gentile —

“I have no dealings with you!”

It is proven from here that “I have no dealings with you” is the wording of complete emancipation, and the slave is permitted to marry a free woman.

The Gemara returns to the subject of betrothal with money [as we learned in our Mishna: “A woman is acquired through money or an object worth money”], and cites a statement of Abaye concerning betrothal with money that is not present, such as one who betroths with the proceeds of a loan or with the benefit derived from waiving a loan—

Abaye said: One who betroths

a woman

with a loan

that he had lent her—for example, he had previously lent her money, and now he comes to betroth her with that money, telling her that the money of the loan will be hers and that she will not have to repay it—

she is not betrothed!

The reason is that the money of a loan is acquired by the borrower, who may spend it for his needs and is not required to return the same money, but may repay with other money. Betrothal with money is derived through a gzera shava, “taking” from “taking,” from the purchase of the field of Ephron, where the purchaser gives the seller money or an object worth money that belongs to the purchaser. Therefore, the woman is not betrothed with the money of the loan, since it no longer belongs to the lender. But one who betroths a woman

with the benefit of a loan—

she is betrothed. [The Gemara will immediately explain what “the benefit of a loan” is.]

[The Gemara will immediately explain what “the benefit of a loan” means.]

And

however,

it is prohibited to do so,

to betroth with the benefit of a loan,

because

this involves the prohibition of

the appearance of interest

by rabbinic decree, as will be explained below:

And we raised a difficulty concerning this:

This “benefit of a loan”

with which he betrothed the woman—

what are the circumstances?

What case is being discussed?

If you say that he established it as a debt,

that initially, when he lent the money to the woman, he stipulated an obligation of interest for the loan, for example,

he said to her:

“I am lending you”

four

zuz, and you will repay me

five

for them

five

zuz [for the benefit you derive from my lending the money to you]. And afterward, when he comes to betroth her, he waives the fifth zuz that she had undertaken to pay him for the benefit of the loan—

This cannot be the case, for two reasons:

a.

This—

this fifth zuz—

is full-fledged interest,

and not merely the appearance of interest! Since at the time of the loan the woman undertook to pay more than she received, this is full-fledged interest, prohibited by Torah law, and it is impossible that Abaye would refer to it as merely “the appearance of interest” [that is, that the person is using a ruse to take interest that is not prohibited by Torah law]!

b.

Furthermore,

since the lender betroths the woman with the fifth zuz that she owes him, and this zuz, too, is not present, just as the loan itself is not present, if so,

this is

betrothing with

a loan!

And since Abaye already said that one who betroths a woman with a loan has not betrothed her, why did he say that one who betroths her with the benefit of a loan has betrothed her?

Therefore, the Gemara explains “the benefit of a loan” in a different manner:

It is necessary to state this, as he extended the loan period.

This is referring to a case in which the lender extends the period of the loan for her. For example, he lent her money on the condition that she repay him after one year the same sum that she borrowed from him, and now, at the time of the betrothal, he extends the repayment period, allowing her to repay the debt after two years. He says to her: “Be betrothed to me through this benefit, for you would have agreed to pay a peruta to another person so that he would appease me and induce me to extend the loan period. Or, you would have paid that same peruta to me myself so that I would be appeased and extend the repayment period for you.”

And since the lender does not betroth the woman with the money itself [which does not currently exist], but rather with the benefit that comes to the woman as a result of extending the period, she is therefore betrothed, because this benefit exists at present and is worth a peruta.

This is not fully-fledged interest, because the woman did not give the man any money in exchange for extending the period; she merely became betrothed to him instead of giving him a peruta to persuade him to agree to extend the repayment period for her. Betrothal to him is not “money,” and this is not considered interest by Torah law; rather, its prohibition is rabbinic, as a form of “an artifice of interest.”

And all the more so, if the lender forgave the woman’s entire debt and betrothed her through the benefit, she is betrothed. It is only when he betroths her with the money of the loan itself that she is not betrothed, because the betrothal money does not currently exist. Rashi.

The Gemara cites a statement of Rava concerning another case involving the giving of money, where it must be determined whether it is effective for betrothal:

Rava said:

A person who says to another:

Here is a maneh

as a gift

on the condition that you return it to me

after some time—

If he gave that same maneh

in a sale

[for the purchase of land acquired through money]—

he has not acquired

the land with that maneh, because a “gift on the condition that it be returned” is not a gift, and there has been no giving of money.

And likewise, if he gave the maneh

for

the betrothal of a

woman—

she is not betrothed,

for the same reason.

And likewise, if he gave the maneh to a priest

for

the fulfillment of the mitzva of

the redemption of the firstborn—

his son is not redeemed,

for the same reason.

But

with teruma,

if he gave the teruma to a priest on the condition that he return it to him afterward—

he has fulfilled

through this

his obligation

of the mitzva of

giving.

Once the priest returns it to him, it is his, and he may sell it to priests and use the proceeds.

And below the Gemara challenges this: In what way is teruma different from the other things?

It is prohibited to do so,

to give the teruma to a priest on the condition that he return it to him,

because

he

appears as a priest who assists

the owners in threshing and winnowing the grain while it is still

in the threshing floor

[in the granary], so that afterward, when the grain becomes subject to terumot and tithes, the owners will give him the teruma in return for his assistance, rather than giving it to another priest.

Similarly, a priest who receives teruma from an Israelite on the condition that he return it does so so that, on another occasion, the Israelite will give him teruma as a complete gift.

It is prohibited for priests to assist an Israelite in order to receive the teruma from him afterward, because of the denigration involved. Concerning priests who do so it is said [Malachi 2]: “You have corrupted the covenant of Levi.”

These are Rava’s words.

The Gemara has difficulty with his statement: In what way is teruma different from the other things mentioned?

And we raise a difficulty:

What does Rava hold?

If he holds that a

“gift on the condition that it be returned”

is called a gift,

and therefore Rava said that one who gives teruma to a priest on the condition that it be returned has fulfilled his obligation, this is difficult:

Even

with

all of them—

all the things Rava mentioned—

also

we should say that a gift on the condition that it be returned is like a complete gift!

Why, then, did Rava say that in a sale he has not acquired the item, that with a woman she is not betrothed, and that with the redemption of the firstborn his son is not redeemed?

And if he holds

that a gift on the condition that it be returned

is not called a gift,

and therefore he said that in a sale he has not acquired the item, that with a woman she is not betrothed, and that in the redemption of the firstborn the son is not redeemed—this too is difficult:

a.

Even

with

teruma as well,

even one who gives teruma to a priest as a gift on the condition that it be returned—

has not

fulfilled his obligation through this! Why, then, did Rava say that with teruma he has fulfilled it?

b.

Furthermore, Rava himself

himself

is the one who said: A gift on the condition that it be returned is called a gift!

For Rava said:

One who says to his fellow on the festival of Sukkot:

Here is this etrog

as a gift, so that you can fulfill the mitzva of taking the lulav and etrog,

on the condition that you return it to me

after fulfilling the mitzva—

If

he took it

his fellow and

returned it

afterward—

he has fulfilled

the mitzva of taking the lulav.

But if not,

if he did not return it after taking it—

he has not fulfilled

the mitzva of taking the lulav and etrog, because it emerges retroactively that the etrog was stolen property in his possession at the time he fulfilled the mitzva. For the giver gave it to him only on the condition that he receive it back afterward. From these words of Rava it is proven that a gift on the condition that it be returned is called a gift. If so, this is difficult: Why, when one gives a maneh to his fellow on the condition that it be returned, has he not acquired the item in a sale, is the woman not betrothed, and in the redemption of the firstborn is the son not redeemed?

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

It must be that Rava did not make the statement cited above. Rather, this is what Rava said:

With all of them,

with all the things mentioned above [in a sale, in the redemption of the firstborn and in teruma], if he gives a gift on the condition that it be returned—

you acquire it.

because a gift given on condition that it be returned is called a gift.

except

outside

from

that which constitutes a woman’s betrothal,

since a woman is not acquired through

an acquisition of

chalifin.

But when one gives a woman a gift on condition that it be returned, this is similar to an acquisition through chalifin. For this is the usual procedure in an acquisition through chalifin: the acquirer gives a cloth to the transferor, the transferor takes hold of it, and immediately returns it to the acquirer.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Neḥemya, said to Rav Ashi: This is what we say in the name of Rava, in accordance with your view.

This is what we say in our beit-midrash in the name of Rava, in accordance with your view, as you explained his statement.

And now the Gemara cites another statement of Rava, concerning several ways of giving the money of betrothal: