Kiddushin 6a (ו.) — the Talmud in English

Abaye answered:

These

teach us the later formulations—

Shmuel comes to teach us the later formulations [that are stated in the continuation of Shmuel’s words].

That is, “I am your husband” and “I am your master”: there is no concern here. And similarly with regard to divorce, if he says, “I am not your husband,” there is no concern here.

And Shmuel’s reason is:

Here—

with regard to betrothal—

it is written [in Deuteronomy 24]: “

Deuteronomy 24]: “

When a man takes

a woman,”

and not that he takes himself

to her.

And here—

with regard to divorce—

it is written [there]: “

there]: “

And he sends her

from his house,”

and not that he sends himself.

And the Gemara continues to discuss additional formulations of betrothal:

The Sages taught:

One who betroths a woman and says to her:

“Behold, you are my wife,” or

“or”

“Behold, you are my betrothed,” or

“or”

“Behold, you are acquired by me” \-

she is betrothed.

And similarly, one who says:

“Behold, you are mine,” “Behold, you are in my possession,” “Behold, you are attached to me”—

she is betrothed.

And we raise a difficulty: Why did the tanna divide these formulations into two sentences?

Let him teach them all as one!

It would have been appropriate for him to teach all the formulations in a single sentence!

And we answer:

The tanna heard them in groups of three, and recorded them accordingly.

The tanna heard each group of three separately, and taught them separately, in the manner in which he heard them.

They raised a dilemma before them

the members of the academy were uncertain:

a. One who says to a woman, “Behold, you are

designated for me”—

what

is the law in this case? Is this a formulation of betrothal, in accordance with the wording of the verse [Genesis 2], “and he shall cleave to his wife, and they shall become one flesh,” or not?

b. One who says:

“Designated for me,”

from the term “designation,” which is a formulation of betrothal with regard to a Hebrew maidservant—

what

is the law in this case?

c. One who says to a woman: “Behold, you are

my help”—

because the woman is called “a help” in the Torah [“I will make him a helpmate corresponding to him,” Genesis 2]—

what

is the law in this case? [d.] “My counterpart”—from the expression “a helpmate corresponding to him” [there], which is said with regard to a woman—

what

is the law in this case?

e.

“My gathered one”—

from the term “gathering” [meaning an assembly], that is, “May you be gathered with me in the house”—

what

is the law in this case?

f.

“My rib”—

because the woman was taken from the rib [as explained in Genesis 2]—

what

is the law in this case?

g.

“My enclosed one”—

because it is stated concerning the woman who was taken from the man’s rib, “and He closed up the flesh beneath it” [there]—

what

is the law in this case?

h.

“My beneath” —

what

is the law in this case?

i.

“My seized one” —

what

is the law in this case? [j.] “My acquired one” [because of “when a man takes a woman,” Deuteronomy 24]—

what

is the law in this case?

And we conclude:

Resolve at least one of them.

Resolve at least one uncertainty from among all these uncertainties:

As it was taught: One who says

to a woman, “Behold, you are

my acquired one”—

she is betrothed, because it is stated

with regard to betrothal [Deuteronomy 24]:

“When a man takes a woman.”

They raised a dilemma before them

the members of the academy were uncertain:

One who says to a woman, “Behold, you are

my ḥarufa”—

what

is the law in this case?

Come and hear

a beraita that explicitly addressed this matter:

As it was taught: One who says, “My ḥarufa,”

she is

betrothed.

For in Judea they call a betrothed woman “ḥarufa.”

And we are astonished:

And

are the people of

Judea

themselves

the majority of the world?

Are they the majority of the world’s inhabitants, such that it should be said that their terminology is determinative?! And why did the beraita rule that everywhere in the world, if one says to a woman, “My ḥarufa,” she is betrothed, because in Judea they call a betrothed woman ḥarufa?

And we answer:

This is what it means:

this is the beraita’s intent:

One who says, “My ḥarufa,”—

she is betrothed,

because

it is stated [in Leviticus 19]:

Leviticus 19]:

“And she is a maidservant designated to a man.”

That is, it is stated concerning a designated maidservant [Leviticus 19:20]: “And if a man lies carnally with a woman, and she is a maidservant designated to a man, but not fully redeemed, nor has freedom been given her; there shall be an indemnity.”

And the tannaim disagreed concerning what a designated maidservant is [“designated to a man”]:

According to Rabbi Akiva, the verse speaks of a maidservant who is half a Canaanite maidservant and half a free woman, who became betrothed to a Hebrew slave, who is permitted to a Canaanite maidservant [for example, a maidservant belonging to two masters, one of whom emancipated her, so that she became half maidservant and half free woman].

The amoraim disagreed concerning a woman who is half free: Do betrothals take effect with regard to her free half, or do betrothals not take effect with regard to her at all?

But according to Rabbi Ishmael, the verse speaks of a completely Canaanite maidservant who became betrothed to a Hebrew slave. Although betrothal does not take effect with regard to an un emancipated Canaanite maidservant, and she is not technically “betrothed,” nevertheless she is designated for the Hebrew slave.

Here the Gemara explains the beraita’s statement—that one who says “My ḥarufa” betroths her—in accordance with the view of Rabbi Akiva, that a designated maidservant is a woman who is half maidservant and half free, betrothed to a Hebrew slave, and betrothal takes effect with regard to her.

And since the verse says “designated,” meaning “betrothed,” we learn from here that “my ḥarufa” means “my betrothed.”

And this is what the tanna said: One who says “My ḥarufa”—she is betrothed, because it is stated, “and she is a maidservant designated to a man.”

And furthermore,

for

in Judea they call a betrothed woman “ḥarufa.”

And we are astonished:

And

why

is Judea additional support for the verse?!

Since we have brought proof from the verse that ḥarufa means a betrothed woman, there is no need or reason to bring proof from the fact that this is the customary terminology in Judea [for the words of the verse are proof that requires no support from a Judean custom]!

Because of this difficulty, the Gemara retracts and says:

Rather, it must be that the beraita follows the view of Rabbi Ishmael, that a designated maidservant is a Canaanite maidservant with regard to whom betrothal does not take effect at all. It follows that “designated” does not mean betrothed; rather, she is merely “designated” for the Hebrew slave, and there is no proof from the verse that a betrothed woman is also called ḥarufa.

In light of this, the beraita’s statement should be explained as follows:

This is what it means,

the tanna said:

One who says “

ḥarufa” \-

in Judea—

she is

betrothed, for in Judea they call a betrothed woman “ḥarufa.”

But in other places, if he says to a woman, “Behold, you are my ḥarufa,” she is not betrothed, because it is not customary there to call a betrothed woman by the name ḥarufa.

The Gemara now discusses all these formulations about which we were uncertain as to whether the betrothal took effect, since the formulation is not clear: How do we know that the woman understood his intention and agreed to the betrothal? To answer this question, the Gemara clarifies the circumstances in which we were speaking:

And we examine this:

What are we dealing with?

In what case were we uncertain concerning these formulations whether his betrothal is effective or not?

If you say

that the case is

one in which he had not been speaking with her

previously

about the matter of her bill of divorce or her betrothal,

but rather he gave her a bill of divorce and said to her, “You are not designated for me,” or one of the other formulations about which we raised an uncertainty, in order to divorce her; or he gave a woman a peruta and said to her, “Behold, you are designated for me,” in order to betroth her—this is difficult: Why were we uncertain in this case whether his betrothal is effective? For even assuming that these formulations are indeed formulations of betrothal, it must still be asked:

From where

would the woman

know what he was saying to her

? The woman did not understand what he said to her and did not agree to the betrothal!

Rather,

if you say that the case is

one in

which he was

speaking with her about the matter of her bill of divorce or her betrothal

before betrothing or divorcing her, and therefore it is reasonable that the woman understood his intention and agreed to the betrothal, then the other side is difficult:

Since he had previously spoken with her about the matter of her bill of divorce and her betrothal, it is obvious that she is betrothed; what uncertainty could there be in this matter?

But

even though he said nothing to her, she is likewise betrothed

!

And all the more so when he said one of these expressions after having spoken with her about the matter of her betrothal: she is betrothed. What, then, was the basis of our uncertainty?!

The Gemara proves that when one had previously spoken with a woman about the matter of her betrothal, even though he said nothing to her at the time he gave her the money, she is betrothed—

as we learned

in tractate Ma'aser Sheni [4:7]:

If he was speaking with a woman about the matter of her bill of divorce or her betrothal, and he gave her

her

bill of divorce or money for her betrothal, and did not specify

for what purpose he was giving them:

Rabbi Yosei says: That is sufficient

He need do no more than that. It is sufficient that he had previously discussed the matter with her, and it is as though he specified his intention.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He must specify.

And

with regard to this

Rav Huna said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

who says that he need not specify.

If so, since even if he did not specify anything, this is a valid betrothal, all the more so if he mentioned one of these expressions, she is betrothed. Why, then, were we uncertain about the matter?

And we answer:

They said

the members of the academy offered the following answer:

Actually

our uncertainty was

when he was speaking with her about the matter of her bill of divorce or her betrothal.

And if he gave her the money and remained silent—

that is indeed so!

If he gave her the money and remained silent, it is indeed clear to us that he intended to betroth her, and the betrothal is valid.

But

when he mentioned one of these expressions,

this is what he was asking—

this was the matter about which we were uncertain:

Whether

these expressions

he was saying to her for the purpose of betrothal.

Do these expressions have the meaning of an expression of betrothal, so that she became betrothed through them,

or perhaps he was saying them with regard to work!

Perhaps these expressions refer to the performance of work. When he said, “Behold, you are designated exclusively for me,” he intended to designate her to perform his work, and similarly with regard to the other expressions.

If so, although he had previously spoken with her about the matter of her bill of divorce or her betrothal, now that he said these expressions, insofar as they are expressions referring to work, he revealed that he does not now desire to betroth her to himself, but only to designate her for his work.

And we conclude:

Teyku.

The substance of the matter—

The Gemara now comes to discuss the substance of that Mishna in tractate Ma'aser Sheni:

As we learned:

If he was speaking with the woman about the matter of her bill of divorce or her betrothal, and he gave her

her

bill of divorce or money for her betrothal, and did not specify

for what purpose he was giving them:

Rabbi Yosei says: That is sufficient—

It is sufficient that he discussed with her the matter of her bill of divorce or her betrothal, and it is as though he now specified that he was betrothing or divorcing her.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He must specify.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

Rabbi Yosei’s statement that it is sufficient for him to have discussed with her the matter of her bill of divorce or her betrothal is subject to a condition:

And that

they should be

engaged in that same matter

of discussing the betrothal until the time he gives the money.

And Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Oshaya likewise said: And that

they should be

engaged in that same matter.

As a matter of dispute between tanna'im—

The tanna'im disagreed [in a beraita] about this matter:

Rabbi says: And that they be engaged in that same matter

until the time of the giving.

Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon says: Even though they are not engaged in that same matter

until the time of the giving, nevertheless, if they had discussed it earlier, this is a valid betrothal.

And we raise a difficulty against the statement of Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon:

And if they were not engaged in that same matter

until the giving of the money—

from where,

from where would the woman

know what he was saying to her?

Since, at the time he gave her the money, he did not specify that he was giving it for the purpose of betrothal, she did not understand that this was his intention and did not consent to the betrothal!

Abaye said

in answer:

Indeed, Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon maintains that it is not necessary for him to be engaged with her at the time of the giving in the actual matter of betrothal, but he agrees that he must at least be engaged with her

in one matter leading to another, but within the same subject.

At first they discussed the actual matter of betrothal, then they stopped discussing it and moved on to discuss other matters connected with the needs of marriage.

For example, the man asked the woman how much dowry she had, or the woman asked the man how many fields he had from which he could support himself.

Rav Huna said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

Since he spoke with the woman about the matter of her bill of divorce or her betrothal, he need not further specify that he is giving the money for the purpose of betrothal.

He said

and asked

Rav Yemar

a question

of Rav Ashi:

But then, with regard to that which Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Anyone who is not familiar with the details of

the laws of

bills of divorce and betrothal—

should have no involvement with them,

to serve as a judge in these matters, so that he will not come to permit a forbidden relationship and cause a transgression that cannot be rectified. I have a question:

Whether

even

if

he did not hear it

the statement of the one arranging the betrothal or the bill of divorce,

that

said

Rav Huna said that Shmuel said, namely, that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, does Shmuel also say with regard to him that he should have no involvement with them, because it is common for a person to give a bill of divorce or money for betrothal to a woman without specifying for what purpose he is giving it?

Or perhaps this is not common, and therefore, even if the one arranging the betrothal or the bill of divorce did not hear Shmuel’s statement, he may serve as a judge in matters of bills of divorce and betrothal.

Or perhaps this is not common. Therefore, even if the person arranging the betrothal or divorce has not heard Shmuel’s statement, he may serve as a judge in matters of bills of divorce and betrothal.

Rav Ashi said to him: Yes, indeed!

Indeed, with regard to this matter as well, Shmuel said that one who had not heard this halakha should not serve as a judge in matters of bills of divorce and betrothal.

The Gemara now returns to discuss Shmuel’s statement cited above:

And similarly with regard to divorce—

he gave her a bill of divorce and said to her: Behold, you are sent away,

or

behold, you are divorced,

or

behold, you are permitted to every man—

she is divorced.

The Gemara presents other expressions with regard to divorce, concerning which it must be determined whether they constitute an expression of divorce:

This

is obvious,

and there is no uncertainty about the matter: If a man

gave her

his wife

her bill of divorce and said

[wrote]

to her, his wife,

in that bill of divorce, “

Behold, you are a free woman,” -

You are a free woman” -