Kiddushin 5a (ה.) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara brings the continuation of the words of the tanna cited above:

Until this point, the tanna expounded the verse, “When a man takes a woman and marries her,” as follows: “

‘When he takes’ teaches that a woman is acquired with money. “

‘And marries her’ teaches that a woman is acquired through intercourse.”

And now the tanna asks:

And from where

is it known that a woman is acquired

also with a document?

At first, he wishes to derive this through a kal va-chomer:

And the inference [

kal va-chomer ]

is as follows:

And if money,

whose power of acquisition is not strong,

for

it

does not

remove

her

from her husband’s authority [to acquire herself], and nevertheless it is considered an acquisition

to bring

the woman into his authority through betrothal,

A document,

whose power of acquisition is stronger,

for

it

does

remove the woman from her husband’s authority [through a bill of divorce],

is it not the case

that

it

should

bring

the woman into betrothal?!

But the tanna rejects the kal va-chomer:

As for money,

the fact that it brings the woman into her husband’s authority is because money’s power of acquisition is strong with regard to another matter,

as with it one redeems

with money

consecrated property and second tithe,

and through this they become unconsecrated.

Can you say

that the same applies to a

document,

whose power is not as great,

as one cannot redeem consecrated property with it

or second tithe?!

As it is written [

Leviticus 27, concerning the redemption of consecrated property ], “‘

And he shall give the money’—

and it shall be his.”

When the redeemer gives the money, the field then becomes his.

From here it follows that consecrated property becomes unconsecrated only through money. And since the kal va-chomer has been rejected, the tanna derives that a document acquires a woman from the verse:

Rather,

the verse says [

Deuteronomy 24, concerning the divorce of a woman ]: “If [the woman] does not find favor in his [her husband’s] eyes, he shall write her a document [a bill] of severance.”

And she shall leave

his house and go,

and she shall be [

and become betrothed ] to another man.”

And since “she shall leave” and “she shall be” are written adjacent to one another, the verse teaches that the two are juxtaposed:

the state of being [

betrothal ]

to departure [

divorce ]—

Just as departure

is

through a document [

a bill of divorce ], so

too, the state of being [

betrothal ]

also

takes place

through a document.

From here it follows that a woman becomes betrothed through a document.

But the Gemara raises an objection to the tanna’s words: If, indeed, the state of being and departure are juxtaposed to one another, this is difficult:

And let us also juxtapose departure to the state of being

with regard to another matter, and say:

Just as the state of being [

betrothal ] takes place

with money, so too, departure

of the woman shall take place

with money!

And why did we learn in the Mishna that a woman acquires herself through a bill of divorce and through the death of her husband alone, and not through money?!

Said

Abaye

in explanation:

It is not possible to juxtapose departure to the state of being and thereby establish divorce with money, because

people will say:

“

Money brings

the woman into the husband’s authority, and

money

itself also

takes her out!”

It is impossible that the same acquisition [money] should accomplish opposite things.

As an analogy: Is it possible that

an advocate,

the money of betrothal,

should become an accuser,

the money of divorce?!

The Gemara is surprised at Abaye’s answer: If your words are indeed correct—that it is impossible for one acquisition to accomplish opposite things—

if so,

why did the tanna juxtapose the state of being to departure, deriving from this that a woman is acquired through a document?

For with regard to

a document, too, people will say: A document takes her out,

and

a document

itself also

brings her in.

Is it possible that

an accuser [

the bill of divorce ]

should become an advocate [

the betrothal document ]?!

The Gemara resolves Abaye’s answer:

With regard to a document, there is no difficulty of “Can an accuser become an advocate?” For

the matters of this document

of the bill of divorce

are separate, and the matters of that document

of betrothal

are separate.

For the bill of divorce states that he divorces her, whereas the betrothal document states that he betrothes her.

The Gemara now raises the converse objection: If we answer that when the content of one document differs from the content of the other, there is no difficulty of “Can an accuser become an advocate,” then the earlier question returns: Why not juxtapose departure to the state of being and say that departure, too, takes place through money?

For

here too,

there should be no difficulty of “Can an advocate become an accuser” with regard to money, because

this money

of betrothal

is separate, and that money

of divorce

is separate!

For the money of betrothal differs from the money of divorce—

At the time he gives the betrothal money, he specifies that he is giving it for the purpose of betrothal, whereas at the time of divorce he specifies that he is giving it for the purpose of divorce!

The Gemara answers: Even though at the time of giving it he specifies for what purpose he is giving it to her, nevertheless,

the coin itself is, in any event, one and the same!

The form stamped on the money is always the same, and it is not stated on the body of the money whether it is intended to bring her in or take her out. Therefore, it is impossible for the same coin to accomplish opposite things [unlike a document, whose very form in the case of a betrothal document differs from the form of a bill of divorce].

Rava said

another answer: It is impossible to say that money effects divorce, because

the verse says [

Deuteronomy 24 ]: “

And he shall write for her

a document of severance, and place it in her hand.” If it were not specifically necessary to write a bill of divorce, and it were possible to divorce her also by giving money, the verse should have said, “And he shall give her a document of severance.” Why did the verse add the words, “And he shall write for her”? Rather, the verse necessarily comes to teach that only

through writing

the woman

is divorced, and she is not divorced with money.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rava’s answer:

According to your approach, why not expound the verse differently:

And say,

that the verse comes to teach that

through writing [

in a written document ] the woman

is divorced, but she is not betrothed through writing [

in a document ]!

The Gemara answers:

Is it not written: “

And she shall leave, and she shall be”—

the verse juxtaposes

the state of being to departure: Just as departure is through a document, so too the state of being is through a document!

Therefore, it cannot be said that “And he shall write for her” comes to teach that a woman cannot be betrothed through a document.

But the Gemara immediately asks: We have before us two verses: One is the juxtaposition of “And she shall leave, and she shall be,” which equates the acquisitions of betrothal and divorce. The other is the exclusion in “And he shall write for her,” which excludes another means of divorcing a woman.

And what have you seen

that you should include acquisition through a document in betrothal on the basis of the juxtaposition of “And she shall leave, and she shall be,” and exclude acquisition through money in divorce on the basis of the exclusion “And he shall write for her”?

Why not say the opposite: Include acquisition through money in divorce on the basis of the juxtaposition “And she shall leave, and she shall be,” and exclude acquisition through a document in betrothal on the basis of the exclusion “And he shall write for her” ! The Gemara answers:

It is logical

that since the verse “And he shall write for her”

stands,

is stated

with regard to divorce,

it

excludes

another means of acquisition

with regard to divorce: She is divorced only through writing and is not divorced with money.

But if you say that “And he shall write for her” comes to exclude that she is divorced through writing but is not betrothed through writing, this is difficult: Is it possible that the verse “And he shall write for her,” which

stands,

is stated

with regard to divorce, and

that it

excludes

a means of

betrothal?!

The Gemara now raises an objection to Rava’s answer, that the verse “And he shall write for her” excludes divorce with money:

And according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who assigned this verse to another exposition,

who derived another exposition from the verse “And he shall write for her” in Tractate Gittin [21b], it is impossible to derive from here also that a woman is not divorced with money. According to him, this is difficult—

The fact

that

a woman

is not divorced with money—

from where does he derive it?!

From where will Rabbi Yosei HaGelili learn that a woman is not divorced with money?

The Gemara answers:

The verse says [

Deuteronomy 24, concerning divorce ]: “And he shall write for her,

a document of severance.”

From the fact that the verse juxtaposes the word “severance” to “document”

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derives: Only

a document severs her

from her husband,

and nothing else [

money ]

severs her.

The Gemara asks:

And the Rabbis,

who exclude money from “And he shall write for her,” what do they make of

this word “

severance”?

What do they use it for?

What do they derive from the word “severance”?

The Gemara answers:

They need it

because the word “severance” is necessary in order

to

teach that the bill of divorce must be

something that severs between him and her.

The husband must not stipulate in the bill of divorce any condition that would thereby bind the woman to her husband—

As it was taught:

One who says to his wife,

“This is your bill of divorce

on condition

that you do not drink wine,”

or

on condition that you never go to your father’s house”—

this is not severance!

This woman has not been severed [separated] from her husband, for she remains bound to him all her life, since she must fulfill this condition because of him. Therefore, this divorce does not take effect.

But if he says to her, “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you do not drink wine or go to your father’s house”

for thirty days, it

is included among the requirements of

“severance.”

For once the condition has been fulfilled for thirty days, she may go and do whatever she wishes, and it follows that she is not bound to her husband forever. Therefore, as soon as she receives the bill of divorce she is divorced, since it is possible that she will ultimately become completely separated from her husband.

It follows that, according to the Rabbis, from “And he shall write for her” we learn that she is divorced through writing and not with money, while from “severance” we learn that the bill of divorce must be something that severs between him and her.

Rabbi Yosei derived “And he shall write for her” for another exposition in Tractate Gittin. Therefore, he had to derive from “severance” that a woman is divorced through a document [a bill of divorce] and not with money.

The Gemara now discusses, according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: From where did the Rabbis learn that the bill of divorce must be something that severs between him and her?

And it explains:

And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili—

from

the fact that the verse could have said, “a document

that severs,” but instead it says, “a document

of

severance,”

the law emerges

that the bill of divorce must be something that severs between him and her.

And

if

the Sages had learned this law from the entire word “divorces,” the difference between “

”

divorce

and “

divorces”—

would not have appeared to them

as a basis for expounding the superfluous wording and deriving any teaching from it.

Thus far, the Gemara has explained the words of the tanna who brought a source for kiddushin through money, intercourse, and a document.

And since the tanna derived kiddushin through a document from “and she shall leave and become,” the Gemara expands its discussion also to the source of the law that money is ineffective for divorce, and to the sequence of the scriptural expositions concerning a bill of divorce.

The Gemara now clarifies why we could not derive each of the means of kiddushin from the others:

The tanna asked why one means of acquisition should not be learned from another, such as money from intercourse: An Israelite maidservant, who is not acquired through intercourse, is acquired through money. If so, a woman who is acquired through intercourse should certainly be acquired through money by means of a kal va-chomer!

And we conclude: Money acquires an Israelite maidservant because it also emancipates her. This is not so with kiddushin.

And likewise, intercourse from money: If a yevama, who is not acquired through money, is acquired through intercourse, then a woman who is acquired through money should certainly be acquired through intercourse!

And we conclude: The yevama is already bound and awaiting the levirate bond, and intercourse is effective only in such a case. This is not so with kiddushin.

And likewise, a document from money: If money, which does not remove a woman from the relationship, brings her into it, then a document, which does remove her from the relationship, should certainly bring her into it!

And we conclude: Money is a stronger means of acquisition, since consecrated property and second tithe can be redeemed with it. This is not so with a document.

And we challenge this: Indeed, the tanna explained that

one from one

cannot be derived. One means of acquisition cannot be learned from a single other means of acquisition.

But it can still be asked:

Let one

be derived

from two. Let one means of acquisition be learned from the common denominator of two means of acquisition: Just as we find that two means of acquisition acquire in another context, and they also acquire here, since the means of acquisition that we find with regard to women are general means of acquisition in all contexts, and they acquire even with regard to kiddushin,

so too, the third means of acquisition, which we find acquires in another context, is a general means of acquisition with regard to all women, and it should acquire here as well.

For all of them acquire in another context: Money and a document acquire an Israelite maidservant [as below, on 14b], and intercourse acquires a yevama!

And we answer:

Which one would be derived?

Which of them, you who raised the objection, do you wish us to learn from the other two means of acquisition?

If you say that

the Torah would not have written with regard to a document

that it acquires,

and it would be derived from these,

we would learn it from money and intercourse: Just as money and intercourse, which acquire in other contexts involving women, also acquire with regard to kiddushin, so too, a document, which acquires a woman in another context [with an Israelite maidservant], should also acquire with regard to kiddushin! Your statement can be rejected and it can be said:

What is there about these

money and intercourse, which acquire with regard to kiddushin, that gives them this status?

They have the feature that the benefit they provide is substantial.

But a document, from which the woman derives no benefit whatsoever, as it is merely a piece of paper on which is written, “Behold, you are betrothed to me,” cannot effect kiddushin.

And perhaps you will say:

The Torah would not have written with regard to intercourse

that it acquires,

and it would be derived from these,

we would learn it from money and a document.

Your statement can be rejected and it can be said:

What is there about these

money and a document, which acquire with regard to kiddushin, that gives them this status?

Their acquisition power is greater,

as it is possible to acquire slaves and land with them [which are strong forms of acquisition]. But intercourse, which acquires only in the case of a yevama, cannot effect kiddushin.

And if you say that

the Torah would not have written with regard to money

that it acquires,

and it would be derived from these,

we would learn it from a document and intercourse.

Your statement can be rejected and it can be said:

What is there about these

a document and intercourse, which acquire with regard to kiddushin, that gives them this status?

They have the feature that

they are strong means of acquisition, which

apply

even

against the woman’s will,

as, for example, intercourse acquires a yevama against her will, and a document is effective for divorce even against the woman’s will. Therefore, they are strong means of acquisition.

But money, which we do not find acquiring anywhere against the woman’s will, cannot effect kiddushin.

And if you say,

perhaps you will say:

Money too

does

apply against the will of

the woman, for example,

in the case of an Israelite maidservant,

whose father sells her without her consent! If so, kiddushin through money can be learned from a document and intercourse.

Your answer is:

With regard to marriage, at least, we have not found it!

We have not found a case involving marriage in which money is effective against the woman’s will. Therefore, money cannot be learned from a document and intercourse, which are effective against the woman’s will even in matters of marriage.

We learned in the Mishna: A woman is acquired through money, through a document, and through intercourse.

And the Gemara brings an opinion that a woman is acquired even through ḥuppa—the wedding canopy—and expands the discussion of this matter:

Rav Huna said: A wedding canopy

acquires

a woman with the acquisition of kiddushin,

by means of a kal va-chomer

from the acquisition through money:

And

what of the acquisition through

money, which

does not have the power to effect marriage [but only kiddushin], and therefore, if an Israelite woman became betrothed to a kohen, money

does not enable

her

to eat teruma.

[For only a married woman eats teruma, as stated below], nevertheless, money

acquires

a woman with the acquisition of kiddushin.

If so,

a wedding canopy,

whose power is greater,

which

because it effects marriage

enables

the woman to eat

teruma,

and

is it not certainly the case that it should acquire her with the acquisition of kiddushin?! And we challenge Rav Huna’s words:

And

does

money

not enable her to eat

teruma?

But Ulla said: By Torah law, an Israelite woman who is betrothed

to a kohen

eats teruma. As it is stated

[Leviticus 22:11]: “

And when a kohen acquires a person as an acquisition of his money,

he shall eat of it [teruma].”

And this woman,

a woman betrothed to a kohen, is included in the category of “

an acquisition of his money”

she is,

since she became betrothed to him through the acquisition of money!

And Ulla adds and says:

And what is the reason

that

the Sages said

that a betrothed woman

does not eat

teruma?—

It is a decree lest they pour her a cup

of wine of teruma when she is

in her father’s house

[as is customary with betrothed women], and she will give it to drink

to her brothers and sisters,

who are Israelites and are prohibited from teruma and who are also present in her father’s house.

And since by Torah law even a betrothed woman eats teruma, this presents a difficulty for Rav Huna’s words: Money is certainly no less effective than ḥuppa, since money enables the woman to eat teruma by Torah law!

Because of this difficulty, the Gemara revises Rav Huna’s statement:

And we say:

Rather, raise the objection in this manner:

Ask and formulate the kal va-chomer as follows:

And if money, which does not complete

the process of removing the daughter from her father’s authority with regard to her labor and inheritance [which belong to the father until he gives her over under the wedding canopy for the purpose of marriage], nevertheless

acquires

her with the acquisition of kiddushin.