Kiddushin 5b — the Talmud in English

The canopy,

whose power is great,

which

is

completing

the removal of the daughter from her father's authority [for from the time she is delivered to the canopy, her labor and her inheritance do not belong to her father], and

is it not logical that it should acquire

the acquisition of betrothal?!

And from here Rav Huna learned that the canopy acquires the acquisition of betrothal.

And we challenge this: Is it not possible to reject the kal va-chomer and say:

Behold,

what

is the reason

for money

that it acquires the acquisition of betrothal? —

For

since

one redeems consecrated property and Second Tithe with it.

Therefore its power is great, and it is effective also for acquiring the woman. But the canopy, with which one does not redeem consecrated property and Second Tithe, likewise cannot acquire the woman!

And we answer:

Intercourse will prove it!

The acquisition of betrothal does not depend on the fact that one redeems consecrated property and Second Tithe with it, for one does not redeem consecrated property and Second Tithe through intercourse, and nevertheless it acquires! And likewise let us say regarding the canopy.

But it is possible to reject this and say:

What

is the reason

for intercourse

that it acquires the acquisition of betrothal? — It is because its power is great,

for

intercourse

acquires in the case of a levirate wife.

But the canopy, which does not acquire in the case of a levirate wife, likewise cannot acquire the woman through it!

And we answer:

Money will prove it!

The acquisition of betrothal does not depend on the fact that it acquires in the case of a levirate wife, for money does not acquire in the case of a levirate wife, and nevertheless it acquires in the case of a woman; and likewise let us say regarding the canopy.

And the matter returns [

one must return and ask whether perhaps money acquires specifically because one redeems consecrated property and Second Tithe with it, and return and prove from intercourse, and return and ask about it as mentioned. And so on forever].

And therefore we say:

This one is not like that one.

The stringency of money is not identical with the stringency of intercourse.

And that one is not like this one.

The stringency of intercourse is not identical with the stringency of money.

But

the common aspect in them is that

they

acquire in general [

money in the case of a Hebrew maidservant, and intercourse in the case of a levirate wife],

and acquire

also

here,

in the betrothal of a woman.

Therefore,

I too will bring [

I will derive]

the canopy, which acquires in general [

in marriage], and therefore it

acquires

also

here,

in the betrothal of a woman.

And we refute this:

What is the common aspect in them? That their benefit is great [

for when the woman receives the money or the intercourse, her benefit is great]. But a canopy does not provide great benefit. Therefore it cannot acquire in the betrothal of a woman!

And we answer:

A document will prove it,

for the acquisition of betrothal does not depend on the fact that its benefit is great [for there is no great benefit in receiving the document].

And we refute this: It is not possible to derive the canopy from a document, for it is possible to say:

What

is the reason

for

the

document

acquiring? — It is because

it removes her from the status of a daughter of Israel,

but the canopy, which does not remove her, has no power to acquire the acquisition of betrothal!

And we answer:

Money and intercourse will prove it,

for the acquisition of betrothal does not depend on the fact that it removes her from the status of a daughter of Israel, for money and intercourse do not remove her, and nevertheless they bring her in [and therefore even a canopy, which does not remove her from the status of a daughter of Israel, has the power to acquire].

And the matter returns [

one must return and ask whether perhaps money and intercourse acquire specifically because their benefit is great. And return and prove from a document, and return and ask about the document as mentioned, and so on forever].

And therefore we say:

This one is not like that one,

the stringency of money and intercourse is not identical with the stringency of a document.

And that one is not like this one.

The stringency of a document is not identical with the stringency of money and intercourse.

But,

the common aspect in them is that they acquire in general [

money and a document in the case of the Hebrew maidservant, and intercourse in the case of a levirate wife],

and acquire

also

here

in the betrothal of a woman.

Therefore,

I too will bring [

I will derive] regarding

the canopy, which acquires in general [

in marriage],

and

therefore it

acquires

also

here,

in the betrothal of a woman.

And we reject this:

What is the common aspect in them

that they acquire here? It is because

they have,

that they acquire in general,

against her will:

money acquires the Hebrew maidservant against her will, and the document in divorce, and intercourse in the case of a levirate wife, and therefore their power is great. And by virtue of this they acquire even in betrothal.

But a canopy is not effective against the woman's will, and therefore it is possible to say that it too cannot acquire the acquisition of betrothal!

And we answer the words of Rav Huna:

And Rav Huna,

who derived the canopy from the common aspect, will answer: The acquisition of

money, at least,

in any event,

in marital status —

we have not found [

we have not found]

against her will

of the woman. [

And we do not take into consideration that the maidservant is acquired with money against her will. Since this is not in the matter of marital status].

Therefore one should prove from the acquisition by money that betrothal does not depend on its being against her will. For money does not acquire in marital status against her will.

But Rava disputes the words of Rav Huna, and his view is that a canopy does not acquire the acquisition of betrothal:

Rava said: There are two answers to the matter!

The kal va-chomer that Rav Huna said should be rejected on the basis of two arguments:

One,

one argument:

For "

the woman is acquired through

three

ways"

we have learned, and

if there were

four

ways,

we would not have learned it.

It follows from here that the woman is not acquired through a canopy [for according to Rav Huna, who says that the woman is acquired through a canopy, it would have been proper to teach four ways] !

And furthermore,

an argument:

Is it at all the case that we have not found

that

a canopy completes except through

what preceded it,

betrothal [

for it is impossible to make a marriage except after betrothal].

If so, one must wonder:

Do we derive [

we learn]

the canopy

so that it should acquire

without betrothal, from a canopy that

completes

through

the

betrothal

that preceded it?!

Abaye said to him

to Rava: Your arguments can be rejected:

A.

As for this,

the first argument,

that you said: "

three

ways"

we have learned, and "

four

ways"

we have not learned!

It can be said:

The tanna teaches a matter that is explicitly written.

The tanna taught only acquisitions that were multiplied explicitly in the Torah. But the canopy, which is

a matter that is not explicitly written,

not written explicitly in the Torah, but which we learned through a kal va-chomer,

he does not teach.

B.

And

regarding the second argument,

that you said: Is it the case that a canopy

does not

complete except through betrothal,

and one cannot learn from it that a canopy should acquire even without betrothal! It can be said:

Rav Huna too

included all this in the kal va-chomer. And

this is what he said:

Just as money, which does not complete [

marriage], even

after money

of betrothal, nevertheless it

acquires [

without betrothal that preceded it].

A canopy, which completes

marriage

after

the acquisition of betrothal with

money,

and is it

not logical that it should acquire

even without betrothal preceding it?! And from here Rav Huna learned that a canopy acquires.

We learned in the Mishna:

The Gemara brings a beraita explaining how the acquisition through money is performed:

The Sages taught:

With money, how so?

He gave her

to the woman

money or an item worth money, and said to her "

Behold, you are betrothed to me",

or

"Behold, you are betrothed to me",

or "

Behold, you are my wife [

a wife] " —

she is betrothed.

But she [

the woman]

who gave

the money

and she said

to the husband "

Behold, I am betrothed to you",

or "

Behold, I am betrothed to you",

or "

Behold, I am your wife [

a wife] " —

she is not betrothed.

Rav Pappa challenged it:

The beginning of the beraita contradicts its end:

For at first the beraita explained that betrothal through money is effected by the husband giving the money and saying "Behold, you are betrothed to me":

And it implies,

the reason,

the reason that the betrothal took effect is because

he gave

the money

and

also

he said

the wording of betrothal.

But,

however, if

he gave

the money

and she said "

Behold, I am betrothed to you" —

she is not betrothed.

Now say the end,

say now the end of the beraita:

But she who gave him

money,

and she said "

Behold, I am betrothed to you" —

there was no betrothal.

And it implies,

the reason,

the reason that this is not betrothal is because

she gave

the money

and

also

she said

the wording of betrothal. But

if,

if

he gave and she said, there is betrothal.

Thus the beginning and the end contradict one another regarding the case where he gave and she said! For from the beginning it implies that it is not betrothal, while from the end it implies that it is betrothal.

And we answer the words of the beraita:

The beginning —

specifically.

The words of the beginning were stated precisely, so that we should infer from them that if he gave and she said, she is not betrothed.

But

the end —

it was brought incidentally.

The tanna stated the words of the end "for no particular reason" [since we learned in the beginning "he gave and he said," we taught the opposite case in the end, "she gave and she said," which is the case opposite to the beginning. But the end was not written so that we should infer from it regarding the case where he gave and she said].

And we wonder: Indeed, we find in several places that the tanna teaches the end incidentally to the words of the beginning. But we find such a thing only when no law contradicting the beginning can be inferred from the end. But here [when we have said that the end was taught incidentally to the beginning], a law contradicting the beginning can be inferred from the end, and therefore one must wonder:

And

is it the case that

he teaches an end containing a matter that contradicts the beginning!?

Is it appropriate to teach in the end a law from which it implies that it contradicts the beginning?!

And we answer:

Rather, this is what he said

this is what the tanna [who taught the beraita] intended to say:

He gave and he said —

it is obvious that there is betrothal.

And we taught this first in order to continue and state the novelty in the words of the end —

that if

he gave and she said —

it is treated as though "

she gave and she said",

and there is no betrothal.

And so the beraita said in its end: "But," the law differs from what we said in the beginning: if he gave and she said, the matter is treated as though "she gave and she said," and therefore "she is not betrothed."

And if you wish, say

there is another answer:

Thus the tanna said:

He gave and he said —

certainly

she is betrothed.

She gave and she said —

certainly

she is not betrothed.

And we infer from here that if

he gave and she said —

it is uncertain.

This is doubtful betrothal,

and we are stringent by rabbinic law.

