Kiddushin 62b — the Talmud in English

1. A gentile who comes to convert must circumcise him and immerse him for the sake of Jewishness, and he must also accept upon himself the observance of all the mitzvot.

2. At the time of the conversion, some of the lenient mitzvot and some of the stringent mitzvot are made known to the convert.

A convert requires three

Israelites who will immerse him and make known to him some lenient and stringent mitzvot.

And

what is the reason

does he require three? Because

“judgment” is written concerning it

[with regard to conversion], and it is

like

a

a judgment,

and a judgment requires three.

And since he requires three who will attend to him and handle his conversion, it follows that it is not “within his power” to convert, because

who can say that these

three

will attend to him? Perhaps the three will not wish to handle his conversion.

And since it is not “within his power” to convert, it follows that betrothal after the conversion is betrothal concerning “something that has not yet come into the world,” and it is not betrothal.

He challenged it

[he raised an objection],

Rabbi Abba bar Memel:

If it is according to the words of Rabbi Yohanan, who says: Anything that is within his power is not considered as requiring an act,

but from now on

[if so],

one who gives a peruta to his maidservant

and says

to her: “

Behold, you are betrothed to me after I free you”

[after I free you], and it is “within his power” to free her,

would this also be betrothal

[and are they indeed betrothal]!?

And we answer:

Can this be compared

[is this a difficulty]?

There

it is different, for

at first

the maidservant was considered like

an animal,

but

now

she has been freed and possesses

a different mind,

and you have no case requiring an act greater than this essential change.

Therefore, before the release she is considered like something that has not yet come into the world, and she is not betrothed to him, even though it is within his power to free her.

And we challenge this:

But what of that which Rabbi Oshaya said: One who gives a peruta to his wife and says to her, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after I divorce you,”

[he gave her betrothal money, and he wants the betrothal to take effect immediately after he divorces her],

she is not betrothed

to him if he divorced her.

And is it so that

this too

according to

Rabbi Yohanan

we should say

that they are betrothal, and they are not betrothal concerning “something that has not yet come into the world,” since it is within his power to divorce her!?

, and it is not a betrothal involving “something that does not yet exist,” since it is in his control to divorce her?!

And we answer: Rabbi Yohanan does not disagree with Rabbi Oshaya, and this woman is not considered something that has come into the world, because

although

[indeed]

it is within his power to divorce her,

and is it so that

it is within his power to betroth her

once he divorces her? Perhaps she will not consent to his betrothal. And we say that anything within his power is not considered as requiring an act only where the one performing it does not depend on the opinion of others. And we ask: According to your words, that it is impossible to betroth a woman, even his wife, after her divorce, if so

resolve

the uncertainty of Rav Oshaya.

For Rav

[was uncertain],

Oshaya

asked: One who gives two perutot

at one time

to a woman—concerning one he said to her, “Become betrothed to me today,” and concerning one he said to her, “Become betrothed to me after I divorce you,”

will she indeed be betrothed to him after he divorces her?

Does

one resolve from it

[from what we said: it is not within his power to betroth her afterward]

that they are not betrothal?

And we reject this: One cannot resolve it from here, for one can say:

perhaps

[perhaps]

just as

[in the same way as]

betrothal takes effect

if he betroths her

now, it also takes effect

if he betroths her now for the time

afterward,

but if he gave a peruta to his wife, whom he cannot betroth now, perhaps she is not betrothed even if he betroths her after he divorces her.

It was taught

in a beraita

in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan: One may not separate from detached produce

that is obligated in teruma

for attached produce

that is exempt,

and if he separated, his separation is not a valid separation.

How so?

If he

said: “

The produce of this garden bed

that is

detached shall be teruma for the produce of this garden bed

that is

attached”;

or he said: “

The produce of this garden bed

that is

attached shall be teruma for the produce of this garden bed

that is

detached”—he has said nothing, since one may not separate from what is exempt for what is obligated, nor from what is obligated for what is exempt.

, because one may not separate from exempt produce for obligated produce, nor from obligated produce for exempt produce.

But,

if he

said: “The separation shall take effect

: “The separation shall take effect

when they are detached

the produce and become obligated in terumot and maasrot,”

and they were detached,

the produce,

his words stand,

because it is within his power to detach them, and anything within his power is not considered as requiring an act.

The produce is not obligated in terumot and maasrot until it reaches the “season of tithes.”

What is the season of tithes? Once the produce reaches the stage at which it can be sown and will sprout.

With grain: the “season of tithes” is when the grain reaches one-third of its ripeness.

Furthermore

[an addition to the words of the first tanna],

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said: Even

if it is not within his power—that is, not only if he

said: “

The produce of this garden bed

that is

detached shall be teruma for the produce of this garden bed

that is now

attached,”

or if he said: “

The produce of this garden bed

that is

attached shall be teruma for the produce of this garden bed

that is

that is

detached when they are detached,” and they were detached, his words stand.

