Kiddushin 8b (ח:) — the Talmud in English

Poskolku

mana

kotoryi on obyazalsya dat ey,

zdes net,

sledovatelno, takzhe

zdes net mashkona!

Mashkon nichego ne stoit, poskolku mashkon ne byl podaren. a. Mnenie Rosh, po ponimaniyu Maharit, Avnei Miluim 29:11 i drugikh: nelzya ustanovit obremenenie na mashkon, esli emu ne predshestvoval dolg. Poetomu dazhe esli on skazal zhenshchine: «Priobretay etim mashkonom obremenenie na manu i stan moei», ona ne stanovitsya mekudeshet. Ved mashkon ne byl ey peredan v sobstvennost, i poluchaetsya, chto on nichego ey ne dal. [Hazon Ish schitaet, chto Rosh soglasaetsya s Raavadom, privodimym nizhe; smotri, odnako, chto napisal ob etom Minhat Yehuda]. b. Mnenie Raavada, po ponimaniyu Maharit, Hazon Ish i drugikh: esli skazal zhenshchine: «Priobretay etim mashkonom obremenenie na manu i stan moei», dal ey mashkon, i ona ego prityanula k sebe, ona stanovitsya mekudeshet. Zdeshe v Gemare rech idet o sluchae, kogda on skazal ey: «Stan moei na manu, vot mashkon». I tolko v etom sluchae ona ne stanovitsya mekudeshet, potomu chto iz ego slov sleduet, chto on khochet obremenit mashkon na totu manu, kotoruyu uzhe obyazalsya dat ey; na samom zhe dele on ey nichego ne dolzhen, tak kak ne sovershil nikakogo priobreteniya, obyazyvayushchego ego dat manu. Poetomu i mashkon ne obremenyaetsya v ee polzu. A poskolku zhenshchina ne priobrela obremenenie, poluchaetsya, chto on ey nichego ne dal, i ona ne stanovitsya mekudeshet. [Avnei Miluim 29:11 schitaet, chto Raavad soglasaetsya s vysheprivodym mneniem Rosha]. v. Mnenie Rambana i Rashba: dazhe esli osvyashayushchii peredal zhenshchine mashkon polnym priobreteniem dlya ustanovleniya obremenenia, ona ne stanovitsya mekudeshet etim, potomu chto mana, kotoryu on obyazalsya dat ey, vse eshche nakhoditsya u nego; a zhenshchina ne stanovitsya mekudeshet den'gami, kotorye svyazany v rukakh muzhchiny i ne vyshedli iz ego vladeniya. Hazon Ish, v 148-m simane, vyvel iz slov Rambana, chto dazhe esli on skazal zhenshchine: «Ya dam tebe manu, vot mashkon», ona priobretaet obremenenie posredstvom prityagivaniya mashkona. Poslednie aharonim sporyat o mnenii Rambana. a. Avnei Miluim 29 tolkuet, chto na cheloveke ne voznikayet lichnogo obyazatelstva platit manu iz prochikh ego imushchestv, a voznikayet tolko obremenenie samogo mashkona; tak zhe schitaet Hazon Ish, siman 148; smotri tam opredelenie etogo ponyatiya. No rabbi Shimon Shkop napisal, chto, po mneniyu Rambana, posredstvom prityagivaniya mashkona na cheloveke voznikayet lichnoe obyazatelstvo. Takzhe Minhat Yehuda vyvel eto iz formulirovki Rosha ot imeni «nekotorykh tolkovatelei», a takzhe iz slov Ran i Rambana; smotri primechanie 239 k Tosafot. b. Sporyat takzhe o slovakh Rambana, chto nelzya osvyatit zhenshchinu den'gami, svyazannymi v rukakh muzhchiny: yavlyaetsya li eto zakonom tolko kidushin ili takzhe priobreteniya zemli denezhnym priobreteniem. Smotri Mahane Efrayim, Hilkhot Kinyan Maot, siman 5; Ketsot ha-Hoshen 39:8, 96:6; Hidushei rabbi Shimon Shkop, siman 17; Minhat Yehuda. d. Dopolnitelnoe mnenie — rabbi Yitshak Migash, privodimyi Nimukei Yosef v nachale traktata Bava Metzia; smotri Ketsot ha-Hoshen 72:2, Avnei Miluim 29:10 i Hidushei rabbi Shimon Yehuda ha-Kohen, siman 17, gde ego metod razbiraetsya podrobno. Rashi napisal o slovakh Gemary: «Mana zdes net; sledovatelno, mashkon nichego ne stoit, tak kak mashkon ne byl podaren». Iz slov Rashi sleduet, chto prichina, po kotoroi «mashkona zdes net», v tom, chto zdes net obremenenia na manu; to est poskolku zdes net obremenenia na manu, mashkon ne obremenyaetsya v polzu zhenshchiny. Eto sootvetstvuet mneniyu Rosha ili Raavada, a ne slovam Rambana. [No Bah schital, chto Rashi tolkuet podobno Rambanu; eto privoditsya v Birurei ha-Shitot]. Smotri vyshe v primechanii obyasnenie slov Rashi. [Dopolnitelnoe obyasnenie mneniya Rambana, Tosafot i Rosha smotri v nashikh slovakh k Tosafot, zagolovok «Mana», i v primechaniyakh tam]. V itoge rishonim sporyat o dvukh zakonakh: a. O cheloveke, kotoryi peredaet drugomu mashkon, ne obyazavshis predvaritelno priobreteniem dat samu manu: po mneniyu Rosha [po obyasneniyu bolshinstva aharonim], mashkon nikogda ne obremenyaetsya; po mneniyu Raavada, esli on skazal: «Priobretay etot mashkon dlya obremenenia na manu», mashkon obremenyaetsya, a esli skazal: «Ya dam tebe manu, vot mashkon», on ne obremenyaetsya; po mneniyu Rambana, mashkon vsegda obremenyaetsya. b. O muzhchine, kotoryi osvyashaet zhenshchinu i peredaet ey mashkon posredstvom priobreteniya prityagivaniem, kak polozheno [po mneniyu rishonim, schitayushchikh, chto mashkon mozhno peredat bez predshestvovavshego dolga]: po mneniyu Raavada, ona stanovitsya mekudeshet; po mneniyu Rambana, ne stanovitsya mekudeshet, potomu chto mana ostalas svyazannoi v rukakh muzhchiny.

Rava vozrazil Rav Nahmanu iz barayty, v kotoroi my uchili:

from a beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna, in which we learned:

Esli on osvyatil ee mashkonom, ona stanovitsya mekudeshet! B. Rabbi Hayim Kohen skazal ot imeni Rabenu Tam [v Tosafot, zagolovok «Mana»], chto esli chelovek govorit drugomu: «Ya podaryu tebe manu, vot mashkon, i ne vozvrashchay mne mashkon, poka ya ne dam tebe manu», poluchatel mozhet uderzhivat mashkon, poka emu ne dadut manu; smotri primechanie 244 k Tosafot. Po etomu neponyatno: pochemu Gemara ne obyasnila baraytu imenno tak? I otsyuda Be'er Heitev, 29:2 [privoditsya v Birurei ha-Shitot zdes], dokazal, chto, hotya poluchatel mozhet uderzhivat mashkon, mashkon ne perekhodit k nemu v sobstvennost i ne goditsya dlya kidushin. [Smotri takzhe ukazannoe primechanie].

I Rav Nahman otvetil emu:

tam, v barayte, rech idet o tom, kto osvyashaet ee

v mashkone

drugikh, to est drugie byli dolzhny emu den'gi, dali emu mashkon, i on osvyatil zhenshchinu dolgom, na kotorom mashkon byl obremenен,

peredav ey mashkon; togda sam mashkon priobretaetsya ey s obyazatelstvom nestи otvetstvennost za nego, i poetomu on mozhet osvyatit ee im.

I

kak sledstvuet iz pravila

kotoryi skazal rabbi Yitshak,

chto mashkon priobretaetsya tem, komu ego peredali.

Tak skazal rabbi Yitshak: otkuda my znaem, chto kreditor,

kotoryi vzyal mashkon u dolzhnika,

chto on

he

priobretaet

the

mashkon,

tak chto mashkon schitaetsya ego imushchestvom [odnako on obyazan vozvratit ego dolzhniku, kogda tot pogasit dolg]; poetomu, esli mashkon propal, za nego otvechaet zaimodavets —

kak skazano

v knige Devarim, 24] o mashkone: [Po-drugomu mozhno obyясnit, chto Rashi schitaet kak Rashba [zdes, a nizhe, v 19a, napisal eto bolee pryamo], chto kidushin byli soversheny samim mashkonom. [Takzhe kazhetsya iz slov Ritba]. Slova Rashi «i osvyatil ee dolgом, kotoryi na nem» oznachayut: esli by on skazal ey «Stan moei etim predmetom», ona ne byla by mekudeshet, potomu chto zhenshchina namerevaetsya osvyatit себя samim predmetom, no predmet ne prinadlezhit ey i ego pridetsya vozvratit; zdeshe zhe rech idet o том, chto on osvyatil ee dolgom, lezhashchim na mashkone, to est pravom vzyskat posredstvom nego manu. Po analogii so slovami Tosafot Rabbi Yehuda ha-Zaken, smotri tam] ot imeni «nekotorykh», kak my obyasnili v primechanii 240 k Tosafot; smotri Hidushei rabbi Shimon Shkop, siman 17; smotri]. V chem razlichie? A. Po mneniyu Rosha i Raavada [smotri vyshe primechanie 225], «ego sobstvennyi mashkon» oznachaet sluchay, kogda on skazal zhenshchine: «Stan moei na manu» — i dal ey mashkon; ona ne stanovitsya mekudeshet, potomu chto zdes ne bylo predshestvuyushchego dolga na manu, i poetomu na mashkone ne vozniklo nikakogo obremenenia. [Tak zhe sleduet iz slov Rashi]. Eto otnositsya k sluchayu, kogda on teper sozdaet novyi dolg, no ego slova nichego ne znachat, tak kak on ne sovershil nikakogo priobreteniya, obyazyvayushchego ego dat manu; poetomu i na mane ne vozniklo obremenenia. No esli u nego est dolg drugikh, na kotorom ustanovlen mashkon, on mozhet osvyatit ee mashkonom. B. Po mneniyu Rambana i Rashba, esli muzhchina osvyashaet zhenshchinu svoim mashkonom, ona ne stanovitsya mekudeshet, potomu chto mana ostalas u nego; eto otnositsya k sluchayu, kogda on osvyashaet ee svoim dolgom. No kogda on osvyashaet ee dolgom drugikh, togda, peredav ey ikh dolg, on bolshe nichego ne sohranyaet u sebya, i poetomu ona stanovitsya mekudeshet. Nizhe [v primechaniyakh 232–234] budet obyasneno, pochemu Gemara dolzhna byla skazat, chto mashkon priobretaetsya ey na osnovanii slova rabbi Yitshaka. [Dopolnitelnoe mnenie — rabbi Yitshak Migash; smotri Ketsot ha-Hoshen 72:2 i Hidushei rabbi Shimon Yehuda ha-Kohen, siman 17]. Rashba napisal: upominanie Gemaroi «mashkonom drugikh» prizyvaet isklyuchit ego sobstvennyi mashkon. No esli on osvyashaet zhenshchinu ee sobstvennym mashkonom [to est zhenshchina dolzhna emu den'gi, u nego nakhoditsya ee mashkon, i on proshchaet ey dolg i vozvrashchaet mashkon], ona stanovitsya mekudeshet, kak obyasnyaetsya v Gemare nizhe, 19a; smotri Atsemot Yosef i Mekane. Rashi i Tosafot sporyat o razmere etoi otvetstvennosti. Po mneniyu Rashi, zaimodavets otvechaet dazhe za neschastnye obstoyatelstva. Po mneniyu Tosafot, on otvechaet tolko za krazhu i propazhu, kak naemnyi khranitel; esli zhe mashkon propal po neizbezhnosti, zaimodavets ne poteryal svoi den'gi, smotri tam. Ramban, Rashba i Ritba napisali, chto prakticheskoe sledstvie priobreteniya mashkona proyavlyaetsya v sleduyushchikh sluchayakh: a. Esli dolzhnik umer, zaimodavets mozhet vzyskat dolg iz mashkona, togda kak iz dvizhimego imushchestva, ostavlennogo im ego synovyam, on mozhet vzyskat ego tolko iz zemelnykh vladenii [Bava Metzia 115a]. b. Sedmoi god spisyvaet dolg zaimodavtsa. To est chelovek zaimstvuet den'gi drugomu do sedmogo goda, prokhodit sedmoi god, i togda dolg «spisyvaetsya» — zaimodavetsu zapreshcheno trebuyat dolg s dolzhnika. Eto otnositsya k zaimu bez mashkona; no pri zaime pod mashkon mashkon schitaetsya priobretennym zaimodavtsem i ne opredelyaetsya kak «obyazatelstvo», poetomu sedmoi god ego ne spisyvaet [Gittin 37a]. v. Ritba dobavil eshche odno prakticheskoe sledstvie: esli na dolge est mashkon, proshchenie ne deistvuet, poka mashkon ne vozvrashchen [to est esli zaimodavets prostil dolg, no eshche ne vozvratil mashkon, on mozhet peremenit reshenie i potrebovat dolg]. No Rema [Hoshen Mishpat, siman 241, paragraf 2] privel slova Mordekhai, chto dazhe pri zaime pod mashkon proshchenie deistvuet; smotri Ketsot ha-Hoshen i Netivot ha-Mishpat tam. "

A esli on bedny [dolzhnik], ne spи v ego zaloge".

V pisanii skazano: ne spi nochyu, poka ego zalog [mashkon] nakhoditsya v tvoem vladenii. No «obyazatelno vozvrati emu zalog pri zakhode solntsa [vecherom; a na sleduyushchee utro snova pridи i vozmi ego]]].

I dlya tebya eto budet tzedaka

pered Gospodom, tvoim Bogom».

I

esli

ty skazhesh, chto zaimodavets

ne priobretaet

mashkon —

otkuda zhe u nego tzedaka? Pochemu vozvrat mashkona dolzhniku vecherom schitaetsya dlya nego podayaniem tzedaki iz ego imushchestva? Ved mashkon voobsche ne prinadlezhit emu!

for him? Why is returning the pledge to the debtor in the evening regarded as giving charity from his own property? The pledge does not belong to him at all!

No

iz etogo

my uchili

chto kreditor

he

priobretaet

the

mashkon,

kak by tot byl ego sobstvennostyu. Poetomu, kogda on vozvrashchaet ego dolzhniku vecherom, eto podobno tomu, kak on daet dolzhniku tzedaku iz svoego imushchestva.

A poskolku kreditor priobretaet mashkon, esli chelovek peredal zhenshchine mashkon, kotoryi nakhodilsya u nego v obespechenie dolga drugikh, dolzhnykh emu, chtoby osvyatit ee im, ona stanovitsya mekudeshet. Poskolku rishonim obyasnili, chto zhenshchinu mozhno osvyatit obremeneniyem i polnogo denezhnogo priobreteniya ne trebuetsya, nuzhno ponyat, zachem Gemara privela slova rabbi Yitshaka, chto kreditor priobretaet mashkon. Mozhno otvetit tak: a. Iz slov Rashba i Ritba sleduet, chto zhenshchina namerevaetsya stat mekudeshet samim mashkonom; poetomu ona stanovitsya mekudeshet imenno potomu, chto mashkon chastichno priobretaetsya ey. [No o mnenii Rashi nekotorye govoryat, chto kidushin byli soversheny dolgom, a ne mashkonom; smotri vyshe primechanie 227]. b. Po mneniyu Mudretsov, zhenshchina ne stanovitsya mekudeshet dolgom drugikh, potomu chto zaimodavets mozhet prostить dolg, kak skazano vyshe. Prichina zhe, po kotoroi ona stanovitsya mekudeshet dolgom, obespechennym mashkonom, v tom, chto muzhchina ne mozhet prostить ego. A ne mozhet on prostить ego potomu, chto mashkon priobreten kreditorom в том otnoshenii, chto proshchenie ne deistvuet, poka mashkon ne vozvrashchen [kak skazano v kontse primechaniya 229 ot imeni Ritba]. Poskolku mashkon priobretaetsya zhenshchine i zaimodavets ne mozhet vozvratit ego, ego proshchenie ne deistvuet. [Tak zhe obyasnil Ketsot ha-Hoshen 241:2 slova Rashba; smotri vyshe v kontse primechaniya 229]. Smotri takzhe Shaar ha-Melekh, Ishut 5:23, Minhat Yehuda [a takzhe vyshe primechanie 227] i smotri nizhe primechanie 234.

Gemara privodit sluchai, iz kotorogo mozhno vyvesti, chto i rabbi Ami schitaet: esli muzhchina osvyashaet zhenshchinu na manu i ostavlyaet ey mashkon v ee obespechenie, ona ne stanovitsya mekudeshet. Poskolku zdes net peredachi many, zdes net i mashkona, ustanovlennogo na nee:

Synovya Rav Huna bar Avina kupili odnu rabynyu za prutot,

to est kupili kenaanskuyu sluzhanku, i prodavtsy dogovorilis s nimi, chto oni dadut za nee mednye prutot.

U nikh ikh s soboi ne bylo,

to est v tot moment u synovei Rav Huna bar Avina ne bylo prutot.

Oni pomestili na nee srebrnyi slitok,

peredav prodavtsam kusok serebra kak mashkon do oplaty prutot.

V kontse rabynya podorozhala,

i prodavtsy zakhoteli otkazatsya ot sdelki, poskolku eshche ne poluchili prutoty, dogovorennye v sdelke.

Oni prishli k rabbi Ami,

chtoby razreshit pered nim spor: mogut li prodavtsy otkazatsya ot sdelki.

Storony somneniya byli takovy:

S odnoi storony, vozmozhno, pokupateli priobreli rabynyu posredstvom srebrnogo slitka, kak budto oni uzhe peredali prutot; kenaanskaya rabynya priobretaetsya za den'gi, i prodavtsy ne mogut otkazatsya ot sdelki. S drugoi storony, vozmozhno, poka oni ne zaplatili prutoty, kotorye obyazalis zaplatit, rabynya eshche ne priobretena imi, i prodavtsy mogut otkazatsya ot sdelki.

He said to them:

Rabbi Ami: Since the

coins

that they stipulated would be paid with

are not

here,

there is nothing here,

therefore also the

ingot

that they gave as collateral for them

is not here;

the collateral is not considered collateral, and it cannot take the place of the coins and effect the acquisition of the maidservant. The Gemara now brings several beraitot concerning betrothal with money:

The Sages taught:

If one says to a woman, “

You are betrothed to me with a hundred dinars,”

and they gave it to her.

The woman took

the hundred dinars,

and threw it

before him

into the sea or into the fire

[into the fire],

or into any place where it would be lost—

she is not betrothed.

Since she threw it before him to be lost, she revealed that she did not wish to become betrothed to him.

We raise a difficulty concerning the words of the beraita: The beraita implies that she is not betrothed specifically if she threw it into a place where it would be lost;

but if she threw it before him—

the betrothal would be valid.

If she threw it before him in a place where it would not be lost, the betrothal would be valid. How can this be said?

But she said to him: “Take it; I do not want it!”

By throwing it before him, she is effectively saying to him: “Take [the hundred dinars that you gave me, because] I do not want [to become betrothed to you with it]!” And we answer: Indeed, even if the woman threw it before him in a place where it would not be lost, she is not betrothed.

The tanna spoke of her throwing it into a place where it would be lost because there is a novel element in this case, and he stated his words in the form of

“It is not necessary”

he is saying

his words—

“It is not necessary

to say that if she

threw it before him,

she threw the money he had given her before him onto the ground,

the betrothal is not valid,

since this is equivalent to her saying, “I do not want to become betrothed to you”!

But if she threw it into the sea or into the fire, I might have said

that if the woman had not agreed to become betrothed, the hundred dinars would still belong to the betrother, and by throwing his money into the sea she would become liable to compensate him for the loss of his money.

And

since

the woman

is liable for it

to compensate for the loss of the hundred dinars on the assumption that she is not betrothed, it is reasonable to assume that this woman indeed

betrothed herself.

It is likely that she agreed to become betrothed to him, and that she acquired the hundred dinars through becoming betrothed to him; it belongs to her. Therefore, when she threw it into the sea, she is not liable to compensate him.

And as for the fact that she did this,

the reason she acted in this manner is that she

thought

[she believed],

“I will test this man to see whether he is an irascible person,

by seeing whether he will become angry [lose his temper] because I threw the hundred dinars into the sea

or not.”

Therefore,

it teaches us

that the tanna teaches us that she is not betrothed, because her purpose in throwing the hundred dinars into a place where it would be lost was not merely to test his degree of irascibility; rather, she threw it in order to demonstrate that she was not interested in his betrothal.

The Sages taught

another beraita concerning betrothal with money:

One who said to a woman, “

You are betrothed to me with a hundred dinars,”

and she replied to him: “

Give them to my father.”

And

likewise, if she said to him, “Give them

to your father.”

The betrother went and gave them to her father or to his father, as she had told him—

she is not betrothed

by this. For her sole intention was to deceive him, saying to him: “I do not want to become betrothed to you; give your money to others!”

But if she said to him: “Give them to my father or to your father

on

the condition that they accept them for me”

[on my behalf],

she is betrothed.

Because they acquired the hundred dinars on her behalf, it is as though she herself had received it. (238a)

The Gemara explains why the beraita spoke both of a woman who says, “Give them to my father,” and one who says, “Give them to your father”:

And we say: The tanna

taught

“Give them to

my father,”

in order

to inform you of the force of the first clause,

to teach you the novelty of the first clause, in which she says, “Give them to my father”: Even though he is her father, nevertheless she did not intend to agree to the betrothal through his receiving the hundred dinars.

And he also

taught

“Give them to

your father,”

in order

to inform you of the force of the latter clause,

in which she says, “Give them to your father on the condition that he accept them for me”: Even though his father is not her relative, nevertheless she agreed to become betrothed through his receiving the money on her behalf.

The Gemara now brings the continuation of the beraita:

One who says to a woman, “

You are betrothed to me with a hundred dinars,”

and she says to him, “

Give them to so-and-so”

[a stranger], and the betrother went and gave them to that so-and-so—

she is not betrothed.

And if she says to him, “Give them to so-and-so

on the condition that he accept them for me”—

she is

betrothed.

The Gemara asks: Why did the beraita need to teach this same law both in the cases of “Give them to my father or to your father” and “Give them to so-and-so”?

And we explain:

It is necessary;

it is necessary to teach us both cases.

For if it had taught us

that if the tanna had taught us this law only in the case of

my father and your father,

I would have said that specifically

there

[in that case]

when she says “

on the condition that they accept them for me,”

the betrothal is valid—

because

she relies on them.

For

she thinks: “They will perform their agency for me!”

She relies on them and assumes that they will agree to serve as her agents, and therefore, when she says, “Give them to my father or to your father, so that they will accept them for me,” we say that she intended this seriously.

But if she says, “Give them to

so-and-so

on the condition that he accept them for me,” then she

did not

intend seriously to become betrothed, because she does not rely on that so-and-so to agree to become an agent to betroth her. Therefore, when she says, “Give them to so-and-so,” she intends to deceive him, and this is equivalent to her saying, “Give your money to others”; she is not betrothed.

Therefore, the tanna had to teach this law also in the case of “Give them to so-and-so.”

And if it had taught us

that if the tanna had taught us this law only in the case of

so-and-so,

I would have said that specifically

here, when she says “

Give them to so-and-so”

[and does not say, “on the condition that he accept them for me”],

the betrothal is not valid—

because

her mind is not close to him, to the extent that she would give it to him as a gift.

Since her mind is not close to that so-and-so to the extent that she would wish to give him the hundred dinars as a gift, it is reasonable that she was not speaking seriously, but intended to deceive him and say to him, “Give your money to others.”

But

in the case of

my father and your father, since her mind is close to them

[since she feels close to them],

I might have said that she is giving it to them as a gift,

that she was speaking seriously, and that indeed she wished to become betrothed to him by having him give the money to them as a gift.

Therefore,

it is necessary

to teach that the law of “my father and your father” is the same as the law of “Give them to so-and-so.”

The Sages taught

another beraita concerning betrothal with money:

One who said to a woman: “

You are betrothed to me with a maneh,”

and the woman replied: “

Place it on a rock,”

and he went and placed it on the rock—

she is not betrothed.

But if it was

the

rock belonging to her —

—

she is betrothed.

Because a person’s courtyard acquires for him whatever is within it. And this is as though the woman herself had received the maneh.

Rav Beivi raised a question: [

asked

Rav Beivi:

If the

rock belonged to both of them,

to the man who was betrothing her and to the woman—

what

is the ruling in this case?

And we conclude:

Teyku!

Let the question remain unresolved.

The Gemara cites the continuation of the earlier beraita:

One who said to a woman, “

You are betrothed to me with a loaf,”

and the woman replied: “

Give it to a dog,”

and he went and gave it to the dog—

she is not betrothed.

But if it was

the

dog belonging to her—

she is

betrothed.

Rav Mari raised a question [

asked]

Rav Mari:

If there was a

dog

that did not belong to her

running after her

to bite her, and she said to the man betrothing her, “Give the loaf to this dog”—

what

is the ruling in this case?

The sides of the uncertainty are:

It is possible that

through the benefit that she derives from saving herself from it—she

resolves to transfer herself to him.

Since she is saved by means of the loaf, she resolves in her mind to become betrothed to him, and she is therefore betrothed.

Or perhaps [

perhaps]

she can say to him:

After all,

by Torah law,

you are obligated to save me!

She can say to him: You are commanded and obligated by Torah law to save me from the dog, and I did not consent to the betrothal; rather, I told you to save me just as you are obligated in any event to save every Jewish life. Therefore, she is not betrothed.

And we conclude:

Teyku—

let this question remain unresolved.

The Gemara cites the continuation of the earlier beraita:

One who said to a woman, “

You are betrothed to me with a loaf,”

and the woman replied: “

Give it to a poor person.”

And he went and gave it to that poor person—

she is not betrothed.

This is so

even

if that poor person was

a poor person dependent upon her [

a poor person who relied on her table, whom she supported from her own money], and she benefits from the fact that the poor person received the loaf; nevertheless, she is not betrothed.

And we inquire:

What is the reason?

What is the reason that she is not betrothed when the poor person is dependent upon her? After all, she benefits by not having to give the poor person one of her own loaves!

And we answer: Because

she said to him,

the woman:

Just as I am obligated concerning him

to support the poor person— -

so are you obligated concerning him!

Just as I am obligated to feed the poor person dependent upon my table, so are you also obligated to feed him, since all of Israel are commanded to support the poor; and I did not consent to the betrothal, rather, I told you to feed the poor person just as you are obligated to feed him in any event.

The Gemara cites several incidents from which a ruling concerning acquisition through money can be derived: