Kiddushin 63b — the Talmud in English

On the condition that my father will approve," as the son said, implies: "

On the condition that my father will remain silent,"

when he hears, and will not protest or oppose my kiddushin.

And thus our Mishna will be interpreted: If the father approved, meaning, he remained silent at the time he heard and did not protest, she is betrothed; and if the father did not approve, meaning, he protested and said: "I do not approve of my son's kiddushin," she is not betrothed.

And if the father died before he heard about his son's kiddushin, she is betrothed, for he did not oppose his son's kiddushin.

Even so, it is impossible to say this, because

say the latter clause

of our Mishna:

If the son died, they teach the father to say that he does not approve;

it is implied that the father heard and remained silent, and we teach him to say: "I do not approve," and

why

is his protest effective,

but he remained silent

at the time of hearing, and thereafter his protest cannot be effective!?

Rather,

you are compelled to interpret the latter clause as referring to a case in which he said to her:

"On the condition that he said": "

On the condition that my father will not protest,"

and say: "I do not approve of the kiddushin"; therefore, if the son died, the father can protest and annul the kiddushin.

The middle clause, too, can be interpreted as referring to when he said to her: "On the condition that my father will not protest"; therefore, if the father died, and he had not protested, she is betrothed.

But the first clause cannot be interpreted in this way, because if he said to her: "On the condition that my father will not protest," then his father has the option of protesting whenever he wishes. If so, how did the tannai say: "The father approved," meaning, if the father did not protest, she is betrothed? It is implied that she is certainly betrothed, and why? For she is only doubtfully betrothed, lest the father protest later!?

You are compelled to interpret the first clause: "On the condition that my father will remain silent," and therefore, if he remained silent, she is betrothed; if he did not remain silent, but protested immediately, she is not betrothed. And the middle clause and the latter clause must be interpreted: "On the condition that my father will not protest." Therefore, if the father died before he protested, she is betrothed; but throughout his lifetime she is not betrothed, lest the father protest. If the son died, they teach the father to protest, so that she will not be required to perform yibbum. And now this is difficult: Is it so that

and is it really that

the first clause has one rationale [

in one interpretation ]

while the middle clause and the latter clause have one rationale!?

Rabbi Yannai said: Yes.

That is, indeed, this is how the Mishna must be interpreted.

Reish Lakish said: You can infer from it, according to

the view of

Rabbi Yannai:

We force ourselves and establish the Mishna according to two interpretations [

according to two interpretations ]

and according to one tannai, and we do not establish

the Mishna

according to a

dispute

between two tannaim and according to one rationale.

"on condition that my father approves"

That is: It is preferable to struggle and establish the first clause and the latter clause according to two interpretations, rather than say that one Mishna contains two opinions of tannaim who dispute one another, without the Mishna hinting at this.

Therefore, we establish the first clause as referring to when he stipulated: "On the condition that he will remain silent," and the latter clause as referring to when he said: "On the condition that he will not protest."

And we do not say: The entire Mishna speaks of when he said: "On the condition that my father will approve," and it is a dispute between tannaim how to interpret his words: The tannai of the first clause holds that his intention was: "On the condition that my father will remain silent." And the tannai of the latter clause holds that the intention of the man effecting the kiddushin was: "On the condition that my father will not protest."

It follows that, in order to establish the Mishna according to one tannai, we are compelled to establish it according to two rationales.

Rav Yosef bar Ami said:

There is no need to force our Mishna according to two rationales, because

in every case, it is one rationale, and what is

"on the condition that my father will approve"

that he said: "

On the condition that my father will not protest from now until thirty days" [

within thirty days ].

And thus the Mishna will be interpreted: If the father approved, meaning, he did not protest throughout all those thirty days, she is betrothed; if the father did not approve, because he protested during that time, she is not betrothed.

If the father died, and he had not protested, she is betrothed. If the son died, and the father had still not protested, they teach him to protest, if it is still within the thirty days, in order to exempt her from the yavam.

Mishna:

a. A father is permitted to betroth his daughter as long as she is a minor, and likewise when she is a "naara," meaning, six months after she becomes a "gedola."

After this, she is a "bogeret," and she is in her own authority.

b. The father is trusted to say: "I betrothed my daughter," as it is stated [Deuteronomy 22:16]: "My daughter I gave to this man."

The father who said

"I betrothed my daughter, and I do not know to whom I betrothed her"

is trusted, and she is forbidden to the entire world because of doubt, for with regard to each and every one it can be said: Perhaps she is betrothed to another.

And

if

one came and said: "

I betrothed

her,"

the

and the father does not deny him,

he is trusted.

And if two came before us,

this one said: "

I betrothed

her,"

the

and this one said: "

I betrothed

her."

If

both

give

her

a get,

she is permitted to every person.

And if they wished, one gives a get, and one [

the other ]

takes her

—whichever way you look at it: If he is the one who betrothed her, all is well; and if his fellow betrothed her, he gave her a get, and she is permitted to him.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One came and said: "I betrothed her"; he is trusted.

Rav said: He is trusted

He is also trusted to take her as his wife,

to give

her

a get, but he is not trusted to take her

.

He is trusted to give a get,

and there is no concern lest he is not her husband and he is speaking falsely, because there is a presumption:

A person does not sin for one who is not his;

for why would he gratuitously permit a married woman, in a matter from which he derives no benefit?

And he is not trusted

to say: "I betrothed her," in order

to take

her, because

say [

we say ]: Perhaps

his inclination is overpowering him

to marry this woman, even though she is forbidden to him.

Rav Asi said: "

He is also trusted to take her],

for if he were not her husband, he would not brazenly face her father and say: "I betrothed her," for he is afraid lest the father deny him and say to him: Indeed, I do not remember to whom I betrothed her, but I know with certainty that you are not her husband. Therefore, if he said: "I betrothed her," he is trusted to take her.

And Rav Asi concedes

to Rav

with regard to

a woman who

says: "

I became betrothed, and I do not know to whom I became betrothed," and one came and said: "

I

betrothed her, he is not

является

trusted

to take her,

for he is not afraid lest she deny him, since he knows that she will cover for him and agree to him, and will deny anyone else who later comes and says: "I am the one who betrothed her." Therefore, he is not trusted to take her, lest his inclination is overpowering him.

We learned: "

I betrothed my daughter, and I do not know to whom I betrothed her"; this one said: "I betrothed her," and this one said: "I betrothed her." Both give a get, and if

they wished, one gives a get and one takes her,

he is therefore trusted even to take her, and

a refutation of Rav!?

He said [

he will answer ]

to you, Rav: There it is different, since there is another with him [

together with him ],

he is afraid [

he is afraid ] from the outset, lest the father recognize that his fellow betrothed her and not he. And since this is so, we say: This one who takes her is speaking truthfully, and the other is a liar; therefore he is afraid to take her and gives her a get.

Tanya

in a beraita

in accordance with Rav Asi:

The father who said: “

I betrothed my daughter, but I do not know to whom I betrothed her,”

and one came and said:

I

betrothed her; he is also trusted to marry her,

in accordance with the words of Rav Asi.

If he married her,

this is the one who said: “I betrothed her,”

and

afterward

another came and said: “I

am the one who

betrothed her,”

it is not within his power,

the last one’s,

to forbid her to him

[to the first one], since she had already been established as permitted.

The woman who said: “

I was betrothed, but I do not know to whom I was betrothed,”

and one came and said: “

I betrothed

her,”

he is not trusted to marry

her,

because she is covering for him.

A betrothed young woman who committed adultery—her death is by stoning.

It was asked of them

[the members of the academy were uncertain]:

What is the law regarding stoning on the basis of his word

of the father? That is, does the father’s credibility in saying, “I betrothed my daughter,” function like two witnesses, and if she committed adultery, should she be stoned according to the law of a betrothed young woman who committed adultery with a man?

Or: the father’s credibility is effective only with regard to making her forbidden to others, but he is not entirely trusted like two witnesses.

Rav said: They do not stone.

And Rav Asi said: They stone

her like any betrothed young woman who committed adultery.

And we explain the reason:

Rav said: They do not stone

because

when the Merciful One trusted the father, it was with regard to prohibition

[the Torah trusted the father to forbid her], but

with regard to execution, it did not trust him

the Merciful One.

Rav Asi said: They stone

her, because

for all of his matter

[for every matter]

the Merciful One trusted the father.

Rav Asi said: And I concede

[I concede] to Rav

when she says, “I was betrothed,”

and committed adultery with others,

that they do not

put her to death and

stone

her.

And Rav Asi said: These teachings of mine are breaking roofs

[breaking roofs], that is, my statements contradict one another, and no one understands their reasoning! For

now, and what is it like in a case where

the father said, “I betrothed my daughter,”

that

if one came and said, “I betrothed her,” he is trusted, and

if he came to marry her, he marries her,

which implies that, on the basis of the father’s words, she is not so strongly presumed forbidden.

Even so,

you say

[I say]:

They stone

on the basis of his word!

A place where

the woman herself said, “I was betrothed, but I do not know to whom I was betrothed,” and if one came and said, “I betrothed her,”

if he came to marry her, he does not marry her,

for she is presumed betrothed, and we are stringent concerning her, so that he should not marry her because of the uncertainty.

Is it not a matter of inference that

if she committed adultery,

they stone

her!?

And Rav Asi explains:

That is not so,

that is, this is not a difficulty for one who understands the reason for the matter.

For

the Merciful One trusted the father

as it is stated [Deuteronomy 22:16]: “I gave my daughter to this man”; therefore, they stone on the basis of his word.

But

concerning her, He did not trust her

the Merciful One. Indeed, she can make herself forbidden by saying, “I am a married woman,” but she is not trusted with regard to death.

And Rav Hisda said:

Whether concerning a father who says, “I betrothed my daughter,” or concerning a woman who says, “I was betrothed,” and she went and committed adultery,

in both this case and that case, they do not stone

them.

And Rav Hisda proceeded

[goes]

with

his reasoning, having said that even the father is not trusted to have stoning carried out on the basis of his word,

according to his approach

[according to his method] elsewhere:

a. One who has intercourse with one of the forbidden relations: if they were unwitting, he and she are liable for a sin-offering; and if they were intentional, there are some of the forbidden relations for which they are liable to a court-imposed death, and there are some of the forbidden relations for which they are liable to lashes.

b. There is neither liability for a sacrifice nor liability for lashes except with adults, but a minor boy and a minor girl are exempt.

c. An adult who has intercourse with a minor girl, and likewise an adult woman with whom a minor boy had intercourse: the adults are liable and the minors are exempt, provided that the minor girl is three years and one day old and the minor boy is nine years and one day old, because below this age intercourse is not considered intercourse, and even the adult man and adult woman are exempt.

For Rav Hisda said:

The father who said: “

This son of mine is nine years and one day old,”

or who said: “

This daughter of mine is three years and one day old,”

and they are fit for intercourse,

is trusted

he

to

make him liable for a

sin-offering

if the son had intercourse with any of the forbidden relations, or if one of the forbidden relations had intercourse with the daughter and the intercourse was unwitting.

But

he is not trusted

not with regard to

the matter of

lashes ,

and not with regard to

the matter of

punishments

of death, if they warned the woman with whom the son had intercourse, and they warned the man who had intercourse with the daughter.

Tanya

in a beraita

in accordance with Rav Hisda

The one who says: “

This son of mine is thirteen years and one day old

he is,” or: “

This daughter of mine is twelve years and one day old

she is.”