Kiddushin 66a (סו.) — the Talmud in English

Your ox was sodomized

by a person, and therefore it is disqualified for sacrifice,

and the other remains silent, he is deemed credible,

because the silence of the owner is tantamount to an admission.

And the tanna teaches this as well

in a Mishna in Bekhorot: “And these are the cases for which one may not slaughter the firstborn, neither in the Temple [as they are unfit for sacrifice] nor in the country [as they are not permitted to be eaten like other firstborn animals with permanent blemishes]:

and with which [the firstborn]

the firstborn

an offense was committed [it was sodomized],

it was sexually abused,

and which killed

a person, and there are no witnesses to the matter, but only

on the testimony of one witness or on the testimony of the owners [he is

deemed credible.

This word does not appear in the Mishna there].

That is to say: Although a firstborn animal with which an offense was committed, or which killed a person, is disqualified for sacrifice but permitted to be eaten, nevertheless, if the matter is known only through the testimony of one witness or through the testimony of the owners, it is unfit for sacrifice and, on the other hand, is not permitted to be eaten.

But

this “

on the testimony of one witness”—

through which it is disqualified for sacrifice—

what are the circumstances?

If the owners admit

to the matter, this cannot be what is meant, for if so there would be a difficulty:

this is “

on the testimony of the owners,”

as we already learned in the Mishna, that the firstborn is disqualified for sacrifice on their testimony; why, then, do I need the additional phrase “on the testimony of one witness”?

Rather, is it not necessarily the case that the Mishna is speaking of a situation

in which

he remains silent,

the owner? We learn from this that the witness is deemed credible when the owner remains silent.

And it is necessary

for Abaye to teach us all these cases, that the silence of the owners is tantamount to an admission.

For had he taught us

only

the first of these [only his first statement, concerning a witness who testified to him: “You ate forbidden fat”], that the offering is valid if he remains silent, I would say that it is valid because

only his first statement, concerning a witness who testified to him, “You ate forbidden fat,” that the sacrifice is valid if he remains silent, I would have said that it is valid for the following reason:

if he were not certain in himself that he had committed

an offense [if he were not certain that he had committed an offense], surely

he would not have brought non-sacred animals into the Temple courtyard

[he would not have brought a non-sacred animal into the Temple courtyard]; therefore, the offering he brought is valid.

But

when one witness tells him, “

Your ritually pure food has become impure,”

we might say

[I would say]:

the reason he remains silent

is

because he reasons: “

It is fit for me during the days of my ritual impurity.” That is to say: He is not silent because he admits the witness’s statement, but because he does not care, since even according to the witness, the items that became impure are fit for him to eat while he is ritually impure.

that is: he is not silent because he admits the words of the witness, but because he does not care, for even according to the witness, those things that became impure are fit for him to eat when he is ritually impure.

And had he taught us

only

this case of “Your ritually pure food has become impure,” and had he not taught us this law also concerning “

Your ox was sodomized,” I would say: The reason that his silence is considered an admission in the case of “Your ritually pure food has become impure” is

because

in any event

he ultimately loses it

the ritually pure food

during the days of his ritual purity,

as he cannot eat it because it became impure—

But

when the witness tells him, “

Your ox was sodomized,”

I would say that his silence is not considered an admission, because

he might

say

[the owner might say to himself]:

Not all oxen stand destined for the altar; oxen are not all designated for sacrifice, and he does not care that his ox has been disqualified as an offering.

Not all oxen are designated to be offered as sacrifices, and therefore he does not care if his ox is disqualified as a sacrifice.

Therefore,

it is necessary

for Abaye to teach us in all three of these cases that his silence is considered an admission.

A dilemma was raised before them: If one witness says that his wife committed adultery,

and one witness said to him: “Your wife committed adultery and is forbidden to you,”

and he remains silent,

the husband,

what is the law?

Abaye said: He is deemed credible

the witness, and she is forbidden to him.

Rava said: He is not deemed credible,

because

it is a matter concerning marital relations, and there is no matter concerning marital relations [established] by fewer than two [witnesses].

Abaye said: From where do I derive my position,

from where did I learn my view?

For

there was an incident involving

a certain blind man who used to arrange the beraitot

before Mar Shmuel. One day he was delayed

the blind man

and did not come, so he sent

Shmuel

a messenger after him

the blind man.

As the messenger was going

to the blind man’s home

by one road, he came

the blind man

by another

road.

When the messenger came

from the blind man’s home, he

said

to the blind man: “

Your wife committed adultery”;

he came before Mar Shmuel.

[There was an incident involving a blind man who was accustomed to arranging beraitot before Shmuel. One day that blind man was late in coming, and Shmuel sent a messenger after him to hurry him. The messenger went by one road to the blind man’s home, while at that time the blind man went by another road to Shmuel’s study hall. When the messenger returned from the blind man’s home, he testified to the blind man concerning his wife, that she had committed adultery at that time, and the blind man came before Shmuel to ask about the law, whether she was permitted to him.]

He said to him

Shmuel said to that blind man:

If he is credible to you

the witness [if he is credible in your eyes], then

go and divorce her

[go and give her a bill of divorce];

but if not

credible to you, then

do not divorce her.

Abaye proved from this incident that one witness is deemed credible concerning adultery when the other person remains silent:

Is it not

that Shmuel’s intention was:

If you are certain that he is not a robber

—if you trust that he is not a robber and is fit to testify, then you should divorce her; but if you do not trust that he is not a robber, then you should not divorce your wife? It follows that if the witness is fit to testify, he is deemed credible.

The Gemara explains:

And Rava

who holds that the witness is not deemed credible—could say to you that this is what Shmuel said:

If you are certain of him as you would be of two witnesses, go and divorce her; but if not, do not divorce her;

and if so, no proof can be brought from this incident that the testimony of an ordinary single witness suffices.

And

he said

further, Abaye: From where do I derive my position,

from where did I learn my view? From that

which was taught:

There was an incident involving King Yannai, who went to

the province of

Kokhlicit

[that was its name]

in the desert, and conquered sixty cities there. Upon his return he rejoiced greatly and summoned all the Sages of Israel.

He said to them

Yannai said to the Sages of Israel:

Our ancestors used to eat meluḥim

[a type of vegetable, considered a poor person’s food],

when they were occupied with building the Second Temple

and were poor.

We too shall eat meluḥim in memory of our ancestors,

that is: We shall eat them in remembrance of the poverty that once existed, and to thank the Holy One, blessed be He, for having now granted us success and wealth—

And they brought up

at the feast they held after the victory

meluḥim on golden tables, and they ate.

And there was

a

certain

man there who was

a scornful man,

a person with

an evil heart, and

a

wicked man, named Elazar ben Po’ira.

And Elazar ben Po’ira said to King Yannai:

King Yannai!

Know that

the hearts of the Pharisees

[his reference was to the Sages of Israel]

are against you,

meaning: They hate you, and they do not rejoice in your happiness!

Yannai said to Elazar:

And what shall I do

to prove that your statement is indeed true?

Elazar said to Yannai, who was also the High Priest:

Stand before them wearing the frontlet between your eyes,

that is: Place the sacred frontlet on your forehead and see whether they will protest that you are serving as High Priest, even though you are descended from Aaron [as Yannai was among the Hasmonean priests].

And indeed

Yanai established for them

for the Sages of Israel

with the tzitz between his eyes.

And

there was one elder there, named Yehuda ben Gedidya, and Yehuda ben Gedidya said to King Yanai:

King Yanai! The royal crown is enough for you [

you have enough with the royal crown], and

leave the crown of the priesthood to

the rest of

the descendants of Aaron;

and he said this even though he too was descended from Aaron, because

they would say

about Yanai:

his mother

Yanai’s mother

had been taken captive in Modi'in

before she married his father, and a captive woman is disqualified by rabbinic enactment from marrying into the priesthood, due to the concern that she may have had intercourse with a gentile, which disqualifies her from the priesthood; and Yanai, her son, who was born to a priest who had intercourse with a captive woman, is therefore a ḥalal by rabbinic enactment and is not fit for the priestly crown.

And the matter was investigated,

Yanai ordered that the matter be examined and clarified, to determine whether what they said was indeed so, but it

was not found,

the matter could not be proven; the Gemara explains this below.

And the Sages of Israel withdrew in anger

at Yanai—that is, the Sages of Israel separated themselves from Yanai because of his anger.

And Elazar ben Po'ira said to King Yanai: King Yanai!

Is it possible that

this is the law for an ordinary Israelite

—that he must endure his humiliation and not take revenge—

and

even

you,

who are

king and High Priest, are subject to this law

—to endure your humiliation without taking revenge against them?!

Yanai said to Elazar:

What shall I do

to the Sages of Israel?

Elazar said to King Yanai:

If you heed my advice, massacre them!

Yanai said to Elazar:

And what will become of the Torah,

if I kill the Sages of Israel?

Elazar said to Yanai:

Behold,

the Torah scroll

is rolled up and placed in the corner,

and the mitzvot are written within it;

anyone who wishes to study may come and study—

that is: What need is there for the Sages of Israel? The Torah is before us, and people can study from it.

Yanai was silent and did not answer him, and he followed his advice—as will be stated below. However, in the course of bringing the beraita, the Gemara cites the words of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

Immediately,

in Yanai,

heresy took hold ,

for he should have said

to Elazar ben Po'ira:

Granted, this applies to the Written Torah,

for indeed anyone who wishes to study may come and study; but

what of the Oral Torah,

which is transmitted by tradition from generation to generation through the Sages of Israel?

What

will become of it? Who will transmit the Oral Torah if the Sages of Israel are killed?

And the Gemara continues to bring the continuation of the beraita:

Immediately, the evil was ignited

through Elazar ben Po'ira, and they killed—

at Yanai’s command—

all the Sages of Israel.

And the world was desolate [

desolate of Torah],

until Shimon ben Shetaḥ came,

who had escaped Yanai’s sword,

and restored the Torah to its former state.

From here Abaye proves his position.

For

what are the circumstances?

What does the beraita mean by saying that they investigated and did not find that Yanai’s mother had been taken captive?!

If you say,

suppose you say:

Two said, “She was taken captive,” and two said, “She was not taken captive”, [

two witnesses testified that his mother had been taken captive, and two testified that she had not been taken captive]—this cannot be said, because:

If so, why did we learn, “And the matter was investigated and was not found,” implying that they maintained him in a presumption of fitness?! For

what have you seen that makes you rely on these? Rely on those [

what did you see that makes you rely on the two witnesses who say that his mother was not taken captive, when, on the other hand, you have the two witnesses who affirm that she was taken captive], and because of the uncertainty we should have disqualified him from the priesthood?!

Rather, it must be

that there was

one witness

testifying that she had been taken captive, and two witnesses contradicted him; therefore they declared Yanai fit. From here Abaye proves his position: that when one witness says, “Your wife committed adultery,” and the husband remains silent, the witness is believed.

And the reason is that two witnesses contradicted him [it follows that the witness was not believed because two witnesses contradicted him],

and one witness is of no significance in the presence of two.

Had that not been so,

but if two witnesses had not come and contradicted him, then

the witness would be believed.

Thus we have learned in accordance with Abaye’s position, that one witness is believed concerning a matter of forbidden sexual status when the party concerned remains silent.

And Rava—

who disagrees and holds that one witness is not believed concerning a matter of forbidden sexual status even when the other party remains silent—would say to you:

Actually,

this was never testimony by one witness that was contradicted by two; rather, it was conflicting testimony by

two against two:

two testified that his mother had been taken captive, and two nullified that testimony.

However, the contradiction was not created by a denial, for if so there would be a difficulty: “Why do you see fit to rely on these? Rely on those!” And the incident was as Rav Adda bar Minyomi said in another context: they established the case as involving conspiring witnesses. Here too, it involved conspiring witnesses. That is, the two who nullified the testimony disqualified the original witnesses as conspiring witnesses, saying to them: “You were with us at that time when you claim to have witnessed Yanai’s mother being taken captive, so you could not have witnessed it at all.” We rely on those who exposed the conspiracy, because the Torah grants greater credibility to witnesses exposed as conspirators than to the original witnesses. Alternatively, to explain Yanai’s incident according to Rava’s view, it was as Rabbi Yitzḥak said! For Rabbi Yitzḥak said: They substituted a maidservant for her. Two other witnesses came and said: “We were with her the entire time, and when the captors wanted to take her in order to disqualify her, we put a maidservant in her place. She remains fit.” Rava said, who holds that one witness is not believed concerning a matter of forbidden sexual status, even when the other party remains silent:

! And

the incident was

as Rav Adda bar Minyomi said

regarding another matter, that they established it

with disqualified witnesses.

Here too, with disqualified witnesses.

That is, those two who nullified the testimony disqualified the first witnesses, saying about them: “You were with us at that time when you testify concerning the capture of Yanai’s mother, and you cannot testify about it at all.” And we rely on these who disqualify them, because the Torah trusted witnesses of disqualification more than the first witnesses.

Alternatively,

to explain the incident of Yanai according to Rava’s opinion,

it can be explained in accordance with Rabbi Yitzḥak!

For Rabbi Yitzḥak said: They substituted a maidservant for her.

Two other witnesses came and said: “We were with her the entire time, and when the captors sought to take her in order to disqualify her, we put a maidservant in her place; she remains fit.”

Rava said,

who holds that one witness is not believed concerning a matter of forbidden sexual relations, even when the other remains silent: