Kiddushin 65b (סה:) — the Talmud in English

Beit Shammai maintain:

If we did not see him engage in intercourse with her, she does not require a get from him, because

we do not say:

“They are the witnesses to seclusion; they are the witnesses to intercourse,”

that is, witnesses to seclusion alone are insufficient.

And Beit Hillel maintain: We say: “They are the witnesses to seclusion; they are the witnesses to intercourse”;

that is, once witnesses saw that she secluded herself with him, testimony concerning the intercourse is no longer required. Since she had been married to him and he was familiar with her, he is presumed to have engaged in intercourse with her.

And they certainly agree,

that is, since this is the reasoning of Beit Hillel, it is certainly understandable what we learned in the beraita: They agree when she was divorced after betrothal, because it is certainly the case that

when she was divorced after betrothal, we do not say: “

They are the witnesses to seclusion; they are the witnesses to intercourse,”

because he was not familiar with her.

Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta said in the name of Rav:

Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta said in the name of Rav: One who betroths in the presence of one witness—there is no concern regarding his betrothal, even if both of them admit,

because one witness is insufficient to establish the betrothal.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: With regard to one who betroths in the presence of one witness, the great court

[the supreme court; he proceeds to explain it]

say: There is no concern regarding his betrothal.

And Rabba bar Rav Huna explained:

Who is the “

great court”

[that is, who is the great court]? It is

Rav

and his court!

And some say: Rabba bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: With regard to one who betroths in the presence of one witness, the great court says: There is no concern regarding his betrothal,

and Rav explains:

Who is the great court?

It is

Rabbi

and his court!

Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raised an objection

[he challenged]

according to the view that one who betroths in the presence of one witness is of no concern,

from a beraita that proves that she is betrothed even when both of them do not admit, because the witness alone is trusted:

As it was taught:

Two men came from overseas, with a woman and a bundle with them.

This one

—one of the men—

says: “

This woman

—the woman—

is my wife

and

this one

—the other man—

is my slave

and

this is my bundle.”

And this one

—the other man—

says: “

Not so; rather,

she is my wife

and not his wife, and

this one

—the other man—

is my slave

and

this is my bundle.”

And the woman says: “

Not as this one says and not as that one says. Rather,

these

—the two men—

are both my slaves, and the bundle is mine.”

What should they do?

Since it is uncertain whether she is unmarried or married, and to which of them she is married,

she requires

two

bills of divorce

from the two men in order to permit her to marry someone else. As for the bundle, whose it is is uncertain; it shall remain until Elijah comes.

And

once she receives a get from both of them, she

collects

her

marriage contract from the bundle,

for in either event she has the right to collect the amount of her marriage contract from the bundle: If the bundle is hers, all is well; and if it belongs to one of them, he himself claimed that she is his wife, and once he gives her a get, he becomes liable for her marriage contract. Therefore, she may collect her marriage contract from the bundle.

And Rav Aḥadvoi proves from this beraita that one witness is trusted with regard to betrothal, for:

What are the circumstances?

If one

has two

witnesses for this one, and he has

two

witnesses for that one

[if each of the men brings two witnesses who testify in accordance with his claim], this cannot be what the beraita is discussing, for

can she say

the woman:

“These two are my slaves and the bundle is mine”?!

Can she place us in doubt as to whether she owns the bundle? Surely she is not included in the uncertainty; only the two men are, each of whom brings witnesses in support of his claim.

who testified according to his claim;

Rather, is it not

in

a case where each of them brought

one witness

who says in accordance with his claim? It is explicit in the beraita that she requires a get on the basis of the witness’s testimony. Thus, one witness is trusted to testify concerning betrothal!?

And we answer:

Can you really say so?

Do you think it is possible to interpret the beraita as you interpreted it!?

For even if your statement were correct, that one witness is trusted with regard to betrothal, nevertheless,

when one witness is contradicted

[when one witness contradicts the other]

who is trusted?

Are they indeed trusted at all to create uncertainty concerning the divorce!? Surely, even if he is trusted on his own, once the other witness contradicts him, his testimony has no force whatsoever!?

Rather

this is the interpretation of the beraita: The beraita is always dealing with a case in which neither of them brings testimony that is effective in establishing her as betrothed to him, and

as for permitting her to everyone, all agree that she is permitted

and in order for her to be permitted to marry, she does not require a get at all. That is to say: When we learned: “She requires two gittin,” this is not in order to permit her to the world, because she is permitted in any event, as they are not believed in their claim to establish her as a married woman —

and here,

in the beraita in which we learned: “She requires two gittin,”

this is what it is saying:

She requires two gittin in order to collect her ketuba from the bundle of property,

that is to say: If the two men give her a get, she can collect her ketuba from the bundle of property, because without a get she cannot approach the bundle of property by virtue of her ketuba, since a ketuba is not given to be collected so long as he has neither died nor divorced her.

And if you say: If so, what does the beraita teach us!?

I can tell you:

It is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: Movable property is liened for a ketuba,

and she has the right to collect from the bundle of property, which is movable property; and this is the innovation of the beraita.

Here the Gemara returns to the matter of one who betroths with one witness, and asks:

What is the conclusion

[what is the ruling in this matter]?

Rav Kahana said: We are not concerned about his betrothal.

Rav Pappa said: We are concerned about his betrothal.

He said

He said

and challenged

Rav Ashi to Rav Kahana:

What is your reasoning

[what is the basis for your saying that one who betroths with one witness is not subject to concern regarding his betrothal]? Is it

because you derive

by means of a gzera shava

“matter”

from monetary law,

as it is stated with regard to monetary law: “By the mouth of two witnesses a matter shall stand,” and it is stated concerning a woman: “Because he has found in her a matter of indecency.”

And if so, we too shall say:

If, as there

—with regard to monetary law—

the admission of an interested party is considered like the testimony of one hundred witnesses, so too here

with regard to betrothal, let us say:

the admission of an interested party is considered like the testimony of one hundred witnesses,

and his admission should make him credible concerning the betrothal!?

He said

in answer

to him

Rav Ashi to Rav Kahana:

There,

with regard to monetary law,

he does not obligate—

the litigant is not obligated through his admission—

others

[other people], for only he suffers a loss through his admission—but

here,

with regard to betrothal,

he does obligate others,

because the litigant’s admission concerning the betrothal also imposes consequences upon others who suffer loss through his admission: Her relatives become forbidden to him, and his relatives become forbidden to her.

There was an incident involving

Mar Zutra and Rav Adda the Elder, sons of Rav Mari bar Isur,

who

divided their property between one another and came before Rav Ashi,

and

said to him

[there was an incident involving Mar Zutra and Rav Adda the Elder, the sons of Rav Mari bar Isur, who divided an inheritance of property between themselves and came to ask Rav Ashi]:

Is the phrase

“By the mouth of two witnesses”

that

the Merciful One stated, meaning that if they wished to retract, they could not retract, and

if so,

we will not retract,

to be understood as follows: The Torah’s statement concerning monetary law, “By the mouth of two witnesses a matter shall stand,” implying that a matter stands only in the presence of two witnesses, is not because monetary law requires “testimony validating the act.” Rather, it is because if witnesses are not present, one of them might retract, and there would be no one to testify concerning the matter; if so, we do not require witnesses, because we are not concerned that either of us will retract —

Or perhaps: A matter is established only through witnesses

[there is no validation of any monetary transaction without the presence of two witnesses to validate the matter], and if so, our division likewise has no validity without two witnesses?

Rav Ashi said to them:

Rav Ashi

“Witnesses were created only for liars”

[the shin has a pataḥ and the kuf a kamatz]; witnesses were created only to counter liars, and your division is valid even without two witnesses to validate it.

Abaye said: If one witness said to

a person:

“You ate forbidden fat”

unintentionally and are liable to bring a sin-offering,

and the other

—the one who hears—

is silent,

and that person brought an offering on his word, the witness is

believed,

and the offering is valid, because his silence is considered like an admission,

And the tanna also teaches this,

that is, the tanna of the Mishna in Keritot [11b] supports my statement! For we learned there:

“One witness said to him:

‘You ate forbidden fat,’

and the other said

‘I did not eat,’

he is exempt

from the offering.

And it follows:

The reason is that he said:

“I did

not eat,” and he is exempt—

but if he was silent,

he remained silent and did not contradict him,

he is believed.

And

further

Abaye said: If one witness said to him:

“Your pure items became impure,”

and the other remained silent, he is believed,

the witness, because the owner’s silence is considered like an admission.

And the tanna also teaches this: One witness says:

“They became impure,”

and the other says:

“They did not become impure”—

he is exempt.

It follows that:

The reason is that he said:

“No,”

but if he was silent

[he remained silent],

he is believed.

And

further

Abaye said: If one witness said to him: