Kiddushin 63a (סג.) — the Talmud in English

You shall not hand over a slave to his master,

who has escaped to you from his master" [Deuteronomy 23:16],

Rabbi says: The verse

speaks

of one who purchases a slave with the intention of emancipating him,

such that if the slave comes to court to escape from the purchaser, the court is cautioned not to hand him over so that the purchaser may subjugate him.

And we ask:

What are the circumstances?

If he had already emancipated him, and the slave came to subjugate himself to him, why does the verse call him a “slave”!?

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said

[he explained]:

For example, he wrote to him

in his bill of emancipation: “

When I purchase

you

,

you are hereby acquired by yourself from now,”

that is, he gives the bill of emancipation to the slave of another person and says to him: The emancipation will take effect when you become acquired by me, and then the giving of the bill that is performed now will benefit you.

And yet, at the time of the giving of the bill, the slave is not his and is not “in his possession”; nevertheless, Rabbi maintains that the slave becomes emancipated when he enters the purchaser’s domain. Thus, Rabbi maintains that a person can acquire an entity that has not yet come into the world.

3.

Rabbi Meir

also maintains that a person can acquire an entity that has not yet come into the world.

As it was taught

in a baraita:

If one says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me after I convert,

or: “

after

you convert,”

or: “

after I am emancipated,”

or: “

after you are emancipated,”

or: “

after your husband dies,”

or:

“after your sister dies,”

or: “

after your yavam performs ḥalitza for you,”

in all these cases:

she is not betrothed,

because they are “an entity that has not yet come into the world,” and the first tanna maintains that a person cannot acquire an entity that has not yet come into the world.

Rabbi Meir says: She is betrothed,

because Rabbi Meir maintains that a person can acquire an entity that has not yet come into the world, as we have said.

Rabbi Yoḥanan the Sandal-Maker says: She is not betrothed,

because he maintains that a person cannot acquire an entity that has not yet come into the world.

Rabbi Judah the Prince says:

By Torah law, she is

betrothed

to him,

and for what reason did

the Sages say that one who says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me after your husband dies,” or “after your sister dies,”

she is not betrothed? Because of the animosity

of her husband and the animosity of her sister, lest they say: She is waiting for us to die.

And we ask: Why did Abaye count only three—Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, Rabbi, and Rabbi Meir—

and count

[include]

also

Rabbi

Rabbi Judah the Prince,

who maintains in this baraita that a person can acquire an entity that has not yet come into the world!?

And we answer:

Rabbi and Rabbi Judah the Prince are one and the same,

that is, Rabbi is Rabbi Judah the Prince, and there are not two authorities here but one.

And we ask:

And should we count

and include

also

Rabbi

Rabbi Akiva

among those who maintain that a person can acquire an entity that has not yet come into the world!?

a. Just as a person can make a vow and prohibit an object to himself, so too he can prohibit it to others, provided that the object being prohibited belongs to the one making the vow.

b. One of the expressions of a vow is to say, “Such-and-such an object shall be konam,” meaning that he is saying: “Such-and-such an object shall be forbidden like an offering.”

c. With regard to a woman who makes a vow, there are vows that her husband can annul and nullify.

d. A woman’s “handiwork” belongs to her husband, and the Sages established a measure for this obligation: how much she is required to produce for him.

As it was taught

in a baraita: A woman who said to her husband: “

Konam: What I produce is forbidden to you,

meaning: “My handiwork shall be forbidden to you [so that you may not eat it] like an offering,”

the

husband

need not annul

the vow, because since the woman is obligated to her husband to perform work for him, the vow does not take effect. A person cannot prohibit to another something that belongs to that other person or to which that other person is entitled.

Rabbi Akiva says:

He must

annul

her vow, because

perhaps she will produce for him

and

more than what is proper for him,

that is, perhaps she will produce more than the amount she is obligated to produce for her husband, in which case the “surplus” belongs to her, and she can prohibit it to her husband by means of a vow. Thus, Rabbi Akiva maintains that a person can prohibit by means of a vow even “an entity that has not yet come into the world,” since at the time of the vow her handiwork had not yet come into the world, and nevertheless the vow takes effect.

And we reject this: There is no “entity that has not yet come into the world,” because

it

was

was stated concerning it

[it was said concerning the ruling of this baraita]:

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said:

This baraita is dealing

with

a woman who

says: “

Let my hands be consecrated to their Maker,

meaning: “My hands shall be consecrated to the Holy One, blessed be He, who created them.”

And

since the

hands exist

[are present]

in the world,

the vow takes effect upon them, consecrating them; consequently, her handiwork, which comes by virtue of the consecrated hands, becomes forbidden to him.

Mishna:

One who says to a woman: “You are betrothed to me on the condition

that I speak on your behalf to the authorities”

[that I speak to the ruler on your behalf].

And

similarly, one who says to a woman: “You are betrothed to me on the condition that I

work for you

[that I work for you]

as a laborer

for one day’s work.”

If he

speaks on her behalf to the authorities

[in the first case],

and works for her as a laborer

[in the second case], she is

betrothed;

but if not, she is not betrothed.

Gemara:

Reish Lakish said: The phrase “she is betrothed” that we learned

means

that he gave her the value of one peruta,

for the purpose of betrothal: He gave her the value of one peruta and betrothed her with that peruta, but made a condition in the betrothal that she would be betrothed to him if he spoke on her behalf to the authorities or if he worked for her as a laborer.

And we are astonished:

But

if he said to her, “You are betrothed to me

for the payment

for speaking on your behalf to the authorities,” or “for the payment for working for you as a laborer,”

is she not

betrothed!?

After all, for her to become betrothed, it is not necessary for him to give her specifically money. If he performed an action for her for which people pay at least one peruta, she becomes betrothed through that action, as though he gave her a peruta.

If one betroths a woman with a loan that he lent her, or with a debt that she owes him, she is not betrothed.

And

it was

taught

in a baraita: One who says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me

for the payment

that you owe me for

my having carried

you

on the donkey,” or: “For the payment for

having

seated

you

in the wagon,”

or: “For the payment for having seated you

in the ship,”

she is not betrothed,

because she had already become obligated to pay him for what he had done for her, and this is a loan, with which one cannot betroth a woman.

But if he said to her, “You are betrothed to me

But if he says to her: "You are betrothed to me

for the payment for carrying

you

on the donkey,”

or: “

For seating

you

in the wagon,”

or: “For seating you

in the

in the ship,”

and he indeed carried or seated her, she is

betrothed.

For he is not betrothing her with a debt that she incurred in the past; rather, it is as though he is now giving her the service. Since people pay at least one peruta for this service, it is as though he gave her a peruta. The difficulty now arises: Why did Reish Lakish say that she does not become betrothed through the service he performs for her, and that he must give her an additional peruta? The baraita clearly states that a woman can be betrothed through the performance of a service!?

And if you would say

[and if you say]:

It is indeed so;

the baraita is also speaking

of a case where he gave her

[gave her]

the value of one peruta.

But

this cannot be said,

for the wording “You are betrothed to me

said: "You are betrothed to me

for the payment

for carrying you”

is what it says.

Furthermore,

it was

taught

in a baraita: The woman said to him: “

Sit with me in companionship,

so that I will not be alone,

and I will become betrothed to you,”

or she said to him: “

Laugh

[play]

before me,”

or: “

Dance before me,”

or: “

Make

me

a building like this”

[a structure]

one

and I will become betrothed to you,” and he did as she requested and said to her, “You are betrothed to me through this service.”

They assess

[evaluate] the value of the service that he performed for her:

If it is worth one peruta,

meaning, if people pay at least one peruta for someone to perform this service for them,

she is betrothed

to him,

but if not, she is not betrothed.

This too is difficult for Reish Lakish!?

And if you would say: It is indeed so; here too it is a case where he gave her the value of one peruta

[and if you say: Here too, the case is that he gave her the value of one peruta], in addition to performing the service as she requested.

But the tanna says, “They assess its value,”

which indicates that he betroths her through the service itself. Therefore, the value of the service must be assessed; for if he gave her the value of one peruta and the service is merely a condition, what difference would it make how much the service is worth!?

If so, these baraitot are

a refutation of Reish Lakish!? The tanna’im disagreed regarding the nature of the payment obligation for hired labor. Some say: “Payment for labor accrues from beginning to end,” meaning that as the laborer performs the work, for every peruta’s worth of work that is completed,

the employer becomes obligated to the laborer for payment for performing that work. And some say: “Payment for labor accrues only at the end,” meaning that the obligation to pay the wages takes effect only when the laborer completes the work, The time of payment, according to everyone, is when the laborer completes the work. Therefore, according to the one who says that payment for labor accrues from beginning to end, the wages have become a debt before the laborer completed the work.

And some say: "Payment for labor accrues only at the end," meaning that the obligation to pay the wages does not take effect until the laborer completes the work.

According to everyone, the time for payment is when the laborer completes the work. Therefore, according to the one who says that payment for labor accrues from beginning to end, the wages become a debt before the laborer completes the work.

and the Temple through rental is therefore like “betrothing with a loan.”

According to the one who says: The rental fee accrues only at the end, the obligation to make the payment takes effect at the time the work is completed. And one who betroths a woman through rental “gives her the work,” and it is not like betrothing with a loan.

He said he will explain to you:

he will explain to you

Reish Lakish: This tanna of the beraita of the beraita

of the beraita

held that: “

The rental fee accrues only at the end,” and when the work is completed, the obligation to make the payment takes effect. At that point the kiddushin also takes effect, and this is not kiddushin through a loan, because he betroths her by “giving the work.”

and when the work is completed, the obligation to pay takes effect; at that point the betrothal also takes effect, and this is not betrothal with a loan, because he betroths her by “giving her the work”.

But our tanna of the Mishna

of the Mishna

held that: “

The rental fee accrues from the beginning until the end,” and it follows that from the outset she had already become obligated to make the payment. Thus, when the work was completed and the time for payment arrived, he was betrothing her with a “debt” and not with “work.” Therefore, she is not betrothed through the rental of the work.

so she already became obligated to pay from the outset. When the work was completed and the time for payment arrived, he was betrothing her with a “debt,” and not with the “work”; therefore, she is not betrothed through the payment for the work.

Therefore, Reish Lakish said: She is betrothed only if he gave her the value of a peruta, and the kiddushin takes effect through that; the work is merely a condition for the kiddushin to take effect.

And we ask:

What forced Reish Lakish what forced Reish Lakish

what compelled Reish Lakish

to establish the Mishna as referring to a case in which the rental fee accrues from the beginning until the end, and in which he gave her the value of a peruta? For if he had interpreted the Mishna according to the one who says: The rental fee accrues only at the end, the Mishna would have been understood according to its simple meaning.

a coin worth at least one peruta? For if he had interpreted the Mishna according to the one who says that the payment for hired work comes into existence only at the end, the Mishna could have been understood according to its plain meaning.

He said in explanation:

he answered:

Rava: The Mishna itself

itself

was difficult for him was difficult for Reish Lakish, because

was difficult for Reish Lakish, because

why particularly did the tanna

what reason did the tanna have

teach: “On the condition” that I speak about you, which is the language of a condition?

that I speak about you,” which is language expressing a condition,

Let him teach: “Be betrothed to me

“You are betrothed to me

through the payment for my speaking about you”?!

for my speaking about you”?

Rather, learn from it that he gives her money and betroths her subject to a condition. For

that he gives her money and betroths her on a condition, because

every place where he teaches

place where the tanna teaches

“on the condition,”

it is where he gave her the value of a peruta

a coin worth at least one peruta

that is the case.

Mishna:

One who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me

on the condition that my father desires these kiddushin,” if

of this betrothal,” if

the father desires it, she is

then she is

betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed.

If the father dies, she is betrothed.

If the son dies, without children, and he has brothers,

without children, and he has brothers,

they instruct the

the

father to say that he does not desire it, in order to uproot the kiddushin retroactively, so that the woman will not require levirate marriage with the son’s brother. The entire Mishna is explained in the Gemara.

in order to annul the betrothal retroactively, so that the woman will not be required to undergo levirate marriage with the son’s brother. The entire Mishna is explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

And we ask:

What is the meaning of the condition

is the meaning of the condition

“on the condition that my father desires”?

If you say that “on the condition that my father desires” means

that “on the condition that my father approves” means

until my father says verbally:

verbally:

“Yes,” meaning, “I desire these kiddushin.”

meaning, “I approve of this betrothal,”

This cannot be said, because

let us consider the middle clause of the Mishna:

of the Mishna:

“If the father dies, she is betrothed,” but if the kiddushin depend on the father saying “Yes,” how is she betrothed,

but if the betrothal depends on the father saying “Yes,” how can she be betrothed,

when he did not say

“Yes” before he died?

before he died?

Rather,

it should be explained: