Kiddushin 65b — the Talmud in English

Beit Shammai hold:

if we did not see that he had intercourse with her, she does not require a get from him, because

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do we say: They are the witnesses of seclusion; they are the witnesses of intercourse—

that is to say: witnesses of seclusion are not sufficient.

And Beit Hillel hold: We say: They are the witnesses of seclusion; they are the witnesses of intercourse;

that is to say: once witnesses saw that she secluded herself with him, testimony concerning the intercourse is no longer required, because since she had been married to him and he was familiar with her, he has the presumptive status that he had intercourse with her.

And they certainly agree,

that is to say: and since this is the reason of Beit Hillel, if so, what we learned in the beraita, that they agree when she was divorced from the betrothal, is certainly understood, and because it is certain that

when she was divorced from the betrothal, we do not say: “

They are the witnesses of seclusion; they are the witnesses of intercourse,”

because he was not familiar with her.

Rav Yitzhak bar Shmuel bar Marta said in the name of Rav:

One who betroths with one witness—there is no concern for his betrothal, even if both of them admit,

because one witness is not sufficient for establishing the betrothal.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: One who betroths with one witness: the great court

[the great court, and he proceeds to explain it]

say: There is no concern for his betrothal.

And Rabba bar Rav Huna explained:

Who is the “

great court”

[who is the great court]? It is

Rav

and his court!

And some say: Rabba bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: One who betroths with one witness, the great court says: There is no concern for his betrothal,

and Rav explains:

Who is the great court?

It is

Rabbi

and his court!

He raised an objection

[he challenged]

Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami,

against the view of those who hold that one who betroths with one witness has no concern for his betrothal, from a beraita from which it is proven that she is betrothed even when both of them do not admit, because the witness alone is believed:

For it was taught:

Two men who came from overseas, and a woman was with them, and a bundle was with them:

This one—

one of the men—

says: “

This one”

the woman—“

is my wife

she is,

and this one”

the second man—

is my slave

he is,

and this is my bundle.”

And this one—

the second man—

says: “

Not so; rather:

she is my wife

and not his wife,

and this one”

the other man—

is my slave

he is,

and this is my bundle”?

And the woman says: “

Not according to the words of this one and not according to the words of that one, but rather:

these”

the two men—

are my two slaves, and the bundle is mine”;

what should they do?

Since it is uncertain whether she is unmarried or married, and to whom she is married,

she requires

two

gittin

from the two men in order to permit her to the marketplace; whereas the bundle, whose ownership is uncertain, shall be left until Elijah comes.

And

once she receives a get from both of them, she

collects

her

ketuba from the bundle,

for in either event she has a claim to collect the amount of her ketuba from the bundle: if the bundle is hers, all is well; and if it belongs to one of them, he himself claimed that she is his wife, and once he gave her a get, he became obligated to her for her ketuba, and therefore she can collect her ketuba from the bundle. And Rav Aḥadvoi proves from this beraita that one witness is believed concerning betrothal, for: What are the circumstances? In what manner does this beraita deal!? If this one has two witnesses for this one, and he has

two

witnesses for this one

[if each of the men brings two witnesses who testify according to his claim], this cannot be said, for

can she say

the woman:

“These two are my slaves and the bundle is mine”!?

Can she provide us with uncertainty as to whether she owns the bundle? Surely she is certainly not included in the uncertainty; only the two men are, each of whom brings witnesses according to his claim.

Rather, is it not necessarily that the beraita deals with a case in which each of them brought one witness who says according to his claim; and it is clear from the beraita that she requires a get by virtue of the witness’s testimony. Thus, one witness is believed to testify concerning betrothal!?

—the woman—

“These two are my slaves and the bundle is mine”?

Can she make us uncertain that she owns the bundle? Surely she is not included in the uncertainty; only the two men are, each of whom brings witnesses supporting his claim.

Rather, is it not necessarily the case that the beraita is dealing with a situation in which each man brought one witness

And we answer:

And can you maintain this?

Do you think that it is possible to explain the beraita as you explained it!?

For even if your words were so, that one witness is believed concerning betrothal, nevertheless,

one witness when contradicted

[when one contradicts the other] who is believed? Can they be believed at all so as to create uncertainty concerning the divorces!? Surely even if he is believed alone, nevertheless, when his fellow contradicts him, his testimony has no substance whatsoever!?

one witness when contradicted

[when one witness contradicts the other]

is he trusted? Are they truly trusted enough to create uncertainty concerning the divorces!? Surely, even if he is trusted when he testifies alone, once the other witness contradicts him, his testimony has no force at all!?

For even if your statement were correct, that one witness is trusted with regard to betrothal, nevertheless,

when one witness is contradicted

[when one witness contradicts the other]

who is trusted?

Are they indeed trusted at all to create uncertainty concerning the divorce!? Surely, even if he is trusted on his own, once the other witness contradicts him, his testimony has no force whatsoever!?

Rather

this is the interpretation of the beraita: the beraita is always dealing with a case in which neither of them brings testimony that is useful to establish her as betrothed to him, and

as for permitting her to everyone, all agree that she is permitted

[and in order for her to be permitted to marry, she does not need a get at all], meaning: and that which we learned: “She requires two gittin,” is not in order to permit her to the world, for in any event she is permitted, since they are not believed in their claim to establish her as a married woman—

And here,

in the beraita in which we learned: “She requires two gittin,”

this is what it says:

She requires two gittin in order to collect her ketuba from the bundle,

that is: if the two men give her a get, then she collects her ketuba from the bundle, because without a get she cannot come upon the bundle by virtue of the ketuba, since a ketuba was not given to be collected so long as he has neither died nor divorced her.

And if you say: If so, what does the beraita teach us!?

I can say to you:

It is Rabbi Meir’s [opinion], who says: Movable property is pledged for a ketuba,

and she has the right to collect from the bundle, which is movable property; and this is the novelty of the beraita.

Here the Gemara returns to the matter of one who betroths with one witness, and asks:

What has become of it

[what is the law in this matter]?

Rav Kahana said: We are not concerned for his betrothals.

Rav Pappa said: We are concerned for his betrothals.

He said

he wondered

to him, Rav Ashi, to Rav Kahana:

What is your view

[what is the reason for your saying that one who betroths with one witness is not a matter of concern for his betrothals], because

you derive

by means of a gzera shava

“

matter”

from monetary matters,

for concerning monetary matters it is said: “By the mouth of two witnesses a matter shall stand,” and concerning a woman it is said: “For he has found in her a matter of nakedness.”

And if so, we too shall say: If so, just as there

—concerning monetary matters—

the admission of a litigant is considered like one hundred witnesses;

so here

concerning betrothals, let us say:

the admission of a litigant is considered like one hundred witnesses,

and his admission should be effective to make him believed concerning the betrothal!?

He said

he answered

to him

Rav Ashi to Rav Kahana:

There

concerning monetary matters,

he does not obligate

the litigant is not obligated by his admission

others

[other people], for he alone suffers loss from his admission—but

here

concerning betrothals,

he does obligate others,

for the litigant’s admission concerning betrothal obligates others as well, who suffer loss through his admission, since her female relatives become forbidden to him, and his male relatives become forbidden to her.

There was an incident involving Mar Zutra and Rav Adda the elder, sons of Rav Mari bar Isur,

who

divided their property with one another and came before Rav Ashi,

and

said to him

[an incident involving Mar Zutra and Rav Adda the elder, the sons of Rav Mari bar Isur, who divided an inheritance of property between themselves and came to ask Rav Ashi]:

Is it the case that “

by the mouth of two witnesses”

the Merciful One said,

so that if they wished to retract, they could not retract from it, and

we do not retract,

that is: is what the Torah said concerning monetary law, that “by the mouth of two witnesses a matter shall stand,” implying that a matter stands only in the presence of two witnesses, not because monetary law requires “testimony for validation,” but rather because if witnesses are not present, perhaps one of them will retract, and there will be no one to testify concerning the matter; and if so, we do not require witnesses because we are not concerned that one of them will retract —

we do not retract,

Or perhaps:

a matter is not validated except through witnesses [there is no validation for any monetary act except in the presence of two witnesses for validation of the matter], and if so, our division too has no validity without two witnesses?

He said to them

Rav Ashi:

Witnesses were created only for liars

[the shin is vocalized with an open vowel and the kuf with a kamatz]; witnesses were created only against liars, and your division is valid even without two witnesses for validation.

Abaye said: If one witness said to a man

:

You ate forbidden fat,

unwittingly, and you are liable for a sin-offering,

and the other

—the one who hears—

is silent,

and the other brought a sacrifice on his word, then the witness is

believed

and the sacrifice is valid,

since his silence is considered like an admission. And the tanna teaches likewise,

that is: the tanna of the Mishna in Keritot [11b] supports my words! For we learned there:

One witness said to him: “

You ate forbidden fat,”

and the other says: “

I did not eat,”

he is exempt

from the sacrifice.

from the sacrifice.

And it implies:

The reason is that he said: “

I did not

eat”; he is exempt—

But if he remained silent,

and did not contradict him,

he is believed.

And

Abaye further

said: One witness said to him: “

Your ritually pure things became impure,”

and the other remained silent, he is believed,

the witness, because the owner’s silence is considered like an admission.

And the tanna teaches likewise: One witness says: “

They became impure,”

and the other says: “

They did not become impure”—

he is exempt.

Thus it implies:

The reason is that he said: “

No”;

but if he remained silent

[he was silent],

he is believed.

And

Abaye further

said: One witness said to him: