Kiddushin 65a — the Talmud in English

Even one who has two groups of daughters and betrothed the eldest,

the middle one of the second group should be permitted

[she should be permitted].

But we learned: “All of them are forbidden,” implying that even the middle one of the second group is included in the prohibition!?

And we answer:

What are we dealing with here

in the Mishna?

In

a case

where there are only an eldest and a youngest

and no middle one.

And when Rabbi Meir said in the first clause that all of them are forbidden, this means the two daughters in the group of the elder ones, and the eldest daughter in the group of the younger ones. But if there were middle ones there, Rabbi Meir would say: “Except for the youngest among the youngest,” for the middle one among the youngest is also permitted, and she is not called “eldest.”

And so too it is reasonable,

that the Mishna is dealing with a case in which there is no middle one,

for if it is so that there is one, let it teach it

[if indeed there is a “middle one,” let the tanna state what her law is ]. Rather, certainly, the Mishna is not speaking of a middle one, since her law differs from that of the eldest, and she is permitted.

And we object:

And

is this proof!? Behold,

according to your reasoning

[according to your view], that you infer from the fact that the Mishna did not mention the middle one,

the middle one of the first group certainly

is included in the

uncertainty

when he said: “I betrothed my eldest daughter,”

and

certainly

is forbidden to him; does it

[does it]

teach it

even though her law is like the law explained in the Mishna!?

If so, it may likewise be said concerning the middle one of the second group: she is forbidden, like her elder sister, and one cannot raise a difficulty from the fact that the tanna omitted her law.

And we answer:

Now how can these be compared

[and is this proof!?] Granted,

there

with regard to the middle one of the group of the elder ones, there is no wonder why the tanna did not mention her, for

he taught her own youngest

[of her group]

as forbidden, and

it is consequently understood

the same law

and all the more so

for this

middle one

who is older than her

[who is older than her].

But

here,

with regard to the middle one of the group of the younger ones,

if it is so that there is

a prohibition,

let him teach it,

for if the tanna does not state explicitly that she is forbidden, we cannot learn her law from the law of her sisters.

And from the fact that the tanna did not teach this law, infer from it that the middle one of the second group is permitted when he betrothed his eldest daughter without specification.

He said

[he asked]

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua to Rava: This

one who vows: “Until the eve of

Passover: for

he has only

one group

of daughters,

it is comparable.

And they disagree

about it, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, and one of them holds: He is forbidden until Passover ends, because he also calls the intermediate days “the eve of Passover,” since there are days later than them.

And this is difficult: How did Abaye say: “With one group they do not disagree”!? Behold, concerning Passover as well one may say the same reasoning: if his intention was to forbid himself until the middle of Passover, which is “before” its end, he should have specified this in his language, for every day and every period has its own designation. And why do we say that he is forbidden until it ends!?

He said

[he answered]

to him,

Rava:

There,

in the case of one who vows: “Until the eve of Passover,” they do not disagree over whether “the eve” means before the beginning of Passover or before the end of Passover. Rather,

they disagree concerning ordinary usage

[the meaning of the language of people]

they disagree.

One

who permits

holds that the expression “

until the

eve of Passover

” means: “

until before Passover”

[until before Passover]. Therefore, he is forbidden only until Passover arrives.

And the other

who forbids

holds that the expression “until the eve of Passover” means: “

until

Passover has passed”

[until Passover is cleared away and passes]. Therefore, he is forbidden until Passover ends.

a. A person is believed to forbid something to himself. Therefore, if a person says that a particular woman, or a particular thing, is forbidden to him by Torah law, he is forbidden to them. The basis of this law is called “he has made himself as a piece of prohibition,” for through his words the matter becomes forbidden to him, just as the eating of a piece of forbidden matter is forbidden to him.

b. A man who marries a woman becomes forbidden to her relatives, such as her mother, daughter, and sister. Likewise, the woman becomes forbidden to her husband’s relatives, such as his father, son, and brother.

This prohibition of relatives is a permanent prohibition, and it does not lapse through divorce or upon the death of his wife [except for the prohibition of his wife’s sister, which lapses upon the death of his wife].

c. A minor who has no father has betrothal by rabbinic enactment, whether she betrothed herself, or whether her mother or brother betrothed her, with her consent.

Mishna:

a.

One who says to a woman: “

I betrothed you

and you are my wife,” and according to his words he is forbidden to her relatives,

and she

denies him and

says: “

You did not betroth me” -

Behold,

he is forbidden to his wife’s relatives,

for “he has made himself [her relatives] as a piece of prohibition.”

And

if

she is permitted to his relatives

[and to every person], for concerning her and concerning his relatives he is not believed to say that he betrothed her until two witnesses come and testify to this.

b. And likewise, if

she

[the woman]

says: “

You betrothed me,”

and he

denies her and

says: “

I did not betroth you” -

he is permitted to her relatives

of the woman, because she is not believed either concerning him or concerning her relatives —

and

if

she is forbidden to his relatives

because “she has made herself [his relatives] as a piece of prohibition.”

And likewise she is forbidden to every person, since according to her words she is a married woman.

c. One who says to a woman: “

I betrothed you,”

and she says: “

You did not betroth

me,

but

you betrothed

my daughter

betrothed” —

he is forbidden to the relatives of

the

elder one

[she is the mother], for “he has made himself [her relatives] as a piece of prohibition.”

And

if

the elder one

[the mother]

is permitted to his relatives

and to every person, because she denies him and says: “I was not betrothed to you, and I am not forbidden to your relatives.”

And

likewise,

he is permitted to the relatives of

the

minor

[the daughter], since he does not admit that he betrothed her.

And

also

the minor

[the daughter]

is permitted to his relatives

of the man, because she is not made forbidden by her mother’s words.

d. One who says to a woman: “

I betrothed your daughter,”

and she says: “

You did not betroth

my daughter,

but me

you betrothed” —

he is forbidden to the relatives of

the

minor

[the daughter], for “he has made himself [her daughter’s relatives] as a piece of prohibition.”

And

if the

minor

[the daughter]

is permitted to his relatives,

because he is not believed to forbid her.

He is permitted to the relatives of

the

elder one

[the mother], because he does not admit her words and denies them,

and the elder one

[the mother]

is forbidden to his relatives,

because “she has made herself [his relatives] as a piece of prohibition.”

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

“One who says to a woman, I betrothed you,”

and she says, “You did not betroth me,” he is forbidden to her relatives, and she is permitted to his relatives. She says, “You betrothed me,” and he says, “I did not betroth you,” he is permitted to her relatives, and she is forbidden to his relatives:

And the Gemara explains:

And it was necessary,

for our Mishna needed to inform us that he is not made forbidden through her words, after the tanna had already informed us that she is not made forbidden through his words:

For if it had informed us

only

with regard to him,

that when he says “I betrothed you,” she is not made forbidden, I would say that only he is not believed concerning her

because the man,

who becomes forbidden only to her relatives and not to other women,

does not care

to become forbidden to her relatives for nothing.

And

therefore, at times he

happens to say

[it may happen that he says] “I betrothed you,” even though he did not betroth her.

But she,

a woman who says “You betrothed me,” thereby making herself forbidden to the entire world,

I would say

[I would have said] that she certainly speaks the truth, because

if it were not clear to her in her statement, she would not have said it

[if it were not clear to her that this is the truth, she would not have said this], since a woman does not make herself forbidden to the entire world for nothing.

And

if so, she should also be believed concerning him, and

he should become forbidden

even

he

[he too should become forbidden]

to her relatives.

Therefore,

he informs us

the tanna that nevertheless he is not made forbidden through her words. And if he denies her, he is not forbidden to her relatives.

We learned in the Mishna: “I betrothed you,” and she says, “You did not betroth me, but my daughter”; he is forbidden to the relatives of the elder one, and the elder one is permitted to his relatives. He is permitted to the relatives of the minor, and the minor is permitted to his relatives:

And we object:

This further

[additional clause]

why do I need it!?

What novelty is there in it that is not written in the first clause? Behold, we have already learned that a person is believed to forbid himself, but is not believed to forbid others!?

And we answer:

It was necessary

for the tanna to teach this clause, in order to inform us that a minor who is an orphan without a father is permitted, even though according to her mother’s words she is forbidden.

For

it might enter your mind to say: Since, by Torah law, the Merciful One believed

[the Torah believed]

the father

concerning his daughter’s betrothal, as explained above, 64a, because it is written [Deuteronomy 22:16]: “I gave my daughter to this man”— -

and

by rabbinic enactment they believed her

the Sages believed

her

[the mother] concerning the betrothal of her minor daughter when she is an orphan without a father,

and the daughter should become forbidden

[and the daughter should be forbidden]

through her statement,

the mother’s statement.

he informs us

our Mishna that the Sages did not believe her to say concerning her daughter, even if she is a minor orphan, that she is betrothed.

We learned in the Mishna:

“I betrothed your daughter,”

and she says, “You did not betroth my daughter, but me”; he is forbidden to the relatives of the minor, and the minor is permitted to his relatives. He is permitted to the relatives of the elder one, and the elder one is forbidden to his relatives:

And we object:

This further clause, why do I need it?

Behold, there is no novelty in this clause that is not written in the Mishna above!? And we answer:

Since

[by virtue of the fact that]

he taught this, he also taught that,

that is, since the tanna taught the law of one who says to a woman, “I betrothed you,” and she says, “You betrothed my daughter,” the tanna also taught the opposite case, when he says, “I betrothed the daughter,” and she says, “You betrothed me.”

A woman who says, “You betrothed me,” who is believed to make herself forbidden to the entire world, but is not believed to make her relatives forbidden to him, and the husband gave her a bill of divorce [since she needs it], he becomes forbidden to her relatives by rabbinic enactment.

It was stated

a disagreement in which Rav and Shmuel disagreed concerning one of the situations explained in our Mishna:

Rav said: “We compel”

the husband to give her a get according to her wishes. And the Gemara proceeds to explain with regard to which clause in our Mishna Rav said this.

And

if

Shmuel said:

we do not compel him, but

we ask

him to give her a get according to her wishes.

And the Gemara discusses:

with regard to which [clause]

[with regard to which clause in our Mishna] was this dispute stated?

If you say

[if it is said]

with regard to the first part

of the first part, where he said, “I betrothed you,” and she said, “You did not betroth me,” or with regard to the first part of the latter section, where he said, “I betrothed you”]] -

It is impossible to say this, because:

There is no “

”“we compel”

and there is no “

”“we ask”

at all!

For she does not require a get at all, since he is not trusted at all with regard to her, and it is inapplicable to say here either “we compel” or “we ask him to give a get.”

Rather,

perhaps you will say that with regard to

the latter part

of the first part and the latter part of the latter section their dispute was stated—namely, where she said, “You betrothed me,” and she is forbidden to everyone, and they disputed in this matter: whether we compel him to give her a get, since she became forbidden, on the basis of her own statement, to marry another, or whether we ask him to give her a get, but do not compel him to do so.

This too is impossible to say. For:

Granted,

as for that which Shmuel said,

we ask

the husband to give her a get,

that is well

[it is properly explained]!

Rather,

as for that which Rav said,

“we compel,”

the difficulty is:

why

should we compel him to give her a get in order to permit her to marry, when he could

say

the man:

“I do not wish to become forbidden with regard to her relative”

[that I should become forbidden with regard to the woman’s relative] through giving the get, for we said that once he gives a get he becomes forbidden with regard to her relatives by rabbinic law, even though she is not trusted with regard to him]!?

And therefore the Gemara explains that Rav and Shmuel do not disagree.

Rather,

the teachings -

were stated with regard to one another

[the teachings of Rav and Shmuel are not conflicting teachings, but two teachings that fit together]; they were not stated in order for one to disagree with the other, but one added to what the other did not specify. And this is how it was stated:

Shmuel said: “We ask him to give a get”

in order to permit her to marry, if he does not desire her, but we do not compel him to give a get, since through this he will become forbidden with regard to her relatives by rabbinic law.

And concerning this

Rav said,

that indeed, if he did not give a get of his own accord, but gave a get because they asked him to release her to the world, he is not obligated to give her a ketuba, since according to his statement she was never his wife, and he owes her nothing. But

if he gave

her

a get of his own accord,

without a request from the court,

we compel him

to give

her

a ketuba.

For by giving the get he revealed to us that he indeed betrothed her, since if he had not betrothed her he would not have divorced her. Therefore, he must give her a ketuba, like every woman whose husband divorces her.

It was also stated

as we explained:

Rav Aḥa bar Adda said that Rav said, and some say

[there are those who say that Rav Aḥa bar Adda did not hear the words from Rav himself, but]

Rav Aḥa bar Adda said:

thus

Rav Hamnuna said

that

Rav said:

“We compel and we ask.”

And these words as they stand are difficult to accommodate, for the difficulty is:

“Two [contradictory statements]”

These two things contradict one another, for if “we compel,” there is no “we ask,” and if “we ask,” there is no “we compel”! Rather, necessarily

this is what he is saying: “We ask him to give a get, and if he gave

a get

of his own accord, we compel him to give

her

a ketuba.

Rav Yehuda said: “One who betroths

a woman

in the presence of one witness,

where only one witness was present at the time of the betrothal, and afterward he testified that betrothal took place in his presence, without another being with him,

we do not take concern for his betrothal,

and he proceeds to explain the reason.

They asked

[they asked]

Rav Yehuda:

if

both,

the man and the woman,

admit

to the words of the one witness,

what

is the law?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Is the presence of one witness sufficient for the validity of the betrothal, since we find that the testimony of one witness is also considered testimony, for one witness in monetary matters obligates the opposing party to swear, and that which two witnesses are required for betrothal is only in order to verify and testify concerning it; and here, since the husband and the woman admit the words of the witness, there is no deficiency of trustworthiness, and the woman is forbidden to everyone, while he is forbidden with regard to her relatives? Or perhaps betrothal cannot take effect in the presence of one witness; rather, two “witnesses of validity” are required for the betrothal to take effect.

And Rav Yehuda did not give a decisive answer, because Rav Yehuda did not hold firmly to his position, neither for prohibition nor for permission. Therefore, at times Rav Yehuda said

“yes”

[yes], meaning that if she was betrothed in the presence of one witness and both admit the matter, it is betrothal,

and

at times Rav Yehuda said

“no,”

meaning that she is not betrothed, because betrothal cannot take effect without two witnesses of validity.

And

the matter was in the category of

“it was uncertain in his hand,”

for his ruling concerning this matter was uncertain in his hand.

It was stated: Rav Naḥman said

[in the name of]

Shmuel: “One who betroths in the presence of one witness, we do not take concern for his betrothal, even

if

both admit.”

Rava raised an objection

[he raised a difficulty]

to Rav Naḥman

from our Mishna:

“One who says to a woman: “

I betrothed you,”

and she says: “

You did not betroth me,”

he is forbidden with regard to her relatives, and she is permitted with regard to his relatives.

And in what circumstance does our Mishna deal!?

If there are

two

witnesses

who say, “She was betrothed in our presence,” it is impossible to say this, for if so:

why is she permitted

she

with regard to his relatives!?

For she is certainly his wife, and she is certainly forbidden with regard to his relatives!

And if there are no witnesses

at all, even at the time of the betrothal, as when he says, “I betrothed you privately between you and me,” this too is impossible to say, for if so:

why is he forbidden

he

with regard to her relatives?

For surely betrothal without any witnesses is not betrothal, and if so he does not become forbidden with regard to her relatives!

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that our Mishna deals

with one witness

who testified concerning the betrothal? If betrothal indeed took place in his presence, it is betrothal, but he is not trusted to testify concerning it. Therefore, only he, who admitted the words of the witness, is forbidden with regard to her relatives, whereas she, who did not admit him, is permitted with regard to the man’s relatives.

And it is demonstrated that one who betroths in the presence of one witness, when both admit, his betrothal is betrothal. And this is difficult for Rav Naḥman!?

And we answer: Actually, even if both admit, his betrothal is not betrothal, because betrothal does not take effect without two witnesses of validity.

And

here,

in our Mishna,

with what are we dealing? For example, where he said to her: “

I betrothed you in the presence of

two witnesses,

so-and-so and so-and-so, and

I cannot bring them to court, because

they went overseas.”

Further,

Rava raised an objection

[Rava raised a difficulty] to Rav Naḥman from a Mishna in tractate Gittin 81a:

As we learned in a Mishna:

“One who divorces his wife and

afterward—even after some time—

the divorced woman slept

the divorced woman

with him in an inn

[she secluded herself with him in an inn].

Beit Shammai say: “She does not need

to receive

from him

[from him]

a second get.”

And Beit Hillel say: “She needs

to receive

from him

[from him]

a second get,

and he proceeds to explain it.

It entered our mind that the Mishna deals with a case in which he had intercourse with her for the sake of betrothal, and they disputed whether she is betrothed through this intercourse and requires a second get, or whether she is not betrothed and therefore does not require a second get. Therefore the Gemara proves:

what are the circumstances,

in what circumstances does this Mishna deal!?

If there are witnesses,

if there are witnesses testifying that she was betrothed through intercourse, this cannot be said, for if so the difficulty is:

what is the reason of Beit Shammai!?

Why do Beit Shammai hold that she is not betrothed, when she was betrothed in the presence of two witnesses?

And if there are no witnesses,

and if you say that the Mishna deals with a case in which there were no witnesses at all at the time of the intercourse, this too cannot be said, for if so the difficulty is:

what is the reason of Beit Hillel!?

Why do Beit Hillel hold that she requires a second get, when it is obvious that betrothal does not take effect without witnesses!?

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that it deals with one who had intercourse with her

in the presence of

the

one witness,

and both admit the matter, and they disputed as follows:

Beit Shammai hold that betrothal does not take effect with fewer than two “witnesses of validity”; therefore, she is not betrothed and does not require a second get from him.

Whereas Beit Hillel hold that one who betroths in the presence of one witness, when both admit, his betrothal is betrothal; therefore, she requires a second get from him.

And if so, this is difficult for Rav Naḥman, who said that his betrothal is not betrothal. For the halakha is according to Beit Hillel, and they hold that his betrothal is betrothal!?

And we reject this:

“And according to your reasoning,”

and according to you, who explain their dispute as concerning one witness and where both admit, is this Mishna resolved!?

And yet

say the latter part: “And they agree,”

Beit Hillel with Beit Shammai,

concerning

one who

was divorced from betrothal,

and slept with him in an inn,

that she does not require a second get from him, because his heart is not familiar with her

yet, and they are embarrassed before one another, so we do not take concern that perhaps he had intercourse with her.

And if it should enter your mind

according to your words, that according to Beit Hillel

one witness is reliable,

and if he had intercourse with her for the purpose of kiddushin in the presence of one witness, and we know that he had intercourse with her because both of them admit it, the kiddushin takes effect according to Beit Hillel, because one witness suffices for validating the kiddushin, whereas according to Beit Shammai one witness is insufficient, then

what difference does it make whether

she was divorced

from betrothal,

or

what difference does it make whether

she was divorced

from marriage,

for both of them admit that he had intercourse with her!?

Rather,

necessarily

here, with what are we dealing? With a case in which there are witnesses to seclusion, but there are no witnesses to intercourse,

that is, two witnesses saw them secluding themselves, but did not see that he had intercourse with her; and it is in this that they dispute: