Kiddushin 64b — the Talmud in English

But

the baraitha—a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna—

is discussing a case such as

where

before the betrothal

it was established to us that he had brothers, but it was not established to us that he had sons, and

therefore, if he were to die, his wife would be required to undergo levirate marriage.

When, at the time of the betrothal, he said, “I have sons,” or, “I have no brothers,” and she consequently is not required to undergo levirate marriage, everyone agrees that he is trusted, because

we say:

“What would I gain by lying?”

That is, the husband has no reason to lie, and he is certainly telling the truth.

The Gemara asks:

What is he saying?

That is, why does his statement help

to release her

from the obligation

of levirate marriage?

After all, even without this claim, he

could say

to her shortly before his death:

“I will release you”

from the obligation of levirate marriage

with a bill of divorce.

Rabbi and Rabbi Natan disagree only when he later said to her, at the time of his death, that she was required to undergo levirate marriage:

Rabbi holds:

“What would I gain by lying?”

His statement at the time of the betrothal

is like the testimony of witnesses

as though witnesses had come and testified about the matter.

And witnesses—that is, the claim “What would I gain by lying”—

come and

completely uproot the original presumption

that she was required to undergo levirate marriage. Accordingly, she has the presumption that she is not required to undergo levirate marriage. When he said at the time of his death, “I have no sons,” or, “I have brothers,” he is not trusted, because he does not have the power to remove her from her presumption of being permitted.

And Rabbi Natan holds:

“What would I gain by lying?”

The statement made at the time of the betrothal is not fully clarifying, like the testimony of witnesses. Rather,

it is like a presumption.

Indeed, if he had not retracted his statement at the time of his death, we would have said: There is a presumption that “a person does not sin for someone who will gain nothing from his sin”; that is, he is not suspected of causing her to violate a prohibition when he has no benefit from doing so. On the basis of this presumption, together with the claim “What would I gain by lying?”, we would permit her to marry outside the levirate bond.

But if he retracted his statement at the time of his death, there is no longer the presumption that “a person does not sin for someone who will gain nothing from his sin.” Opposite the presumption that she is required to undergo levirate marriage, there remains only the claim “What would I gain by lying,” and that claim is merely like a presumption.

And

the

presumption

of “What would I gain by lying”

does not come and uproot

the presumption

that it was established to us that he had brothers but not sons

completely.

Therefore, she may not marry a stranger without first undergoing the ritual of release from the levirate bond.

Mishna:

1.

If a man betroths his daughter without specifying which daughter,

for example, a man who has several daughters says to the man performing the betrothal, “My daughter is betrothed to you,” without specifying which of them he is betrothing,

the

daughters

who have reached majority are not included

in his statement, since they are not under their father’s authority for him to betroth them.

2.

One who has two groups

of daughters

from two wives,

and he married the second wife after the death of the first, so that all the daughters of the first wife are older than all the daughters of the second wife. [Thus, all the daughters of the first wife are called “older,” and all the daughters of the second wife are called “younger.”]

And he said:

“I betrothed my older daughter,”

meaning: I said to the man performing the betrothal, “My older daughter is betrothed to you.”

“But I do not know whether

the daughter

who is the oldest among the

“older”

daughters [the oldest daughter of the first wife] is the one I betrothed,

or

the daughter

who is the oldest among

the

“younger”

daughters [of the second wife],

or

the

youngest among

the

“older” daughters,

who is also called “older,”

because she is older than

the

older

among

the

“younger” daughters.”

It follows that

all of them are prohibited

because of the uncertainty,

except for

the daughter

who is the youngest among

the

“younger” daughters,

because concerning each one of them there is uncertainty whether he called her “older,” since ultimately each one is older than another daughter.

These are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei says: All of them are permitted except for

the daughter

who is the oldest among

the

“older” daughters,

because a person does not want to speak in a way that would create uncertainty about what he intended. Therefore, it is clear to us that the term “older” refers only to the oldest among the older daughters.

But Rabbi Meir holds that a person may place himself in a situation of uncertainty. Therefore, all his daughters, except for the youngest among the youngest daughters, are included in the uncertainty concerning his intention.

C. One who has two groups of daughters from two wives, and said:

“I betrothed my youngest daughter, but I do not know

whether

the daughter

who is the youngest among

the

“younger” daughters

is the one I betrothed,

or

the daughter

who is the youngest among

the

“older,” or

the daughter

who is the oldest among

the

“younger” daughters,

who is also called “youngest,”

because she is younger than

the

younger

among

the

“older” daughters.”

It follows that

all of them are prohibited, except for

the daughter

who is the oldest among

the

“older” daughters.

These are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei

disagrees and

says: All of them are permitted except

for the youngest among the youngest,

because he certainly did not intend to place himself in a situation of uncertainty, and “my youngest daughter” can refer only to the youngest among the youngest daughters.

Gemara:

Abaye and Rava disagreed [above, 51a] about whether “betrothals that are not suitable for consummation” are valid betrothals. For example, if one betroths “one of two sisters,” are the betrothals valid, or are they not valid, since these betrothals have caused his wife to become prohibited to him through sexual relations? According to Tosafot and the early authorities, 51a, there is uncertainty as to which one he betrothed and which one is “his wife’s sister,” so these betrothals are not suitable for consummation.

We learned in the Mishna: If one betroths his daughter without specifying which daughter, the daughters who have reached majority are not included. This implies:

yes,

his

minor daughters are included,

even if he has two minor daughters.

The Gemara asks: If so,

you can infer:

“Betrothals that are not suitable for consummation are valid betrothals”!?

When he has two minor daughters and betroths his daughter without specifying which one, there is uncertainty as to which one he betrothed. Consequently, these betrothals are “not suitable for consummation,” because each one is possibly “his wife’s sister.”

If so, this is difficult for Rava, who holds that “betrothals that are not suitable for consummation are not valid betrothals”!

And we answer:

What are we dealing with here? A case in which there is

only one daughter

but

one

older

daughter

and

one

younger

daughter. When he betroths his daughter without specifying which one, and the daughter who has reached majority is not included, it follows that the betrothal of the minor daughter is certainly valid and suitable for consummation.

The Gemara asks:

But

“those who have reached majority”

is taught in the plural. If so, he must have at least two daughters who have reached majority. Correspondingly, “minor daughters” would also mean two, and if both are included in his statement, their betrothals are not suitable for consummation!

во множественном числе; если так, у него есть по меньшей мере две совершеннолетние, и подобно тому как «совершеннолетние» — это две, так и «малолетние» — две; а если обе входят в его слова, получается, что их обручения не предназначены для близости!?

We explain: In fact, this is a case in which there is only one daughter who has reached majority and one minor daughter. And

what does

“those who have reached majority”

mean in the plural? It means

daughters who have reached majority in general;

that is, whenever any man betroths his daughters without specifying which one, daughters who have reached majority are not included.

The Gemara asks: If so,

it is obvious

that daughters who have reached majority are not included in the betrothal, since

daughters who have reached majority,

who are not under their father’s authority for him to betroth them,

what business do they have in the matter of fathers betrothing their daughters who have reached majority?

Granted, if he has two daughters who have reached majority, the Mishna teaches us something: It is daughters who have reached majority that are not included in his statement, but minor daughters are included, even when there are two of them. And you can infer from this: “Betrothals that are not suitable for consummation are valid betrothals.”

But if he has only one minor daughter, it is obvious, since there is no novel point here—neither that the minor daughter is betrothed nor that the daughter who has reached majority is not betrothed, since her betrothal is not under his control!

And we explain:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case in which she appointed him

the adult daughter appointed her father to be

an agent

of hers to receive kiddushin for her. For

you might say

[perhaps you will say]:

when

[when]

the father receives

the

kiddushin

,

he receives with her intention

[his intention was to receive kiddushin for her].

This teaches us

, he did not intend to receive kiddushin for her, for

a person does not abandon something from which he has benefit and do something from which he has no benefit.

That is, it is presumed of him that he would not set aside the kiddushin of his minor daughter, from whose kiddushin he has benefit, since the money of the kiddushin belongs to him, and betroth the adult daughter, from whose kiddushin he has no benefit.

And we raise an objection: If she appointed him as an agent,

are we not dealing

[is it not the case] also in a situation

that she said to him

the adult daughter: “Receive kiddushin for me, and the money of my

kiddushin

shall be

yours,”

and if so, from where do we know that he did not intend to receive kiddushin for his adult daughter?

And we explain: It is always a case in which she appointed him as an agent, and even if she said to him, “My kiddushin is yours,” nevertheless the adult daughter is not included in the doubt, because

even so, a person does not abandon

[a person does not abandon] the kiddushin of his minor daughter, which is

a mitzva

that is imposed upon him

[that is incumbent upon him], as it is stated [Jeremiah 29:6]: “And give your daughters to men.”

And perform a mitzva

of the kiddushin of his adult daughter

that is not imposed upon him

[that is not incumbent upon him], since she has the understanding to marry herself.

Therefore, one who betroths his daughter “without specification”—the adult daughter is not included, even if she appointed him as an agent and also said to him: “The money of my kiddushin shall be yours.”

We learned in the Mishna:

One who has two groups of daughters

from two wives, and said, “I betrothed my older daughter,” and so on: all of them are forbidden, except for the youngest of the youngest group; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: All of them are permitted, except for the oldest of the oldest group. “I betrothed my younger daughter,” and so on: all of them are forbidden, except for the youngest of the youngest group; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: All of them are permitted, except for the youngest of the youngest group.

And it is necessary

to inform us of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose both regarding the older daughter and regarding the younger daughter.

For if it had taught us the first one

[if the tanna had taught us only the first dispute], when he says, “I betrothed my older daughter,”

we might have thought:

In this case Rabbi Meir says

that all of them are in doubt, for his intention may also be interpreted as referring to the younger of the older group and the older of the younger group, since

since there is a younger one than her

[younger than her],

to this one

[the older of the younger group and the younger of the older group]

“older”

he calls her,

for it is praise for a person to call his daughter “older” if there is a younger one than her.

But regarding this

the latter clause, in which he said, “I betrothed my younger daughter,”

say

[perhaps we will say]:

Rabbi Meir agrees

with Rabbi Yose

that

whenever he is able to call his daughter “older,” he does not call her “younger,” and if he said

“younger,”

he calls the youngest of them all

[he calls the one who is the youngest of all] “younger,” and not the others.

And if it was stated

their dispute

regarding this

[regarding the latter clause], we might have thought:

in this case

specifically

Rabbi Yose says

that he calls “younger” only the youngest of the younger group, for the others he calls “older,”

but regarding this one

the first clause,

perhaps Rabbi Yose agrees

with

Rabbi Meir

that he calls all of them “older,” because this is a form of praise for him.

Therefore,

it is necessary

to state their dispute both regarding “older” and regarding “younger.” And we ask:

does this imply

[can it be learned from the words of the Mishna]:

that Rabbi Meir holds: a person brings himself into uncertainty

[a person puts himself into doubts], and therefore it is possible that he calls several daughters “older,” and he is not concerned that all of them will be in doubt concerning the kiddushin.

And Rabbi Yose holds: a person does not bring

himself

into uncertainty,

and therefore he calls “older” only the oldest of them all, and not the others.

But

this

we learn in the opposite manner from them,

regarding vows: Rabbi Meir holds that a person does not bring himself into uncertainty, while Rabbi Yose holds that he does, and the Mishna of vows conflicts with our Mishna!?

For we learned: One who vows

and establishes a time for his vow:

“Until Passover,”

he is

forbidden until it arrives

Passover, and immediately when Passover arrives his vow ends and he returns to being permitted. And if he said:

“Until Passover shall be,”

since he added the word “shall be,” he is

forbidden until it departs

Passover. And if he said:

“Until the face of Passover,”

Rabbi Meir says:

he is not

forbidden

except

until it arrives

Passover.

And

Rabbi Yose

disagrees and

says:

he is forbidden

until it departs

Passover.

It might have entered our minds that “until the face of Passover” means until before Passover, and they disagree in this: Rabbi Meir holds that a person does not bring himself into uncertainty; therefore “until before Passover” is interpreted as before the beginning of the festival.

And Rabbi Yose holds that a person brings himself into uncertainty, and since it is possible to interpret his expression “the face of Passover” as meaning before the final day of Passover, or even until before the final moment at the end of Passover, therefore, because of the uncertainty, he is forbidden until Passover departs, that is, until its end.

And if so, this is difficult: In Kiddushin, Rabbi Meir holds that a person brings himself into uncertainty, whereas in vows he holds the opposite. And likewise Rabbi Yose: in Kiddushin he holds that a person does not bring himself into uncertainty, whereas in vows he holds the opposite!?

And we explain:

Rabbi Hanina bar Avdimi said in the name of

[in the name of]

Rav: The position

has been

reversed

in the matter of vows, and it is necessary to say: Rabbi Meir says: “Until it departs,” and Rabbi Yose says: “Until it arrives.”

And it was taught

in a beraita in accordance with our words:

This is the general rule: Every

matter

whose time is fixed,

that is, the number of days of the duration of its time is fixed,

and he said

a vow in the expression

“until the face of,”

Rabbi Meir says:

he is forbidden

until it departs,

for a person brings himself into uncertainty, and

Rabbi Yose says:

he is forbidden only

until it arrives.

But a matter “whose time is not fixed,” such as a vow “until the face of the harvest,” or even “until the harvest shall be,” is forbidden only until it arrives, since the duration of its time is not fixed: one hastens to finish his harvest, and another delays. This person intended only its beginning, that is, from when people begin to harvest.

Abaye said: The dispute

between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose

is regarding

a person who has

two groups of daughters,

for Rabbi Meir says: all of them are included in the doubt except for the youngest of the youngest group, while Rabbi Yose holds: only the oldest of the oldest group is forbidden.

But regarding

a person who has only

one group

of daughters, all of whom were born to one woman, according to

everyone,

if he said

“older,”

his intention is: older

in the actual sense,

that is, the oldest of them all.

And if he said

“younger,”

his intention is: younger

in the actual sense,

that is, the youngest of them all.

And the

middle daughter

is not included in the doubt, for if he wishes to betroth her, he does not call her “older” or “younger,” but

he calls her by her name.

For one calls “older” only one who is older than a complete group of daughters, and likewise with regard to “younger.”

He said

[he asked]

Rav Adda bar Matna to Abaye: If that is so,

according to your words: