Kiddushin 5a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara brings the continuation of the words of the tannai above:

Until here, the tannai expounded the verse, “When a man takes a woman and possesses her,” as follows: “

‘When he takes’ teaches that the woman is acquired with money. “

‘And possesses her’ teaches that the woman is acquired through intercourse.”

And now the tannai asks:

And from where is it derived that the woman is acquired

also

with a document?

And initially he wishes to learn this through a kal va-chomer:

And the reasoning

kal va-chomer

is:

And if money,

whose power of acquisition is not strong,

for

it

does not

it

remove

the woman from her husband’s authority [to acquire herself], and nevertheless, it is considered an acquisition

to bring

the woman into his authority through kiddushin.

A document,

whose power of acquisition is strong,

for

it

removes

the woman from her husband’s authority [through a get],

is it not a matter of reasoning

that it should be said

that

it

brings

the woman into kiddushin?!

But the tannai rejects the kal va-chomer:

What is the case with money,

that it brings the woman into her husband’s authority? It is because the power of the acquisition of money is strong with regard to another matter,

for with it they redeem

with money

consecrated property and second tithe,

and through this they leave the status of non-sacred property.

Can you say

with

a document,

whose power is not great,

for one does not redeem consecrated property with it

and second tithe?!

For it is written [Leviticus 27], concerning the redemption of consecrated property:

“

And he shall give the money —

and it shall be established for him.”

When the redeemer gives the money, then the field is established for him as his.

And from here, that consecrated property leaves the status of non-sacred property only through money. And since the kal va-chomer was rejected, the tannai learns that a document acquires the woman from the verse:

Rather,

the verse says [Deuteronomy 24], concerning the divorce of a woman, “If the woman does not find favor in his eyes [in her husband’s eyes], and he writes for her a scroll [document] of severance.”

Deuteronomy 24, concerning the divorce of a woman ]: “If [the woman] does not find favor in his [her husband’s] eyes, he shall write her a document [a bill] of severance.”

And she shall leave

his house, and she shall go

and she shall become [and become betrothed]

to another man.”

And since “and she shall leave” and “and she shall become” are written adjacent to one another, Scripture teaches that havaya

is compared

[kiddushin]

to departure

[divorce] —

Just as departure

is

with a document

[a get] —

so too havaya

[kiddushin]

also

is effected

with a document.

And from here, that the woman is betrothed with a document.

But the Gemara raises an objection against the tannai’s words, for if indeed havaya and departure are compared to one another, this is difficult:

And let us also compare departure to havaya

for an additional matter, and let us say:

Just as havaya

[kiddushin] is effected

with money, so too departure

of the woman shall be effected

with money!

And why did we learn in the Mishna that the woman acquires herself through a get and through the death of the husband alone, and not with money?!

Said

he answered,

Abaye:

It is not possible to compare departure to havaya even with regard to divorce through money, because

people will say:

the men:

Money brings

the woman into the husband’s authority, and

money

itself also

removes her!

And this matter is not possible: that the same acquisition should accomplish a thing and its opposite.

And as an analogy for the matter: is it possible that

an advocate,

the money of kiddushin,

should become an accuser,

the money of divorce?!

And the Gemara is astonished at Abaye’s answer: if your words are indeed correct, that it is not possible for one acquisition to accomplish a thing and its opposite,

if so,

if so, why did the tannai compare havaya to departure, to learn from here that the woman is acquired with a document?

For with

a document too, people will say: a document removes

and

a document

itself also

brings in.

And is it possible that

an accuser

[the divorce document]

should become an advocate

[the document of kiddushin]?!

And the Gemara resolves Abaye’s answer:

Concerning a document, there is no reason to wonder, “Can an accuser become an advocate?” For

the matters of this document

of the get

alone, and the matters of this document

of kiddushin

alone.

For in the document of the get it is written in it that he divorces her, whereas in the document of kiddushin it is written in it that he betroths her.

But now the Gemara raises the opposite objection: if we answer that when the words of one document differ from the words of the other document there is no reason to wonder, “Can an accuser become an advocate?” the objection raised above returns: why should we not compare departure to havaya and say that departure too is effected with money?

For

here too,

also concerning money there is no reason to wonder, “Can an advocate become an accuser?” For

this money

of kiddushin

alone, and this money

of divorce

alone!

For the money of kiddushin differs from the money of divorce —

At the time of giving the money of kiddushin, he specifies that he gives it for the sake of kiddushin, whereas at the time of divorce, he specifies that he gives it for the sake of divorce!

And we answer: even though at the time of giving it he specifies for what purpose he gives it to her, nevertheless

the coin, at any rate, is one and the same!

The form of the imprint on money is always the same, and it is not specified in the body of the money whether it comes to bring in or to remove. Therefore, it is not possible for the same coin to accomplish a thing and its opposite [unlike a document, in which the form of the document of kiddushin itself differs from the form of the document of divorce].

Rava said

another answer: it is impossible to say that money effects divorce, because

the verse says [Deuteronomy 24]: “

And he shall write for her

a scroll of severance, and he shall place it in her hand.” And if it were not necessary to write the get specifically, but it were possible to divorce also by giving money, it should have said: “And he shall give her a scroll of severance”; and why did Scripture add and say, “And he shall write for her”? Rather, necessarily, Scripture comes to say that only

by writing

the woman

is divorced, and she is not divorced with money.

And the Gemara raises an objection against Rava’s answer:

According to your method, why should you not expound the verse in another manner,

and say,

and say that Scripture comes to teach that

by writing

[in a document it is written] the woman

is divorced, and she is not betrothed by writing

[in a document]!

And we answer:

here it is written, “

And she shall leave, and she shall become” —

it compares

the verse havaya to departure: just as departure is with a document, so too havaya is with a document!

And therefore it cannot be said that “And he shall write for her” comes to teach that the woman is not betrothed with a document.

But immediately the Gemara is astonished: we have before us two verses: one, the comparison of “And she shall leave, and she shall become,” which equates the acquisitions of kiddushin and divorce; and the second, the exclusion of “And he shall write for her,” which excludes another acquisition in the divorce of a woman.

What have you seen

to include the acquisition of a document in kiddushin from the comparison of “And she shall leave, and she shall become,” and to exclude the acquisition of money in divorce from the exclusion of “And he shall write for her”?

And why should we not say the opposite? To include the acquisition of money in divorce from the comparison of “And she shall leave, and she shall become,”

and to exclude the acquisition of a document in kiddushin from the exclusion of “And he shall write for her” ! And we answer: It is logical

that the verse “And he shall write for her,” since it

stands

and is stated

with regard to divorce,

it

excludes

another acquisition

with regard to divorce,

for she is divorced only by writing and is not divorced with money.

But if you say that “And he shall write for her” comes to exclude that by writing she is divorced but is not betrothed by writing, there is reason to wonder: can the verse “And he shall write for her,” which

stands,

is stated

with regard to divorce, and

which

excludes

an acquisition of

kiddushin?!

And now the Gemara raises an objection against Rava’s answer, that the verse “And he shall write for her” excludes that the woman is not divorced with money:

And according to Rabbi Yosei the Galilean, who assigned this verse to another exposition,

who learned from the verse “And he shall write for her” another exposition in tractate Gittin [21b], it is impossible to learn from here also that the woman is not divorced with money. And according to him there is a difficulty —

This

that

a woman

is not divorced with money —

from where does he derive it?!

From where will Rabbi Yosei the Galilean learn that the woman is not divorced with money?

And we answer:

The verse says [Deuteronomy 24], concerning divorce: and he shall write for her

“

a scroll of severance.”

From the fact that the verse placed the word “severance” adjacent to “scroll”

Rabbi Yosei the Galilean derives: only

a scroll severs her

from her husband,

and no other thing

[money]

severs her.

And we ask:

And the Rabbis,

who exclude money from “And he shall write for her,”

this “

severance” —

what do they use it for?

What will they derive from the word “severance”?

And we answer:

They require it,

they need the word “severance” in order

to

teach that the get must be

a thing that severs between him and her.

That the husband must not impose in the get any condition that thereby binds the woman to her husband —

As it was taught:

One who says to his wife:

“This is your get”

on condition

“that you not drink wine,”

or

“on condition that you never go to your father’s house” —

this is not severance!

This woman is not severed [separated] from her husband, for she is bound to him all the days of her life, since she must fulfill this condition because of him; therefore, these divorces do not take effect.

But if he said to her, “This is your get on condition that you not drink wine or that you not go to your father’s house”

for thirty days —

this is included in “

severance.”

For after the condition has been fulfilled for thirty days, she can go and do whatever she wishes, and it follows that she is not bound to her husband forever. Therefore, as soon as she receives the get, she is divorced, since there is a possibility that she will reach complete separation from her husband.

It follows that, according to the Rabbis, from “And he shall write for her” they learn that she is divorced by writing and not with money, and from “severance” they learn that the get must be a thing that severs between him and her.

And Rabbi Yosei expounded “And he shall write for her” for another exposition in tractate Gittin. Therefore, he needed to derive from “severance” that the woman is divorced with a scroll [with a get] and not with money.

And now the Gemara discusses, according to Rabbi Yosei the Galilean: from where did the Rabbis learn that the get must be a thing that severs between him and her?

And we explain:

And Rabbi Yosei the Galilean —

from

the fact that Scripture could have said, “a scroll

of severance,” and said, “a scroll

of severing,”

it emerges,

the law emerges for him that the get must be a thing that severs between him and her.

that the bill of divorce must be something that severs between him and her.

And

if

the Rabbis,

who derived this law from the entire word “keritut,” the difference between

“karet”

and

“keritut”—

does not indicate to them

that one should expound the superfluous wording and derive any exposition from it.

Up to here, the Gemara explained the words of the tanna who brought a source for kiddushin by money, intercourse, and a document.

[And since the tanna derived kiddushin by document from “and she shall leave and she shall be,” the Gemara expands its discussion also concerning the source of the law that money is not effective for divorce, and the order of the expositions of the verses concerning a bill of divorce.]

And now the Gemara clarifies why we could not derive the means of kiddushin from one another:

The tanna asked why one does not learn one acquisition from another, such as money from intercourse: for the Hebrew maidservant, who is not acquired through intercourse, is acquired through money; if so, a woman who is acquired through intercourse—kal va-chomer—is acquired through money!

And we conclude: Money acquires the Hebrew maidservant because it also brings her out to freedom. This is not so with kiddushin.

And likewise intercourse from money: And just as a yevama, who is not acquired through money, is acquired through intercourse, a woman who is acquired through money—kal va-chomer—is acquired through intercourse!

And we conclude: The yevama is already designated and standing [for levirate marriage], and intercourse is effective only in such a case; this is not so with kiddushin.

And likewise a document from money: If money, which does not bring out, brings in, then a document, which brings out, surely brings in!

And we conclude: Money is a stronger acquisition, for with it consecrated property and second tithe are redeemed. This is not so with a document.

And we object: Indeed, the tanna explained that

one from one

does not come.

One acquisition cannot be learned from one acquisition.

But there is still a question:

Let one come

from two.

Let one acquisition be learned from the common feature of two acquisitions: just as we find with two acquisitions that they acquire elsewhere and also acquire here, since the acquisitions that we find with women are general acquisitions in all places, and they acquire also for kiddushin, so too the third acquisition, which we find acquires elsewhere, is a general acquisition, with all women, and acquires also here.

For they all acquire elsewhere: money and a document acquire the Hebrew maidservant [as below, 14b], and intercourse acquires with a yevama!

And we answer:

Which one shall come?

Which of them, you who object, do you want us to learn from the other two acquisitions?

If you say that

the Merciful One should not have written concerning a document

that it acquires,

and let it come from these,

let us learn it from money and intercourse: just as money and intercourse, which acquire other acquisitions concerning women, acquire also for kiddushin, so too a document, which acquires a woman elsewhere [with the Hebrew maidservant], acquires also for kiddushin! Your words can be rejected and one can say:

What is there about these

money and intercourse, that they acquire for kiddushin, because

their benefit is substantial.

But a document, from which the woman has no benefit whatsoever, since it is nothing but paper on which is written, “Behold, you are betrothed to me,” does not effect kiddushin.

And perhaps you will say,

the Merciful One should not have written concerning intercourse

that it acquires,

and let it come from these,

let us learn it from money and a document.

Your words can be rejected, and one can say:

What is there about these

money and a document, that they acquire for kiddushin, because

their acquisition is substantial,

for with them it is possible to acquire also slaves and land [which are strong acquisitions]. But intercourse, which acquires only with a yevama, does not effect kiddushin in a woman.

And if you say that

the Merciful One should not have written concerning money

that it acquires,

and let it come from these,

let us learn it from a document and intercourse.

Your words can be rejected, and one can say:

What is there about these,

a document and intercourse, that they acquire for kiddushin, because

they

are strong acquisitions, which

are found

even

against her will

—for example, intercourse acquires with a yevama against her will, and a document is effective for divorce even against the woman’s will; therefore they are strong acquisitions.

But money, concerning which we have not found that it acquires anywhere against the woman’s will, does not effect kiddushin in a woman.

And if you should say,

perhaps you will say,

money also

is found

against the will of

the woman, such as

with the Hebrew maidservant,

whose father sells her without her consent! And if so, it is possible to learn kiddushin by money from a document and intercourse!

Your answer is:

With regard to marriage, at least, we have not found it!

We have not found, concerning marriage, that money is effective against the woman’s will. Therefore money cannot be learned from a document and intercourse, which are effective against the woman’s will even in matters of marriage.

We learned in the Mishna: “A woman is acquired”—through money, through a document, and through intercourse.

And the Gemara brings an opinion that a woman is acquired also through huppa, and expands on this matter:

Rav Huna said: Huppa

acquires

an acquisition of kiddushin in a woman,

by a kal va-chomer

from the acquisition through money:

And

an acquisition

of money, which

does not have the power to effect marriage [but only kiddushin], and therefore, if a Jewish woman became betrothed to a koen, money

does not feed

her

teruma.

[For only a married woman eats teruma, as below], nevertheless money

acquires

an acquisition of kiddushin in a woman.

If so,

huppa,

whose power is greater,

which

because it effects marriage

feeds

the woman

teruma,

and

is it not the law that it should acquire

an acquisition of kiddushin?! And we are astonished at Rav Huna’s words:

And

is it that

money does not feed

[her] teruma?!

But Ulla said: By Torah law, a Jewish betrothed woman

who became betrothed to a koen

eats teruma. As it is stated

[Leviticus 22:11]: “

And when a koen acquires a person, the acquisition of his money

he shall eat of it [teruma].”

And this,

a woman betrothed to a koen, is included in

“the acquisition of his money”

she is,

for she became betrothed to him through the acquisition of money!

And Ulla adds and says:

And for what reason

did

they say

that a betrothed woman

does not eat

teruma?—

A decree, lest they mix for her a cup

of teruma wine when she is

in her father’s house

[as is the way of betrothed women], and she give it to drink

to her brother and sister,

Israelites, who are forbidden teruma and are also present in her father’s house.

And since by Torah law even a betrothed woman eats teruma, this is difficult concerning Rav Huna’s words: After all, money is not less powerful than huppa, for money feeds the woman teruma by Torah law!

And on the basis of this difficulty the Gemara corrects Rav Huna’s words:

And we say:

Rather, refute it in this manner,

ask and construct the kal va-chomer as follows:

And just as money, which does not complete

by bringing the daughter out of her father’s authority with regard to her labor and her inheritance [which belong to the father until he hands her over to the huppa for marriage], nevertheless it

acquires

an acquisition of kiddushin.