Kiddushin 65a (סה.) — the Talmud in English

Even one who has two groups of daughters, and betrothed the eldest,

the middle one of the second group should be permitted

to him.

But we learned: They are all forbidden. This indicates that even the middle one of the second group is included in the prohibition!?

And we answer:

In what case are we dealing

in the Mishna?

In

a case

where there are only an eldest and a youngest

and no middle daughter.

And when Rabbi Meir said in the first clause that they are all forbidden, he was referring to the two daughters in the group of the eldest daughters, and the eldest daughter in the group of the youngest daughters. But if there were middle daughters there, Rabbi Meir would say: “Except for the youngest among the youngest,” because even the middle daughter among the youngest is permitted, and she is not called “eldest.”

And this too stands to reason, since

the Mishna is dealing with a case in which there is no middle daughter:

For if there is one, let the tanna state it

if indeed there is a “middle daughter,” let the tanna state her status . Rather, certainly the Mishna is not discussing a middle daughter, since her status differs from that of the eldest, and she is permitted.

And we challenge this:

But

is this proof? After all,

according to your reasoning

according to your view, since you infer from the fact that the Mishna did not mention the middle daughter,

the middle one of the first group is certainly

included

in the uncertainty

when he said: “I betrothed my eldest daughter,”

and

certainly

she is forbidden to him; does it

mean that

the tanna state it,

even though her status is identical to the law set out in the Mishna!?

If so, it may likewise be said concerning the middle one of the second group that she is forbidden, like her elder sister, and one cannot raise an objection from the fact that the tanna omitted her status.

And we answer:

Can this be compared

is that proof!? Granted,

there

with regard to the middle one of the group of the eldest daughters, there is no wonder why the tanna did not mention her, since

he stated the younger one of her group

of her group

as forbidden, and

it is consequently understood that

the same law applies

and all the more so

to this one

middle daughter

who is older than her

who is older than that younger daughter.

But

here,

with regard to the middle one of the group of the youngest daughters,

if there is one

and she is forbidden,

let him state it,

because if the tanna does not explicitly say that she is forbidden, we cannot derive her status from the law of her sisters.

And from the fact that the tanna did not teach this law, conclude from it that the middle one of the second group is permitted when he betrothed his eldest daughter without specifying which one.

He said

asked

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, to Rava: But

one who vows: “Until the face of Passover,”

for

when he has only

one group

of daughters

it is comparable.

And they disagree

concerning this: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, and one of them maintains that he is forbidden until Passover has ended, because he also calls the intermediate days “the face of Passover,” since later days follow them.

And the difficulty is: How could Abaye say that they do not disagree when there is one group!? After all, with regard to Passover one may say the same reasoning: If his intention is to prohibit himself until the middle of Passover, which is “before” its end, he should have made this explicit in his wording, since each day and each period of time has its own designation. Why, then, do we say that he is forbidden until Passover ends!?

He said

replied

to him

Rava:

There,

with regard to one who vows: “Until the face of Passover,” they do not disagree as to whether “face” means before the beginning of Passover or before the end of Passover. Rather,

they disagree over ordinary usage

the meaning of ordinary human speech.

One

who

permits,

holds that the expression

“until the

face of Passover”

means

until before Passover, and therefore he is forbidden only until Passover arrives.

[until before Passover]. Therefore, he is forbidden only until Passover arrives.

And the other

who forbids

holds that the expression “until the face of Passover” means:

“

until Passover has passed,”

and therefore he is forbidden until Passover ends.

a. A person is believed with regard to prohibiting something to himself. Therefore, if a person says that a certain woman or a certain object is forbidden to him by Torah law, it is forbidden to him. The basis of this law is called “he renders himself as a piece of forbidden matter”: through his words, the object becomes forbidden to him, just as the consumption of a piece of forbidden matter is forbidden to him.

b. When a man marries a woman, he becomes forbidden to her female relatives, such as her mother, daughter, and sister. Likewise, the woman becomes forbidden to her husband’s relatives, such as his father, son, and brother.

This prohibition concerning relatives applies forever, and is not lifted by divorce or by the death of his wife [except for the prohibition against his wife’s sister, which is lifted upon the death of his wife].

c. A minor girl who has no father has kiddushin by rabbinic ordinance, whether she betroths herself or whether her mother or brother betroths her, with her consent.

Mishna:

a.

One who says to a woman: “

I betrothed you

and you are my wife,” and according to his statement he is forbidden to her relatives,

and she

denies him and

says: “

You did not betroth me” -

He is

forbidden to her relatives

as his wife’s relatives, since “he renders himself [with regard to her relatives] as a piece of forbidden matter.”

But

she

is permitted to his relatives

and to everyone else, since with regard to her and to his relatives he is not believed to say that he betrothed her unless two witnesses come and testify to this.

b. Likewise, if

she

the woman

says: “

You betrothed me,”

and he

denies her and

says: “

I did not betroth you” -

He is permitted to her relatives

as the woman’s relatives, because she is not believed either with regard to him or with regard to her relatives—

but

she

is forbidden to his relatives

because “she renders herself [with regard to his relatives] as a piece of forbidden matter.”

She is likewise forbidden to everyone, since according to her statement she is a married woman.

c. One who says to a woman: “

I betrothed you,”

and she says: “

You did not betroth

me,

but

you betrothed

my daughter

instead”—

He is forbidden to the relatives of

the

eldest

[the mother], since “he renders himself [with regard to her relatives] as a piece of forbidden matter.”

But

the

eldest

[the mother]

is permitted to his relatives

and to everyone else, since she denies him and says: “I was not betrothed to you, and I am not forbidden to your relatives.”

And

likewise,

he is permitted to the relatives

of the

minor

[the daughter], since he does not admit that he betrothed her.

And

also the

minor

[the daughter]

is permitted to his relatives

since she does not become forbidden through her mother’s statement.

d. One who says to a woman: “

I betrothed your daughter,”

and she says: “

You did not betroth

my daughter,

but me

you betrothed” —

He is forbidden to the relatives of

the

minor

[the daughter], since “he renders himself [with regard to her relatives] as a piece of forbidden matter.”

But the

minor

is permitted to his relatives,

[the daughter]

because he is not believed to prohibit her.

because he is not believed to forbid her.

He is permitted to the relatives of

the

eldest

[the mother], since he does not admit her statement but denies it,

and the eldest

[the mother]

is forbidden to his relatives, since “she renders herself [with regard to his relatives] as a piece of forbidden matter.”

because she has rendered herself [with regard to his relatives] as a piece of forbidden matter.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

One who says to a woman, “I betrothed you,”

and she says, “You did not betroth me,” he is forbidden to her relatives, and she is permitted to his relatives. She says, “You betrothed me,” and he says, “I did not betroth you”; he is permitted to her relatives, and she is forbidden to his relatives.

And the Gemara explains:

And it is necessary

for our Mishna to teach that he does not become forbidden through her statement, after the tanna had already taught that she does not become forbidden through his statement:

Had he taught us

only

with regard to him,

that when he says, “I betrothed you,” she does not become forbidden, I would have said that only he is not believed concerning her

because the man

becomes forbidden only to her relatives and not to other women,

does not care

about becoming forbidden to her relatives for no reason.

And

therefore, at times

he happens to say

“I betrothed you,” even though he did not betroth her.

But she,

a woman who says, “You betrothed me,” thereby renders herself forbidden to the entire world,

I might say

that she certainly speaks the truth, because

if she were not certain of what she was saying, she would not have said it

if it were not clear to her that this was the truth, she would not have said so, since a woman does not render herself forbidden to the entire world for no reason.

And

if so, she should be believed with regard to him as well, and

he should become forbidden

even

he

should also become forbidden

to her relatives.

Therefore,

it teaches us

the tanna that nevertheless he does not become forbidden through her statement. If he denies her, he is not forbidden to her relatives.

We learned in the Mishna: “I betrothed you,” and she says, “You did not betroth me, but my daughter”; he is forbidden to the relatives of the eldest, and the eldest is permitted to his relatives. He is permitted to the relatives of the minor, and the minor is permitted to his relatives:

And we challenge this:

This additional clause

this further case,

why do I need it!?

What new point does it teach that is not written in the first clause? We have already learned that a person is believed to prohibit himself, but is not believed to prohibit others!?

And we answer:

It was necessary

for the tanna to teach this clause in order to teach us that a minor girl who is an orphan without a father is permitted, even though according to her mother’s statement she is forbidden.

For

it might enter your mind to say: The Merciful One granted credibility by Torah law

the Torah granted credibility

to the father

concerning the kiddushin of his daughter, as explained above, on 64a, based on the verse [Deuteronomy 22:16]: “I gave my daughter to this man” -

and

the Sages granted credibility

the Sages granted her credibility

to her

[the mother] concerning the kiddushin of her minor daughter who is an orphan without a father,

and the daughter should become forbidden

the daughter should become forbidden

through her statement

the mother’s statement.

It teaches us

our Mishna that the Sages did not grant her credibility to say concerning her daughter—even when she is a minor orphan—that she is betrothed.

We learned in the Mishna:

“I betrothed your daughter,”

and she says, “You did not betroth my daughter but me”; he is forbidden to the relatives of the minor, and the minor is permitted to his relatives. He is permitted to the relatives of the eldest, and the eldest is forbidden to his relatives:

And we challenge this:

Why do I need this additional clause?

There is no new point in this clause that was not written in the earlier Mishna!? And we answer:

Since

in addition to

teaching this, he also taught that,

that is, since the tanna taught the law of one who says to a woman, “I betrothed you,” and she says, “You betrothed my daughter,” the tanna also taught the opposite case, when he says, “I betrothed the daughter,” and she says, “You betrothed me.”

A woman who says, “You betrothed me,” is believed to render herself forbidden to the entire world, but she is not believed to render his relatives forbidden to him. If the husband gives her a bill of divorce [since she requires one from him], he becomes forbidden to her relatives by rabbinic ordinance.

It was stated

a dispute between Rav and Shmuel concerning one of the circumstances described in our Mishna:

Rav said: We compel

the husband to give her a get as she wishes.

And

if

Shmuel said:

We do not compel him; rather,

we ask

him to give her a get as she wishes.

The Gemara discusses:

With regard to which

[with regard to which clause in our Mishna] was this dispute stated?

If you say

[if it is said]

with regard to the first clause

of the first part, in which he said, “I betrothed you,” and she said, “You did not betroth me,” or with regard to the first clause of the latter part, in which he said, “I betrothed you”—

This cannot be said, because:

There is neither “

we compel”

nor is there “

we ask

him”!

For she requires no get at all, since he is entirely untrusted with regard to her, and it is inapplicable here to say either that “we compel” or that “we ask” him to give a get.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that

with regard to the latter clause

of the first part and the latter clause of the latter part their dispute was stated; that is, where she said, “You betrothed me,” and she is thereby forbidden to everyone else, and they disputed whether we compel him to give her a get, since she became forbidden to marry another on the basis of her statement, or whether we ask him to give her a get without compelling him to do so.

This, too, cannot be said. For

granted

that which Shmuel said,

we ask

the husband to give her a get,

it is fine

[this works]!

Rather,

with regard to what Rav said,

we compel,

the following difficulty arises:

why

should we compel him to give her a get in order to permit her to marry? He could

say

the man:

“I do not want to become forbidden to her relative”

[so that I would become forbidden to the woman’s relative] through giving the get. For we said that once he gives a get, he becomes forbidden to her relatives by rabbinic decree, even though she is not trusted with regard to him!?

Therefore, the Gemara explains that Rav and Shmuel did not disagree.

Rather,

the statements

were stated in relation to one another

[the statements of Rav and Shmuel are not contradictory statements, but two statements that complement one another]. They did not come to disagree with one another; rather, one added what the other had not specified. And this is how it was stated:

Shmuel said: We ask him to give a get

in order to permit her to marry, if he has no desire for her; but we do not compel him to give a get, because by doing so he would become forbidden to her relatives by rabbinic decree.

And concerning this,

Rav said

that although he did not give a get of his own accord, but gave one because they asked him to release her so that she could marry, he is not obligated to give her a ketuba, since according to his statement she was never his wife and he owes her nothing. But

if he gave

her

a get of his own accord

without a request from the court,

we compel him

to give

her

a ketuba.

For by giving the get he revealed to us that he did in fact betroth her, since had he not betrothed her, he would not have divorced her. Therefore, he must give her a ketuba, as with any woman whom her husband divorces.

It was likewise stated

as we explained:

Rav Aḥa bar Adda said in the name of Rav—and some say

[some say that Rav Aḥa bar Adda did not hear this directly from Rav, but]

Rav Aḥa bar Adda said:

Thus

Rav Hamnuna

said that

Rav said:

“We compel and we ask.”

These words as they stand are difficult to reconcile, for surely the following difficulty arises:

“Two things?!”

These two statements contradict one another: if “we compel,” there is no “we ask,” and if “we ask,” there is no “we compel”!? Rather, it must be that

this is what he is saying: We ask him to give a get, and if he gave

a get

of his own accord, we compel him to give

her

a ketuba.

Rav Yehuda said: One who betroths

a woman

in the presence of one witness,

where only one witness was present at the time of the betrothal, and afterward testified that the betrothal took place before him without anyone else with him,

we do not take account of his betrothal;

and the Gemara proceeds to explain the reason.

They asked

[they posed the question]

Rav Yehuda:

If

both of them,

the man and the woman,

admit

the statement of the one witness,

what

is the law?

The two sides of the uncertainty are:

Is the presence of one witness sufficient for the betrothal to take effect? For we find that the testimony of one witness is also considered testimony, since one witness regarding money obligates the opposing party to take an oath; and the requirement of two witnesses for betrothal may be only in order to authenticate and attest to it. Here, since the husband and wife admit the witness’s statement, there is no deficiency of trustworthiness, and the woman is forbidden to everyone else while he is forbidden to her relatives. Or perhaps betrothal cannot take effect in the presence of one witness, but requires two “witnesses of validity” for the betrothal to take effect.

Rav Yehuda did not give a decisive answer, because Rav Yehuda did not hold firmly to his position, neither for prohibition nor for permission. Therefore, at times Rav Yehuda said

“no”

[yes], meaning that if she was betrothed in the presence of one witness and both of them admit the matter, the betrothal is valid,

and

at other times Rav Yehuda said

“not,”

meaning that she is not betrothed, because betrothal cannot take effect without two witnesses of validity.

And

the matter was

“uncertain in his hands,”

for his ruling concerning this matter remained uncertain to him.

It was stated: Rav Naḥman said

[in the name of]

Shmuel: One who betroths in the presence of one witness, we do not take account of his betrothal, even

if

both of them admit.

Rava raised an objection

[challenged]

Rav Naḥman

from our Mishna:

One who says to a woman:

“I betrothed you,”

and she says:

“You did not betroth me,”

he is forbidden to her relatives, and she is permitted to his relatives.

In what circumstances does our Mishna deal with this!?

If there are

two

witnesses

who say, “She was betrothed in our presence,” this cannot be said, because if so,

why is she permitted

to him

relatives!?

She is certainly his full-fledged wife and is unquestionably forbidden to his relatives!

And if there are no witnesses

at all, even at the time of the betrothal—for example, he says, “I betrothed you privately between you and me”—this, too, cannot be said, because if so,

why is he forbidden

to her

relatives?

Surely betrothal without any witnesses at all is not betrothal, and if so, he should not become forbidden to her relatives!

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that our Mishna deals

with one witness

who testified about the betrothal? If the betrothal indeed took place in his presence, it is a valid betrothal, but he is not trusted to testify about it. Therefore, only he, who admits the witness’s statement, is forbidden to her relatives, whereas she, who does not admit his statement, is permitted to the man’s relatives.

This proves that when one betroths in the presence of one witness and both of them admit, their betrothal is valid. This is difficult for Rav Naḥman!?

And we answer: In fact, even if both of them admit, his betrothal is not a valid betrothal, because betrothal cannot take effect without two witnesses of validity.

And

here,

in our Mishna,

with what are we dealing? For example, where he said to her:

“I betrothed you in the presence of

two witnesses,

so-and-so and so-and-so, and

I cannot bring them before the court, because

they went overseas.”

Again,

Rava raised an objection

[challenged] Rav Naḥman from a Mishna in Tractate Gittin 81a:

As we learned:

One who divorces his wife and

afterward—even after some time—

she spent the night

with the divorced woman

at an inn

[she secluded herself with him at an inn].

Beit Shammai say: She does not require

to receive

from him

[from him]

a second get.

And Beit Hillel say: She does require

to receive

from him

[from him]

a second get,

and the Gemara proceeds to explain it.

It might have entered our minds that the Mishna is dealing with a case in which he had intercourse with her for the purpose of betrothal, and they disputed whether she becomes betrothed through this intercourse and requires a second get, or whether she does not become betrothed and therefore does not require a second get. Accordingly, the Gemara proves:

What are the circumstances

in which this Mishna deals?

If there are witnesses,

if there are witnesses testifying that she was betrothed through intercourse, this cannot be said, for if so, the following difficulty arises:

What is the reasoning of Beit Shammai!?

Why do Beit Shammai hold that she is not betrothed, when she was betrothed in the presence of two witnesses?

And if there are no witnesses,

if you say that the Mishna deals with a case in which there were no witnesses at all at the time of the intercourse, this, too, cannot be said, for if so, the following difficulty arises:

What is the reasoning of Beit Hillel!?

Why do Beit Hillel hold that she requires a second get, when it is obvious that betrothal cannot take effect without witnesses!?

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that he had intercourse with her

in the

presence of

one witness,

and they disputed as follows:

Beit Shammai hold that betrothal cannot take effect with fewer than two “witnesses of validity”; therefore, she is not betrothed and does not require a second get from him.

But Beit Hillel hold that when one betroths in the presence of one witness and both of them admit, his betrothal is valid; therefore, she requires a second get from him.

If so, this presents a difficulty for Rav Naḥman, who said that his betrothal is not a valid betrothal. For the halakha follows Beit Hillel, and they hold that his betrothal is valid!?

And we reject this:

But according to your reasoning,

according to your interpretation of their dispute as concerning one witness when both of them admit, is this Mishna resolved!?

But

consider the latter clause: And Beit Hillel concede

to Beit Shammai

with regard to

one who

was divorced after betrothal,

and spent the night with him at an inn,

that she does not require a second get from him, because he is not yet familiar with her

and they are still embarrassed before one another, so there is no concern that he may have had intercourse with her.

And if you should say

as you say, that according to Beit Hillel

one witness is deemed reliable,

and if he had relations with her for the purpose of kiddushin in the presence of one witness, and we know that he had relations with her because both of them admit it, the kiddushin take effect according to Beit Hillel, because one witness suffices to validate the kiddushin, whereas according to Beit Shammai one witness does not suffice—if so,

what difference is there if

she was divorced

from betrothal,

and

what difference is there if

she was divorced

from marriage,

since both of them admit that he had relations with her?!

Rather,

necessarily,

here, with what are we dealing? With a case in which there are witnesses to seclusion, but there are no witnesses to intercourse

—that is, two witnesses saw them seclude themselves, but did not see that he had relations with her; and they disagree over this: