Kiddushin 6a — the Talmud in English

Abaye answered:

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teach us the later formulations—

Shmuel came to teach us the later formulations [which are stated later in Shmuel’s words].

That is, “I am your husband,” “I am your master,” there is no concern here. And likewise with divorce: “I am not your husband,” there is no concern here.

And Shmuel’s reason is:

Here—

in the matter of betrothal,

it is written [Deuteronomy 24]: “

Deuteronomy 24]: “

When a man takes

a woman,”

and not that he takes himself

to her.

And here—

in the matter of divorce,

it is written [there]: “

there]: “

And he sends her away

from his house,”

and not that he sends himself away.

And the Gemara continues to discuss additional formulations of betrothal:

The Sages taught:

One who betroths a woman and says to her:

“Behold, you are my wife,” or

or

“Behold, you are my betrothed,” or

or

“Behold, you are acquired to me,” \-

she is betrothed.

And likewise, one who says:

“Behold, you are mine,” “Behold, you are in my possession,” “Behold, you are dependent upon me”—

she is betrothed.

And we raise a difficulty: Why did the tanna divide these formulations into two sentences?

And let him teach them all together!

It would have been proper for him to teach all the formulations in one sentence!

And we answer:

The tanna heard them three at a time, and recorded them.

The tanna heard each three separately, and taught them separately, in the manner in which he heard them.

They raised a dilemma

the members of the academy were uncertain:

[a] One who says to a woman, “Behold, you are

designated to me”—

what

is the law in this matter? Is this a formulation of betrothal, in accordance with the wording of the verse [Genesis 2], “and he shall cleave to his wife, and they shall become one flesh,” or not?

[b] One who says:

“Designated for me,”

from the term “designation,” which is a formulation of betrothal with regard to a Hebrew maidservant—

what

is the law in this matter?

[c] One who says to a woman, “Behold, you are my

help”—

because the woman was called in the Torah “a help” [“I shall make for him a help corresponding to him,” Genesis 2]—

what

is the law in this matter? [d] “My counterpart”—from the expression “a help corresponding to him” [there], which is stated regarding the woman—

what

is the law in this matter?

[e]

“My assembly”—

from the term “assembly” [that is, gathering], meaning, “May you be gathered together with me in the house,” —

what

is the law in this matter?

[f]

“My rib”—

because the woman was taken from the rib [as explained in Genesis 2]—

what

is the law in this matter?

[g]

“My enclosed one”—

because it is said concerning the woman who was taken from the man’s rib, “and He closed the flesh beneath it” [there]—

what

is the law in this matter?

[h]

“My beneath” —

what

is the law in this matter?

[i]

“My seized one” —

what

is the law in this matter? [j] “My acquired one” [because of “when a man takes a woman,” Deuteronomy 24]—

what

is the law in this matter?

And we conclude:

At least resolve one.

Resolve, at least, one uncertainty from all these uncertainties:

For it was taught: One who says

to a woman, “Behold, you are

my acquired one”—

behold, she is betrothed, because it is said

concerning betrothal [Deuteronomy 24]:

“When a man takes a woman.”

They raised a dilemma

the members of the academy were uncertain:

One who says to a woman, “Behold, you are

my designated one”—

what

is the law in this matter?

Come and hear

a beraita that spoke explicitly about this:

For it was taught: One who says, “My designated one,”

behold, she is

betrothed.

For in Judea they call a betrothed woman “designated.”

And we object:

And

are the people of

Judea

they

the majority of the world?

Are they the majority of the people of the world, so that their language is decisive?! And why did the beraita rule that everywhere in the world, one who says to a woman, “My designated one,” behold, she is betrothed, because in Judea they call a betrothed woman “designated”?

And we answer:

This is what it says,

this is the intention of the beraita to say:

One who says, “My designated one,”—

she is betrothed,

because

it is said [Leviticus 19]

Leviticus 19]:

“And she is a maidservant designated to a man.”

That is, it is said concerning a designated maidservant [Leviticus 19:20]: “And if a man lies with a woman, and she is a maidservant designated to a man; and she has not been fully redeemed, or freedom has not been given to her; he shall bring his guilt-offering.”

And the tannaim disputed what a designated maidservant is [“designated to a man”]:

According to Rabbi Akiva, the verse speaks of a maidservant who is half a Canaanite maidservant and half a free woman, who became betrothed to a Hebrew slave, who is permitted to a Canaanite maidservant [for example, a maidservant belonging to two masters, one of whom freed her, leaving her half maidservant and half free woman].

And the amoraim disputed, concerning a woman who is half free, whether betrothal takes effect in her half, or whether betrothal does not take effect in her at all.

But according to Rabbi Ishmael, the verse speaks of a completely Canaanite maidservant who became betrothed to a Hebrew slave. And although betrothal does not take effect with an unfreed Canaanite maidservant, and she is not “betrothed,” nevertheless she is designated for the Hebrew slave.

And the Gemara here explains the words of the beraita—that one who says “my designated one” has betrothed her—as following Rabbi Akiva, that a designated maidservant is one who is half maidservant and half free woman, betrothed to a Hebrew slave, and betrothal takes effect with her.

And since it is said in the verse “designated,” with the intention of “betrothed,” we learn from here that “my designated one” means “my betrothed.”

And thus the tanna said: One who says “my designated one”—she is betrothed, because it is said, “and she is a maidservant designated to a man.”

And furthermore,

for

in Judea they call a betrothed woman “designated.”

And we object:

And

is

Judea an additional proof for the verse?!

But since we brought proof from the verse that “designated” means “betrothed,” there is no need or reason to bring proof from the fact that they customarily call it so in Judea [for the words of Scripture are proof that requires no support from a custom in Judea]!

And because of this difficulty, the Gemara retracts and says—

Rather, necessarily, the beraita follows the view of Rabbi Ishmael, that a designated maidservant is a Canaanite maidservant, with whom betrothal does not take effect at all, and from here “designated” does not mean “betrothed,” but rather she is “designated” only for the Hebrew slave; therefore there is no proof from the verse that a betrothed woman is also called “designated.”

In light of this, the words of the beraita should be explained as follows:

This is what it says,

thus the tanna said:

One who says “

designated” \-

in Judea,

behold, she is

betrothed, for in Judea they call a betrothed woman “designated.”

But in the other places, if he says to a woman, “Behold, you are my designated one,” she is not betrothed, because they do not customarily call a betrothed woman there by the name “designated.”

And now the Gemara comes to discuss all these formulations about which we were uncertain, whether the betrothal took effect or not, since this formulation is not clear—how do we know that the woman understood his intention and consented to the betrothal? To answer this question, the Gemara clarifies in what manner he spoke:

And we examine it:

With what are we dealing?

In what case were we uncertain concerning these formulations whether his betrothal is betrothal or not?

If you say,

if it is said,

when he was not speaking with her

previously

about the matter of her bill of divorce or her betrothal,

but rather he gave her a bill of divorce and said to her, “You are not designated to me,” or one of the other formulations about which we raised a dilemma, in order to divorce her; or he gave a woman a peruta and said to her, “Behold, you are designated to me,” in order to betroth her—then there is a difficulty: Why were we uncertain about this, whether his betrothal is betrothal? For even on the possibility that these formulations are indeed formulations of betrothal, it must still be asked:

From where,

from where did the woman

know what he was saying to her

the husband? For the woman did not understand what he said to her and did not consent to betrothal!

But rather,

perhaps you will say that the case is

one in which

he had been

speaking with her about the matter of her bill of divorce or her betrothal

before he betrothed or divorced her, and therefore it is reasonable that the woman understood his intention and consented to the betrothal; then there is a difficulty with the other side—

Since he had spoken with her beforehand about the matters of her bill of divorce and her betrothal, it is obvious that she is betrothed; what doubt could there be concerning the matter?

But

even though he said nothing to her, likewise

she is betrothed!

And all the more so when he said to her one of these expressions after he had spoken with her about the matters of her betrothal, that she is betrothed. So what was the substance of the doubt

? The Gemara proves that one who had spoken beforehand with the woman about the matters of her betrothal: even though he said nothing to her at the time when he gave her the money, she is betrothed —

as we learned

in tractate Maaser Sheni [4:7]:

If he was speaking with a woman about the matters of her bill of divorce or her betrothal, and he gave her

the

bill of divorce or the betrothal-money, and did not specify

for what purpose he was giving them:

Rabbi Yosei says: It is sufficient

for him in this. It is sufficient that he had dealt with her beforehand concerning the matter, and it is as though he had specified.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He must specify.

And

concerning this

Rav Huna said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

that he need not specify.

If so, since even if he did not specify anything, these are his betrothal-money, all the more so if he mentioned one of the expressions, she is betrothed. Why, then, did we have a doubt concerning the matter?

And we answer:

They said

the members of the academy an answer:

Actually,

we had the doubt

in a case where he was speaking with her about the matters of her bill of divorce or her betrothal.

And if he gave it to her and was silent —

so too!

If he gave her the money and was silent, indeed it is clear to us that he intended to betroth her, and his betrothal is a betrothal.

But

when he mentioned one of these expressions,

this is what he was asking —

this was our doubt:

Whether

these expressions —

he said them for betrothal.

Whether the meaning of these expressions is an expression of betrothal, and she became betrothed through this.

Or perhaps, he said them for work!

Perhaps the meaning of these expressions concerns the performance of work. And when he said, “Behold, you are designated to me,” his intention was that he designates her to perform his work, and similarly with the other expressions.

If so, despite the fact that he had spoken with her beforehand about the matters of her bill of divorce and her betrothal, now, when he said these expressions to her, insofar as they are expressions referring to work, he revealed his intention that he does not now desire to betroth her to himself, but only to designate her for his work.

And we conclude:

teyku.

The matter itself —

The Gemara now comes to discuss the body of the Mishna in tractate Maaser Sheni there:

As we learned:

If he was speaking with the woman about the matters of her bill of divorce or her betrothal, and he gave her

the

bill of divorce or the betrothal-money, and did not specify

for what purpose he was giving them:

Rabbi Yosei says: It is sufficient —

It is sufficient for him that he spoke with her about the matters of her bill of divorce or her betrothal, and it is as though he now specified that he was betrothing her or divorcing her.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He must specify.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

What Rabbi Yosei said, that it is sufficient that he spoke with her about the matters of her bill of divorce or her betrothal, is subject to a condition:

And that

they should be

occupied with that same matter

of the matters of the betrothal until the time of giving the money.

And likewise Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: And that

they should be

occupied with that same matter.

As a condition —

The tannaim disagreed [in a beraita] about this matter:

Rabbi says: And that they be occupied with that same matter

until the time of the giving.

Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon says: Even though they are not occupied with that same matter

until the time of the giving, nevertheless, if they had dealt with this beforehand, it is a betrothal.

And we wonder about the words of Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon:

And if they are not occupied with that same matter

until the giving of the money —

from where,

from where does the woman

know what he is saying to her?

Since, at the time of giving the money, he did not specify to her that he was giving it for the purpose of betrothal, she did not understand that this was his intention, and she did not consent to the betrothal!

Abaye said

an answer:

Indeed, Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon’s view is that he need not engage with her at the time of the giving in the actual matters of betrothal, but he agrees that he must at least engage with her

from one matter to another within that same matter.

At first they dealt with the actual matter of betrothal, then they stopped dealing with this and moved on to speak about other matters connected with the needs of marriage.

For example, the man asked the woman, “How much dowry do you have?” Or the woman asked the man, “How many fields do you have from which you can support yourself?”

Rav Huna said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

Since he spoke with the woman about the matters of her bill of divorce or her betrothal, he no longer needs to specify that he is giving the money for the purpose of betrothal.

He said

—he asked

Rav Yeimar

a question

of Rav Ashi:

But then, that which Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Anyone who does not know the nature of

the laws of

bills of divorce and betrothal —

let him have no dealings with them

to serve as a judge in the matter, so that he will not come to permit a prohibition of forbidden relations and cause a transgression that cannot be rectified. I have a question:

Whether

even

if

he did not hear it from him

—from the one arranging the betrothal or the bills of divorce—

this that

said

Rav Huna in the name of Shmuel,

that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, did Shmuel also say concerning him that he should have no dealings with them, because it is common for a person to give a bill of divorce or betrothal-money to a woman without specifying for what purpose he is giving it?

Or perhaps this is not common. Therefore, even if the one arranging the betrothal or the bills of divorce did not hear Shmuel’s words, he may serve as a judge in bills of divorce and betrothal.

Rav Ashi said to him: Indeed, so!

Indeed, concerning this matter as well, Shmuel said: One who has not heard this halakha should not serve as a judge in bills of divorce and betrothal.

And now the Gemara returns to discuss Shmuel’s words that we brought above:

And likewise with divorce —

he gave her her bill of divorce and said to her: Behold, you are sent away,

or

behold, you are divorced,

or

behold, you are permitted to every person —

she is divorced.

And the Gemara brings other expressions concerning divorce, regarding which it must be considered whether they are an expression of divorce or not:

This

is obvious,

and there is no doubt about the matter, that if a man

gave her

—to his wife—her

bill of divorce, and said [

wrote ]

to her, his wife,

in that bill of divorce: “

Behold, you are a free woman” —

This is how Rashi explained it [at the beginning of the second amud]. But it is difficult: Why did Rashi not explain the words of the Gemara according to their simple meaning, that this concerns a man who said one of these expressions with his mouth, and this is an inferior expression and therefore she is not divorced? And similarly we learned above concerning one who says, “I am not your husband,” that his expression is inferior and she is not divorced; and the Rashash likewise raised this difficulty. These are the words of Tosafot Rabbi Yehuda the Elder: “He said to his wife—in writing, that he wrote this to her; but through speech she is not divorced.” It appears that he did not have the words of the Gemara, “He gave her her bill of divorce.” Rather, in the books before him it was written: “It is obvious: He said to his wife, ‘Behold, you are a free woman,’” and so on. He explained that he wrote this in the bill of divorce, so that one should not err and say that this concerns a statement alone; the reason she is not divorced is that he did not give her a bill of divorce, but merely said it to her orally. Therefore Tosafot Rabbi Yehuda the Elder wrote that this concerns his writing this to her in the bill of divorce, and nevertheless she is not divorced because this is not an expression of divorce. It appears that Rashi likewise had this reading. Accordingly, his wording is well precise. [For Rashi wrote here, “He said nothing—for the purpose of divorcing her.” If Rashi had had the version before us, “He gave her a bill of divorce,” and so on, then it would be self-evident that this concerns divorce; why did Rashi need to add this? Rather, necessarily Rashi did not have “He gave her a bill of divorce.” He came to teach that this concerns divorce, since the expression “Behold, you are a free woman” does not at all indicate that this concerns divorce.] Our sugya appears in precisely this wording also in tractate Gittin 85a, and there it indeed does not say, “He gave her her bill of divorce,” but rather as we have written. The Tur [Even HaEzer 136] brought the law of the Gemara in a case of saying, and not of writing. And Beit Yosef wrote that even Rashi, who explained the words of the Gemara as referring to writing, agrees that if he said this with his mouth, he said nothing. [See there, where he gave a reason for the words of Rashi, Rif, and Rambam, who explained the Gemara as referring to writing.] [And see above, note 119]. -