Kiddushin 63a — the Talmud in English

You shall not hand over a slave to his master,

who has escaped to you from his master" [Deuteronomy 23:16],

Rabbi says: The verse speaks

of one

who purchases a slave in order to free him,

so that if he comes to the court to escape from the purchaser, the court is warned not to hand him over to be enslaved by him.

And we ask:

What are the circumstances?

If he already freed him, and he came to enslave him, why does the verse call him a "slave"?!

He said

[he explained]:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak: For example, he wrote to him

in his bill of manumission: "

When I purchase

you,

you are hereby acquired to yourself from now,

" meaning: He gives the bill of manumission into the hands of his fellow's slave, and says to him: The manumission will take effect when you are acquired by me, and then the giving of the bill that is done now will benefit you.

that is, he gives the bill of emancipation to the slave of another person and says to him: The emancipation will take effect when you become acquired by me, and then the giving of the bill that is performed now will benefit you.

But at the time of giving the bill, the slave is not his and is not "in his possession," and nevertheless Rabbi holds that the slave becomes free when the slave enters the purchaser's domain. It follows that Rabbi holds: A person can acquire an object that has not yet come into the world.

3.

Rabbi Meir

also holds: A person can acquire an object that has not yet come into the world.

For it was taught

in a beraita:

One who says to a woman: "You are betrothed to me after I convert,

" or: "

after

you convert,

" or: "

after I am freed,

" or: "

after you are freed,

" or: "

after your husband dies,

" or:

"after your sister dies,"

" or: "

after your levir performs ḥalitza for you,

" in all these cases:

she is not betrothed,

because they are "an object that has not yet come into the world," and the first tanna holds: A person cannot acquire an object that has not yet come into the world.

Rabbi Meir says: She is betrothed,

because Rabbi Meir holds: A person can acquire an object that has not yet come into the world, as we said.

Rabbi Yoḥanan the Sandal-Maker says: She is not betrothed,

because he holds: A person cannot acquire an object that has not yet come into the world.

Rabbi Judah the Nasi says:

by Torah law

she is betrothed

to him,

and for what reason did

the Sages say that one who says to a woman, "You are betrothed to me after your husband dies," or, "after your sister dies,"

she is not betrothed? Because of hostility

from her husband and hostility from her sister, lest they say: She is waiting for us to die.

And we ask: Why did Abaye count only three—Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, Rabbi, and Rabbi Meir—

and count

[include]

also

Rabbi

Judah the Nasi,

who holds in this beraita that a person can acquire an object that has not yet come into the world?!

And we answer:

Rabbi and Rabbi Judah the Nasi are the same,

meaning: Rabbi is Rabbi Judah the Nasi, and there are not two, but one.

And we ask:

And count

and include

also

Rabbi

Akiva

among those who hold that a person can acquire an object that has not yet come into the world?!

a. Just as a person can make a vow and prohibit an object to himself, so can he prohibit it to others, provided that the prohibited object belongs to the one making the vow.

b. One of the formulations of a vow is when one says: "Such-and-such an object shall be konam," and the meaning of this formulation is as though he said: "Such-and-such an object shall be prohibited like an offering."

c. When a woman makes a vow, there are vows that her husband can annul and nullify.

d. A woman's "handiwork" belongs to her husband, and the Sages established a measure for this—how much she is obligated to do for him.

For it was taught

in a beraita: A woman who said to her husband: "

What I make shall be konam for you,

" meaning: "My handiwork shall be prohibited to you [so that you may not eat it] like an offering,"

the

husband

does not need to annul

the vow, because since the woman is bound to her husband to perform work for him, the vow does not take effect, for a person cannot prohibit to his fellow an object that belongs to his fellow or to which he is entitled.

Rabbi Akiva says:

He must

annul

her vow, because

perhaps she will produce more for him

than

what is fitting for him,

meaning: Perhaps she will do more than the measure that she is obligated to do for her husband, and then the "surplus" belongs to her, and she can prohibit it to her husband. It follows that Rabbi Akiva holds: A person can prohibit through a vow even "an object that has not yet come into the world," for at the time of the vow, her handiwork had not yet come into the world, and nevertheless the vow takes effect.

And we reject this: There is no "object that has not yet come into the world," because

it

is

stated concerning it

[it was said concerning the words of this beraita]:

Rav Huna son of Rav Joshua said:

This beraita deals

with

a woman

saying: "

Let my hands be consecrated to their Maker,

" meaning: "My hands shall be consecrated to the Holy One, blessed be He, who created them."

And

the

hands exist

[they exist]

in the world,

and the vow takes effect upon them to consecrate them, and consequently her handiwork, which comes by means of the consecrated hands, is prohibited to him.

Mishna:

One who says to a woman: "You are betrothed to me on condition

that I speak about you to the authorities"

[that I speak to the ruler on your behalf].

And

likewise, one who says to a woman: "You are betrothed to me on condition that I

work with you

[that I work for you]

as a laborer

for the work of one day."

If

he spoke about her to the authorities

[in the first case],

and worked with her as a laborer

[in the second case], she is

betrothed,

but if not, she is not betrothed.

Gemara:

Reish Lakish said: The "she is betrothed" that we learned

is

provided that he gave her the value of a peruta,

for the sake of betrothal, by giving the value of a peruta, and betrothed her with that peruta, except that he made a condition in the betrothal that she would be betrothed to him if he spoke about her to the authorities or if he worked with her as a laborer.

And we are astonished:

And

if he said to her: "You are betrothed to me

for the wages

that I will receive for speaking about you to the authorities," or "for the wages that I will receive for working with you as a laborer,"

is she not

betrothed?!

For in order for her to be betrothed, it is not necessary that he give her specifically money; even if he performed an action for her, for which one pays at least a peruta, she is betrothed through this, as though he had given her a peruta.

One who betroths a woman with a loan that he lent her, or with a debt that she owes him, does not betroth her.

And

it

was taught

in a beraita: One who says to a woman: "You are betrothed to me

for the wages

that you owe me for

having carried

you

on the donkey," or: "For the wages

of

having seated

you

in the carriage,"

or: "For the wages

of having seated you

in the ship,"

she is not betrothed,

because she had already become obligated to pay him for what he did for her, and this is like a loan, with which one does not betroth.

But if he said to her: "You are betrothed to me

for the wages of carrying

you

on the donkey,"

or: "

of seating

you

in the carriage,"

or: "of seating you

in the

ship,"

and he indeed carried her or seated her, she is

betrothed.

For he is not betrothing her with a debt that she became obligated to him in the past; rather, he is like one who now gives her the action, and since one pays at least a peruta for this action, he is like one who gives her a peruta. Now this is difficult against Reish Lakish: Why did Reish Lakish say that she is not betrothed through an action that he performs for her, and that he must give her an additional value of a peruta? For the beraita teaches that it is possible to betroth through the performance of an action?!

And if you would say

[and if you say]:

Here too,

the beraita speaks

of his giving her

[giving her]

the value of a peruta.

And

this cannot be said, for

after all, "

You are betrothed to me

for the wages

of carrying you"

is what he says.

Furthermore,

it

was taught

in a beraita: The woman said to him: "

Sit with me in companionship,

so that I will not be alone,

and I will be betrothed to you,

" or she said to him: "

Laugh

[play]

before me,

" or: "

Dance before me,

" or: "

Make

for me

a dimos

[a structure]

this

and I will be betrothed to you," and he did as she requested and said to her: "You are betrothed to me through this action."

They assess

[evaluate] the value of the action that he performed for her;

if it has the value of a peruta,

meaning, if people pay at least a peruta in order for this action to be performed for them,

she is betrothed,

to him,

but if not, she is not betrothed,

and this is difficult against Reish Lakish?!

And if you would say: Here too, it involves his giving her the value of a peruta

[and if you say: Here too, it speaks of his giving her the value of a peruta], in addition to the action that he performed according to her request,

but the tanna says, "they assess its value,"

which implies that he betroths her through the action itself. Therefore, it is necessary to assess how much the action is worth, because if he gave her the value of a peruta and the action is merely a condition, what difference would it make how much it is worth?!

If so, these beraitot are

a refutation of Reish Lakish

?! The tannaim disagreed concerning the nature of the payment obligation for rental. Some say: "The rental exists from beginning to end," meaning: When the laborer performs work, for every peruta and peruta, when it is completed, the owner of the work becomes obligated to the laborer for the wages of performing the work.

And some say: "The rental exists only at the end," meaning: The obligation to pay the rental takes effect only when the laborer completes the work,

The time of payment, according to everyone, is when the laborer completes the work. Therefore, according to the one who says: "The rental exists from beginning to end," it emerges that the rental became a debt before the laborer completed the work.

and betrothing through rental is like “betrothing with a loan”.

According to the one who says: rental exists only at the end, the obligation to make the payments takes effect at the time of completion of the work, and one who betroths through rental “gives her the work” and is not like one who betroths with a loan.

He said [he will explain to you]:

he will answer

Reish Lakish: This tanna of the beraita

of the beraita

held: “

rental exists only at the end,”

and when the action is completed, the obligation of payment takes effect, and then the kiddushin also takes effect, and here there is no kiddushin with a loan, because he betroths her through the “giving of the action”.

And our tanna

of the Mishna

held: “

rental exists from the beginning until the end,”

and it is found that from the outset she was already obligated to make the payments, and when the action was completed and the time of payment arrived, he betroths her with a “debt” and not with an “action”; therefore she is not betrothed through the rental of the action.

Therefore, Reish Lakish said: she is not betrothed unless he gave her the value of a peruta, and through it the kiddushin takes effect, while the action is only a condition for the kiddushin to take effect.

And we ask:

And what compelled Reish Lakish

what compelled Reish Lakish

to establish our Mishna according to “rental exists from the beginning until the end,” and that he gave her

the value of a peruta, since, if he had interpreted the Mishna according to the one who says: rental exists only at the end, the Mishna would have been interpreted according to its simple meaning.

He said

he answered

Rava: The Mishna

itself

was difficult to him

was difficult to Reish Lakish, because

why specifically

what did the tanna see

that he taught: on condition

that I speak about you, which is the language of a condition,

let him teach

“be betrothed to me

with the payment

for my speaking about you”?!

Rather, learn from it

that he gives her money and betroths her on a condition, because

every

place where he teaches

“on condition,”

it is where he gave her

the value of a peruta

that it is.

Mishna:

One who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me

on condition that my father desires

these kiddushin,” if

the father desires

then she is

betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed.

If the father dies, she is betrothed.

If the son dies,

without sons, and he has brothers,

they instruct

the

father to say that he does not desire,

in order to uproot the kiddushin retroactively, so that the woman will not be required to enter levirate marriage with the son’s brother. The entire Mishna is explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

And we ask:

what

is the meaning of the condition

“on condition that the father desires”?

If you say

if it is said: “on condition that the father desires” means

until the father says

with his mouth:

“Yes”

that is, “I desire these kiddushin.”

This cannot be said, because

let us learn the middle clause

let us learn the middle clause of the Mishna:

“If the father dies, she is betrothed,”

and if the kiddushin depend on the father saying “Yes,” how is she betrothed,

when he did not say

“Yes”

before he died.

Rather

it must be explained: