Kiddushin 64a (סד.) — the Talmud in English

with regard to

the matter of

vows

, that is, the vow of the son and the vow of the daughter are valid.

and consecrations subject to חרם

, that if they said concerning their property, “They are herem,” it is dedicated for the repair of the Temple.

and consecrations

, as they are capable of consecrating an offering.

and valuations

, as if they said, “The valuation of so-and-so is incumbent upon me,” they are obligated to give to the Temple the amount to which they committed themselves.

But he is not

the father deemed credible

with regard to

the matter of

lashes and with regard to

the matter of

punishments.

Mishna:

a. The father is permitted to betroth his “minor” daughter to a man, and likewise his “na’ara” daughter. But once his daughter has reached majority, she is under her own authority, and her father cannot betroth her.

b. In the Mishna and in the discussion of the Gemara, “minor” means either a minor or a na’ara, and “adult” means one who has reached majority.

A father who says: “

I betrothed my daughter

when she was a minor, and she is a married woman.”

And likewise, a father who says concerning his daughter: “

I betrothed her

to a man

and divorced her

[I received her bill of divorce from her husband, and she is divorced and forbidden to a kohen]

when she was a minor,”

and she is

still

a minor

at the time he testified concerning his daughter: He is

deemed credible

to prohibit his daughter to the entire world as a married woman, as he said, “I betrothed her,” and he is likewise deemed credible to disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood, as he said, “I betrothed her and divorced her.”

But if he said: “

I betrothed her and divorced her when she

was

a minor

, and

now

she is an adult

[one who has reached majority]:

He is not deemed credible

, and his daughter is permitted to marry into the priesthood, and the Gemara will explain the reason.

a. If a gentile has relations with a Jewish woman, she becomes disqualified and forbidden to a kohen; and if she is the daughter of a kohen, she is forbidden to eat teruma. The same applies to other disqualified men, such as a mamzer, an Egyptian, or an Edomite, who have relations with her: They disqualify her.

b. When gentiles capture a Jewish woman, we are concerned that they may have had relations with her and disqualified her. Therefore, a captive woman is forbidden to a kohen as a matter of uncertainty.

And likewise, one who says: “My daughter

was taken captive

[she was held captive by gentiles]

and I redeemed her

from them”:

Whether

he said this when she was

a minor, or whether

he said this when she was

an adult

[one who had reached majority], he is

not deemed credible

to disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood, and the Gemara will explain the reason for all the laws of the Mishna.

Gemara:

The first clause of the Mishna indicates that a person is deemed credible to testify concerning his daughter that she was betrothed and divorced if she is still a minor; and the final clause indicates that a person is not deemed credible to testify concerning his daughter’s betrothal once his daughter has already reached majority. Likewise, he is not deemed credible to testify that she was taken captive and thereby disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.

The Gemara asks:

What is the difference in the first clause

that he is deemed credible,

and what is the difference in the final clause

that he is not deemed credible?

And we explain:

The first clause

—where he testifies concerning her betrothal when she is a minor—

is in her possession [in his possession], since he can betroth her to whomever he wishes. Therefore, he is deemed credible to say: “I betrothed her and divorced her.”

in his control ], because he can betroth her to anyone he wishes. Therefore, he is trusted to say, “I betrothed her and divorced her.”

But

the final clause

, with regard to betrothal,

is not in his possession

, since if she is already an adult and has reached majority, he cannot betroth her now. Therefore, he is not deemed credible to say, “I betrothed her and divorced her,” if she has already reached majority.

And likewise, if he testified, “She was taken captive and I redeemed her,” he is not deemed credible, since he does not have the ability to hand her over to a gentile to have relations with her and disqualify her, whether she is an adult or a minor.

When a kohen has relations with a woman who is forbidden to him due to the sanctity of his priesthood, such as a divorcee with a regular kohen or a widow with a High Priest, their son is a “chalal,” meaning one profaned from the priesthood, and he may not serve in the Temple; and their daughter is a “chalala” and is forbidden to a kohen.

And we are astonished:

But

, if he

does not

have the ability to disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood while she is a minor, why should he not be deemed credible to say, “She was taken captive and I redeemed her”?

But he has the ability to marry her to a

“

chalal

, whose

act of intercourse

does disqualify

her

from

the

priesthood.

And she becomes forbidden to eat teruma. If so, he should be deemed credible to say, “She was taken captive and I redeemed her,” by virtue of a migo: If he wished to lie, he could have married her to a chalal and disqualified her, just as she is disqualified when he says that she was taken captive by gentiles!

And we answer:

This is not difficult

, since our Mishna can be explained

in accordance with Rabbi Dostai ben Yehuda

, who holds that intercourse with a chalal does not disqualify a woman from the priesthood.

As Rabbi Dostai ben Yehuda said

: When a chalal has relations with a Jewish woman, his daughter is fit to marry into the priesthood, and she is not a chalala, because

the daughters of Israel

are like

a ritual bath of purity for chalalim

. If a chalal marries a Jewish woman, his offspring is purified from his disqualified status, and the daughter of a chalal is disqualified from the priesthood only if both her father and her mother are chalalim.

And since the daughter of a chalal is fit to marry into the priesthood when her mother is a Jewish woman and not a chalala, likewise, a woman who has had relations with a chalal is fit to marry into the priesthood. For Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said

Therefore, we learned: A person is not deemed credible to say, “My daughter was taken captive and I redeemed her,” since he does not have the ability to disqualify her from the priesthood or from teruma.

And we challenge this:

But

still,

he has the ability to marry her to a

“

person subject to a positive prohibition,” and intercourse with such a person disqualifies her from the priesthood and from teruma! And we answer: This is not difficult, since our Mishna can be explained

in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who said

Betrothal does not take effect with

those subject to negative prohibitions

, and therefore the father does not have the ability to accept betrothal on her behalf from a mamzer.

And we challenge this: Still, if she is a widow,

he has the ability to marry

her

to

a

High Priest as a widow!

And according to

the view of

Rabbi Simai

, who holds that even according to Rabbi Akiva, who says that betrothal does not take effect with “those subject to negative prohibitions,” and consequently the child is a mamzer, if a widow marries a High Priest, which is merely a violation of a priestly prohibition, the child is not a mamzer, and consequently betrothal takes effect for him with her.

As it was taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Simai says: From all

[those subject to negative prohibitions] Rabbi Akiva

would render

the child

a mamzer, except for a widow

who married

a High Priest

, for their child is not a mamzer but a chalal.

For the Torah said [Leviticus 21:14–15]: “A widow, a divorcee, a ḥalala, or a harlot—these he shall

Leviticus 21:14–15 ]: “A widow, a divorcee, a woman profaned, or a prostitute—these he shall not take,”

not take

, but he shall take a virgin from his people as a wife.

And he shall not profane

his offspring among his people.”

It is apparent that he

makes them profaned

[chalalim],

he makes

his offspring, so that they become profaned from the priesthood,

but he does not

make

make

them

mamzerim.

And since a child born from a violation of a priestly prohibition is not a mamzer, betrothal takes effect in such cases, and the father can give his widowed daughter to a High Priest and thereby disqualify her from the priesthood.

If so, when his daughter is a widow or a divorcee, the father should be deemed credible to say, “She was taken captive and I redeemed her,” since he has the ability to disqualify her from the priesthood and from teruma by marrying her to a High Priest. Why, then, did we learn that the father is not deemed credible?

And we answer: This is not difficult, since our Mishna must be established

in accordance with Rabbi Yishavav

, who holds that when a High Priest has relations with a widow, the child is a mamzer, and betrothal does not take effect for him with her.

As Rabbi Yishavav said

:

Come, let us cry out against

Rabbi

Akiva ben Yosef

, who increases the number of disqualified people among Israel,

as

he

would say: Anyone who has no permitted intercourse in Israel [any Jewish man for whom intercourse with the woman with whom he has relations is not permitted]

—any Israelite man who is not permitted to have intercourse with the woman with whom he has intercourse—

the child is a mamzer.

And we refute this:

This works [this is properly explained]

for the Mishna

according to

the

view of Rabbi Yishavav, if

the principle “Anyone who has no permitted intercourse in Israel, the child is a mamzer” is an absolute principle, because

he stated it as his own position

, Rabbi Yishavav expressing his own view.

If so, our Mishna works

well

, in accordance with Rabbi Yishavav, since her father cannot give her to anyone whose intercourse would disqualify her from the priesthood, because in every case where the intercourse is forbidden, betrothal does not take effect for him with her.

An Egyptian or an Edomite is not explicitly prohibited from entering the congregation. Rather, since the Torah says [Deuteronomy 23:9], “The third generation shall enter the congregation of the Lord,” it follows that before then they may not enter the congregation. Therefore, their prohibition is a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment, and thus they are called those subject to positive commandments, not those subject to negative prohibitions.

But if

Rabbi Yishavav

came only to exclude Rabbi Simai’s position

, meaning, if Rabbi Yishavav’s statement is not an absolute principle, and Rabbi Yishavav came only to reject Rabbi Simai’s view—that Rabbi Simai holds that one born from a violation of a priestly prohibition is not a mamzer, while Rabbi Yishavav adds that even one born from a violation of a priestly prohibition is a mamzer—

But Rabbi Yishavav agrees that even according to Rabbi Akiva, a child born from an Egyptian or an Edomite is not a mamzer, since they are subject only to positive prohibitions and not to negative prohibitions.

If so, this is difficult:

He has the ability to marry her to

those

subject to positive prohibitions

, whose intercourse disqualifies her from the priesthood and from teruma. If so, he should be deemed credible to say, “She was taken captive and I redeemed her,” by virtue of a migo: If he wished, he could have handed her over to one subject to a positive prohibition. Rav Ashi said: And can you understand it

[that you would think] that the reason for the first clause is

because

it is in his power

to do so

, as we said above!?

Indeed,

although

[it is true]

it is in his power to betroth her,

but is it really

in his power to divorce her!?

After all, divorce is in the husband’s control and does not depend on the father’s will!?

Furthermore,

even the betrothal is not actually “in his power,” for

if this man said

[the betrother]

that he did not desire

her

as his wife

[that he did not want her],

could he betroth her to him against his will

[could he really deliver her to him for betrothal against his will]!?

And we conclude:

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

The reason for the

first clause

is not because it is in his power, but because

the Torah trusted him

[the Torah deemed him credible],

as

the words of

Rav Huna.

For Rav Huna said in the name of

[in the name of]

Rav: From where is it established that a father is deemed credible

[that the father is deemed credible]

to prohibit his daughter

to everyone in the world, by saying: “I betrothed my daughter,”

from the Torah

, that is, what is the proof of this from the Torah!?

As it is stated

[Deuteronomy 22:16]: “And the father of the girl shall say to the elders:

I gave my daughter to this man

as a wife.”

When he says: “I gave my daughter

to a man,”

then

he prohibits her

to everyone in the world.

And when he adds and says: “To

this

man,” then

he permits

her

to

that particular man, for before he said “this,” she was prohibited even to that man, since we did not know that he was her husband.

This indicates that the matter depends on the father of the daughter, and the Torah deemed him credible in this regard.

This verse speaks of a young girl; therefore, when she is an adult [a bogeret], the father is not deemed credible concerning her. Likewise,

with regard to marriage

which is the subject of the verse,

the Merciful One deemed the father credible.

But

with regard to a captive woman, He did not deem him credible

[the Torah did not deem the father credible] to say that his daughter had been taken captive.

Therefore, the father is deemed credible to say concerning his minor daughter: “I betrothed her and divorced her,” but he is not deemed credible to say this about her once she has grown up and reached maturity. Nor is he deemed credible to say: “She was taken captive and I redeemed her,” even when she is a minor.

Mishna:

If a man dies and has no sons, and he has brothers, his wife must enter into yibbum with one of them, and she is prohibited from marrying a stranger unless she removes the shoe of the yavam.

One who

was presumed by us to have neither sons nor brothers, so that his wife would not have to enter into yibbum when he dies,

said at the time of his death: “

I have

sons,

and my wife does not require a yavam,”

is deemed credible.

She is permitted to marry a stranger without halitza.

But if he said:

“I have brothers,

and my wife requires a yavam,”

he is not deemed credible,

since until now we had presumed her to be a woman who did not require yibbum.

Gemara:

It follows

[we see from the Mishna] that he

is deemed credible to permit

her to marry a stranger,

but

he

is not deemed credible to prohibit

her.

The Gemara asks:

Shall we say

[is it to be said]:

the Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Natan,

who holds that he is deemed credible both to permit and to prohibit!?

For it was taught

in a beraita: If

at the time of the betrothal he said

to her that he

has sons,

so that she need not fear that she might have to enter into yibbum after his death, and

at the time of his death he said

that he

has no sons

and that she requires a yavam.

And likewise, if

at the time of the betrothal he said

to her that he

has no brothers,

so that she need not fear that she might have to enter into yibbum after his death if he had no children, and in fact he had no children, and

at the time of his death he said

that he

has brothers

and that she must enter into yibbum.

In both of these cases,

he is deemed credible

with regard to what he said at the time of the betrothal

to permit

her to a stranger without halitza,

but

he

is not deemed credible

with regard to what he said at the time of his death

to prohibit

her and make her require a yavam. This is

the statement of Rabbi.

Rabbi Natan

disagrees and

says: He is also deemed credible

to

prohibit

her, as he said at the time of his death. Since our Mishna states that he is not deemed credible to say, “I have brothers, and my wife requires a yavam,” it follows that the tanna of the Mishna does not hold in accordance with Rabbi Natan. This is the Gemara’s question: Shall we say that the Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Natan!?

He said

[explained]

Rava: The Mishna can in fact even accord with Rabbi Natan, for Rabbi Natan too holds that he is not deemed credible to prohibit her. Rather,

the situation is different

there

[in the beraita], since

when he retracted at the time of his death

[he retracted] from what he had said initially; therefore,

we may say:

[we say]:

he is speaking the truth

[the truth]

when he says so.

For one may say that he regrets his initial statement and does not wish to be responsible for his wife’s marrying in a prohibited manner; therefore, he now retracts and says that she requires yibbum.

But if he had said nothing initially and now says that she requires a yavam, he is not deemed credible, and we suspect him: perhaps he has no brothers, and he wants to distress her so that she will be unable to marry.

He said

[challenged]

Abaye to him: But

is it really

not all the more so

[a kal va-chomer]

the case!?

For

now, if in that case

[in the beraita]

where he undermines

[damages and contradicts]

his statement

the first, since initially he said that she did not require a yavam, whereas now he says that he originally spoke falsely, even so

you say: “He is speaking the truth”

[the truth]

when he says so

now,

in the Mishna, where he does not undermine his statement,

for he said nothing initially,

is it not all the more so

that he should be deemed credible regarding his present statement!?

Rather, Abaye said: Indeed, the Mishna can be established even in accordance with Rabbi Natan, but not because he is retracting his initial statement, as Rava said; rather, the Mishna and the beraita deal with two different cases.

Indeed, it is possible to establish the Mishna even in accordance with Rabbi Natan, but not because he retracts his initial words, as Rava said; rather, because the Mishna and the beraita deal with two different cases.

The Mishna

deals with a case

where we had no presumption that he had brothers and no presumption that he had sons

[it was not known to us that he had brothers, and it was not known to us that he had sons].

For we say: Since we had no presumption that he had sons and no

presumption that he

had brothers,

then she does not require a yavam. And if he

said:

“I have sons,”

he does not contradict the presumption, therefore,

he is deemed credible

regarding his statement. Even if someone later comes and says, “I am the dead man’s brother,” the woman will not require him, because the statement “I have sons” joins with her presumption of permissibility.

But if he said:

“I have brothers”

and she requires a yavam,

he is not deemed credible,

because

it is not within his power

[he has no authority]

to prohibit her to everyone

[to prohibit her to everyone] until the yavam performs halitza for her or performs yibbum with her.