If he gave and she said, and afterward another man came and betrothed her in accordance with the law, we are stringent by rabbinic law and are concerned lest the first betrothal was not betrothal, and the second betrothal took effect, making her forbidden to the first by virtue of it.

And we are concerned lest the first betrothal was betrothal, making her forbidden to the second by virtue of it. It follows that the woman is forbidden to both of them. If she comes to marry another, she requires a divorce-document from both of them.

We learned in a beraita: He said to her, "Behold, you are betrothed to me," "Behold, you are betrothed to me," and so on. Since the beraita mentioned several formulations of betrothal, the Gemara discusses at length several other formulations, whether they are effective for betrothal:

Shemuel said: In

the matter of

betrothal:

if

he gave her money or an item worth money and said to her: "Behold, you are betrothed,"

or

"Behold, you are betrothed,"

or

"Behold, you are my wife [

a wife] ", and he did not finish by saying "to me" —

Behold, she is betrothed

to him, and we do not suspect that perhaps he intended to betroth her to another.

And if he said:

“I am your husband,”

or

“I am your master,”

or

“I am your betrothed,”—

there is

here not even

a place for concern

[concern] for a doubt of betrothal. For it is stated in the Torah [Deuteronomy 24]: “When a man takes a woman,” and it implies that he must take her into his possession, and not that he should take himself to her [and the woman is permitted to marry any person without a bill of divorce].

And likewise in

the matter of

divorce:

if

he gave her

a bill of divorce,

and said to her: “Behold, you are sent away,”

or

“Behold, you are divorced,”

or

“Behold, you are permitted to every person,” \-

behold, she is divorced.

But if he said:

“I am not your husband,”

or

“I am not

your master,”

or

“I am not your betrothed,” there is here

even

a place for concern

[concern] for a doubt of divorce; and if the woman was an Israelite woman married to a kohen, behold, she eats teruma and does not suspect that perhaps she is divorced.

And likewise, if she is widowed from her husband, she is permitted to marry a kohen, and there is no concern for her on account of the prohibition of a divorced woman. These are Shmuel’s words up to here.

At the beginning of his words, Shmuel said that one who says “Behold, you are betrothed,” and does not say “to me,” behold, she is betrothed to him, and we do not suspect that perhaps he intended to betroth her to another person.

We learned at the beginning of tractate Nedarim [2a, and in the Gemara there on 2b]: “All the handles of vows are like vows.” That is, one who says a partial expression, from which it is understood that he intends a vow, but he did not say a complete expression of a vow, it is like a complete vow.

And “the handles of vows” were called so because they are like the “handle of a vessel”: one who grasps the handle and lifts it, the entire vessel rises with it, even though he is not grasping the body of the vessel. [And similarly, one who says an incomplete expression, it is like a handle for a vow, and as though he had said the entire vow.] [Commentary of the Rosh, Nedarim 2a].

And Abaye and Rava disputed [there, 5b] concerning “handles that are not conclusive,” an expression that does not prove with certainty that the one who said it intended a vow.

Abaye said: handles that are not conclusive are handles. And Rava said: they are not handles.

Rav Pappa said to him

to Abaye: Is it to say

that Shmuel’s reason [when he said that if he says “Behold, you are betrothed,” and does not say “to me,” this is betrothal] is because

Shmuel holds that handles that are not conclusive are handles?

For even though there is no proof that the one betrothing intended to betroth the woman to himself, this is like a “handle,” and she is betrothed to him?

And

there is a contradiction to this, for

we learned [Nazir 2b]:

the one who

says “

I shall be” [A0058]]I shall be]

I will be]

behold, he is a nazirite.

And we raised this difficulty

in tractate Nazir: Why, when one says “I shall be,” is he a nazirite?

Perhaps

perhaps

he said, “I shall be fasting,”

and did not intend to say “I shall be a nazirite”!

And Shmuel said:

a condition must be added to the words of our Mishna:

“And this is when a nazirite was passing before him,”

specifically if a nazirite passed before him, then it is proven that he intended to say, “I too shall be such.”

And Rav Pappa inferred from Shmuel’s words:

The reason

the reason that he is a nazirite is specifically because

a nazirite was passing before him.

And it implies:

if this were not so, no.

And from here it follows that Shmuel holds that handles that are not conclusive are not included among “handles.”

But this contradicts what Shmuel said concerning betrothal: that one who says “Behold, you are betrothed,” and does not say “to me,” this is betrothal [even though there is no proof here to whom he intended to betroth her]!

Abaye answered Rav Pappa:

What are we dealing with here,

what was Shmuel speaking about?

That he said

“Behold, you are betrothed”

“to me.”

And this is a complete expression of betrothal.

And Rav Pappa returned and raised a difficulty:

If so,

if indeed it is speaking of when he said “to me,”

what does he teach us?

What does Shmuel come to teach us? Behold, here there is a complete expression of betrothal, and it is obvious that she is betrothed!