Kiddushin 66b — the Talmud in English

From where do I say it

—from where did I learn this?

From this

as we learned: Rabbi Shimon said: There was an incident involving the reservoir

of water for a mikva

of Daskim

a person’s name or a place-name

in Yavneh, which had been standing with the presumption of being complete

containing forty seah, the measure required for a valid mikva,

and they measured

it after people had immersed and immersed objects in it,

and it was found deficient

less than the measure required for a mikva—

All purities that were made on its basis

of that reservoir, from the time when it was known that it had been complete until they measured it, Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disagreed concerning them:

Rabbi Tarfon was declaring them pure

as he explains the reason and proceeds,

and Rabbi Akiva was declaring them impure

perhaps the mikva had already become deficient when they immersed them in it; and he explains his reason and proceeds.

Rabbi Tarfon said:

But

this mikva stands with the presumption of being complete, and

you

come to make it deficient on account of doubt—

do not make it deficient on account of doubt,

for it is an established principle throughout the Torah: “Maintain a matter according to its initial presumption.”

Rabbi Akiva said:

On the contrary, but

this person stands with the presumption of being impure, and

you

come to declare him pure on account of doubt—

do not declare him pure on account of doubt,

for it is an established principle: “Maintain a matter according to its presumption.”

That is to say: Rabbi Tarfon validated it because of the presumption of the mikva, while Rabbi Akiva declared it impure because of the presumption of impurity of the person who immersed, and of the purities in which they immersed them.

And further, Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disagreed concerning an impure kohen [who disqualifies the service if he performs it in a state of impurity], who was impure, immersed, and performed the service, and after he performed the service witnesses testified that the mikva had been deficient at the time of his immersion: whether his service is invalid—Rabbi Tarfon validates the service, while Rabbi Akiva invalidates it.

And

Rabbi

Tarfon

said, to explain his reason in his second dispute:

It is analogous to

a kohen who was

standing and offering upon the altar,

assuming that he was a fit kohen,

and it became known

to him after he had performed the service

that he was the son of a divorced woman or the son of a chalutza

and he is a chalal and disqualified for the service,

that his service

which he had already performed

is valid,

as the reason is explained at the end of the sugya from the verse.

Rabbi Akiva said:

On the contrary,

it is analogous to

a kohen who was

standing and offering upon the altar, and it became known that he was blemished,

and he is disqualified for the service,

that his service—

before it became known that he was blemished—

is invalid.

Rabbi Tarfon said

to Rabbi Akiva:

You compared it to a blemished person, but

what if

I compared it to the son of a divorced woman or the son of a chalutza!

Let us see to whom—

the person who immersed in a deficient mikva and performed the service—

is he comparable?

If he is comparable to the son of a divorced woman or the son of a chalutza,

then

let us judge him as the son of a divorced woman or as the son of a chalutza;

and

if he is comparable to a blemished person, let us judge him as a blemished person.

Rabbi Akiva began to reason

and to prove that the case before us is comparable to a blemished person and not to the son of a divorced woman; and this is how he reasoned:

A mikva,

is it not that

its disqualification is through one—

that is to say, the testimony of one person is sufficient to testify that the mikva is invalid—

And

even

a blemished person,

is it not that

his disqualification is through one,

as he explains it and proceeds.

And let not the son of a divorced woman and the son of a chalutza prove otherwise, for their disqualification is through two,

since one witness is not believed to testify about a person that he is a chalal.

Alternatively,

that is to say: there is another reason to compare the case before us to a blemished person and not to the son of a divorced woman, for:

A mikva: its disqualification is in its body,

and also

a blemished person: his disqualification is in his body; and let not the son of a divorced woman and the son of a chalutza prove otherwise, for his disqualification

is

from others,

for he is disqualified on account of his mother.

Rabbi Tarfon said to him,

to Rabbi Akiva:

Akiva! Whoever separates from you is like one who separates from life.

From here Rava proved that one witness who testifies concerning a matter of sexual prohibition, when the other remains silent, is not believed, for the law of one who testifies about a person that he is the son of a divorced woman is like the law of one who testifies concerning a matter of sexual prohibition,

and from here it is demonstrated that even when the בעל הדבר remains silent, the witness is not believed unless “his disqualification is through two”; for:

This blemished person—

of whom we learned—

that his disqualification is through one: what are the circumstances?

If the בעל הדבר contradicts him,

is the witness believed?

But one witness in the face of contradiction is nothing!?

Rather,

necessarily

he remained silent,

and

if so,

similarly

in a case like this

concerning the son of a divorced woman and the son of a chalutza,

of whom we learned that “his disqualification is through two,” this too is in a case where

he remained silent,

And

nevertheless

it teaches: “

A mikva: its disqualification is through one, and a blemished person: his disqualification is through one, and let not the son

of a divorced woman and the son of a chalutza, whose disqualification is through two, prove otherwise”;

we have learned that even when the other remains silent, one witness is not believed to disqualify him as the son of a divorced woman, and likewise to testify in any matter of sexual prohibition.

And Abaye—

who disagrees with Rava and holds that the witness is believed when the בעל הדבר remains silent, even in a matter of sexual prohibition and concerning the son of a divorced woman—

said

to you, to reject the proof:

Actually,

we are dealing here—in both the case of a blemished person and the case of the son of a divorced woman—with a case in which

the בעל הדבר contradicts him,

and what will you say

that if so,

why is he believed

one witness, even to disqualify him as a blemished person? This should not be difficult for you, because:

For he said

that is to say: we say

to him: Send

take off your garments

show us

and show us that you are not blemished; that is to say: since the matter can be clarified, even one witness is believed to disqualify him until the matter is clarified—

and this is what it teaches: A mikva: its disqualification is in its body,

that is to say: we can clarify that its deficiency is before us,

and

also

a blemished person: his disqualification is in his body,

that is to say: we can clarify the matter,

and let not the son of a divorced woman and the son of a chalutza prove otherwise, for his disqualification is from others.

Here the Gemara returns to explain the substance of the law that we learned concerning a chalal: his service, which he performed unintentionally and without knowledge, is valid, whereas a blemished person who performed the service unintentionally has invalid service; and we explain it:

And the son of a divorced woman and the son of a chalutza

who performed the service unintentionally—

that his service is valid,

even though he is a chalal and is not considered of the seed of Aaron—

from where do we know it

from where is it learned?

He said

he explained:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

because

the verse says concerning Pinhas when he was appointed a

priest: “

And it shall be for him and for his descendants after him an everlasting covenant of priesthood,” and we learned from this:

an eternal covenant of priesthood,” and we learn from this:

both valid descendants and invalid descendants,

in a case where he performed the service unwittingly.

Shmuel’s father said: From here

it is to be learned that a halal who performed the service unwittingly performed valid service:

For it is stated in Moses’ blessing to the tribe of Levi: “

May the Lord bless

his strength, and accept the work of his hands.”

And we learned from the expression “his strength” that

even the non-sacred one within him He shall accept.

And this is specifically in such a case, where he did not know of his disqualification; but not initially, for the verse calls him a halal, having been deprived of the sanctity of priesthood.

Rabbi Yannai said: From here

this may be learned: for it is stated in the passage concerning the first fruits [Deuteronomy 26:3]: “

And you shall come to the priest who shall be in those days.”

Why did the Torah say “in those days”?

Would it enter your mind that a person goes to a priest who was not in his days!?

Rather, this is one who was valid [in the Ritva:

priest]

as a priest

and became a halal,

that is to say: the verse came to include one who was a priest only in those days, before his disqualification became known; and therefore he is called “priest,” because his service had been valid, like that of a completely valid priest. We further explain:

As for a blemished priest, whose service is invalid, from where [do we derive this]!?

That is to say: Since you expound “and it shall be for him and for his descendants after him” to include invalid descendants, then let us also include from this verse a blemished priest whose service is valid!?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

because

the verse says: “

Therefore say to him [to Pinhas], ‘

to Pinhas, “

Behold, I give him My covenant of peace; and it shall be for him and for his descendants after him an everlasting covenant of priesthood.’”

and it shall be for him and for his descendants after him an eternal covenant of priesthood”—

And we learned from the expression “peace”:

when he is whole, but not when he is lacking [a

blemished priest].

And we were astonished at this:

But “

peace”

is written!?

He said

he answered,

Rav Naḥman: The vav of “

peace”

is truncated [the letter vav of the word “peace” is written as truncated], and it is expounded as though “whole” had been written.

the vav in the word “peace” is written with a break in its middle, and it is therefore expounded as though the word were written “whole.”

Introduction:

A. Regarding women whom the husband is forbidden to marry by a negative commandment, whether those disqualified for an Israelite or those disqualified for the priesthood: kiddushin takes effect for him with them, according to the halakha as the Sages maintain, who disagree here with Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that even with those liable for negative commandments kiddushin does not take effect. And the position of our Mishna is likewise that of the Sages. But with those liable for karet [apart from a menstruating woman], kiddushin does not take effect for him with them, according to everyone.

B. These are the women forbidden to an ordinary priest: a divorced woman, a halala, and a prostitute [and likewise one who had intercourse with a man who is unrelated to her]; and a widow is also forbidden to a High Priest. Most women with whom forbidden intercourse occurred are forbidden to a priest; some of them become halalot, and some of them become prostitutes [and some of them are forbidden by the negative commandment, “And if a daughter of a priest shall be married to a non-priest, she shall not eat of the sacred offerings”].

C. A halal, namely, one born from a priest’s intercourse with women forbidden to the priesthood, has the sanctity of priesthood removed from him. He does not eat teruma and does not perform the service, and by his intercourse he disqualifies a woman from the priesthood, like a halala. A daughter born from a priest’s intercourse with one of these women disqualified for the priesthood is a halala and disqualified for the priesthood, and she does not eat teruma, whether she was a daughter of a priest or whether she was the wife of a priest.

D. The law of a child born from a halal’s intercourse with a valid woman, and from a valid man’s intercourse with a halala, is a dispute among the tannaim, whether the child is a halal; this dispute is mentioned in our sugya.

E. These are the women disqualified by Torah law from entering the congregation of the Lord: a mamzeret, who is forbidden by a negative commandment; and a female convert of Edomite or Egyptian origin, who is forbidden only by a prohibition derived from a positive commandment.

F. These are the men disqualified by Torah law from entering the congregation of the Lord:

a mamzer, and an Ammonite or Moabite convert, all of whom are forbidden by a negative commandment; and an Edomite or Egyptian convert is forbidden by a prohibition derived from a positive commandment to enter the congregation of the Lord.

G. A mamzer is forbidden forever, and even his tenth-generation descendant is disqualified from entering the congregation. Likewise, an Ammonite or Moabite convert’s offspring remains disqualified even after ten generations from conversion. But an Egyptian or Edomite convert is forbidden only for the first and second generations after his conversion; the third generation is permitted to enter the congregation. Likewise, a third-generation Edomite or Egyptian woman is permitted to enter the congregation of the Lord.

H. The tannaim disagreed—and this will be brought in our sugya—whether “the congregation of converts is called a congregation,” or whether the congregation of converts is not called a “congregation,” in which case a convert is permitted to marry all women disqualified from the congregation, and those disqualified from the congregation are permitted to marry a female convert.

The Mishna before us establishes four principles concerning the matter:

a. Children born from two partners whose respective statuses differ, where we must determine whether the children follow the father or the mother.

b. The validity or disqualification of children born from forbidden intercourse.

Mishna:

The first principle:

Wherever there is kiddushin,

where a man and woman can have kiddushin between them [even if in practice kiddushin was not performed between them],

and there is no transgression

in the man’s intercourse with this woman, for they are not forbidden to one another—

the child

born from them

follows the male,

as the Mishna proceeds to explain.

And which is this? —

This is: a daughter of a priest, a Levite woman, or an Israelite woman, who married

a priest,

a

Levite, and

an

Israelite, for in all these cases kiddushin takes effect with them, and there is no transgression in their marriages.

for in all these cases betrothal takes effect, and there is no transgression in their marriages.

The Mishna teaches that the child’s status with regard to priesthood or Levite status follows the husband [the male]. If the father is a priest, his son is a priest like him, even though his mother is a Levite woman or an Israelite woman. And if the father is an Israelite, his son is also an Israelite, even though his mother is a daughter of a priest or a Levite woman.

The second principle:

And wherever there is kiddushin,

where kiddushin would take effect if he betrothed her,

but

however

there is a transgression

in intercourse with this woman—

the child follows the

disqualified one

among them, whether the disqualification is in his father or in his mother, as the Mishna proceeds to explain.

And which is this? —

This is: a widow,

who is disqualified

for a High Priest;

or

a divorced woman and a woman who performed ḥalitza

who is disqualified even

for an ordinary priest;

for kiddushin takes effect for a priest with them [since they are only those liable for negative commandments], but there is a transgression in their marriages. The Mishna teaches that the children follow the more disqualified one of the two and become “disqualified,” namely, halalim. And likewise,

a mamzeret and a netina

who are disqualified and forbidden

to an Israelite from entering the congregation of the Lord—

And likewise, an Israelite woman

And likewise

an Israelite woman

who is disqualified

for a mamzer and a netin,

who are disqualified and forbidden—

for in these cases kiddushin takes effect [since they are only those liable for negative commandments, with whom kiddushin takes effect], but there is a transgression in their marriages. The Mishna teaches that the law of the child born from them is like the law of the more disqualified one among them, and they become mamzerim or netinim.

The third principle:

And anyone with whom she has no kiddushin,

with whom kiddushin does not take effect for the husband,

but

she is not entirely excluded from kiddushin, for

she has kiddushin with others—

the child

born from intercourse with this woman

is a mamzer

he is.

And which is this? -

One who has intercourse with any one of all the forbidden relations in the Torah,

That is, the close female relatives, who are forbidden to him under the prohibition of forbidden relations, and for whom he is liable to karet, since with these kiddushin do not take effect for him [because kiddushin do not take effect with those liable to karet]. But the woman is not excluded from kiddushin with another. And the Mishna teaches that the offspring born from this intercourse is a mamzer.

The fourth general rule:

And anyone for whom there is no kiddushin, neither with him nor with others,

the status of

the offspring

is

like hers.

And which is this? -

The offspring of a slave woman and a gentile woman,

for whom kiddushin is not applicable.

And the Mishna teaches that the offspring born from an Israelite who had intercourse with them has her status: he is a gentile or a slave.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

Every place where there is kiddushin

and there is no transgression, the offspring follows the male:

Said

in astonishment

Rabbi Shimon

to Rabbi Yohanan:

But is

it a general rule, that every place where there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, the offspring follows the male?