Kiddushin 64a — the Talmud in English

Trustworthy with regard to

the matter of

vows, that is, the vow of the son and the vow of the daughter are a vow.

, that is, the vow of the son and the vow of the daughter are valid.

And for consecrated property,

for if they said concerning their property, “They are herem,” it belongs to the Temple treasury.

And for consecrations,

for they can consecrate an offering.

And for valuations,

for if they said, “The valuation of so-and-so is upon me,” they are obligated to the Temple treasury for what they undertook.

But he is not

the father

trustworthy with regard to

the matter of

lashes and with regard to

the matter of

punishments.

Mishna:

a. The father is permitted to betroth his “minor” daughter to a man, and likewise his “maiden” daughter. But his adult daughter is in her own authority, and her father cannot betroth her.

b. In the Mishna and in the discussion of the Gemara, “minor” means either a minor or a maiden, and “adult” means an adult woman.

A father who says, “

I betrothed my daughter

the minor, and she is a married woman.”

And likewise, a father who says concerning his daughter, “

I betrothed her

to a man

and divorced her [

I received her bill of divorce from her husband, and she is divorced and forbidden to a priest]

when she was a minor,”

and she is

still

a minor

at the time when he testified about his daughter: he is

trustworthy

to forbid his daughter to the entire world as a married woman, as he said, “I betrothed her,” and he is likewise trustworthy to disqualify her from the priesthood, as he said, “I betrothed her and divorced her.”

But if he said, “

I betrothed her and divorced her when she

was

a minor,”

and

now

she is an adult [

an adult woman]:

He is not trustworthy,

and his daughter is permitted to the priesthood, and the reason will be explained in the Gemara.

a. A gentile who has intercourse with a daughter of Israel disqualifies her, and she is forbidden to a priest; and if she is the daughter of a priest, it is forbidden for her to eat teruma. Likewise, the other disqualified men, such as a mamzer, an Egyptian, or an Edomite, who had intercourse with her, disqualify her.

b. When gentiles capture a daughter of Israel, we are concerned that perhaps they had intercourse with her and disqualified her. Therefore, a captive woman is forbidden to a priest because of doubt.

And likewise, one who says, “My daughter

was captured [

she was held captive by gentiles]

and I redeemed her ]

from them”:

Whether

he said this when

she was a minor, or whether

he said this when

she was an adult [

an adult woman], he

is not trustworthy

to disqualify her from the priesthood, and the reason for all the laws of the Mishna will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

The opening clause of the Mishna teaches that a person is trustworthy to testify concerning his daughter that she was betrothed and divorced if she is still a minor; and the final clause teaches that a person is not trustworthy to testify concerning the betrothal of his daughter when his daughter has already grown up, and likewise he is not trustworthy to testify that she was captured and thereby disqualified from the priesthood.

The Gemara asks:

What is different in the opening clause,

that he is trustworthy,

and what is different in the final clause,

that he is not trustworthy!?

And we explain:

The opening clause—

that he testifies about her betrothal when she is a minor—

is in his possession [

in his power], for he can betroth her to whomever he wishes; therefore he is trustworthy to say, “I betrothed her and divorced her.”

But

the final clause,

with regard to betrothal,

is not in his possession,

for if she is already an adult woman, it is not in his power to betroth her now; therefore he is not trustworthy to say, “I betrothed her and divorced her,” if she has already grown up.

And likewise, if he testified, “She was captured and I redeemed her,” he is not trustworthy, because it is not in his power to hand her over to a gentile who would have intercourse with her and disqualify her, whether she is an adult or whether she is a minor.

A priest who has intercourse with a woman forbidden to him because of the sanctity of his priesthood, such as a divorced woman with an ordinary priest or a widow with a high priest, has a son who is a “disqualified priest,” that is, disqualified from the priesthood and unable to serve in the Temple, and a daughter who is a “disqualified priestess” and forbidden to a priest.

And we raise an objection:

And

if

it is not

in his power to disqualify her from the priesthood while she is a minor, why should he not be trustworthy to say, “She was captured and I redeemed her”!?

But is it not in his power to marry her to a “

disqualified priest,”

for

his intercourse

does

disqualify

her

from

the

priesthood

and she becomes forbidden to eat teruma? If so, he should be trustworthy to say, “She was captured and I redeemed her,” by virtue of the possibility that if he had wished to lie, he could have married her to a disqualified priest and disqualified her, just as she is disqualified when he says that she was captured among the gentiles!?

And we answer:

That is not difficult,

for our Mishna can be explained

according to Rabbi Dostai ben Judah,

who holds: intercourse with a disqualified priest does not disqualify a woman from the priesthood.

For

Rabbi Dostai ben Judah said: When a disqualified priest has intercourse with a daughter of Israel, his daughter is fit for the priesthood and is not a “disqualified priestess,” because

the daughters of Israel

are like

a purifying immersion pool for disqualified priests:

if a disqualified priest marries a daughter of Israel, his offspring is purified from his disqualification, and the daughter of a disqualified priest is disqualified from the priesthood only if both her father and her mother are disqualified priests.

And since the daughter of a disqualified priest is fit for the priesthood when her mother is a daughter of Israel and not a “disqualified priestess,” likewise a woman who has intercourse with a disqualified priest is fit for the priesthood, for Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said Anyone whom a priest is permitted to marry as his daughter, the priest is also permitted to marry as a woman who had intercourse with him.

Therefore we learned: A person is not trustworthy to say, “My daughter was captured and I redeemed her,” because it is not in his power to disqualify her from the priesthood or from teruma.

And we object:

And

still,

is it not in his power to marry her to a mamzer,

and a mamzer disqualifies her through his intercourse from the priesthood and from teruma!?

And we answer: That is not difficult, for our Mishna can be explained

according to Rabbi Akiva, who said

Betrothal does not take effect with “

those liable for prohibitions”;

therefore, it is not “in his power” to receive betrothal on her behalf from a mamzer.

And we object: Still, if she is a widow,

is it not in his power to marry

her

to

a

widow to a high priest!?

And according to

the words of

Rabbi Simai,

who holds: Even according to Rabbi Akiva, who says that betrothal does not take effect with “those liable for prohibitions,” and consequently the child is a mamzer, if a widow marries a high priest, since this is only a “prohibition of priesthood,” the child is not a mamzer, and consequently betrothal does take effect with her.

For it was taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Simai says: Of all

[“those liable for prohibitions”] was

Rabbi Akiva making

the child

a mamzer, except for a widow

who married

a high priest,

for their child is not a mamzer but a disqualified priest.

For the Torah said [

Leviticus 21:14–15]: “A widow, a divorced woman, a disqualified priestess, or a prostitute—these

he shall not take,

for he shall take a virgin from his people as a wife.

And he shall not disqualify

his offspring among his people.”

It follows that

disqualifications [

disqualified priests] he

makes

his offspring, for they become disqualified from the priesthood,

but he does not

make

them

into

mamzerim.

And since a child born from “prohibitions of priesthood” is not a mamzer, betrothal takes effect with them, and the father can hand over his widowed daughter to a high priest and disqualify her from the priesthood.

If so, when his daughter is a widow or a divorcee, the father should be trustworthy to say, “She was captured and I redeemed her,” since it is in his power to disqualify her from priests and from teruma by marrying her to a high priest. Why, then, did we learn that the father is not trustworthy!?

And we answer: That is not difficult, for our Mishna must be established

according to Rabbi Yishbav,

who holds: When a high priest has intercourse with a widow, the child is a mamzer, and betrothal does not take effect with her.

For

Rabbi Yishbav

said: Come, let us cry out against

Rabbi

Akiva ben Yosef,

who increases the disqualified among Israel,

for

he

would say: Anyone who has no permitted intercourse in Israel [

any man in Israel for whom intercourse with the woman with whom he has intercourse is not permitted]

the child is a mamzer.

And we refute this:

That works [

it is properly explained] for our Mishna

according

to the opinion of

Rabbi Yishbav, if [

if] this rule—“Anyone who has no permitted intercourse in Israel, the child is a mamzer”—is an absolute rule, because

according to his own view [

his own opinion] Rabbi Yishbav said it.

If so, our Mishna works

properly,

according to Rabbi Yishbav, for her father cannot hand her over to anyone whose intercourse would disqualify her from the priesthood, since with anyone whose intercourse is forbidden, betrothal does not take effect.

An Egyptian and an Edomite were not explicitly forbidden to the assembly. Rather, since the Torah said [Deuteronomy 23:9], “The third generation shall enter the assembly of the Lord,” you understand that before that they may not enter the assembly. Therefore, their prohibition is a prohibition derived from a positive commandment; accordingly, they are called “those liable for a positive commandment,” and not “those liable for prohibitions.”

But if

Rabbi Yishbav

came to exclude the view of Rabbi Simai,

that is, if Rabbi Yishbav’s words are not an absolute rule, and Rabbi Yishbav came only to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Simai—for Rabbi Simai holds that one born from “prohibitions of priesthood” is not a mamzer, while Rabbi Yishbav adds that even one born from “prohibitions of priesthood” is a mamzer—

but Rabbi Yishbav concedes that even according to Rabbi Akiva, there is no mamzer from an Egyptian or an Edomite, since they are only “those liable for a positive commandment” and not “those liable for prohibitions.”

If so, this is difficult:

is it not in his power to marry her to “

those liable for a positive commandment,”

whose intercourse disqualifies her from the priesthood and from teruma? If so, he should be trustworthy to say, “She was captured and I redeemed her,” by virtue of the possibility that if he wished, he could hand her over to “those liable for a positive commandment”!?

Rav Ashi said: And can you understand it thus?

[And do you think] that the reason of the

first clause is because

it is in his power

to do so, as we said above?!

, as we said above!?

Behold,

although

[indeed]

it is in his power to betroth her,

but is it so that

it is in his power to divorce her?!

For divorce is in the husband’s authority, and does not depend upon the father’s will?!

And furthermore,

for even the betrothal is not “in his power,” since

if this one said

[the one betrothing]

that he does not desire

her

in her,

[that he does not desire her,]

can he betroth her to him against his will

[is it so that he can hand her over to him for betrothal against his will]?!

And we conclude:

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

The reason of the

first clause

is not because it is in his power, but because

the Torah entrusted him

[the Torah deemed him trustworthy],

as

the words of

Rav Huna.

For Rav Huna said in the name of

[in the name of]

Rav: From where is it established that a father is deemed trustworthy

[that the father is deemed trustworthy]

to prohibit his daughter

to the entire world, by saying: “I betrothed my daughter,”

from the Torah,

that is to say, what is the proof of this from the Torah?!

As it is stated

[Deuteronomy 22:16]: “And the father of the young woman shall say to the elders”:

“I gave my daughter to this man

as a wife.”

And when he said: “I gave my daughter

to a man,”

behold, he

prohibited her

to the entire world.

And when he added and said: “To

this man,”

behold, he

permitted

her

to

that man, for before he said: “this,” she was prohibited even to that man, since we did not know that he was her husband.

It follows that, with regard to the father of the daughter, the matter depends upon him, and the Torah deemed him trustworthy concerning this.

But this verse speaks of a young woman; therefore, with regard to an adult woman [a mature woman], the father is not deemed trustworthy concerning her, and likewise,

with regard to marriage,

the verse is speaking,

the Merciful One deemed the father trustworthy

but

with regard to a captive woman, He did not deem him trustworthy

[the Torah did not deem the father trustworthy] to say that his daughter was taken captive.

Therefore, the father is deemed trustworthy to say concerning his minor daughter: “I betrothed her and divorced her,” but he is not deemed trustworthy to say this concerning her once she has grown and matured; nor is he deemed trustworthy to say: “She was taken captive and I redeemed her,” even though she is a minor.

Mishna:

One who dies and has no sons, if he has brothers, his wife must undergo yibbum with one of them, and she is prohibited from marrying a stranger, unless she removes the shoe of the yavam.

One who

was presumed by us not to have sons or brothers, and whose wife would not need to undergo yibbum when he dies, and

said at the time of his death: “

I have

sons

and my wife does not require a yavam,”

is deemed trustworthy.

And she is permitted to marry a stranger without chalitza.

But if he said: “

I have brothers

and my wife requires a yavam,” he

is not deemed trustworthy,

since until now we had presumed her to be a woman who did not require yibbum.

Gemara:

Apparently

[we see from the Mishna] that he

is deemed trustworthy to permit

her to marry a stranger,

and

he

is not deemed trustworthy to prohibit

her.

The Gemara asks:

Shall we say

[should we say]:

The Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Natan

who holds: He is deemed trustworthy both to permit and to prohibit?!

For it was taught

in a beraita: If

at the time of betrothal he said

to her that he

has sons,

so that she need not fear that she might have to undergo yibbum after his death, and

at the time of death he said

that he

has no sons,

and she requires a yavam.

And likewise, if

at the time of betrothal he said

to her that he

has no brothers,

so that she need not fear that she might have to undergo yibbum after his death if children were not born to him—and indeed children were not born to him—and

at the time of death he said

that he

has brothers,

and she requires yibbum.

In both of these cases, he is

deemed trustworthy concerning what he said at the time of betrothal

to

permit

her to a stranger without chalitza,

and he

he

is not deemed trustworthy concerning what he said at the time of death

with regard to what he said at the time of his death

to prohibit

her and make her require a yavam—these are

the words of Rabbi.

Rabbi Natan disagrees and

disagrees and

says: He is also deemed trustworthy

to

prohibit

her, as he said at the time of his death; and since in our Mishna it is stated that he is not deemed trustworthy to say, “I have brothers, and my wife requires a yavam,” it follows that the tanna of the Mishna does not hold in accordance with Rabbi Natan. And this is what the Gemara asked: Shall we say that the Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Natan?!

He said

[he explained,]

Rava:

In truth, the Mishna can even be in accordance with Rabbi Natan, for Rabbi Natan also holds that he is not deemed trustworthy to prohibit her; rather,

it is different

это

there

[in the beraita],

since at the time of death he retracts

[he retracts] from what he said initially; therefore,

let us say

[we say]:

The truth

[the truth]

he is saying.

For it may be said: He regrets his initial words, and does not wish to be guilty of causing his wife to marry in prohibition; therefore he retracts now and says that she requires yibbum.

But if he said nothing initially, and now he says that she requires a yavam, he is not deemed trustworthy, and we suspect him: perhaps he has no brothers, and he wishes to distress her so that she cannot marry.

He said

[he challenged]

Abaye: And is it not

surely

a fortiori

[kal va-chomer]

so?!

For

now, if there,

[in the beraita]

where he damages

[spoils and contradicts]

his statement,

the first one—for initially he said that she did not require a yavam, and now he says that initially he spoke falsely—even so,

you said: “The truth

[the truth]

he is saying

now.

In the Mishna, where he does not damage his statement,

for he said nothing initially,

all the more so

should he be deemed trustworthy concerning his present statement?!

Rather, Abaye said:

Indeed, it is possible to establish the Mishna even in accordance with Rabbi Natan, but not because he retracts his initial words, as Rava said; rather, because the Mishna and the beraita deal with two different cases.

The Mishna

deals with a case

where we have no presumption concerning brothers, and we have no presumption concerning sons

[it is not known to us that he has brothers, and it is not known to us that he has sons].

For we say: Since we have no presumption concerning sons, and no

presumption

concerning brothers,

then she does not require a yavam; and if he

said: “

I have sons,”

he does not contradict the presumption, therefore, he is

deemed trustworthy

concerning his words, and even if afterward a man should come and say, “I am the dead man’s brother,” the woman would not require him, for the statement that he said, “I have sons,” joins with her presumption of permissibility.

But if he said: “

I have brothers”

and she requires a yavam, he

is not deemed trustworthy,

because

it is not within his power

[he has no power]

to prohibit her to the entire world

[to prohibit her to the entire world] until the yavam removes her shoe, or performs yibbum with her.