Kiddushin 64b (סד:) — the Talmud in English

But

the beraita

is speaking

of

before the betrothal, when

we have an established presumption that he has brothers, but we do not have an established presumption that he has sons, so that if he were to die, his wife would require yibbum.

And when, at the time of the betrothal, he said, “I have sons,” or, “I have no brothers,” and she therefore does not require yibbum, he is deemed credible according to everyone, because

we say

:

“What would I have to lie about?”

That is, the husband has no reason to lie, and he certainly is telling the truth.

For

what is he saying?

That is, how does his statement help

to exempt her

[to exempt her]

from the yavam,

since even otherwise

he could say

[he could say to her:] “Shortly before my death,

I will exempt you

[I will exempt you] from the yavam

with a bill of divorce.”

In its simple sense, he is trusted to say, “I have sons,” on the basis of the fact that he could give her a bill of divorce. But this cannot be the explanation, since he wants her to remain his wife and does not want to divorce her; nor is it appropriate to trust him on the basis that he could give her a bill of divorce shortly before his death. Therefore, the early authorities explained that he could give her a bill of divorce now, taking effect shortly before his death. Rashi wrote that he could promise her that he would divorce her shortly before his death, and she would be satisfied with that, just as she would be if he had sons or no brothers. See the Ritva and what he cites in Torat Abirim, letter 33, concerning this matter.

Rabbi and Rabbi Natan disagree only when he subsequently said to her, at the time of his death, that she did require yibbum:

Rabbi holds:

“What would I have to lie about?”

at the time of the betrothal

is equivalent to witnesses

[it is as though witnesses had come to testify concerning the matter],

and witnesses

[“What would I have to lie about?”]

completely uproot

the original presumption. Accordingly, she has the presumptive status of one who does not require yibbum, and when he said at the time of his death, “I have no sons,” or, “I have brothers,” he is not deemed credible, for it is not within his power to remove her from her presumptive status of permissibility.

But Rabbi Natan holds:

“What would I have to lie about?”

at the time of the betrothal is not a complete clarification like witnesses; rather, it

is equivalent to a presumption.

Indeed, had he not retracted his statement at the time of his death, we would have said: There is a presumption that “a person does not sin where he has no benefit”; that is, he is not suspected of causing her to violate a prohibition when he derives no benefit from the matter. On the basis of this presumption, together with “What would I have to lie about?”, we would permit her to marry someone unrelated to the yavam.

But if he retracted his statement at the time of his death, there is no longer a presumption that “a person does not sin where he has no benefit.” Opposite the presumption that she requires yibbum, there remains only “What would I have to lie about,” and “What would I have to lie about” is merely like a presumption.”

But

the

presumption

of “What would I have to lie about?”

does not come and

uproot the

presumption that we have an established presumption that he has brothers but not sons

completely.

Therefore, she may not marry a stranger without halitza.

Mishna:

1.

One who betroths his daughter without specifying,

for example, a man who has several daughters, said to the one performing the betrothal, “My daughter is betrothed to you,” but did not specify which of them he was betrothing,

the

daughters who have reached majority

are not included

in his statement, since they are not under their father’s authority for him to betroth them.

2.

One who has two groups of

[groups of]

daughters from two wives,

and he married the second after the death of the first, with the result that all the daughters of the first wife are older than all the daughters of the second wife. [Thus, all the daughters of the first wife are called “older,” and all the daughters of the second wife are called “younger.”]

And he said:

“I betrothed my older daughter,”

that is, I said to the one performing the betrothal, “My older daughter is betrothed to you.”

“And I do not know whether

the daughter who is

the older of the

“older”

[the oldest daughter of the first wife] I betrothed,

or

the daughter who is

the older of

the “younger” daughters

,”

[of the second wife],

or

the

youngest of

the “older” daughters,

“older,”

since she too is called “older,” because

she is older than

the

older

of

the “younger”

daughters.

It should read: “the daughter the eldest — Rishon leTzion. And so it is in the Gemara above (Nah b), and it is compelled from what they say below (64a) here — what are we discussing where there is only "the large" and "the small." who is the oldest”—Rashash. This is also the wording of the Gemara above, 51b, and it is compelled by what is stated below, 65a: “Here we are dealing with a case in which there is only an older daughter and a younger daughter.”

All of them

are prohibited

as a matter of doubt,

except for

the

youngest of

the “younger”

daughters, since with regard to each one of the others there is a possibility that he called her “older,” as ultimately each one is older than another daughter.

because concerning each one of them there is uncertainty whether he called her “older,” since ultimately each one is older than another daughter.

And these are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei says: All of them are permitted except

the

oldest of

the

older daughters, since a person does not wish to speak in a manner that will create uncertainty as to what he intended. Therefore, it is clear to us that the term “older” refers only to the oldest of the older daughters.

But Rabbi Meir holds that a person may place himself in a state of uncertainty. Therefore, all his daughters, except for the youngest of the younger daughters, are included in the doubt as to what he intended.

But Rabbi Meir holds that a person may place himself in a situation of uncertainty. Therefore, all his daughters, except for the youngest among the youngest daughters, are included in the uncertainty concerning his intention.

c. One who has two groups of daughters from two wives and said:

“I betrothed my younger daughter, and I do not know

whether

the daughter who is

the youngest of

the “younger”

daughters

I betrothed,

or

the daughter who is

the youngest of

the “older” daughters,

or

the daughter who is

the oldest of

the “younger”

daughters,

since she too is called “younger,” because

she is younger than

the

younger

of

the “older”

daughters.”

It should read: “the daughter the youngest — Rishon leTzion; see above note 9. who is the youngest”—Rashash. See also above, note 9.

All of them

are prohibited, except for

the daughter who is

the oldest of

the “older”

daughters.

And these are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei

disagrees and

says: All of them are permitted except

the youngest of the younger daughters, since he certainly did not intend to place himself in a state of uncertainty, and “my younger daughter” can refer only to the youngest of the younger daughters.

because he certainly did not intend to place himself in a situation of uncertainty, and “my youngest daughter” can refer only to the youngest among the youngest daughters.

Gemara:

Abaye and Rava disagreed [above, 51a] as to whether “betrothals that are not fit for consummation” are valid betrothals—for example, when one betroths “one of two sisters,” are the betrothals valid, or are they invalid, since these betrothals caused his wife to become prohibited to him through intercourse, as there is uncertainty as to which one he betrothed and which one is the “sister of his wife,” with the result that these betrothals were not fit [not suitable] for consummation.

We learned in the Mishna: “One who betroths his daughter without specification: the daughters who have reached majority are not included.” This implies

that

his

minor daughters are included,

even though he has two minor daughters.

The Gemara asks: If so,

you may conclude:

“Betrothals that are not fit for consummation are valid betrothals”!

For when he has two minor daughters and betroths his daughter without specification, there is uncertainty as to which of them he betrothed, and it follows that these betrothals are “not fit for consummation,” since each one is possibly the “sister of his wife.”

And if so, this is difficult for Rava, who holds that “betrothals that are not fit for consummation are not valid betrothals”!

And we answer:

With what are we dealing here? With a case in which there is

[for that man]

only

one

older

daughter

and

one

younger

daughter. When he betrothed his daughter without specification, and the adult daughter is not included, the betrothal of the minor daughter is certainly valid and is fit for consummation.

The Gemara objects:

But “

daughters who have reached majority”

is taught, in the plural. If so, he has at least two adult daughters, and just as “daughters who have reached majority” is plural, so too “minor daughters” means two; and if both are included in his statement, their betrothals are not fit for consummation!

is taught in the plural. If so, he must have at least two daughters who have reached majority. Correspondingly, “minor daughters” would also mean two, and if both are included in his statement, their betrothals are not suitable for consummation!

And we explain: In fact, this is a case in which there is only one adult daughter and one minor daughter. And

what does “

daughters who have reached majority” mean, although it is in the plural?

mean in the plural? It means

Adult daughters in general—that is, whenever any man betroths his daughters without specification, adult daughters are not included.

that is, whenever any man betroths his daughters without specifying which one, daughters who have reached majority are not included.

The Gemara objects: If so,

it is obvious

that adult daughters are not included in the betrothal, for

adult daughters,

who are not under their father’s authority for him to betroth them,

what business do they have

with fathers betrothing them!?

Granted, if he has two adult daughters, then the Mishna teaches us this: It is adult daughters who are not included in his statement, but minor daughters are included, even if there are two of them; and you may conclude from this that “betrothals that are not fit for consummation are valid betrothals.”

But if he has only one minor daughter, then it is obvious, since there is no novelty here—neither in the fact that the minor daughter is betrothed nor in the fact that the adult daughter is not betrothed, since her betrothal is not under his control!

And we explain:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where she appointed him the adult daughter appointed her father to be

the adult daughter appointed her father

an agent to receive kiddushin on her behalf.

to accept betrothal on her behalf. For

lest you say

perhaps one might say:

For

lest you say that when the father

receives the

the father

kiddushin,

s

he receives it with her intention that is, his intention was to receive kiddushin on her behalf.

his intention was to accept the betrothal on her behalf.

This teaches us: his intention was not to receive kiddushin on her behalf, because

his intention was not to accept betrothal on her behalf, because

a person does not abandon something from which he derives benefit and do something from which he derives no benefit. That is, it is presumed that he would not leave aside the kiddushin of his minor daughter, from whose kiddushin he benefits, since the money of the kiddushin belongs to him, and betroth the adult daughter, from whose kiddushin he derives no benefit.

That is, there is a presumption that he would not abandon the betrothal of his minor daughter, from whose betrothal he benefits, since the betrothal money belongs to him, and instead betroth the adult daughter, from whose betrothal he does not benefit.

And we challenge this: If it is a case where she appointed him as an agent,

are we not dealing also with a situation

with a case

where she said to him the adult daughter: “Receive kiddushin on my behalf, and the money of my

the adult daughter said to him: “Accept betrothal on my behalf, and the money of

kiddushin shall be

my betrothal money will be

yours”? If so, from where do we know that he did not intend to receive kiddushin for his adult daughter!?

and if so, from where do we know that he did not intend to accept betrothal on behalf of his adult daughter!?

And we explain: Actually, it is a case where she appointed him as an agent, and even if she said to him, “The money of my kiddushin shall be yours,” nevertheless the adult daughter is not included in the uncertainty, because

even so, a person does not abandon the kiddushin of his minor daughter, which is

a person does not abandon the betrothal of his minor daughter, which is

a mitzva incumbent upon him, as it is stated [Jeremiah 29:6]: “And give your daughters to men.”

that is incumbent upon him

that is incumbent upon him, as it is stated [Jeremiah 29:6]: “And give your daughters to husbands.”

And perform a mitzva by arranging the kiddushin of his adult daughter,

of betrothing his adult daughter,

which is not incumbent upon him since she has the understanding to marry herself off.

which is not incumbent upon him, since she has the understanding to arrange her own marriage.

Accordingly, one who betroths his daughter “without specification” does not include the adult daughter, even if she appointed him as an agent and also said to him: “The money of my kiddushin shall be yours.”

We learned in the Mishna:

“One who has two sets of daughters” from two wives, and said, “I betrothed my older daughter,” and so on: all of them are forbidden, except for the youngest of the younger set; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: all of them are permitted, except for the oldest of the older set. If he said, “I betrothed my younger daughter,” and so on: all of them are forbidden, except for the youngest of the younger set; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: all of them are permitted, except for the youngest of the younger set.

from two wives, and said, “I betrothed my older daughter,” and so forth: All of them are forbidden, except the youngest of the younger set; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: All of them are permitted, except the oldest of the older set. If he said, “I betrothed my younger daughter,” and so forth: All of them are forbidden, except the youngest of the younger set; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: All of them are permitted, except the youngest of the younger set.

And it is necessary to teach us the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei both with regard to the older daughter and with regard to the younger daughter.

to teach us the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei both regarding the older daughter and regarding the younger daughter.

For had it taught us only the first case where he says, “I betrothed my older daughter,”

if the tanna had taught us only the first dispute, in which he said, “I betrothed my older daughter,”

we might have thought:

In this case Rabbi Meir says: all of them are in doubt, since his intention can also be interpreted as referring to the younger of the older set and the older of the younger set, because

that all of them are subject to uncertainty, because his intention could also be understood as referring to the younger of the older set and the older of the younger set, since

since there is a younger one than her and

one younger than her,

with regard to this one the older of the younger set and the younger of the older set—he

the older of the younger set and the younger of the older set,

calls her “older” since it is a compliment for a person to call his daughter “older” if there is a younger one than her.

he calls her

because it is praise for a person to call his daughter “older” if there is another daughter younger than her.

But with regard to this the latter case, where he says, “I betrothed my younger daughter,”

the latter case, in which he said, “I betrothed my younger daughter,”

let us say that

perhaps

Rabbi Meir concedes to Rabbi Yosei

Rabbi Meir

that whenever he can call his daughter “older,” he does not call her “younger”; and if he says

whenever he can call his daughter “older,” he does not call her “younger”; and if he said

“younger,”

he calls only the youngest of them all “younger,” and not the others.

he calls the one who is the youngest of all “younger,” and not the others.

And if their dispute had been stated

between them

with regard to this the latter case, we might have thought:

in the latter case, we might have said:

In this case specifically

specifically

Rabbi Yosei says: he calls “younger” only the youngest of the younger set, because he calls the others “older”;

that he calls “younger” only the youngest of the younger set, because he calls the others “older,”

but with regard to this the first case,

the first case,

let us say that Rabbi Yosei concedes to Rabbi Meir

Rabbi Yosei

that he calls all of them “older,” since this is a compliment for him.

that he calls all of them “older,” because doing so is a form of praise for him.

Therefore,

it is necessary to state their dispute both with regard to “older” and with regard to “younger.”

And we ask:

Does this mean that the Mishna teaches:

that from the words of the Mishna we may infer:

Rabbi Meir holds that a person exposes himself to uncertainty and therefore it is possible that he calls several daughters “older” without being concerned that all of them will be in doubt with regard to the kiddushin?

a person is willing to place himself in a state of uncertainty; therefore, it is possible that he calls several daughters “older” and is not concerned that all of them will be subject to uncertainty regarding the betrothal.

And Rabbi Yosei holds that a person does not expose himself

himself

to uncertainty; therefore, he calls “older” only the oldest of all, and not the others.

and therefore he calls “older” only the oldest of them all, and not the others.

But

the opposite is inferred from them, with regard to vows: Rabbi Meir holds that a person does not expose himself to uncertainty, while Rabbi Yosei holds that he does. This conflicts with the Mishna here!?

we find them saying the opposite

with regard to vows: Rabbi Meir holds that a person does not bring himself into uncertainty, while Rabbi Yosei holds that he does; and the Mishna here conflicts with the Mishna of Tractate Nedarim!?

As we learned: One who vows and designates a time for his vow:

and sets a time for his vow:

“Until Passover,” he is

he is

forbidden until it arrives Passover, and as soon as Passover arrives his vow ends and he returns to being permitted. But if he said:

Passover, and as soon as Passover arrives, his vow ends and he returns to being permitted. But if he said:

“Until Passover exists,” since he added the word “exists” to his formulation, he is

since he added the word “exists” to his wording, he is

forbidden until it departs Passover.

And if he said:

“Until the face of Passover,”

Rabbi Meir says: he is not

he is not

forbidden except

except

until it arrives Passover.

Passover.

And

Rabbi Yosei disagrees and

disagrees and

says: He is forbidden

He is forbidden

until Passover departs Passover.

Passover.

The initial assumption was that “until the face of Passover” means until before Passover, and this is the basis of their dispute: Rabbi Meir holds that a person does not expose himself to uncertainty; therefore, “until before Passover” is interpreted as before the beginning of the Festival.

Rabbi Yosei holds that a person does expose himself to uncertainty. Since his expression “the face of Passover” can be interpreted as meaning before the last day of Passover, or even until before the final moment at the end of Passover, he is therefore forbidden due to the uncertainty until Passover departs—that is, until its end.

If so, there is a difficulty: With regard to kiddushin, Rabbi Meir holds that a person exposes himself to uncertainty, whereas with regard to vows he holds the opposite. And likewise Rabbi Yosei: with regard to kiddushin he holds that a person does not expose himself to uncertainty, whereas with regard to vows he holds the opposite!?

And we explain:

Rabbi Hanina bar Avdimi said in the name of

in the name of

Rav: The positions of the sages

have been

are reversed with regard to vows, and one must say: Rabbi Meir says, “Until it departs,” and Rabbi Yosei says, “Until it arrives.”

in the Mishna of Tractate Nedarim, and it must be stated there: Rabbi Meir says, “Until it ends,” and Rabbi Yosei says, “Until it arrives.”

And it was taught in a beraita in accordance with our statement:

in a beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna, in accordance with our explanation:

“This is the general principle: Anything whose

whose

time is fixed that is, the number of days comprising its duration is fixed,

meaning, the number of days in its duration is fixed,

and one says a vow with the wording

a vow using the expression

“until the face of,”

Rabbi Meir says: He is forbidden

He is forbidden

until it departs, because a person exposes himself to uncertainty, while

because a person brings himself into uncertainty, while

Rabbi Yosei says: He is forbidden only

he is forbidden only

until it arrives.

But with regard to something “whose time is not fixed,” such as a vow “until the face of the harvest,” or even “until the harvest exists,” he is forbidden only until it arrives. Since the duration of its time is not fixed—for one person finishes harvesting quickly, while another delays—he intended only its beginning; that is, from the time people begin to harvest.

Abaye said: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei

between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei

concerns a person who has

a man who has

two sets of daughters, where Rabbi Meir says that all of them are included in the uncertainty except for the youngest of the younger set, while Rabbi Yosei holds that only the oldest of the older set is forbidden.

as Rabbi Meir says: All of them are included in the uncertainty except the youngest of the younger set, while Rabbi Yosei holds that only the oldest of the older set is forbidden.

But with a person who has only

in the case of a man who has only

one set of daughters, all born to one woman,

of daughters, all born to one woman, according to

everyone agrees: if he says

if he said

“older,” his intention is the

his intention is: the

actual older daughter—that is, the oldest of them all.

older one, meaning the oldest of them all.

And if he says

“younger,” his intention is the

his intention is: the

actual younger daughter—that is, the youngest of them all.

younger one, meaning the youngest of them all.

And the

middle daughter is not included in the uncertainty, since if he wishes to betroth her, he calls her neither “older” nor “younger,” but

is not included in the uncertainty, because if he wishes to betroth her, he calls her neither “older” nor “younger,” but

calls her by her name. For one calls “older” only someone who is older than an entire group of daughters, and the same applies with regard to “younger.”

For one calls “older” only a daughter who is older than an entire group of daughters, and the same applies with regard to “younger.”

Rabbi asked

asked

Rav Adda bar Mattana to Abaye: If that is so, according to your words:

according to your words: