Kiddushin 62b (סב:) — the Talmud in English

1. A gentile who comes to convert must circumcise him and immerse him for the sake of conversion to Judaism, and he must also accept upon himself the observance of all the mitzvot.

2. At the time of the conversion, some of the lenient mitzvot and some of the stringent mitzvot are explained to the convert.

A convert requires three

Israelites to immerse him and explain to him some of the lenient and stringent mitzvot.

And

what is the reason

that he requires three? Because

“judgment” is written with regard to it

in the context of conversion, and it is

like

a

court case

, and a court case requires three.

And since he requires three who will make themselves available to him and attend to his conversion, it follows that it is not “in his power” to convert, because

who can say that these

three

will make themselves available to him? Perhaps the three will not wish to attend to his conversion.

And since it is not “in his power” to convert, it follows that the betrothal after the conversion is betrothal concerning “something that has not yet come into the world,” and is not betrothal.

Rabbi Abba bar Memel raised an objection

[he challenged]

Rabbi Abba bar Memel: If it is as Rabbi Yoḥanan says, that anything in one’s power is not considered lacking an act,

if it is as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anything in one’s power is not considered lacking an act,

but if that is so

[if so],

if one gives a peruta to his maidservant and

says

to her: “

Behold, you are betrothed to me after I free you”

[after I free you], and it is “in his power” to free her,

would the betrothal likewise be valid

[would it indeed be betrothal]!?

And we answer:

Can this be compared

[is this indeed a difficulty]?

There

it is different, for

initially

the maidservant was considered like a

beast,

but

now

she has been freed and possesses

a different capacity for understanding, and there is no greater case of something lacking an act than this fundamental change.

. You have no greater case of something lacking an act than this essential change.

Therefore, before the freeing, she is considered like something that has not yet come into the world, and she is not betrothed to him, even though it is in his power to free her.

And we challenge this:

But what about that which Rabbi Oshaya said: If one gives a peruta to his wife and says to her, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after I divorce you,”

[he gave her betrothal money and wishes the betrothal to take effect immediately after he divorces her],

she is not betrothed

to him if he divorces her.

But is it really so that

likewise

that

according to Rabbi Yoḥanan

we should say

that the betrothal would be valid, and would not be betrothal concerning “something that has not yet come into the world,” since it is in his power to divorce her!?

, and it is not a betrothal involving “something that does not yet exist,” since it is in his control to divorce her?!

And we answer: Rabbi Yoḥanan does not disagree with Rabbi Oshaya, and this woman is not considered something that has come into the world, because

although

[indeed]

it is in his power to divorce her,

but

is it in his power to betroth her if he divorces her? Perhaps she will not consent to his betrothal.

We say that anything in one’s power is not considered lacking an act only when the person performing the act is not dependent on the will of others. And we ask: According to you, that it is impossible to betroth a woman, even one’s wife, after divorcing her, if so resolve

Rabbi Oshaya’s uncertainty.

Rabbi Oshaya’s uncertainty.

For

[Rav]

Oshaya was uncertain

about one who gives two perutot

at once

to a woman, saying with one: “Be betrothed to me today,” and with the other: “Be betrothed to me after I divorce you,”

whether she will indeed be betrothed to him after he divorces her.

Does this

resolve from it

[from what we have said—that it is not in his power to betroth her afterward]

that the betrothal is not valid?

And we reject this: It cannot be resolved from here, because it may be said:

Perhaps

[perhaps]

just as

[in the same way as]

the betrothal takes effect

if he betroths her

now, it likewise takes effect

if he betroths her now for a time

later,

but if one gives a peruta to his wife, whom he cannot betroth now, perhaps she is not betrothed even if he betroths her after he divorces her.

It was taught

in a beraita

in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan: One may not separate teruma from produce that has been detached

that is obligated in teruma

for produce that is attached

that is exempt,

and if he separated it, his teruma is not teruma.

How so?

If he

said: “

The produce of this furrow

that is

detached shall be teruma for the produce of this furrow

that is

attached”; or if he said: “

,” or if he said: “

The produce of this furrow

that is

attached shall be teruma for the produce of this furrow

that is

detached; he has said nothing: One may not separate teruma from exempt produce for obligated produce, nor from obligated produce for exempt produce.

, because one may not separate from exempt produce for obligated produce, nor from obligated produce for exempt produce.

But, if he

if he

said: “The separation shall take effect

: “The separation shall take effect

when

the produce becomes detached and becomes obligated in terumot and tithes,” and the produce

became detached

—

his statement stands,

because it is in his power to detach it, and anything in one’s power is not considered lacking an act.

The produce is not obligated in terumot and tithes until it reaches the “season of tithing.”

What is the season of tithing? Once the produce reaches the stage at which it can be sown and will sprout.

With regard to grain: The “season of tithing” is when the grain reaches one-third of its ripening.

Moreover

[an addition to the words of the first tanna],

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said: Even

if it is not in his power—that is, not only when he

said: “

The produce of this furrow

that is

detached shall be teruma for the produce of this furrow

that is now

attached,” or if he said: “

,” or if he said: “

The produce of this furrow

that is

attached shall be teruma for the produce of this furrow

that is

detached, when it becomes detached,” and it became detached—his statement stands.

, when it is detached,” and it was detached, his statement takes effect.

Rather, even if the attached produce had not reached one-third, and it was not in his power to make it obligated in terumot and tithes, nevertheless, if he said: “The teruma shall take effect

when

the attached produce

reaches one-third and becomes detached,”

and

afterward

it reached one-third and became detached, his statement stands.

For Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds that a person may consecrate and transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world. Therefore, he can separate teruma from produce that has not reached one-third, even though it is not in his power to bring it to the stage of obligation.

Rabba said

[explained]:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov did not say

that a person may transfer ownership of and separate teruma from something that has not yet come into the world,

except in the case of

a furrow of

shachath,

for although the kernels have not reached one-third, there is nevertheless shachath here—that is, grain fit to be reaped and fed to an animal—and there is therefore an identifiable and significant entity here.

But in a marsh,

which is a furrow containing tender plants that have grown only slightly, so that what protrudes from the ground is merely enough to bend its head,

not

did Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov say this. He agrees that an insignificant entity cannot be transferred while it has not yet come into the world.

And

Rav Yosef

disagreed with Rabba and

said: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds that a person may transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world, even when it is not particularly significant. Therefore,

: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds that a person can transfer ownership of something that does not yet exist, even when it is not particularly significant. Therefore,

even in a marsh

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said: His statement stands.

And we ask:

From where is it inferred that this term “agam” means a marsh of young grain?

That is, from where do we know that “agam” means grain that can be bent, and that it has not yet reached the stage of shachath, which is hard and does not bend?

Rabbi Elazar said: For the verse says

[Isaiah 58:5]: “

To bend like a marsh plant

his head,”

indicating that “agam,” from the term agmon, refers to something whose head can be bent.

And we ask:

According to whom,

of the amoraim

does this

statement of Rabbi Ḥanina [below] follow?

As we learned in the Mishna:

If one says to his fellow: “If your wife gives birth to a female,

this daughter of yours

shall be betrothed to me,” he has said nothing.

And

since the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, therefore

Rabbi Ḥanina said: They taught

in the Mishna, “he has said nothing,”

only

when

his wife is not pregnant,

and not even part of the daughter who is to be betrothed has come into the world.

But,

if

his wife was pregnant, the words

of the one effecting the betrothal

stand,

since part of her has come into the world.

And now, we must ask:

According to whom

that is, according to which of the amoraim [Rabba and Rav Yosef] was this statement said? Is it according to everyone, or only according to one of them?

And we explain: It is according to everyone; rather, Rabba and Rav Yosef differ regarding the stage of pregnancy at which the woman must be, so that the betrothal will take effect if she gives birth to a female.

For,

if Rabbi Ḥanina follows Rabba,

then Rabbi Ḥanina holds that the Mishna is speaking

when her pregnancy has become discernible,

for once her pregnancy is discernible, it is a recognizable and significant entity, like shachat in grain.

And

if he follows Rav Yosef,

then Rabbi Ḥanina holds that it suffices that part of her has come into the world; a recognizable and significant entity is not required. Therefore,

even though her pregnancy has not become discernible,

she is betrothed, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

And some say:

Both Rabba and Rav Yosef hold that with regard to agam, Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov concedes that one may not designate teruma from it; and they disagree with regard to shachat itself.

And thus

Rabba said: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said

that his words stand

only with regard to the shachat of a field dependent on rainfall [of a beit baal],

which suffices with rainwater, and there is no concern that the shachat will be lost and spoiled. Therefore, it is considered as having come into the world, and one may designate teruma from it.

But with regard to the shachat of an irrigated field [of a beit hashelahin],

which requires irrigation,

no,

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said this, because it is liable to be lost if it is not irrigated properly. Therefore, it is as though it had not come into the world at all.

And

Rav Yosef

disagreed with Rabba and

said: Even with regard to the shachat of an irrigated field,

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said this.

And we ask:

According to which

of the amoraim [Rabba and Rav Yosef]

does [that is, does it follow or correspond to]

this

statement of Rabbi Ḥanina below follow?

As we learned in the Mishna: One who says to his fellow: “

If your wife gives birth to a female,

this daughter of yours

is betrothed to me,”

he has said nothing. And Rabbi Ḥanina said: They taught

in the Mishna that she is not betrothed

only when his wife is not pregnant; but if his wife is pregnant, his words stand.

And now we must ask:

According to whom

does Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement follow?

And we explain: Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement is speaking

when her pregnancy has become discernible, and

as

according to everyone,

for even according to Rav Yosef, designation of teruma does not take effect with regard to agam, but only with regard to shachat, which is a recognizable and significant entity. Similarly, with regard to a woman, betrothal takes effect only if her pregnancy has already become discernible, and not before.

Abaye said:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, and

also

Rabbi, and

also

Rabbi Meir—all of them

[all three of them]

hold

that a person can transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet

fully

come into the world,

and he proceeds to explain it:

A.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov

holds that a person can transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet fully come into the world,

as we stated

that which we mentioned above: his words stand even if it has not reached one-third of its growth.

B.

Rabbi

likewise holds that a person can transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world,

as it was taught in a beraita

in the beraita.