Rather, even if the attached produce has not reached one-third, and it is not within his power to make it obligated in terumot and maasrot, nevertheless, if he said: “The teruma shall take effect

when they reach

the attached produce

one-third and are detached,”

and

afterward

they reached one-third and were detached, his words stand.

For Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds: A person consecrates and transfers ownership of something that has not yet come into the world. Therefore he can separate teruma from produce that has not reached one-third, even though it is not within his power to bring it to the state of obligation.

Rabba said

[explained]:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov did not say

that a person transfers ownership of and separates something that has not yet come into the world,

except in

a garden bed of

fodder,

for although the grains have not reached one-third, in any event there is fodder here, which is fit to be cut and fed to an animal; thus there is something recognizable and significant here.

But in a marsh,

which is a garden bed containing soft plants that have grown only a little, and what protrudes from the ground is only enough to bend its head,

not

did Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov say this, for he concedes that with regard to an insignificant thing, one cannot transfer ownership of it while it has not yet come into the world.

And

Rav Yosef

disagreed with Rabba and

said:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds: A person transfers ownership of something that has not yet come into the world, even in a thing that does not possess great significance. Therefore,

even in a marsh

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said: His words stand.

And we ask:

And from where is it inferred that this “marsh” is the expression “butzelna”?

That is to say, from where do we know that “marsh” means grain that can be bent, while it is not yet “fodder,” which is hard and does not bend?

Rabbi Elazar said: For the verse says

[Isaiah 58:5]: “

To bend like a reed

his head,”

implying that “marsh” [from the expression “reed”] is something whose head is fit to be bent.

And we ask:

According to whom

among the amoraim

does this

statement of Rabbi Hanina [below] proceed?

For we learned:

“One who says to his fellow: ‘If your wife gives birth to a female,

this daughter of yours

shall be betrothed to me,’ he has said nothing.”

And

since the halakha is according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, therefore

Rabbi Hanina said: “They taught only”

in the Mishna: “he has said nothing,”

but

when

his wife is pregnant

and not even part of the daughter who is being betrothed has come into the world.

But,

if she was

his wife was pregnant, his words

of the betrothed man

stand,

since part of her has come into the world.

And now, one must ask:

According to whom

as whom] among the amoraim [Rabba and Rav Yosef] is this statement said—does it apply according to everyone, or only according to one of them?

And we explain: It applies according to everyone, but there is a difference between Rabba and Rav Yosef as to what stage of the pregnancy the woman is in, so that the kiddushin will take effect if she gives birth to a female.

For,

if it is according to Rabba

that Rabbi Hanina holds, then the Mishna is speaking

when her pregnancy has been recognized,

for when her pregnancy has been recognized, it is a noticeable and significant thing, like grain that has reached the stage of shahat.

And

if it is according to Rav Yosef

that Rabbi Hanina holds, then it is sufficient that part of her has come into the world, and a noticeable and significant thing is not required; therefore,

even though her pregnancy has not been recognized,

she is betrothed, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

And some say: Both Rabba and Rav Yosef hold that in the case of an agam, Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov concedes that a person does not designate teruma from it, while in the case of shahat itself Rabba and Rav Yosef disagree.

And so

Rabbi Rabba

said: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said that

his words stand

only with regard to shahat of a rain-fed field [

of a field belonging to Baal], which suffices with rainwater and there is no concern that the shahat will be lost and spoiled; therefore, it is considered like something that has come into the world, and one may designate teruma from it.

But with regard to shahat of an irrigated field [

of a watered field], which requires irrigation,

not

did Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov say so, for it is liable to be lost if it is not properly irrigated; therefore, it is like something that has not come into the world at all.

And

Rav Yosef

disagreed with Rabba and

said: Even with regard to shahat of an irrigated field

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said so.

And we ask:

According to whom

among the amoraim [Rabba and Rav Yosef]

does

[proceed, fit]

this

statement of Rabbi Hanina below proceed?

For we learned: “One who says to his fellow: “

If your wife gives birth to a female,

behold this daughter of yours

is betrothed to me,”

he has said nothing, and Rabbi Hanina said: “They taught only”

in the Mishna, that she is not betrothed,

“when his wife is not pregnant; but when his wife is pregnant, his words stand.”

And now one must ask:

According to whom

does the statement of Rabbi Hanina proceed?

And we explain: The statement of Rabbi Hanina is speaking

when her pregnancy has been recognized and

according to

everyone’s words

it is so, for even according to Rav Yosef, the designation does not take effect with an agam, but only with shahat, which is a noticeable and significant thing; and likewise, with a woman, there is kiddushin only if her pregnancy has already been recognized, and not earlier.

Abaye said:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and

also

Rabbi and

also

Rabbi Meir—all of them [

the three of them]

hold

that a person can acquire a thing that has not come

into the world

at all,

and he proceeds to explain it:

A.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov

holds that a person can acquire a thing that has not come into the world with complete coming into the world;

this is what we said

[what we mentioned] above: his words stand even if it has not reached one-third of its growth.

B.

Rabbi

also holds that a person can acquire a thing that has not come into the world,

for it was taught

in a beraita.