Kiddushin 66b (סו:) — the Talmud in English

From where do I say this

—from where did I learn this?

As we learned in a Mishna: Rabbi Shimon said: There was an incident involving a reservoir

—a pool of water for a mikve—

of Daskim

—the name of a person or a place—

in Yavne, which stood with an established presumption of being complete

—containing forty se'a, the measure required for a valid mikve.

And they measured it

after people had immersed themselves and had immersed other items in it,

and it was found to be deficient

—less than the amount required for a mikve—

All ritually pure items prepared on its basis

from the time when it was known to be complete until the time it was measured were the subject of a dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva:

Rabbi Tarfon would deem them pure

as he explains the rationale below.

And Rabbi Akiva would deem them impure

lest the mikve had already become deficient when they were immersed in it; he explains his rationale below.

Rabbi Tarfon said:

But

this mikve stands with an established presumption of being complete,

and

you are coming to diminish its status on the basis of uncertainty—

do not diminish its status on the basis of uncertainty,

for we have an established principle throughout the Torah: “Leave an item in accordance with its initial presumption.”

Rabbi Akiva said: On the contrary,

this is so:

this person stands with an established presumption of being impure,

and

you are coming to purify him on the basis of uncertainty—

do not purify him on the basis of uncertainty,

for we have an established principle: “Leave an item in accordance with its presumption.”

In other words: Rabbi Tarfon deemed the items valid because of the presumption of the mikve, whereas Rabbi Akiva deemed them impure because of the presumption of impurity of the person who immersed, and of the ritually pure items immersed in it.

Furthermore, Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disputed the case of an impure koen—who disqualifies the service if he performs it while impure—who was impure, immersed, and performed the Temple service, and after he performed the service witnesses testified that the mikve had been deficient at the time of his immersion: whether his service is disqualified. Rabbi Tarfon deems the service valid, while Rabbi Akiva disqualifies it.

And

Rabbi

Tarfon

said, explaining his rationale in his second dispute:

It is analogous to

a koen who was

standing and offering sacrifices upon the altar,

believing himself to be a fit koen,

and it became known

to him after he had performed the service

that he was the son of a divorced woman or the son of a woman released by halitza,

and he was therefore a halal and disqualified for the service; nevertheless,

his service,

which he had already performed,

is valid, as the rationale is explained at the end of the sugya from a verse.

Rabbi Akiva said:

On the contrary,

it is analogous to

a koen who is

standing and offering sacrifices upon the altar, and it became known that he had a bodily defect,

and he was therefore disqualified for the service;

his service

—before it became known that he had a bodily defect—

is disqualified.

Rabbi Tarfon said

to Rabbi Akiva:

You compared him to one with a bodily defect, but

what if

I compare him to the son of a divorced woman or to the son of a woman released by halitza!

Let us see to whom

the person who immersed in a deficient mikve and performed the service

is comparable.

If he is comparable to the son of a divorced woman or to the son of a woman released by halitza,

then

we should judge him as the son of a divorced woman or as the son of a woman released by halitza;

and

if he is comparable to one with a bodily defect, we should judge him as one with a bodily defect.

Rabbi Akiva began to reason

and prove that the case before us is comparable to one with a bodily defect, and not to the son of a divorced woman; and he reasoned as follows:

A mikve

is it not the case that

its disqualification can be established by one person,

meaning that the testimony of a single person is sufficient to testify that the mikve is disqualified—

And let the son of a divorced woman or the son of a woman released by halitza, whose disqualification requires two witnesses, not prove the point,

for one witness is not believed to testify that a person is a halal.

Alternatively,

meaning, there is another reason to compare the case before us to one with a bodily defect and not to the son of a divorced woman, namely:

A mikve is disqualified through a defect in its body,

and

one with a bodily defect is likewise disqualified through a defect in his body; but let the son of a divorced woman or the son of a woman released by halitza, whose disqualification is

through

others,

not prove the point, since he is disqualified because of his mother.

Rabbi Tarfon said to him

to Rabbi Akiva:

Akiva! Whoever separates himself from you is like one who separates himself from life.

From here Rava proved that a single witness who testifies concerning a matter of forbidden sexual relations, when the person concerned remains silent, is not believed, for the law governing one who testifies that a person is the son of a divorced woman is the same as the law governing one who testifies concerning a matter of forbidden sexual relations, and from here it is demonstrated that even when the person concerned remains silent, a witness is believed only where

the disqualification can be established by two witnesses; for:

This case of one with a bodily defect

—which we learned about—

whose disqualification can be established by one person: what are the circumstances?

If the person concerned contradicts him,

the person concerned,

is the witness believed

? But a single witness whose testimony is contradicted is of no consequence!?

Rather,

necessarily, it is a case in which

he remains silent,

the person concerned,

and

if so,

similarly

—in a comparable case—

with regard to the son of a divorced woman or the son of a woman released by halitza,

where we learned that “his disqualification requires two witnesses,” it too is a case in which

he remains silent,

the person concerned—

And

nevertheless,

it teaches: “

A mikve whose disqualification can be established by one person, and one with a bodily defect whose disqualification can be established by one person, but let the son of a

divorced woman or the son of a woman released by halitza, whose disqualification requires two witnesses, not prove the point”;

we have thus learned that even when the person concerned remains silent, one witness is not believed to disqualify him as the son of a divorced woman, and likewise to testify concerning any matter of forbidden sexual relations.

And Abaye

—who disputes Rava and holds that a witness is believed when the person concerned remains silent, even in a matter of forbidden sexual relations and in the case of the son of a divorced woman—

said

to you, in order to reject the proof:

Actually,

we are dealing here—both with one who has a bodily defect and with the son of a divorced woman—with a case in which

the person concerned contradicts him,

the person concerned.

And as for what you said,

namely, that if so,

why is he believed

—the single witness—even to disqualify him as one with a bodily defect, this is not difficult for you, because:

Here the Gemara returns to explain the substance of the law that we learned concerning a halal whose service, performed inadvertently and unknowingly, is valid, whereas the service of one with a bodily defect who served inadvertently is disqualified; and we explain it:

And the son of a divorced woman or the son of a woman released by halitza

who performed the service inadvertently—

his service is valid,

even though he is a halal and is not considered to be of the seed of Aaron—

from where

is this derived?

He said

:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

because

the verse says

concerning Pinhas, when he was appointed a

kohen: “

And it shall be for him and for his descendants after him an eternal covenant of priesthood,” and we learned from this:

both legitimate descendants and disqualified descendants,

provided that he performed the service inadvertently.

Shmuel’s father said: From here

it can be learned that a ḥalal who performed the service inadvertently performed valid service:

As it is stated in Moses’ blessing to the tribe of Levi: “

May the Lord bless

his resources, and favor the work of his hands.”

And we learn from the wording “his resources” that

even the non-sacred element within him He will favor.

This applies specifically in this circumstance, when he was unaware of his disqualification; but he may not serve ab initio, since Scripture calls him a ḥalal, meaning that he has been divested of the sanctity of priesthood.

Rabbi Yannai said: From here

this may be learned: It is stated in the passage concerning the first fruits [Deuteronomy 26:3]: “

And you shall come to the kohen who will be in office in those days.”

Why did the Torah say, “in those days”!?

Would it enter your mind that a person would go to a kohen who was not alive in his days!?

Rather, this is one who was fit [in the Ritva:

kohen

who was a kohen]

and became disqualified, meaning: Scripture came to include one who was a kohen only in those days, before his disqualification became known; therefore he is called a “kohen,” because the service he performed was valid, as that of a fully qualified kohen.

See further: We explain it as follows:

With regard to a person with a physical defect, whose service is invalid, from where do we know this!?

That is, since you expound “And it shall be for him and for his descendants after him” as including disqualified descendants, let us also include from this verse a person with a physical defect and say that his service is valid!?

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

Because

the verse says: “

Therefore say to him

[to Pinhas],

I hereby grant him My covenant of peace;

and it shall be for him and for his descendants after him an eternal covenant of priesthood”—

And we learn from the wording “peace”:

when he is whole, but not when he is lacking

[that is, when he has a physical defect].

The Gemara challenges this:

But “

peace”

is written!?

He said

and

Rav Naḥman resolved it: The vav of “

peace”

is truncated

[the letter vav in the word “peace” is written with its middle portion truncated], and it is expounded as though “whole” had been written.

Introduction:

A. With regard to women whom the husband is forbidden to marry by a negative commandment, both those disqualified for marriage to an Israelite and those disqualified for marriage to a kohen, the marriage bond takes effect with them according to the halakha, in accordance with the Sages, who disagree on this matter with Rabbi Akiva, who holds that even in cases involving those liable for lashes, the marriage bond does not take effect. This is also the view of our Mishna, in accordance with the Sages. However, in cases involving those liable for karet [apart from a menstruating woman], the marriage bond does not take effect with them according to everyone.

B. The following women are forbidden to an ordinary kohen: a divorcee, a ḥalala, and a woman who engaged in illicit sexual relations [and likewise, a woman who had intercourse with a man who is unrelated to her in a manner that disqualifies her]. A widow is also forbidden to the High kohen. Most women who engage in forbidden intercourse become forbidden to a kohen; some become ḥalalot, and some become women who engaged in illicit sexual relations [and some are forbidden by the negative commandment, “And if the daughter of a kohen be married to a non-kohen, she may not eat of the sacred offerings”].

C. A ḥalal, meaning one born from a kohen’s intercourse with women forbidden to the priesthood, loses the sanctity of priesthood. He may not eat teruma and may not perform the Temple service, and through intercourse he disqualifies a woman from marrying into the priesthood, like a ḥalala. A daughter born from a kohen’s intercourse with one of these women disqualified for the priesthood is a ḥalala and disqualified from marrying into the priesthood, and she may not eat teruma, whether she is the daughter of a kohen or the wife of a kohen.

D. The status of a child born from a ḥalal’s intercourse with a fit woman, and from a fit man’s intercourse with a ḥalala, is subject to a dispute among the tannaim as to whether the child is a ḥalal. This dispute is mentioned in our discussion.

E. The following women are, according to Torah law, disqualified from entering into the congregation of the Lord: a mamzeret, who is forbidden by a negative commandment, and a female convert of Edomite or Egyptian origin, who is forbidden only by a positive commandment.

F. The following men are, according to Torah law, disqualified from entering into the congregation of the Lord:

a mamzer, and an Ammonite or Moabite convert; all of these are forbidden by a negative commandment. An Edomite or Egyptian convert is forbidden by a positive commandment from entering into the congregation of the Lord.

G. A mamzer is forbidden forever, and even his tenth-generation descendant is disqualified from entering into the congregation. Likewise, the offspring of an Ammonite or Moabite convert remain disqualified even after the tenth generation from conversion. An Egyptian or Edomite convert, however, is forbidden only for the first and second generations after conversion; the third generation is permitted to enter into the congregation. Similarly, an Edomite or Egyptian woman of the third generation is permitted to enter into the congregation of the Lord.

H. The tannaim disagree—and this will be brought in our discussion—whether “the congregation of converts is called a congregation,” or whether the congregation of converts is not called a “congregation.” According to the latter view, a convert may marry any woman disqualified from the congregation, and those disqualified from the congregation may marry a female convert.

The Mishna before us establishes four principles concerning:

a. The offspring born to two partners whose respective statuses differ, where we must determine whether the offspring follows the father or the mother.

b. The fitness or disqualification of offspring born from a forbidden intercourse.

Mishna:

The first principle:

Wherever the marriage bond takes effect,

where a man and woman can be married to one another [even if they did not in fact marry one another],

and there is no transgression

in the man’s intercourse with this woman, as they are not forbidden to one another—

the offspring

born to them

follows the male,

as the Mishna proceeds to explain.

And which case is this?

This is the case of a female kohen, a Levite woman, or an Israelite woman, who married

a kohen,

a

Levite, or

an

Israelite,

for in all these cases the marriage bond takes effect, and there is no transgression in their marriage.

The Mishna teaches that the offspring’s status with regard to priesthood or the Levite status follows the husband [the male]. If the father is a kohen, his son is a kohen like him, even if his mother is a Levite woman or an Israelite woman. If the father is an Israelite, his son is also an Israelite, even if his mother is a female kohen or a Levite woman.

The second principle:

And wherever the marriage bond takes effect,

meaning that the marriage bond would take effect if he were to marry her,

but

nevertheless

there is a transgression

in intercourse with this woman—

the offspring follows the

disqualified

one among them, whether the disqualification is in the father or in the mother, as the Mishna proceeds to explain.

And which case is this?

This is the case of a widow,

who is disqualified

for a High kohen;

or

a divorcee or a woman who performed ḥalitza,

who is disqualified even

for an ordinary kohen,

since the marriage bond takes effect for a kohen with these women [as they are subject only to negative commandments], yet there is a transgression in their marriage. The Mishna teaches that the offspring follows the more disqualified of the two and becomes “disqualified,” meaning a ḥalal. Likewise,

a mamzeret and a netina

who are disqualified and forbidden

to an Israelite

from entering the congregation of the Lord—

Likewise,

an Israelite woman

who is disqualified

for a mamzer and a netin,

who are disqualified and forbidden—

In these cases the marriage bond takes effect [as they are subject only to negative commandments, with which the marriage bond takes effect], but there is a transgression in their marriage. The Mishna teaches that the offspring born from them has the status of the more disqualified of the two and becomes a mamzer or a netin.

The third principle:

And anyone with whom she cannot establish a marriage bond,

meaning that the marriage bond does not take effect for the husband with her,

but

she is not entirely excluded from the possibility of marriage, because

she can establish a marriage bond with others—

the offspring

born from intercourse with this woman

is a mamzer

.

And what is this? -

This is one who has intercourse with any of the forbidden relations in the Torah,

namely, close relatives who are forbidden to him as arayot and for whom he is liable to karet. In these cases, kiddushin does not take effect for him with them [because kiddushin does not take effect with those liable to karet]. However, the woman is not excluded from kiddushin with another man. The Mishna teaches that the offspring born from this intercourse is a mamzer.

Fourth principle:

And anyone with whom she has no kiddushin, neither with him nor with others,

the status of the

offspring

is

like hers.

And what is this? -

The offspring of a slave woman or a gentile woman,

with whom kiddushin is not applicable.

The Mishna teaches that the status of offspring born to an Israelite who had intercourse with them is like hers: he is a gentile or a slave.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

Every place where kiddushin applies

and there is no transgression, the offspring follows the male:

Rabbi Shimon

challenged

Rabbi Yohanan

and said:

But is

this indeed a general rule, that everywhere kiddushin applies and there is no transgression, the offspring follows the male?