Kiddushin 67a (סז.) — the Talmud in English

And

behold!

a convert

who is fit,

who married a mamzeret

who is disqualified,

as there are

for a convert

betrothals

with a mamzeret

but there is no

for him

transgression

in having intercourse with her, since a convert is permitted to marry a mamzeret according to Rabbi Yosei, and nevertheless, the law is that

the offspring follows the flawed one,

and the son is a mamzer like her, since she is disqualified and flawed, as explained in the beraita that the Gemara cites.

But according to the principle in our Mishna, we should have said that his status is like that of the male, who is fit!?

D

Behold,

it was taught: A convert who married a mamzeret—the offspring is a mamzer,

the words of Rabbi Yosei.

He said to him

Rabbi Yoḥanan to Rabbi Shimon:

Do you hold that the Mishna

our Mishna is according to the view of

Rabbi Yosei,

and do you think that our Mishna follows Rabbi Yosei, who permits a convert to marry a mamzeret, because the Torah states: “A mamzer shall not enter the assembly of the Lord,” and Rabbi Yosei maintains that a congregation of converts is not called a “congregation”?

That is not so. Rather,

the Mishna is

according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says that a convert may not marry a mamzeret,

for converts too are called a “congregation,”

and

according to his view, a convert who married a mamzeret,

there are betrothals and there is transgression.

And therefore

the offspring follows the flawed one,

and he is a mamzer like her, as explained in the second principle in our Mishna.

And we raise a difficulty: If our Mishna follows Rabbi Yehuda, this is difficult:

And let the tanna teach it!

The tanna should have taught this case as well—a convert who married a mamzeret—among those whom the tanna enumerated in the second principle, in which the offspring follows the flawed one!?

The Gemara answers with two resolutions. The first is that the expression

“Every place”

in the latter clause,

in the second principle,

comes to include

cases that the tanna did not specify, including a convert who married a mamzeret.

And if you wish, say

to resolve Rabbi Shimon’s difficulty:

Actually,

our Mishna is

according to Rabbi Yosei,

who permits a convert to marry a mamzeret.

Indeed, this case is an exception,

and the tanna

taught in the first principle of our Mishna the expression

“Which is this?”,

in order

to exclude

a convert who married a mamzeret, who is not included in this principle.

And we raise a difficulty: Is it possible to say as you have said, that

“Which

is this?”—the expression stated in the first principle—

means specifically this

and no more,

that this principle applies only to those cases that the tanna specified, and not to another case!?

But behold,

even

a ḥalal who married an Israelite woman, where there are betrothals and there is no transgression,

and

the offspring follows the male,

and becomes a ḥalal like his father!

Thus, there are other cases besides those specified by the tanna in which this principle applies!?

And we answer:

This is not difficult.

For the tanna of our Mishna

holds in accordance with Rabbi Dostai ben Yehuda,

who says that when a ḥalal has intercourse with an Israelite woman, the offspring does not become a ḥalal like his father unless his mother is also a ḥalala.

And we raise a difficulty concerning what we said—that the first principle in our Mishna applies only to the cases specified by the tanna:

But an Israelite who married a ḥalala, where there are betrothals and there is no transgression,

and

the offspring follows the male,

who is fit, and the offspring is not a ḥalal like its mother.

Thus, this principle applies even in other cases besides those specified by the Mishna!?

And we answer: Therefore,

the tanna

in our Mishna taught

“Every place”

in the first clause

[in the first principle] in order

to include

also an Israelite who has intercourse with a ḥalala, whose daughter is fit like him.

And we raise a difficulty:

And let him teach it explicitly,

let the tanna teach this case explicitly; why did he allude to it with the expression “Every place”?

And we answer:

Because he could not teach it

that is, the tanna could not teach it in a concise formulation together with the other cases.

For

how could he teach it

[how could the tanna teach it concisely]? Could the tanna say: “Every place where there are betrothals and there is no transgression—and which is this? This is

a kohenet, Levite woman, Israelite woman, or ḥalala who married a kohen, Levite, or Israelite,”

and

behold,

is a ḥalala permitted to a kohen

[is a ḥalala permitted to a kohen]? If so, there is transgression in her case.

And we continue to ask: And still we raise a difficulty:

But there is

this case

of Rabba bar bar Ḥana,

for in his case too there are betrothals and there is no transgression, and the offspring follows the male!?

For Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A second-generation Egyptian

[or Edomite, who are forbidden to enter the congregation only in the first and second generations after conversion, whereas the third generation is permitted to enter the congregation]

who

[that is, whose father converted]

married a first-generation Egyptian woman

[or Edomite woman]

does not

say that the offspring follows the mother and is considered a second-generation Egyptian, who is still forbidden to enter the congregation; rather,

her son

follows his father, and he is

a third-generation Egyptian,

and is permitted to enter the congregation.

This means that the general rule stated in the Mishna also applies to other matters that were not specified in our Mishna!?

And we answer: The Mishna also taught the law of Rabba bar bar Ḥana,

it taught

“Every case”

stated at the beginning

in order

to include [that case].

And the Gemara adds:

And according to Rav Dimi—

who disagrees with Rabba bar bar Ḥana—

who said

in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: When a second-generation Egyptian married a first-generation Egyptian woman, her son follows his mother, and he is a

second-generation Egyptian—

it taught

“Which is this?”

as part of the first general rule in order

to exclude

a second-generation Egyptian who married a first-generation Egyptian woman. For although the marriage is valid and there is no transgression, nevertheless the child does not follow the male, but rather the mother.

And we still raise an objection:

But there is

the halakha

that when Ravin came

when he arrived from Eretz Yisrael,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to the

lineage of

the nations,

before they converted,

one follows the male.

But after they

converted,

one follows the more disqualified party!

And in this case too, the marriage is valid and there is no transgression, and nevertheless the child does not specifically follow the male, but rather the more disqualified party!?

That is, when a child is born to a man and a woman from two nations whose laws differ, there is a distinction in determining whether the child follows [the father or the mother]. If he was born to them while they were still gentiles, the child follows the male. But if he was born to them after his father and mother had converted, the child follows whichever of them is more disqualified. [On folio 68b below, the Gemara explains how this rule is applied and with regard to which matter].

And we answer:

It taught

at the beginning:

“Which is this?”

in order

to exclude

the case cited by Ravin in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

After several matters have now been clarified—some, apart from a convert who married a mamzeret, that must necessarily have been included by the expression “Every case” in the first general rule, and others that must necessarily have been excluded by the expression “Which is this?” in the first general rule—the Gemara returns to the beginning of the matter, to the objection we raised concerning a convert who married a mamzeret, which does not accord with the first general rule, and which we resolved in two ways:

The first: Our Mishna follows Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that a convert is forbidden to marry a mamzeret. Thus, this case does not belong to the first general rule but to the second, and it is alluded to by the expression “Every case” in the second general rule.

The second: Our Mishna indeed follows Rabbi Yosei, who holds that a convert is permitted to marry a mamzeret. This case therefore does belong to the first general rule and does not accord with it; rather, it is alluded to by the expression “Which is this?”, which comes to exclude a convert who married a mamzeret—

And the Gemara challenges the second answer:

What sort of answer is this [that is, what answer is that]!?

Granted, if you say—

according to the first answer—

that the Mishna is Rabbi Yehuda’s, and a convert who marries a mamzeret does not belong to the first general rule but to the second, and is included by the expression “Every case” in the second general rule, then the wording of our Mishna is properly explained: It taught “Every case” and “Which is this?” in the first general rule, and also taught “Every case” in the second, since: “

and a convert who marries a daughter of a forbidden union does not belong to the first rule, but to the second, and is included by the wording “everywhere” in the second clause, then the formulation of our Mishna is well understood: in the first rule it states “everywhere” and “which is this?”, and in the second rule it also states “everywhere,” because: "

Every case”

stated at the beginning: to include an Israelite who married

a woman disqualified as a ḥalala,

for the marriage is valid and there is no transgression, and the child follows the male, as explained above.

And

likewise, it taught “Every case” at the beginning in order

to include

this case

of Rabba bar bar Ḥana [a second-generation Egyptian who married a first-generation Egyptian woman, whose child follows the male], if the halakha is in accordance with him.

And “

Which is this?”

at the beginning comes

to exclude Rav Dimi’s [a second-generation Egyptian who married a first-generation Egyptian woman, whose child does not follow the male but rather the mother], if the halakha is in accordance with him;

and

likewise, “Which is this?” at the beginning comes to exclude the view of

Ravin [that among nations who converted, one follows the more disqualified party rather than the male].