Kiddushin 8b — the Talmud in English

Since

a hundred dinars

that he had undertaken to give her,

is not here,

therefore also

a pledge is not here!

The pledge is worth nothing, since the pledge is not a gift.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Nahman

from a beraita, in which we learned:

If he betrothed her with a pledge, she is betrothed!

And Rav Nahman answered him:

There,

there, in the beraita, it is speaking of one who betroths her

with the pledge of others,

where others owed him money, gave him a pledge, and he betrothed the woman with the debt for which the pledge was subject, and gave her the pledge, in which case the pledge itself is acquired by her, with the obligation of responsibility for it; therefore he can betroth her through it.

And

this is like the principle

that Rabbi Yitzhak stated,

that the pledge is acquired by the one to whom the pledge was given.

For Rabbi Yitzhak stated: From where is it derived that a creditor

who took a pledge from the debtor

that

he

acquires

the

pledge,

so that it is considered his property [except that he is obligated to return it to the debtor when he repays the debt], and therefore, if the pledge is lost, the lender is responsible for it—

as it is stated

[Deuteronomy 24] concerning a pledge: “

And if he is a poor man [the debtor], you shall not lie down with his pledge.”

The verse says: You shall not lie down at night while his pledge [collateral] is in your possession. Rather, “You shall surely return to him the pledge when the sun sets [in the evening. And the following morning you shall return and take it].

And it shall be righteousness for you

[through the fact that you returned the pledge to him in the evening] before the Lord your God.”

But

if

you say that the lender

does not acquire

the pledge—

from where is there righteousness

for him? Why is returning the pledge to the debtor in the evening considered for him as giving charity from his property? But the pledge is not his at all!

Rather,

from here

we learn

with regard to a creditor that

he

acquires

the

pledge

as though it were his. Therefore, when he returns it in the evening to the debtor, it is as though he gives the debtor charity from his own property.

And since a creditor acquires a pledge, therefore, if a person gave a woman a pledge that he possessed against a debt of others who owed him, in order to betroth her through it—she is betrothed.

And the Gemara brings an incident from which it may be learned that Rabbi Ami, too, holds that one who betroths the woman with a hundred dinars and leaves a pledge for it is not betrothed. Because since the giving of a hundred dinars is not here, a pledge for it is also not here:

The sons of Rav Huna bar Avin bought that certain maidservant with small coins,

they bought a Canaanite maidservant, and the sellers stipulated with them that they would give copper perutot for her.

They did not have them with them,

the sons of Rav Huna bar Avin did not have perutot at that time.

They placed a silver ingot upon her,

they gave the sellers a piece of silver as a pledge until they paid them the perutot.

In the end, the maidservant became more expensive,

and the sellers wished to retract from the sale, since they had still not received the perutot of the sale.

They came before Rabbi Ami,

they came to litigate the matter before Rabbi Ami, whether the sellers could retract.

And the sides of the doubt were:

On the one hand, it is possible that the buyers acquired the maidservant through the silver ingot as though they had already given the perutot, and a Canaanite maidservant is acquired with money, so the sellers cannot retract. On the other hand, it is possible that as long as they had not paid the perutot that they had stipulated to pay, the maidservant had still not been acquired by them, and the sellers could retract.

He said to them

Rabbi Ami: Since the

coins

that they stipulated to pay with

are not

here,

here,

therefore also the

ingot

that they gave as collateral for them

is not here,

the collateral is not considered collateral, and it does not have the power to stand in place of the coins and acquire the maidservant. And the Gemara now brings several baraitot concerning betrothal with money:

The Sages taught:

If one says to a woman, “

Be betrothed to me with a hundred maneh,”

and they gave it to her.

She took it

the woman, the hundred maneh,

and threw it

before him

into the sea or into the fire

or fire,

or to any place of destruction—

she is not betrothed.

Since she threw it before him for destruction, she revealed her mind that she does not wish to be betrothed to him.

And we raise a difficulty concerning the words of the baraita: it is implied by the baraita that specifically if she threw it to destruction she is not betrothed,

but if she threw it before him—

it would be betrothal.

If she threw it before him in a place where it would not be lost, this is betrothal. But how can this be said?

She said to him: “Take it; I do not want it!”

For by throwing it before him, she is like one saying to him: “Take [the hundred maneh that you gave me, because] I do not want [to be betrothed to you with it]!” And we answer: indeed, even if the woman threw it before him in a place where it would not be lost, she is not betrothed.

And the tanna spoke of her throwing it to a place of destruction because there is a novelty in this matter, and he stated his words in the style of

“It is not necessary to say”

he says

his words—

“It is not necessary to say,

there is no need to say that if

she threw it before him,

she threw the money that he gave her before him onto the ground,

that it is not betrothal,

for this is like her saying, “I do not wish to be betrothed to you”!

But if she threw it into the sea or into the fire, I might say,

I would say that, if the woman had not agreed to be betrothed, the hundred maneh would still belong to the betrother, and by throwing his money into the sea she becomes liable to pay him for the loss of his money.

And

since

the woman

becomes liable concerning them

to restore the loss of the hundred maneh if she is not betrothed, one should assume that this woman indeed

sanctified herself with betrothal.

It is logical that she agreed to be betrothed to him, and she acquired the hundred maneh through being betrothed to him, and it is hers. Therefore, when she threw it into the sea, she is not liable to pay him.

And the fact that she did this,

the reason she did so is that she

thought

was thinking,

“I will test this man, whether he is an irritable person,

I will test this man to see whether he will become angry [become irritated] because I threw the hundred maneh into the sea,

or not.”

Therefore,

it teaches us

the tanna teaches us that she is not betrothed, because her intention in throwing the hundred maneh to destruction was not merely to test the degree of his irritability; rather, she threw it in order to demonstrate that she was not interested in his betrothal.

The Sages taught

another baraita concerning betrothal with money:

One who said to a woman,

“Be betrothed to me with a hundred maneh,”

and she answered him:

“Give it to my father.”

And

likewise if she said to him, “Give it

to your father.”

And the betrother went and gave it to her father or to his father, as she had said to him—

she is not betrothed

through this, because her entire intention was only to mock him and to say to him: “I do not wish to be betrothed to you; give your money to others!”

But if she said to him: “Give it to my father or to your father”

on

the condition that they receive it for me

for me—she is

betrothed.

Because they acquired the hundred maneh for her. It is as though she herself received it. (238a')

And the Gemara explains why the baraita spoke both of one who says, “Give it to my father,” and of one who says, “Give it to your father”:

And we say:

The tanna

“Give it to my

father,”

in order

to inform you of the force of the first clause,

to teach you the novelty in the first clause, where she says, “Give it to my father”: even though he is her father, nevertheless it was not her intention to agree to the betrothal through his receiving the hundred maneh.

And he also

taught

“Give it to your

father,”

in order

to inform you of the force of the final clause,

where she says, “Give it to your father on the condition that he receive it for me”: even though his father is not her relative, nevertheless she agreed to be betrothed through his receiving it for her.

And now the Gemara brings the continuation of the baraita:

One who says to a woman,

“Be betrothed to me with a hundred maneh,”

and she said to him,

“Give it to so-and-so”

[a stranger], and the betrother went and gave it to that so-and-so—

she is not betrothed.

And if she said to him, “Give it to so-and-so

on the condition that he receive it for me”—

she is

betrothed.

And the Gemara discusses why the baraita had to teach the very same law both concerning “Give it to my father or to your father” and concerning “Give it to so-and-so”:

And we explain:

And it is necessary,

it is necessary to teach us both cases.

For if it had taught us,

if the tanna had taught us this law only concerning

my father and your father,

I would say that specifically

there

there

when she says

“on the condition that they receive it for me,”

it is betrothal—

because

she relies upon them.

For

she thinks: “They will perform agency for me!”

She relies upon them and thinks that they will agree to be her agents, and therefore when she said, “Give it to my father or to your father so that they receive it for me,” we say that she intended this seriously.

But if she said, “Give it to

so-and-so

on the condition that he receive it for me,” then she

did not

intend seriously to be betrothed, because she does not rely upon that so-and-so to agree to be an agent to betroth her. Therefore, when she said, “Give it to so-and-so,” she intended to mock him, and it is as though she said, “Give your money to others,” and she is not betrothed.

Therefore the tanna had to teach us his words also concerning “Give it to so-and-so.”

And if it had taught us,

and if the tanna had taught us this law only concerning

so-and-so,

I would say that specifically

here, when she says

“Give it to so-and-so”

[and she did not say, “on the condition that he receive it for me”]

it is not betrothal—

because

her mind is not close to him, to give it to him as a gift.

For her mind is not close to that so-and-so to the extent that she would wish to give him the hundred maneh as a gift; therefore it is logical that she was not speaking seriously, but intended to mock him and say to him, “Give your money to others.”

But

with

my father and your father, since her mind is close to them

since she is close to them,

I might say that she gave it to them as a gift,

I would say that she was speaking seriously, and that she indeed wished to be betrothed to him through his giving them a gift.

Therefore

it is necessary,

it is necessary to teach us that the law of “my father and your father” is the same as the law of “Give it to so-and-so.”

The Sages taught

another baraita concerning betrothal with money:

One who said to a woman: "

Be betrothed to me with a maneh,"

and the woman answered: "

Place it upon a rock."

And he went and placed it upon the rock —

she is not betrothed.

And if it was

the

rock belonging to her —

—

she is betrothed.

Because a person's courtyard acquires for him what is inside it. And this is as though the woman herself had received the maneh.

He raised a question, [

asked]

Rav Bibi:

If it was the

rock belonging to both of them,

belonging to the betrothing man and to the woman —

what

is the law in this matter?

And we conclude:

teyku!

Let the question stand as a doubt.

And the Gemara brings the continuation of the aforementioned beraita:

One who said to a woman, "

Be betrothed to me with a loaf,"

and the woman answered: "

Give it to a dog,"

and he went and gave it to the dog —

she is not betrothed.

And if it was

the

dog belonging to her —

she is

betrothed.

Rav Mari raised a question [

asked]

Rav Mari:

If there was a

dog

that did not belong to her,

running after her

to bite her, and she said to the betrother, "Give the loaf to this dog" —

what

is the law in this matter?

And the sides of the doubt are:

It is possible that

through that benefit by which she saves herself from it —

she makes up her mind and transfers ownership of herself to him.

For through that benefit by which she was saved by means of the loaf, she makes up her mind to become betrothed to him, and she is betrothed.

Or perhaps [

perhaps]

she can say to him:

Behold,

according to Torah law,

you are obligated to save her!

She can say to him: Behold, you are commanded and obligated by Torah law to save me from the dog, and I did not consent to the betrothal; rather, I said to you that you should save me just as you are obligated in any event to save every life of Israel. And therefore she is not betrothed.

And we conclude:

teyku;

let this question stand as a doubt.

The Gemara brings the continuation of the aforementioned beraita:

One who said to a woman, "

Be betrothed to me with a loaf,"

and the woman answered: "

Give it to a poor person."

And he went and gave it to that poor person —

she is not betrothed.

This is so

even

if that poor person was

a poor person dependent upon her [

a poor person who relies upon her table, and she supports him from her money], and she benefits through the poor person receiving the loaf; nevertheless, she is not betrothed.

And we raised an objection concerning it:

What is the reason?

What is the reason that when the poor person is dependent upon her she is not betrothed? Surely she benefits through not having to give the poor person a loaf of her own!

And we answer: because

she said to him,

the woman:

Just as I am obligated regarding him

to support the poor person —

so are you obligated regarding him!

Just as I am obligated to feed the poor person dependent upon my table, so are you also obligated to feed him, for all Israel are commanded to support the poor, and I did not consent to the betrothal, rather, I said to you that you should feed the poor person just as you are obligated, in any event, to feed him.

And the Gemara brings several incidents from which a halakha concerning acquisition through money will be learned: